Products & Services

Contents

Summary
Affected Products
Details
Vulnerability Scoring Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Workarounds
Obtaining Fixed Software
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of this Notice: Final
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures

Vulnerable Products

Router> show version 
Cisco IOS Software, C3900 Software (C3900-UNIVERSALK9-M), Version 15.0(1)M1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Copyright (c) 1986-2009 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Wed 02-Dec-09 17:17 by prod_rel_team

!--- output truncated 

Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable

Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a popular signaling protocol that is used to manage voice and video calls across IP networks such as the Internet. SIP is responsible for handling all aspects of call setup and termination. Voice and video are the most popular types of sessions that SIP handles, but the protocol has the flexibility to accommodate other applications that require call setup and termination. SIP call signaling can use UDP (port 5060), TCP (port 5060), or Transport Layer Security (TLS; TCP port 5061) as the underlying transport protocol.

A vulnerability exists in the SIP implementation in Cisco IOS Software and Cisco IOS XE Software that could allow a remote attacker to cause an affected device to reload. This vulnerability is triggered when an affected device processes a crafted SIP message that contains a valid Session Description Protocol (SDP) message. Only traffic destined to the device can trigger the vulnerability; transit SIP traffic is not an exploit vector. SDP pass-through must be enabled, either at the global level, or at the dial-peer level, for a device to be affected by this vulnerability.

Note: In cases where SIP is running over TCP transport, a TCP three-way handshake is necessary to exploit this vulnerability.

This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtj33003 (registered customers only) and CSCtw84664 (registered customers only) and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2012-3949.

Cisco has scored the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this security advisory is in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.

CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps organizations determine the urgency and priority of a response.

Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can also compute environmental scores that help determine the impact of the vulnerability in their own networks.

Cisco has provided additional information regarding CVSS at the following link:

http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html

Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to compute the environmental impact for individual networks at the following link:

http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss

When considering software upgrades, customers are advised to consult the Cisco Security Advisories and Responses archive at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and review subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.

In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance providers.

Cisco IOS Software

Each row of the following Cisco IOS Software table corresponds to a Cisco IOS Software train. If a particular train is vulnerable, the earliest releases that contain the fix are listed in the First Fixed Release column. The First Fixed Release for All Advisories in the September 2012 Bundled Publication column lists the earliest possible releases that correct all the published vulnerabilities in the Cisco IOS Software Security Advisory bundled publication. Cisco recommends upgrading to the latest available release, where possible.

The Cisco IOS Software Checker allows customers to search for Cisco Security Advisories that address specific Cisco IOS Software releases. This tool is available on the Cisco Security Intelligence Operations (SIO) portal at http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/selectIOSVersion.x

Cisco IOS XE Software

For a mapping of Cisco IOS XE Software releases to Cisco IOS Software releases, refer to Cisco IOS XE 2 Release Notes, Cisco IOS XE 3S Release Notes, and Cisco IOS XE 3SG Release Notes.

Cisco IOS XR Software

Cisco IOS XR Software is not affected by the vulnerability that is disclosed in this document.

If the affected Cisco IOS device requires SIP and pass-through of SDP for VoIP services, then SIP and SDP pass-through cannot be disabled and no workarounds are available. Users are advised to apply mitigation techniques to help limit exposure to the vulnerabilities. Mitigation consists of allowing only legitimate devices to connect to affected devices. To increase effectiveness, the mitigation must be coupled with anti-spoofing measures on the network edge. This action is required because SIP can use UDP as the transport protocol.

Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the companion document "Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Cisco Unified Communications Manager and Cisco IOS Software Session Initiation Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerability", which is available at the following link:
 
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAMBAlert.x?alertId=26765

Disabling SIP Listening Ports

For devices that do not require SIP to be enabled, the simplest and most effective workaround is to disable SIP processing on the device. Some versions of Cisco IOS Software allow administrators to disable SIP with the following commands:

sip-ua
 no transport udp
 no transport tcp
 no transport tcp tls

Warning: When applying this workaround to devices that are processing Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP) or H.323 calls, the devices will not stop SIP processing while active calls are being processed. Under these circumstances, this workaround should be implemented during a maintenance window when active calls can be briefly stopped.

