When blocked by security intelligence, Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) packet capture does not display DNS queries to the malicious domains that are being blocked by the FTD security intelligence. Connection events on the perimeter FTD show the traffic from the DNS server querying the domain and confirm the FTD is blocking these query responses via security intelligence. However, the same event also shows a match on an FTD access policy rule which is not typically expected. The issue appears related to how Security Intelligence and PTR (reverse DNS) Lookup packets interact on FTDs when blocking malicious domain queries. This can show an event that matches both an access rule and security intelligence.
1. Analyze connection events on the FTD to confirm that DNS queries from the DNS server to the external domain are being blocked by Security Intelligence due to a malicious domain. A specific source and destination IP address are noted and the event can even state a match on an access policy rule which permits the initial PTR lookup from source to destination. However, the same event also shows a Blocked by security intelligence while clearly stating the URL for the query.
Connection Event
Example:
Domain: static.vdc.vn
Action: Blocked (DNS crypto mining threat)
2. Initiate a packet capture on the FTD targeting DNS traffic between the relevant IP addresses. In a Wireshark analysis of the captures from the origin IP address, no DNS query is found specifically for the malicious domain in the packet capture output.
FTD# capture CAP interface match udp host SRCIP host DESTIP eq 53
(no output for the expected packets)
According to Cisco documentation, Security Intelligence filtering is an early phase of access control. If a packet matches a Security Intelligence Block list, it can be dropped before further inspection and before being processed by other policies (including access control, packet capture, DNS inspection).
Security Intelligence filtering occurs before resource-intensive inspection.
Packets blocked by Security Intelligence are sometimes not be captured by standard packet capture mechanisms on the device.
Prefilter rules evaluated before Security Intelligence can also affect visibility.
3. Utilize the system support url-si-debug command in the FTD CLISH to trace PTR lookups between source and destination IPs to understand how and where the traffic is being processed and blocked within the FTD and note the source ports for the packets.
> system support url-si-debug
SRCIP 37046 -> DSTIP 53 17 AS=0 ID=39 GR=1-1 InsightDnsListEventHandler: num_list_matched [1], status 0x00010000, INSIGHT_FOUND (0x00010000) | SHMDB (1), static.vnpt.vn, si_list [ 1048652 ]
SRCIP 49094 -> DSTIP 53 17 AS=0 ID=42 GR=1-1 InsightDnsListEventHandler: num_list_matched [1], status 0x00010000, INSIGHT_FOUND (0x00010000) | SHMDB (1), static.vnpt.vn, si_list [ 1048652 ]
SRCIP 48508 -> DSTIP 53 17 AS=0 ID=12 GR=1-1 InsightDnsListEventHandler: num_list_matched [1], status 0x00010000, INSIGHT_FOUND (0x00010000) | SHMDB (1), static.vnpt.vn, si_list [ 1048652 ]
4. Use the source ports as a reference to correlate with packet captures and logs from system support trace. This is the best method to find the associated ps. As seen in this next example, the related packets show as PTR (reverse DNS) lookups instead of normal DNS queries. This is why the malicious domain query cannot be found when looking at captures from the origin IP address. These types f packets hit an access policy which show on an event even if the same connection shows as Blocked by security intelligence.
8847 2026-01-29 20:41:15.940854Z SRCIP DSTIP DNS 98 Standard query 0x20ef PTR 23.172.189.113.in-addr.arpa OPT
9582 2026-01-29 20:41:18.348889Z SRCIP DSTIP DNS 98 Standard query 0x8b58 PTR 23.172.189.113.in-addr.arpa OPT
10190 2026-01-29 20:41:21.556901Z SRCIP DSTIP DNS 98 Standard query 0x636a PTR 23.172.189.113.in-addr.arpa OPT
11362 2026-01-29 20:41:24.652950Z SRCIP DSTIP DNS 99 Standard query 0xf6f5 PTR 135.238.166.113.in-addr.arpa OPT
13670 2026-01-29 20:41:27.964885Z SRCIP DSTIP DNS 98 Standard query 0xfb40 PTR 23.172.189.113.in-addr.arpa OPT
5. Review the reply packets to these PTR lookups from the destination and the malicious domain can be seen. This triggers the FTD to ultimately block the connection by security intelligence as it now sees the malicious domain.
981 2026-01-29 20:41:12.631818Z DSTIP SRCIP DNS 126 static.vnpt.vn Standard query response 0xc5c3 PTR 23.172.189.113.in-addr.arpa PTR static.vnpt.vn OPT
Coordinate with the customer team to investigate if any reverse DNS queries or unexpected traffic patterns are observed for given IPs related to the crypto mining threat. To permit specific traffic or further analyze it, add the required IPs to the Do-Not-Block list or permit via prefilter as appropriate. This can allow subsequent inspection and visibility in packet capture.
Add IPs to Security Intelligence Do-Not-Block list if further analysis is required.
Permitting in prefilter allows traffic to bypass Security Intelligence block.
The root cause is that the PTR (reverse DNS) Lookup passes through the FTD initially by access rule as it is still pending security intelligence inspection. The response packet for the PTR lookup then contains the malicious domain name. When a PTR response matches a Security Intelligence Block list entry (such as associated with DNS crypto mining threat), the packet is dropped. As a result, the malicious domain is only found in the PTR Lookup reply and events sometimes show a match on both an Allow for access rule and a Block for security intelligence.
Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Device Configuration Guide, 7.4: About Security Intelligence
| Revision | Publish Date | Comments |
|---|---|---|
1.0 |
31-Mar-2026
|
Initial Release |