Configuring Authorization and Revocation of Certificates in a PKI
This module describes how to configure authorization and revocation of certificates in a public key infrastructure (PKI). It includes information on high-availability support for the certificate server.
Note
Security threats, as well as the cryptographic technologies to help protect against them, are constantly changing. For more information about the latest Cisco cryptographic recommendations, see the
Next Generation Encryption (NGE) white paper.
Your software release may not support all the features documented in this module. For the latest caveats and feature information, see
Bug Search Tool and the release notes for your platform and software release. To find information about the features documented in this module, and to see a list of the releases in which each feature is supported, see the feature information table at the end of this module.
Use Cisco Feature Navigator to find information about platform support and Cisco software image support. To access Cisco Feature Navigator, go to
www.cisco.com/go/cfn. An account on Cisco.com is not required.
Prerequisites for Authorization and Revocation of Certificates
Plan Your PKI Strategy
Tip
It is strongly recommended that you plan your entire PKI strategy before you begin to deploy actual certificates.
Authorization and revocation can occur only after you or a network administrator have completed the following tasks:
Configured the certificate authority (CA).
Enrolled peer devices with the CA.
Identified and configured the protocol (such as IP Security [IPsec] or secure socket layer [SSL]) that is to be used for peer-to-peer communication.
You should decide which authorization and revocation strategy you are going to configure before enrolling peer devices because the peer device certificates might have to contain authorization and revocation-specific information.
“crypto ca” to “crypto pki” CLI Change
As of Cisco IOS Release 12.3(7)T, all commands that begin as “crypto ca” have been changed to begin as “crypto pki.” Although the router will still accept crypto ca commands, all output will be read back as crypto pki.
High Availability
For high availability, IPsec-secured Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) must be configured on both the active and the standby routers. For synchronization to work, the redundancy mode on the certificate servers must be set to ACTIVE/STANDBY after you configure SCTP.
Restrictions for Authorization and Revocation of Certificates
PKI High Availability (HA) support of intra-chassis stateful switchover (SSO) redundancy is currently not supported on all switches running the Cisco IOS Release 12.2 S software. See Cisco bug CSCtb59872 for more information.
Information About Authorization and Revocation of Certificates
PKI authentication does not provide authorization. Current solutions for authorization are specific to the router that is being configured, although a centrally managed solution is often required.
There is not a standard mechanism by which certificates are defined as authorized for some tasks and not for others. This authorization information can be captured in the certificate itself if the application is aware of the certificate-based authorization information. But this solution does not provide a simple mechanism for real-time updates to the authorization information and forces each application to be aware of the specific authorization information embedded in the certificate.
When the certificate-based ACL mechanism is configured as part of the trustpoint authentication, the application is no longer responsible for determining this authorization information, and it is no longer possible to specify for which application the certificate is authorized. In some cases, the certificate-based ACL on the router gets so large that it cannot be managed. Additionally, it is beneficial to retrieve certificate-based ACL indications from an external server. (For more information on using certificate-based ACLs for authentication, see the section “When to Use Certificate-Based ACLs for Authorization or Revocation.”)
Current solutions to the real-time authorization problem involve specifying a new protocol and building a new server (with associated tasks, such as management and data distribution).
PKI and AAA Server Integration for Certificate Status
Integrating your PKI with an authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) server provides an alternative online certificate status solution that leverages the existing AAA infrastructure. Certificates can be listed in the AAA database with appropriate levels of authorization. For components that do not explicitly support PKI-AAA, a default label of “all” from the AAA server provides authorization. Likewise, a label of “none” from the AAA database indicates that the specified certificate is not valid. (The absence of any application label is equivalent, but “none” is included for completeness and clarity). If the application component does support PKI-AAA, the component may be specified directly; for example, the application component could be “ipsec,” “ssl,” or “osp.” (ipsec=IP Security, ssl=Secure Sockets Layer, and osp=Open Settlement Protocol.)
Note
Currently, no application component supports specification of the application label.
There may be a time delay when accessing the AAA server. If the AAA server is not available, the authorization fails.
The AAA server can be configured to work with either the RADIUS or TACACS+ protocol. When you are configuring the AAA server for the PKI integration, you must set the RADIUS or TACACS attributes that are required for authorization.
If the RADIUS protocol is used, the password that is configured for the username in the AAA server should be set to “cisco,” which is acceptable because the certificate validation provides authentication and the AAA database is only being used for authorization. When the TACACS protocol is used, the password that is configured for the username in the AAA server is irrelevant because TACACS supports authorization without requiring authentication (the password is used for authentication).
