Overview
Outlines BGP prefix origin validation using mechanisms such as RPKI and provides procedures to configure an RPKI cache server for validating route origin authorship.
A BGP prefix origin validation mechanism is a route security feature that
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uses the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the Autonomous System (AS) originating a BGP prefix
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prevents prefix mis-announcement by verifying that the origin AS claiming an address prefix is authorized, and
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enhances routing security by ensuring that BGP routers accept only prefixes with verifiable, legitimate origin AS numbers.
| Feature Name |
Release Information |
Feature Description |
|---|---|---|
| BGP Prefix Origin Validation Based on RPKI |
Release 25.4.1 |
Introduced in this release on: Fixed Systems (8010 [ASIC: A100], 8700 [ASIC: K100])(select variants only*) *This feature is supported on:
|
| BGP Prefix Origin Validation Based on RPKI |
Release 25.1.1 | Introduced in this release on: Fixed Systems (8010 [ASIC: A100])(select variants only*) *This feature is supported on Cisco 8011-4G24Y4H-I routers. |
| BGP Prefix Origin Validation Based on RPKI |
Release 24.4.1 | Introduced in this release on: Fixed Systems (8200 [ASIC: P100], 8700 [ASIC: P100, K100])(select variants only); Modular Systems (8800 [LC ASIC: P100])(select variants only*) This feature enhances BGP route security by using Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the origin Autonomous System (AS). It associates a route's address prefix with AS numbers, starting with the origin AS, and uses RPKI to verify the AS claiming the prefix. This helps prevent prefix mis-announcement, ensuring routes are secure and legitimate. *This feature is supported on:
|
Overview of RPKI
RPKI is a globally distributed cryptographic framework that creates a verifiable database of IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS) numbers. RPKI enables network operators to securely certify which AS is authorized to advertise specific IP address prefixes.
BGP origin validation process
When a BGP router receives a route, it examines the AS_PATH attribute, which lists the sequence of ASes across which a prefix announcement has traveled. The router identifies the origin AS for the prefix and checks this against the authorization records in the RPKI database. If RPKI lists the prefix-origin pair as valid, the BGP router accepts the route. If not, the router considers the route invalid or suspicious. This process helps you prevent unauthorized or accidental route advertisements.
Security benefits
By leveraging RPKI-based BGP prefix origin validation, networks can defend against several well-known routing threats, such as prefix hijacking, mis-announcements, and monkey-in-the-middle attacks. Only routes authenticated through RPKI are trusted, reducing the risk of disrupted or maliciously re-routed Internet traffic.
Example of BGP prefix origin validation using RPKI
Suppose AS 64500 originates the prefix 192.0.2.0/24 and announces it into BGP. Another router receives this route and checks the RPKI database. If the database confirms that AS 64500 is authorized to originate 192.0.2.0/24, the route is considered valid. If not, the route is rejected or marked as suspicious, thus preventing a possible hijack or mis-announcement.