Security vulnerability scans are flagging SSL/TLS certificate-related findings on Cisco Telepresence video codec endpoints, specifically reporting an untrusted certificate chain on TCP ports 4053, 4060, and 4062. The vulnerability scanner identifies the codec presents a CS-Room certificate issued by ACT2 SUDI CA (Organization: Cisco) with the certificate chain terminating at Cisco Root CA 2048. The security scanning system reports this as an untrusted certificate chain that does not meet organizational security requirements.
The specific findings reported by security scans include:
Self-signed certificate detection
Untrusted certificate chain
Weak hashing algorithm concerns
Certificate expiry warnings
Cisco Telepresence video codec endpoints
Webex Desk Series devices with on-premises registration
Endpoints with ACT2 SUDI (Secure Unique Device Identifier) chips
Security vulnerability scanning infrastructure flagging certificate chain issues
TCP ports 4053, 4060, and 4062 presenting SUDI certificates
The SUDI certificates on Cisco Telepresence endpoints are embedded, immutable certificates that cannot be modified, regenerated, or deleted in a supported manner. These certificates are part of Cisco's Trustworthy Technologies implementation and serve specific security functions.
The certificate behavior varies by port and system configuration:
Port 4053 (Pairing Service): Uses SUDI certificates when the system has an ACT2 chip. Custom certificates are only used on systems without an ACT2 chip (older endpoints).
Port 4047: Uses customer-chosen certificates for communication between touch panels and codecs.
The SUDI certificates are located in the device's certificate store:
device:~] $ cd /etc/cacerts_sudi
device:/etc/cacerts_sudi] $ ls
0763c37d.0 9426d327.0 mic-cbasrcarsa4k2099.pem
29cf4e89.0 a094437b.0 mic-cmca.pem
36087b08.0 b35c8d6c.0 mic-cmca2.pem
417aa245.0 cmca2.pem mic-cmca3.pem
771a09b9.0 crca2048.pem mic-cmca4.pem
89087fe6.0 crca2099.pem mic-crcam2.pem
90359431.0 mic-cbarc2099.pem mic-harsa-ca.pem
The ACT2 SUDI CA certificate details:
CN = ACT2 SUDI CA
O = Cisco
Valid From: Thursday, June 30, 2011 11:26:57 PM
Valid To: Tuesday, May 15, 2029 1:55:42 AM
Step 1: Review the SUDI certificate purpose and security implementation
The SUDI certificate is not self-signed but is signed by Cisco Manufacturing CA. It serves as an immutable identity credential that:
Maintains product identifier and serial number
Provides unchangeable identity for configuration, security, auditing, and management
Is cryptographically bound to the Trust Anchor module chip
Makes cloning or spoofing virtually impossible
Step 2: Work with the security team to exclude SUDI certificate findings
Since the SUDI certificates cannot be modified and serve legitimate security functions, the recommended approach is to:
Configure security scanning tools to exclude the SUDI certificate chain findings for the affected services
Document the business justification for the exception based on Cisco's Trustworthy Technologies implementation
Focus security scanning on customer-configurable certificates on other ports if needed
Step 3: Certificate updates through software upgrades
Certificate updates in the trust store occur automatically when the system is upgraded to newer software versions. This ensures certificate validity is maintained over time.
These limitations apply to SUDI certificates:
Cannot be modified, regenerated, or deleted
Automatic regeneration occurs if certificates are deleted and the device restarts
No supported method exists to assign configurable certificates to these backend services
Certificate replacement is not possible due to the immutable nature of the Trust Anchor implementation
The security scan findings are triggered by the presence of Cisco's SUDI (Secure Unique Device Identifier) certificates, which are embedded manufacturing certificates that chain to Cisco Root CA 2048. These certificates are part of Cisco's Trustworthy Technologies implementation and are designed to be immutable for security purposes. The certificates are not recognized as trusted by organizational security scanning tools because they terminate at Cisco's root certificate authority rather than an organization-specific CA. This is expected behavior for SUDI-enabled devices and represents a design feature rather than a security vulnerability.
| Revision | Publish Date | Comments |
|---|---|---|
1.0 |
13-Nov-2026
|
Initial Release |