Document ID: 59675
Last Updated 2003 May 15
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Original Report: http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/321552/2003-05-12/2003-05-18/0 . Cisco responded with the following, which is also archived at http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/321616/2003-05-12/2003-05-18/0 .
To: BugTraq Subject: Re: Cisco ACL bug when using VPN crypto engine accelerator, PPPoE dialer or ip route-cache Date: May 15 2003 4:56PM Author: Ilker Temir <firstname.lastname@example.org> Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.email@example.com> In-Reply-To: <firstname.lastname@example.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 This is in response to the e-mail sent by Olivier. The original e-mail is available at http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/321552/2003-05-12/2003-05-18/0 Hi Olivier, We can confirm that the inbound ACL is processed twice for IPSec traffic which is the root cause of the issue you have described. This issue is being addressed by the Cisco Bug ID CSCdz54626. Cisco's Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) was not previously aware of it. We are now addressing it with due priority. While this issue does cause administrative overhead to configuration, there is no significant security impact. Permitting internal networks in the inbound ACL may be exploited to inject spoofed packets into the network. However this has no practical impact while using static crypto maps. With static crypto maps, the unencrypted traffic will be dropped even if it passes the inbound ACL. In the case of dynamic crypto maps, in order to bypass the inbound ACL to inject spoofed packets, an attacker would also require control of the neighboring routers that are connected to the interface where the inbound ACL is applied, or the medium in between the neighbors. Protecting our customers' networks is very important for us and we are always open for vulnerability reports regarding any Cisco product. Such reports should be directly sent to psirt cisco com or security-alert cisco com Thank you again for your report, Regards, - -- Ilker Temir Incident Manager, PSIRT Cisco Systems, Inc. +32 2 704-6031 http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt On Wed, 14 May 2003, Olivier wrote: > > > Platform Cisco 1760 dual Ethernet > > IOS 12.2.xT IP/ADSL/FW/IDS PLUS IPSEC 3DES > > Environment: Site to site VPN for small offices. > > > > ACL are not properly parsed as soon as you enable: > > crypto engine accelerator > PPPoE dialer > Ip route-cache > > > Without the feature mentioned above, you can apply an ACL on the outside > interface allowing only inbound ISAKMP and IPSEC traffic. > > I.E. > > ip access-list extended Block-Inbound-unwanted-Trafic > > permit udp 100.100.100.0 0.0.0.255 host 184.108.40.206 eq isakmp > > permit esp 100.100. 100.0 0.0.0.255 host 220.127.116.11 > > deny ip any any log > > > > If you activate the crypto engine, the ACL is parsed as well on decrypted > traffic which forces you to allow as well all traffic for the decrypted > traffic. > I.E. If you are using 10.x addressees internally and the subnet > 10.200.0.0/24 for your Soho LAN. Can be worst if you have a huge network > inside where you would prefer to add permit ip any 10.200.0.0 0.0.0.255. > > > ip access-list extended Block-Inbound-unwanted-Trafic > permit udp 100.100.100.0 0.0.0.255 host 18.104.22.168 eq isakmp > permit esp 100.100. 100.0 0.0.0.255 host 22.214.171.124 > permit ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 10.200.0.0 0.0.0.255 <-----------@%#$%@ > deny ip any any log > > > This looks pretty bad for a VPN box running a Firewall feature set IOS > seen as the best candidate for VPN for small offices. > > The worst is the reply from Cisco: > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > We will be addressing this in the next few months however > the release time frame could be as late as the end > of the year. > > We do have plans to address it but do > not expect it in a released image until the > last calendar quarter of the year. If its possible we > can get it done and released sooner than what I've > mentioned, we will do it, no guarantees however. > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > We would have hope that they put more resources and concern in solving > security issue. > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (SunOS) iD8DBQE+w8bR8/wE0ppYtwURAunzAJ4oUlepUBjdJzQ1jZfBQGNI3UNNkwCcCcRh CJBxZPAMkMO9/PwFxVcibTs= =4dJU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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|Updated: Oct 08, 2004||Document ID: 59675|