In addition, if you are using TACACS, you must add a PKI service to the AAA server. The custom attribute “cert-application=all” is added under the PKI service for the particular user or usergroup to authorize the specific username.
Attribute-Value Pairs for PKI and AAA Server Integration
The table below lists the attribute-value (AV) pairs that are to be used when setting up PKI integration with a AAA server. (Note the values shown in the table are possible values.) The AV pairs must match the client configuration. If they do not match, the peer certificate is not authorized.
Note
Users can sometimes have AV pairs that are different from those of every other user. As a result, a unique username is required for each user. The
all parameter (within the
authorizationusername command) specifies that the entire subject name of the certificate will be used as the authorization username.
Table 1 AV Pairs That Must Match
AV Pair
Value
cisco-avpair=pki:cert-application=all
Valid values are “all” and “none.”
cisco-avpair=pki:cert-trustpoint=msca
The value is a Cisco IOS command-line interface (CLI) configuration trustpoint label.
Note
The cert-trustpoint AV pair is normally optional. If it is specified, the Cisco IOS router query must be coming from a certificate trustpoint that has a matching label, and the certificate that is authenticated must have the specified certificate serial number.
cisco-avpair=pki:cert-serial=16318DB7000100001671
The value is a certificate serial number.
Note
The cert-serial AV pair is normally optional. If it is specified, the Cisco IOS router query must be coming from a certificate trustpoint that has a matching label, and the certificate that is authenticated must have the specified certificate serial number.
cisco-avpair=pki:cert-lifetime-end=1:00 jan 1, 2003
The cert-lifetime-end AV pair is available to artificially extend a certificate lifetime beyond the time period that is indicated in the certificate itself. If the cert-lifetime-end AV pair is used, the cert-trustpoint and cert-serial AV pairs must also be specified. The value must match the following form: hours:minutes month day, year.
Note
Only the first three characters of a month are used: Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec. If more than three characters are entered for the month, the remaining characters are ignored (for example Janxxxx).
CRLs or OCSP Server Choosing a Certificate Revocation Mechanism
After a certificate is validated as a properly signed certificate, a certificate revocation method is performed to ensure that the certificate has not been revoked by the issuing CA. Cisco IOS software supports two revocation mechanisms--certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). Cisco IOS software also supports AAA integration for certificate checking; however, additional authorization functionality is included. For more information on PKI and AAA certificate authorization and status check, see the PKI and AAA Server Integration for Certificate Status section.
The following sections explain how each revocation mechanism works:
A certificate revocation list (CRL) is a list of revoked certificates. The CRL is created and digitally signed by the CA that originally issued the certificates. The CRL contains dates for when each certificate was issued and when it expires.
CAs publish new CRLs periodically or when a certificate for which the CA is responsible has been revoked. By default, a new CRL is downloaded after the currently cached CRL expires. An administrator may also configure the duration for which CRLs are cached in router memory or disable CRL caching completely. The CRL caching configuration applies to all CRLs associated with a trustpoint.
When the CRL expires, the router deletes it from its cache. A new CRL is downloaded when a certificate is presented for verification; however, if a newer version of the CRL that lists the certificate under examination is on the server but the router is still using the CRL in its cache, the router does not know that the certificate has been revoked. The certificate passes the revocation check even though it should have been denied.
When a CA issues a certificate, the CA can include in the certificate the CRL distribution point (CDP) for that certificate. Cisco IOS client devices use CDPs to locate and load the correct CRL. The Cisco IOS client supports multiple CDPs, but the Cisco IOS CA currently supports only one CDP; however, third-party vendor CAs may support multiple CDPs or different CDPs per certificate. If a CDP is not specified in the certificate, the client device uses the default Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) method to retrieve the CRL. (The CDP location can be specified through the
cdp-urlcommand.)
When implementing CRLs, you should consider the following design considerations:
CRL lifetimes and the security association (SA) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) lifetimes.
The CRL lifetime determines the length of time between CA-issued updates to the CRL. The default CRL lifetime value, which is 168 hours [1 week], can be changed through the
lifetimecrl command.
The method of the CDP determines how the CRL is retrieved; some possible choices include HTTP, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), SCEP, or TFTP. HTTP, TFTP, and LDAP are the most commonly used methods. Although Cisco IOS software defaults to SCEP, an HTTP CDP is recommended for large installations using CRLs because HTTP can be made highly scalable.
The location of the CDP determines from where the CRL is retrieved; for example, you can specify the server and file path from which to retrieve the CRL.
