Summary
Affected Products
Details
Vulnerability Scoring Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Workarounds
Obtaining Fixed Software
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of this Notice: FINAL
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
A vulnerability in the handling of IP sockets can cause devices to be vulnerable to a denial of service attack when any of several features of Cisco IOS® Software are enabled. A sequence of specially crafted TCP/IP packets could cause any of the following results:
Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability.
Several mitigation strategies are outlined in the "Workarounds" section of this advisory.
This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090325-ip.shtml.
Note: The March 25, 2009, Cisco IOS Security Advisory bundled publication includes eight Security Advisories. All of the advisories address vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS Software. Each advisory lists the releases that correct the vulnerability or vulnerabilities in the advisory.
Individual publication links are listed below:
Devices that are running affected versions of Cisco IOS Software and Cisco IOS XE Software are affected if they are running any of the following features. Details about confirming whether the affected feature is enabled on a device are in the "Details" section of this advisory.
To determine the Cisco IOS Software release that is running on a Cisco product, administrators can log in to the device and issue the "show version" command to display the system banner. The system banner confirms that the device is running Cisco IOS Software by displaying text similar to "Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software" or "Cisco IOS Software." The image name displays in parentheses, followed by "Version" and the Cisco IOS Software release name. Other Cisco devices do not have the "show version" command or may provide different output.
The following example identifies a Cisco product that is running Cisco IOS Software Release 12.3(26) with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L:
Router#show version Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) 2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.3(26), RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2) Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport Copyright (c) 1986-2008 by cisco Systems, Inc. Compiled Mon 17-Mar-08 14:39 by dchih <output truncated>
The following example shows a product that is running Cisco IOS Software Release 12.4(20)T with an image name of C1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M:
Router#show version Cisco IOS Software, 1841 Software (C1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M), Version 12.4(20)T, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc3) Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport Copyright (c) 1986-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. Compiled Thu 10-Jul-08 20:25 by prod_rel_team <output truncated>
Additional information about Cisco IOS Software release naming conventions is available in "White Paper: Cisco IOS Reference Guide" at the following link: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
The following products are not affected by this vulnerability:
No other Cisco products or features configured in Cisco IOS or Cisco IOS XE Software are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability.
For successful exploitation of this vulnerability, the TCP three-way handshake must be completed to the associated TCP port number(s) for any of the features described in this section.
The following configurations are vulnerable for different Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express services:
A certificate authority proxy function (CAPF) server has been configured.
The following example shows a vulnerable CAPF server configuration:
capf-server auth-mode null-string cert-enroll-trustpoint root password 1 104D000A061843595F trustpoint-label cme_cert source-addr 10.0.0.1
The default TCP port used for CAPF server is 3804.
Further information about CAPF-server is in the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express System Administrator Guide at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucme/admin/configuration/guide/cmeauth.html#wp1085744.
Telephony-service security parameters have been configured.
If the telephony-service security parameters have been configured with "device-security-mode", the device is vulnerable. The following example shows three vulnerable configurations for telephony-service security parameters:
ephone 1 device-security-mode encrypted ephone 2 device-security-mode authenticated ephone 3 device-security-mode none
The TCP port used is defined with the "ip source-address <address> port <port-number>" telephony-service configuration command.
Further information about Telephony-service security parameters is in the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express System Administrator Guide at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucme/admin/configuration/guide/cmeauth.html#wp1080079.
The global telephony-service or call-manager-fallback command has been configured.
Any Cisco IOS configuration with the global "telephony-service" or "call-manager-fallback" command is vulnerable if any subcommands are in the telephony-service or call-manager-fallback configuration mode. The following examples show vulnerable configurations:
telephony-service ip source-address 192.168.0.1 port 2011
or
call-manager-fallback ip source-address 192.168.0.1 port 2011
The TCP port used is defined with the "ip source-address <address> port <port-number>" configuration command.
Further information about telephony service and call-manager-fallback is in the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express System Administrator Guide at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucme/admin/configuration/guide/cmesystm.html.
Note: For customers with devices enabled with SIP, also consult the document "Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Session Initiation Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerability" at the following link http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090325-sip.html.
Devices that are configured for SIP gateway signaling support over TLS transport are vulnerable. The following examples show vulnerable configurations:
voice service voip sip session transport tcp tls url sips
-- or --
dial-peer voice 3456 voip voice-class sip url sips session protocol sipv2 session transport tcp tls
For the SIP gateway signaling support over TLS transport to function correctly, administrators must first configure a trustpoint using the following configuration:
sip-ua
crypto signaling default trustpoint example_trustpoint_name
The default TCP port used for the SIP gateway signaling support over TLS transport feature is 5061.
