Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ONS15454 and Cisco ONS15327 Vulnerabilities

Contents

Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Workarounds
Obtaining Fixed Software
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of This Notice: FINAL
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures

This section provides details on affected products.

Vulnerable Products

Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable

The ONS hardware is managed via the TCC, TCC+, TCCi or the XTC control cards which are usually connected to a network isolated from the Internet and local to the customer's environment. This limits the exposure to the exploitation of the vulnerabilites from the Internet.

These vulnerabilities are documented as Cisco bug ID CSCds52295, CSCdt84146, CSCdv62307, CSCdw15690, CSCdx82962 and CSCdy70756, which requires a CCO account to view and can be viewed after 2002 November 1 at 1600 UTC.

• CSCds52295 -- It is possible to open a FTP connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC using any nonexistent user-name and password. In order to exploit this vulnerability a person must be able to establish a FTP connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
  
• CSCdt84146 -- User-names and passwords are stored in clear text in the running image database of the TCC, TCC+ or XTC. In order to exploit this vulnerability a person needs access to the backup of the image database.
  
• CSCdv62307 -- The SNMP community string "public" cannot be changed in the Cisco ONS software. In order to exploit this vulnerability a person must be able to establish a SNMP connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
  
• CSCdw15690 -- Requesting an invalid CORBA Interoperable Object Reference (IOR) via HTTP may cause the TCC, TCC+ or XTC to reset. In order to exploit this vulnerability a person must be able to establish a HTTP connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
  
• CSCdx82962 -- HTTP requests starting with any character other than '/' may cause the TCC, TCC+, TCCi or XTC to reset. In order to exploit this vulnerability a person must be able to establish a HTTP connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC
  
• CSCdy70756 -- The TCC, TCC+ and XTC have a user-name and password that can be used to gain access to the underlying VxWorks Operating System and it is not possible to change or disable this account. In order to exploit this vulnerability a person must be able to establish a Telnet connection to TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
  

This sections describes the impact of these vulnerabilities.

• CSCds52295 -- Once a FTP connection has been opened a person could upload modified configuration files and delete software images from the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
  
• CSCdt84146 -- By analyzing an offline database backup of the TCC, TCC+ or XTC, it is possible to extract user-name and password pairs. Using the administrator password a person can access the TCC, TCC+ or XTC either remotely or locally and gain complete control over the Cisco ONS platform.
  
• CSCdv62307 -- By using the SNMP read-only community string a person may gain unauthorized access to information in the SNMP MIBs on the TCC, TCC+ or XTC. User-names and passwords cannot be extracted using this method.
  
• CSCdw15690 -- By requesting an invalid CORBA IOR object via HTTP a person may cause the TCC, TCC+ or XTC to reset. This does not impact the traffic already flowing through the switch.
  
• CSCdx82962 -- By requesting URLs starting with a character other than '/' via HTTP a person may cause the TCC, TCC+, TCCi or XTC to reset. This does not impact the traffic already flowing through the switch.
  
• CSCdy70756 -- Using the VxWorks OS account a person can access the TCC, TCC+ or XTC either remotely or locally and gain complete control over the Cisco ONS platform.
  

All vulnerabilities are fixed in the Cisco ONS software release 3.4 and later for the TCC+ installed in the ONS 15454, the TCCi installed in the ONS 15454E and the XTC installed in the ONS 15327. The Cisco ONS software release 3.2.1 also has all the vulnerabilities fixed in it. For the TCC control cards, the Cisco ONS software release 2.3.3 will be available on CCO on November 4, 2002.

The procedure to upgrade to the fixed software version on the Cisco ONS 15454 is detailed at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/optical/ps2006/prod_installation_guides_list.html.

The procedure to upgrade to the fixed software version on the Cisco ONS 15327 is detailed at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/optical/ps2001/prod_installation_guides_list.html.

This section describes workarounds.

• CSCds52295 - Restrict FTP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router configured to restrict FTP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so that FTP access is only allowed from authorized workstations. This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and turning on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.
  Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the authorized workstation from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
  
• CSCdt84146 - It is possible to mitigate the effects of this vulnerability by making sure that the backup Cisco ONS images from the TCC, TCC+ or XTC are secure from unauthorized access.
  
• CSCdv62307 - Restrict SNMP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router configured to restrict SNMP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so that SNMP access is only allowed from valid network management workstations. This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and turning on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.
  Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the network management station from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
  
• CSCdw15690 - Restrict HTTP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router configured to restrict HTTP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so that HTTP access is only allowed from valid network management workstations. This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and turning on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.
  Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the network management station from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
  
• CSCdx82962 - Restrict HTTP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router configured to restrict HTTP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so that HTTP access is only allowed from valid network management workstations. This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and turning on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.
  Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the network management station from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
  
• CSCdy70756 - Restrict Telnet traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router configured to restrict Telnet access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so that Telnet access is only allowed from authorized workstations. This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and turning on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.
  Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the workstation from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.
  

Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability for affected customers. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.

Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.

Do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com" for software upgrades.

Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.

Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.

The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.

Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.

• +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
  
• +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
  
• e-mail: tac@cisco.com
  

Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.

Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.

All defects were reported to Cisco by customers. The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.

This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20021031-ons-vulnerability.shtml.

In addition to worldwide website posting, a text version of this advisory is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key having the fingerprint FEB1 1B89 A64B 60BB 4770 D1CE 93D2 FF06 F236 759C and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients:

• cust-security-announce@cisco.com
  
• bugtraq@securityfocus.com
  
• full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com
  
• first-teams@first.org (includes CERT/CC)
  
• cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
  
• cisco@spot.colorado.edu
  
• comp.dcom.sys.cisco
  
• Various internal Cisco mailing lists
  

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security advisories.