The show udp connections, show tcp brief all, and show processes | include SIP commands can be used to confirm that the SIP UDP and TCP ports are closed after applying this workaround.

Depending on the Cisco IOS Software version in use, when SIP is disabled the output from the show ip sockets command may still show the SIP ports open, but sending traffic to them will cause the SIP process to emit the following message:

*Jul 27 15:22:41.251: sip_udp_sock_process_read: SIP UDP Listener is DISABLED

Disabling SDP Pass-Through

If SIP must remain enabled, but SDP pass-through is not required, then disabling SDP pass-through can be used as a workaround. SDP pass-through is disabled by default. SDP pass-through can be enabled at the global level, or at the dial peer level. Refer to the section "Affected Products" for details on how to disable SDP pass-through.

Control Plane Policing

For devices that must offer SIP services, it is possible to use Control Plane Policing (CoPP) to block SIP traffic to the device from untrusted sources. Cisco IOS Releases 12.0S, 12.2SX, 12.2S, 12.3T, 12.4, and 12.4T support the CoPP feature. CoPP may be configured on a device to protect the management and control planes to minimize the risk and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. The following example can be adapted to specific network configurations:

!-- The 192.168.1.0/24 network and the 172.16.1.1 host are trusted.
!-- Everything else is not trusted. The following access list is used
!-- to determine what traffic needs to be dropped by a control plane
!-- policy (the CoPP feature): if the access list matches (permit)
!-- then traffic will be dropped and if the access list does not
!-- match (deny) then traffic will be processed by the router.
access-list 100 deny udp 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 5060
access-list 100 deny tcp 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 5060
access-list 100 deny tcp 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 5061
access-list 100 deny udp host 172.16.1.1 any eq 5060
access-list 100 deny tcp host 172.16.1.1 any eq 5060
access-list 100 deny tcp host 172.16.1.1 any eq 5061
access-list 100 permit udp any any eq 5060
access-list 100 permit tcp any any eq 5060
access-list 100 permit tcp any any eq 5061

!-- Permit (Police or Drop)/Deny (Allow) all other Layer3 and Layer4
!-- traffic in accordance with existing security policies and
!-- configurations for traffic that is authorized to be sent
!-- to infrastructure devices.
!-- Create a Class-Map for traffic to be policed by
!-- the CoPP feature.
class-map match-all drop-sip-class
  match access-group 100

!-- Create a Policy-Map that will be applied to the
!-- Control-Plane of the device.
policy-map control-plane-policy
 class drop-sip-class
  drop

!-- Apply the Policy-Map to the Control-Plane of the
!-- device.
control-plane
 service-policy input control-plane-policy

Note: Because SIP can use UDP as a transport protocol, it is possible to spoof the source address of an IP packet, which may bypass access control lists that permit communication to these ports from trusted IP addresses.

In the preceding CoPP example, the access control entries (ACEs) that match the potential exploit packets with the permit action result in these packets being discarded by the policy-map drop function, while packets that match the deny action (not shown) are not affected by the policy-map drop function. Additional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can be found at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/coppwp_gs.html and http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t4/feature/guide/gtrtlimt.html.

Cisco has released free software updates that address the vulnerability described in this advisory. Prior to deploying software, customers are advised to consult their maintenance providers or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues that are specific to their environments.

Customers may only install and expect support for feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing, or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to follow the terms of the Cisco software license at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html.

Customers with Service Contracts

Customers using Third Party Support Organizations

Customers without Service Contracts

The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory.

This vulnerability was found during troubleshooting of TAC service requests.

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.

This advisory is posted on Cisco Security Intelligence Operations at the following link:

http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20120926-sip

Additionally, a text version of this advisory is clear signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and circulated among the following e-mail addresses:

• cust-security-announce@cisco.com
• first-bulletins@lists.first.org
• bugtraq@securityfocus.com
• vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
• cisco@spot.colorado.edu
• cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
• full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will reside on Cisco.com but may not be announced on mailing lists. Users can monitor this advisory's URL for any updates.