Further information about Cisco IOS SIP gateway signaling support over TLS transport is in the Cisco IOS Software Release 12.4T feature guide at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_4t/12_4t11/FeatTLS.html.
A device is vulnerable if it is configured with the Media and Signaling Encryption (SRTP/TLS) on DSP Farm Conferencing feature or with Secure Signaling and Media Encryption for analog phones with Skinny Call Control Protocol (SCCP).
The following examples show three different vulnerable secure DSP farm configurations. Several other parts are required for a full configuration, such as certificates and SCCP configuration, but these parts have been excluded for brevity.
dspfarm profile 2 transcode security trustpoint 2851ClientMina codec g711ulaw codec g711alaw codec g729ar8 codec g729abr8 codec gsmfr codec g729r8 codec g729br8 maximum sessions 3 associate application SCCP
dspfarm profile 3 conference security trustpoint sec2800-cfb codec g711ulaw codec g711alaw codec g729ar8 codec g729abr8 codec g729r8 codec g729br8 maximum sessions 2 associate application SCCP
dspfarm profile 5 mtp security trustpoint 2851ClientMina codec g711alaw maximum sessions hardware 1 associate application SCCP
The default TCP port used for the Media and Signaling Encryption on DSP Farm Conferencing feature is 2443.
Further information about the Media and Signaling Encryption on DSP Farm Conferencing feature is in the "Cisco IOS Software Release 12.4 Special and Early Deployments feature guide" at the following link http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_4t/12_4t15/itsdsp.html.
The following output shows the relevant section of Secure Signaling and Media Encryption for analog phones and is a vulnerable configuration (Several other parts are required for a full configuration, such as certificates, SCCP configuration, and dial peers):
!--- The following lines show SCCP Telephony Control Application !--- (STCAPP) security enabled at the system level: stcapp ccm-group 1 stcapp security trustpoint analog stcapp security mode encrypted stcapp <-- output removed for brevity --> dial-peer voice 5002 pots service stcapp !--- The following line shows the security mode configured on the !--- dial peer. security mode authenticated port 2/1
The default TCP port used for Media and Signaling Encryption for analog phones is 2443.
Further information about Media and Signaling Encryption for analog phones is in the "Supplementary Services Features for FXS Ports on Cisco IOS Voice Gateways Configuration Guide, Release 12.4T" at the following link http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/voice/fxs/configuration/guide/fsxsecur.html.
Any configuration or executable command that leverages Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP) as a transport protocol is vulnerable. The following example shows the vulnerable configuration of the feature NETCONF over BEEP. NETCONF over BEEP using SASL is also vulnerable.
crypto key generate rsa general-keys crypto pki trustpoint my_trustpoint enrollment url http://10.2.3.3:80 subject-name CN=dns_name_of_host.com revocation-check none crypto pki authenticate my_trustpoint crypto pki enroll my_trustpoint line vty 0 15 netconf lock-time 60 netconf max-sessions 16 netconf beep initiator host1 23 user my_user password my_password encrypt my_trustpoint reconnect-time 60 netconf beep listener 23 sasl user1 encrypt my_trustpoint
The TCP port used is defined with the "netconf beep initiator" and "netconf beep listener" configuration commands.
Further information about NETCONF over BEEP is in the "Cisco IOS Software Release 12.4T feature guide" at the following link http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_4t/12_4t11/htnetbe.html#wp1049404.
The BEEP executable commands "bingd" and "bingng" could cause this vulnerability to be triggered when they are invoked. The following shows an example of these commands being executed:
bingng device 192.168.0.1 23 bingd device 23
Devices configured with Network Admission Control HTTP Authentication Proxy are vulnerable. For the device to be vulnerable the authentication proxy rule must exist and be applied to an interface.
The following configuration creates an authentication proxy rule.
ip admission name example-ap-rule-name proxy http
The following configuration attaches the authentication proxy rule (created in the previous example) to an interface.
interface GigabitEthernet 0/0 ip admission example-ap-rule-name
The default TCP port used for Network Admission Control HTTP Authentication Proxy is 80.
