Quantum-Safe Encryption with Postquantum Preshared Keys
A postquantum preshared key (PPK) is a preshared secret that IKEv2 mixes into session-key derivation to provide resistance to attacks by a future quantum computer.
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The feature implements RFC 8784 extensions for IKEv2 and uses Cisco Secure Key Integration Protocol (SKIP) to obtain dynamic PPKs.
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Session keys based on PPKs are not vulnerable to quantum attacks if the PPKs have sufficient entropy and the pseudorandom function (PRF), encryption, and authentication transformations are quantum secure.
Postquantum Preshared Keys
Quantum computers pose a serious challenge to the cryptographic algorithms and protocols deployed widely today. A quantum computer can solve Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) problems in polynomial time, and this can compromise the security of existing IKEv2 systems. A man-in-the-middle storing the VPN communications today can decrypt them later when a quantum computer is available.
RFC 8784 defines PPK capability negotiation, communication of the PPK ID, use of the PPK as an additional input to session-key derivation, and optional fallback to a session that does not use a PPK.
A manual PPK is configured on both the IKEv2 initiator and responder. The PPK ID and PPK must match on both peers.
The administrator must ensure that a manual PPK has sufficient size and entropy and is rotated frequently.
A dynamic PPK is imported from an external key source through SKIP. Dynamic PPKs provide automated provisioning and refresh and can provide better entropy than manually provisioned keys.
Cisco SKIP is an HTTPS-based protocol that uses TLS1.2 with a PSK-DHE cipher suite. It allows encryption devices such as routers, to import PPKs from an external key source.
The IR1101 router must implement the SKIP client, and the external key source must implement the SKIP server.
The external key source must meet the following expectations to be SKIP-compliant:
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Must implement SKIP protocol or API, as defined in the Cisco SKIP specification.
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Must provide the same PPK to the encryption device pair—initiator and responder—using an out-of-band synchronization mechanism.
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The IKEv2 initiator and responder are connected to their local key source and configured with the SKIP client that specifies the IP address and port of the key source and the preshared key for the TLS1.2 session. The PPK sources are configured with the SKIP parameters, including the local key source identity and the list of identities of the peer key sources.
Cisco SKIP protocol operates as given:
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The IKEv2 initiator places a request for a PPK from its key source. The key source replies with a PPK and the corresponding PPK ID.
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The initiator-side key source synchronizes the PPK to the responder-side key source using an out-of-band mechanism that is specific to the type of key source. The IKEv2 initiator communicates the PPK ID to the IKEv2 responder over IKEv2 using the RFC 8784 extensions.
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The IKEv2 responder requests from its key source, the PPK corresponding to the PPK ID received from the IKEv2 initiator. The key source replies with the PPK corresponding to the PPK ID.
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The IKEv2 initiator and responder mix the PPK in the key derivation, as specified in RFC 8784. The resulting IKEv2 and IPsec session keys are quantum-safe.
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