Further information about Network Admission Control HTTP Authentication Proxy is in the "Cisco IOS Security Configuration Guide, Release 12.4" at the following link http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/security/configuration/guide/sec_net_admssn_ctrl_external_docbase_0900e4b1805b0530_4container_external_docbase_0900e4b1807b01dc.html#wp1053991.
Devices that have URL redirect feature configured are vulnerable. URL redirect is supported for EAP over UDP (EAPoUDP), Dot1x and MAC Authentication Bypass (MAB) authentication mechanisms. The URL redirect configuration can either be on the server or set up as part of a locally defined profile or policy. Both configurations are vulnerable. A device is vulnerable with either of the following configurations.
URL Redirect Feature Enabled for EAPoUDP
The URL redirect feature is enabled for EAPoUDP with the following global configuration command:
ip admission name <EAPoUDP-rule-name> eapoudp
The following configuration attaches the EAPoUDP rule (created in the previous example) to an interface.
ip admission name <EAPoUDP-rule-name>
URL Redirect Feature Enabled for Dot1x and MAB
The URL redirect feature for both Dot1x and MAB are vulnerable and will have a URL redirect AV pair on the RADIUS server defined in a method that is similar to the following:
url-redirect="http://example.com" url-redirect="urlacl"
For the Dot1x and MAB URL redirect feature to work successfully on the switch, the minimum following configuration would also be required. There is no interface-specific configuration for URL redirect. Basically the interface has to be configured for Dot1x/MAB.
ip http {server | secure-server}
ip device tracking
The default TCP port used for per-user URL redirect for EAPoUDP, Dot1x, and MAB is 80 and 443.
Further information about per-user URL redirect for EAPoUDP, Dot1x, and MAB is in the "Catalyst 4500 Series Switch Software Configuration Guide, 12.2(50)SG" at the following link http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12.2/50sg/configuration/guide/dot1x.html#wp1311079.
A device is vulnerable if Distributed Director is configured with HTTP redirects. The following example shows a vulnerable configuration:
ip director ip-address 192.168.0.1
The default TCP port used for distributed director with HTTP redirect is 53.
Further information about Distributed Director with HTTP redirects is in "Distributed Director Configuration Example Overview" at the following link http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/contnetw/ps813/products_tech_note09186a00801fa9dd.shtml#topic8b.
Devices that are configured with the Cisco IOS DNS feature are vulnerable. A pure DNS over UDP implementation is not vulnerable. See the "Workarounds" section of this advisory for information about filtering DNS over TCP traffic to the device. If any of the commands in the following example appear in the device configuration, the device is vulnerable:
ip dns server ip dns primary example.com soa www.example.com admin@example.com ip dns spoofing 192.168.0.1
The default TCP port used for DNS is 53.
Further information about Cisco IOS DNS is in the "Cisco IOS IP Addressing Services Configuration Guide, Release 12.4" at the following link http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/ipaddr/configuration/guide/iad_config_dns_ps6350_TSD_Products_Configuration_Guide_Chapter.html.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: CSCsm27071 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers CVE-2009-0630.
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html .
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss .
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CSCsm27071: Cisco IOS Software Multiple Features IP Sockets Vulnerability Calculate the environmental score of CSCsm27071 |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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CVSS Base Score - 7.8 |
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Access Vector |
Access Complexity |
Authentication |
Confidentiality Impact |
Integrity Impact |
Availability Impact |
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|
Network |
Low |
None |
None |
None |
Complete |
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CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 |
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Exploitability |
Remediation Level |
Report Confidence |
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Functional |
Official-Fix |
Confirmed |
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Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in the any of the following occurring:
Repeated attempts to exploit this vulnerability could result in a sustained DoS condition.
When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) names a Cisco IOS release train. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the releases which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the "Recommended Releases" column of the table.
|
Major Release |
Availability of Repaired Releases |
|
|---|---|---|
|
Affected 12.0-Based Releases |
First Fixed Release |
Recommended Release |
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2DA |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
12.0(32)S12 |
12.0(32)S12 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.0S |
12.0(32)S12 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.0S |
12.0(32)S12 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.0S |
12.0(32)S12 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.0S |
12.0(32)S12 |
|
|
12.0(32)SY8 |
12.0(32)SY8 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.0S |
12.0(32)S12 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
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Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
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Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
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Releases prior to 12.0(4)XI2 are vulnerable, release 12.0(4)XI2 and later are not vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Affected 12.1-Based Releases |
First Fixed Release |
Recommended Release |
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.1EA |
12.1(22)EA13 12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.1EA |
12.1(22)EA13 12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2DA |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SXF |
12.2(18)SXF16 |
|
|
12.1(22)EA13 |
12.1(22)EA13 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.3BC |
12.2(33)SCB1 12.3(23)BC6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SG |
12.2(31)SGA9 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2SGA |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SXF |
12.2(18)SXF16 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Releases prior to 12.1(5)YE6 are vulnerable, release 12.1(5)YE6 and later are not vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.1EA |
12.1(22)EA13 12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Affected 12.2-Based Releases |
First Fixed Release |
Recommended Release |
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2SCB1 or 12.3BC |
12.2(33)SCB1 12.3(23)BC6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2SB4 |
12.2(33)SB4 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2SCB or 12.3BC |
12.2(33)SCB1 12.3(23)BC6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2SCB or 12.3BC |
12.2(33)SCB1 12.3(23)BC6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SB |
12.2(33)SB4 |
|
|
12.2(12)DA14; Available on 30-JUL-2009 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SG |
12.2(31)SGA9 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SG |
12.2(31)SGA9 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
12.2(44)EY |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SRC |
12.2(33)SRC4; Available on 18-MAY-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SRC |
12.2(33)SRC4; Available on 18-MAY-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to any release in 12.2IXH |
12.2(18)IXH; Available on 31-MAR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to any release in 12.2IXH |
12.2(18)IXH; Available on 31-MAR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to any release in 12.2IXH |
12.2(18)IXH; Available on 31-MAR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to any release in 12.2IXH |
12.2(18)IXH; Available on 31-MAR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to any release in 12.2IXH |
12.2(18)IXH; Available on 31-MAR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to any release in 12.2IXH |
12.2(18)IXH; Available on 31-MAR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to any release in 12.2IXH |
12.2(18)IXH; Available on 31-MAR-2009 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
12.2(15)MC2m |
12.2(15)MC2m |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SB |
12.2(33)SB4 |
|
|
12.2(31)SB14 12.2(33)SB1 12.2(28)SB13 |
12.2(33)SB4 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SB |
12.2(33)SB4 |
|
|
12.2(33)SCA2 |
12.2(33)SCB1 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
12.2(50)SE 12.2(46)SE2 12.2(44)SE5 |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SE |
12.2(44)SE6 |
|
|
12.2(50)SG |
12.2(52)SG; Available on 15-MAY-2009 |
|
|
12.2(31)SGA9 |
12.2(31)SGA9 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SRC |
12.2(33)SRC4; Available on 18-MAY-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SRC |
12.2(33)SRB5a; Available on 3-April-2009 12.2(33)SRC4; Available on 18-MAY-2009 |
|
|
12.2(33)SRC1 |
12.2(33)SRC4; Available on 18-MAY-2009 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SXF |
12.2(18)SXF16 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SXF |
12.2(18)SXF16 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SXF |
12.2(18)SXF16 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SXF |
12.2(18)SXF16 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SXF |
12.2(18)SXF16 |
|
|
12.2(18)SXF16 |
12.2(18)SXF16 |
|
|
12.2(33)SXH5; Available on 20-APR-2009 |
12.2(33)SXH5; Available on 20-APR-2009 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SB |
12.2(33)SB4 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SB |
12.2(33)SB4 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2SCB or 12.3BC |
12.2(33)SCB1 12.3(23)BC6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SRC |
12.2(33)SB4 12.2(33)SRD1 |
|
|
Vulnerable; migrate to any release in 12.2SRD |
12.2(33)SRD1 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
12.2(46)XO |
12.2(46)XO |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SXF |
12.2(18)SXF16 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SXH |
12.2(33)SXH5; Available on 20-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SB |
12.2(33)SB4 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
12.2(18)ZYA1 |
12.2(18)ZYA1 |
|
|
Affected 12.3-Based Releases |
First Fixed Release |
Recommended Release |
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
12.3(23)BC6 |
12.3(23)BC6 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4JK |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.2SB |
12.2(33)SB4 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.3YX |
12.3(14)YX14 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.3YX |
12.3(14)YX14 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.3YX |
12.3(14)YX14 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
12.3(14)YM13 |
12.3(14)YM13 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4XB |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
12.3(14)YX14 |
12.3(14)YX14 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Affected 12.4-Based Releases |
First Fixed Release |
Recommended Release |
|
12.4(19) 12.4(18a) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
12.4(18e) 12.4(23a); Available on 05-JUN-2009 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
12.4(11)MD7 |
12.4(11)MD7 |
|
|
12.4(19)MR |
12.4(19)MR2 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
12.4(20)T 12.4(15)T8 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
12.4(15)T8 12.4(20)T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
12.4(4)XD12; Available on 27-MAR-2009 |
12.4(4)XD12; Available on 27-MAR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
12.4(15)XL4 |
12.4(15)XL4 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
12.4(15)XQ2 |
12.4(15)XQ2 |
|
|
12.4(15)XR4 |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; contact TAC |
||
|
12.4(11)XW10 |
12.4(11)XW10 |
|
|
12.4(15)XY4 |
12.4(22)T1 12.4(15)T9; Available on 29-APR-2009 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
The following mitigations have been identified for this vulnerability:
Although it is often difficult to block traffic that transits a network, it is possible to identify traffic that should never be allowed to target infrastructure devices and block that traffic at the border of networks. Infrastructure Access Control Lists (iACLs) are a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security as well as a workaround for these specific vulnerabilities. The iACL example below should be included as part of the deployed infrastructure access-list which will protect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP address range:
!--- Only sections pertaining to features enabled on the device
!--- need be configured.
!---
!--- Feature: Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express
!---
!--- CAPF server configuration
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 3804
!---
!--- Telephony-Service configuration
!--- The TCP port is as per the ip source-address
!--- <ip-address> port <port-number> telephony
!--- service configuration command. Example below 2999
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 2999
!---
!--- Deny Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express traffic
!--- from all other sources destined to infrastructure addresses.
!---
access-list 150 deny tcp any
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 3804
access-list 150 deny tcp any
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 2999
!---
!--- Feature: SIP Gateway Signaling Support Over TLS Transport
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 5061
!--- Deny SIP Gateway Signaling Support Over TLS Transport
!--- traffic from all other sources destined to infrastructure
!--- addresses.
access-list 150 deny tcp any
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 5061
!---
!--- Feature: Secure Signaling and Media Encryption
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 2443
!--- Deny Secure Signaling and Media Encryption traffic from all
!--- other sources destined to infrastructure addresses.
access-list 150 deny tcp any
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 2443
!---
!--- Feature: Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP)
!--- The TCP port used is defined with the netconf beep initiator
!--- and netconf beep listener configuration
!--- commands. This example uses 3001
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 3001
!--- Deny BEEP traffic from all other sources destined to
!--- infrastructure addresses.
access-list 150 deny tcp any
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 3001
!---
!--- Feature: Network Admission Control HTTP Authentication Proxy
!--- and
!--- Per-user URL Redirect for EAP over UDP, Dot1x and MAC
!--- Authentication Bybass
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 80
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 443
!---
!--- Deny Network Admission Control HTTP Authentication Proxy
!--- and
!--- Per-user URL Redirect for EAP over UDP, Dot1x and MAC
!--- Authentication Bybass traffic to infrastructue
!---
access-list 150 deny tcp any
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 80
access-list 150 deny tcp any
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 443
!---
!--- Features: Distributed Director with HTTP Redirects and DNS
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 53
!--- Deny Distributed Director with HTTP Redirects traffic and DNS
!--- from all other sources destined to infrastructure addresses.
access-list 150 deny tcp any
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 53
!--- Permit/deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in
!--- accordance with existing security policies and configurations
!--- Permit all other traffic to transit the device.
access-list 150 permit ip any any
!--- Apply access-list to all interfaces (only one example shown)
interface serial 2/0
ip access-group 150 in
The white paper entitled "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for infrastructure protection access lists. This white paper can be obtained at the following link http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801a1a55.shtml
For distributed platforms, Receive ACLs may be an option starting in Cisco IOS Software Versions 12.0(21)S2 for the 12000 (GSR), 12.0(24)S for the 7500, and 12.0(31)S for the 10720. The Receive ACL protects the device from harmful traffic before the traffic can impact the route processor. Receive ACLs are designed to only protect the device on which it is configured. On the 12000, 7500, and 10720, transit traffic is never affected by a receive ACL. Because of this, the destination IP address "any" used in the example ACL entries below only refer to the router's own physical or virtual IP addresses. Receive ACLs are considered a network security best practice, and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security, as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The white paper entitled "GSR: Receive Access Control Lists" will help you identify and allow legitimate traffic to your device and deny all unwanted packets. This white paper is available at the following link http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801a0a5e.shtml.
The following is the receive path ACL written to permit this type of traffic from trusted hosts:
!---
!--- Only sections pertaining to features enabled on the device
!--- need be configured.
!---
!---
!--- Feature: Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express
!---
!---
!---
!--- Permit CAPF server traffic from trusted hosts allowed to
!--- the RP.
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
any eq 3804
!---
!--- Telephony-Service configuration
!---
!---
!--- The TCP port is as per the ip source-address
!--- <address> port <port-number> telephony-service
!--- configuration command. Example below 2999
!---
!--- Permit Telephony-Service traffic from trusted hosts allowed
!--- to the RP.
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
any eq 2999
!---
!--- Deny Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express
!--- traffic from all other sources to the RP.
!---
access-list 150 deny tcp any any eq 3804
access-list 150 deny tcp any any eq 2999
!---
!--- Permit SIP Gateway Signaling Support Over TLS Transport
!--- traffic from trusted hosts allowed to the RP.
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
any eq 5061
!---
!--- Deny SIP Gateway Signaling Support Over TLS Transport
!--- traffic from all other sources to the RP.
!---
access-list 150 deny tcp any any eq 5061
!---
!--- Permit Secure Signaling and Media Encryption traffic
!--- from trusted hosts allowed to the RP.
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
any eq 2443
!---
!--- Deny Secure Signaling and Media Encryption traffic from
!--- all other sources to the RP.
!---
access-list 150 deny tcp any any eq 2443
!---
!--- Feature: Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP)
!--- The TCP port used is defined with the netconf beep initiator
!--- and netconf beep listener configuration commands.
!--- This example uses 3001
!---
!---
!--- Permit BEEP traffic from trusted hosts allowed to the RP.
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
any eq 3001
!---
!--- Deny BEEP traffic from all other sources to the RP.
!---
access-list 150 deny tcp any any eq 3001
!---
!--- Feature: Network Admission Control HTTP Authentication Proxy
!--- and
!--- Per-user URL Redirect for EAP over UDP, Dot1x and MAC
!--- Authentication Bybass
!---
!---
!--- Permit Per-user URL Redirect for EAP over UDP, Dot1x and MAC
!--- Authentication Bybass traffic from trusted hosts allowed to
!--- the RP.
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
any eq 80
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
any eq 443
!---
!--- Deny Network Admission Control HTTP Authentication Proxy
!--- and
!--- Per-user URL Redirect for EAP over UDP, Dot1x and MAC
!--- Authentication Bybass traffic from all other sources to
!--- the RP.
!---
access-list 150 deny tcp any any eq 80
access-list 150 deny tcp any any eq 443
!---
!--- Features: Distributed Director with HTTP Redirects and DNS
!---
!---
!--- Permit Distribute Director and DNS traffic from trusted hosts
!--- allowed to the RP.
!---
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
any eq 53
!---
!--- Deny distributed director and DNS traffic from all other
!--- sources to the RP.
!---
access-list 150 deny tcp any any eq 53
!---
!--- Permit all other traffic to the RP.
!--- according to security policy and configurations.
!---
access-list 150 permit ip any any
!---
!--- Apply this access list to the 'receive' path.
!---
ip receive access-list 150
Control Plane Policing (CoPP) can be used to block the affected features TCP traffic access to the device. Cisco IOS software releases 12.0S, 12.2SX, 12.2S, 12.3T, 12.4, and 12.4T support the CoPP feature. CoPP can be configured on a device to protect the management and control planes and minimize the risk and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic that is sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. The CoPP example below should be included as part of the deployed CoPP which will protect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP address range.
!--- !--- Only sections pertaining to features enabled on the device !--- need be configured. !--- !--- Feature: Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express !--- !--- CAPF Server configuration !--- access-list 150 deny tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD any eq 3804 !--- !--- Telephony-Service configuration !--- The TCP port is as per the ip source-address !--- <address> port <port-number> telephony-service !--- configuration command. Example below 2999 !--- access-list 150 deny tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD any eq 2999 !--- !--- Permit Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express traffic !--- sent to all IP addresses configured on all interfaces of !--- the affected device so that it will be policed and dropped !--- by the CoPP feature !--- !--- CAPF server configuration !--- access-list 150 permit tcp any any eq 3804 !--- !--- Telephony-Service configuration !--- access-list 150 permit tcp any any eq 2999 !--- !--- Feature: SIP Gateway Signaling Support Over TLS Transport !--- access-list 150 deny tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD any eq 5061 !--- !--- Permit SIP Gateway Signaling Support Over TLS Transport !--- traffic sent to all IP addresses configured on all interfaces !--- of the affected device so that it will be policed and !--- dropped by the CoPP feature !--- access-list 150 permit tcp any any eq 5061 !--- !--- Feature: Secure Signaling and Media Encryption !--- access-list 150 deny tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD any eq 2443 !--- !--- Permit Secure Signaling and Media Encryption traffic sent to !--- all IP addresses configured on all interfaces of the affected !--- device so that it will be policed and dropped by the CoPP !--- feature !--- access-list 150 permit tcp any any eq 2443 !--- !--- Feature: Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP) !--- The TCP port used is defined with the netconf beep initiator !--- and netconf beep listener configuration commands. !--- This example uses 3001 !--- access-list 150 deny tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD any eq 3001 !--- !--- Permit BEEP traffic sent to all IP addresses configured !--- on all interfaces of the affected device so that it !--- will be policed and dropped by the CoPP feature !--- access-list 150 permit tcp any any eq 3001 !--- !--- Feature: Network Admission Control HTTP Authentication Proxy !--- and !--- Per-user URL Redirect for EAP over UDP, Dot1x and MAC !--- Authentication Bybass !--- access-list 150 deny tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD any eq 80 access-list 150 deny tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD any eq 443 !--- !--- Permit Network Admission Control HTTP Authentication Proxy !--- and Per-user URL Redirect for EAP over UDP, Dot1x and MAC !--- Authentication Bybass traffic sent to all IP addresses !--- configured on all interfaces of the affected device so that it !--- will be policed and dropped by the CoPP feature !--- access-list 150 permit tcp any any eq 80 access-list 150 permit tcp any any eq 443 !--- !--- Features: Distributed Director with HTTP Redirects and DNS !--- access-list 150 deny tcp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD any eq 53 !--- !--- Permit Distributed Director with HTTP Redirects and DNS !--- traffic sent to all IP addresses configured on all interfaces !--- of the affected device so that it will be policed and dropped !--- by the CoPP feature !--- access-list 150 permit tcp any any eq 53 !--- !--- Permit (Police or Drop)/Deny (Allow) all other Layer3 and !--- Layer4 traffic in accordance with existing security policies !--- and configurations for traffic that is authorized to be sent !--- to infrastructure devices !--- !--- !--- Create a Class-Map for traffic to be policed by !--- the CoPP feature !--- class-map match-all drop-tcpip-class match access-group 150 !--- !--- Create a Policy-Map that will be applied to the !--- Control-Plane of the device. !--- policy-map drop-tcpip-traffic class drop-tcpip-class drop !--- !--- Apply the Policy-Map to the !--- Control-Plane of the device !--- control-plane service-policy input drop-tcpip-traffic
In the above CoPP example, the access control list entries (ACEs) that match the potential exploit packets with the "permit" action result in these packets being discarded by the policy-map "drop" function, while packets that match the "deny" action (not shown) are not affected by the policy-map drop function. Please note that the policy-map syntax is different in the 12.2S and 12.0S Cisco IOS trains:
policy-map drop-tcpip-traffic class drop-tcpip-class police 32000 1500 1500 conform-action drop exceed-action drop
Additional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can be found in the documents, "Control Plane Policing Implementation Best Practices" and "Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2 S - Control Plane Policing" at the following links http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/coppwp_gs.html and http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t4/feature/guide/gtrtlimt.html.
Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the "Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin" companion document for this advisory at the following link http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090325-tcp-and-ip.shtml.
Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades.
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was discovered by Cisco when performing internal vulnerability testing. We would also like to thank Jens Link, freelance consultant, for also reporting this vulnerability to us.
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090325-ip.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
|
Revision 1.4 |
2009-June-25 |
Removed references to the March/09 combined fixed software table. |
|
Revision 1.3 |
2009-June-1 |
Updated expected public availability date for release 12.4(23a). |
|
Revision 1.2 |
2009-May-1 |
Updated expected public availability date for release 12.4(23a). |
|
Revision 1.1 |
2009-March-30 |
Specifically called out Wireless Products as not affected |
|
Revision 1.0 |
2009-March-25 |
Initial public release. |
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
| Updated: Jun 25, 2009 | Document ID: 109333 |