When a CDP server does not respond to a request, the Cisco IOS software reports an error, which may result in the peer’s certificate being rejected. To prevent a possible certificate rejection and if there are multiple CDPs in a certificate, the Cisco IOS software will attempt to use the CDPs in the order in which they appear in the certificate. The router will attempt to retrieve a CRL using each CDP URL or directory specification. If an error occurs using a CDP, an attempt will be made using the next CDP.
Note
Prior to Cisco IOS Release 12.3(7)T, the Cisco IOS software makes only one attempt to retrieve the CRL, even when the certificate contains more than one CDP.
Tip
Although the Cisco IOS software will make every attempt to obtain the CRL from one of the indicated CDPs, it is recommended that you use an HTTP CDP server with high-speed redundant HTTP servers to avoid application timeouts because of slow CDP responses.
What Is OCSP
OCSP is an online mechanism that is used to determine certificate validity and provides the following flexibility as a
revocation mechanism:
OCSP can provide real-time certificate status checking.
OCSP allows the network administrator to specify a central OCSP server, which can service all devices within a network.
OCSP also allows the network administrator the flexibility to specify multiple OCSP servers, either per client certificate or per group of client certificates.
OCSP server validation is usually based on the root CA certificate or a valid subordinate CA certificate, but may also be configured so that external CA certificates or self-signed certificates may be used. Using external CA certificates or self-signed certificates allows the OCSP servers certificate to be issued and validated from an alternative PKI hierarchy.
A
network administrator can configure an OCSP server to collect and update CRLs from different CA servers. The devices within the network can rely on the OCSP server to check the certificate status without retrieving and caching each CRL for every peer. When peers have to check the revocation status of a certificate, they send a query to the OCSP server that includes the serial number of the certificate in question and an optional unique identifier for the OCSP request, or a nonce. The OCSP server holds a copy of the CRL to determine if the CA has listed the certificate as being revoked; the server then responds to the peer including the nonce. If the nonce in the response from the OCSP server does not match the original nonce sent by the peer, the response is considered invalid and certificate verification fails. The dialog between the OCSP server and the peer consumes less bandwidth than most CRL downloads.
If the OCSP server is using a CRL, CRL time limitations will be applicable; that is, a CRL that is still valid might be used by the OCSP server although a new CRL has been issued by the CRL containing additional certificate revocation information. Because fewer devices are downloading the CRL information on a regular basis, you can decrease the CRL lifetime value or configure the OCSP server not to cache the CRL. For more information, check your OCSP server documentation.
OCSP may be more appropriate than CRLs if your PKI has any of the following characteristics:
Real-time certificate revocation status is necessary. CRLs are updated only periodically and the latest CRL may not always be cached by the client device. For example, if a client does not yet have the latest CRL cached and a newly revoked certificate is being checked, that revoked certificate will successfully pass the revocation check.
There are a large number of revoked certificates or multiple CRLs. Caching a large CRL consumes large portions of Cisco IOS memory and may reduce resources available to other processes.
CRLs expire frequently, causing the CDP to handle a larger load of CRLs.
Note
As of Cisco IOS Release 12.4(9)T or later, an administrator may configure CRL caching, either by disabling CRL caching completely or setting a maximum lifetime for a cached CRL per trustpoint.
When to Use Certificate-Based ACLs for Authorization or Revocation
Certificates contain several fields that are used to determine whether a device or user is authorized to perform a specified action.
Because certificate-based ACLs are configured on the device, they do not scale well for large numbers of ACLs; however, certificate-based ACLs do provide very granular control of specific device behavior. Certificate-based ACLs are also leveraged by additional features to help determine when PKI components such as revocation, authorization, or a trustpoint should be used. They provide a general mechanism allowing users to select a specific certificate or a group of certificates that are being validated for either authorization or additional processing.
Certificate-based ACLs specify one or more fields within the certificate and an acceptable value for each specified field. You can specify which fields within a certificate should be checked and which values those fields may or may not have.
There are six logical tests for comparing the field with the value--equal, not equal, contains, does not contain, less than, and greater than or equal. If more than one field is specified within a single certificate-based ACL, the tests of all of the fields within the ACL must succeed to match the ACL. The same field may be specified multiple times within the same ACL. More than one ACL may be specified, and ACL will be processed in turn until a match is found or all of the ACLs have been processed.
Ignore Revocation Checks Using a Certificate-Based ACL
Certificate-based ACLs can be configured to instruct your router to ignore the revocation check and expired certificates of a valid peer. Thus, a certificate that meets the specified criteria can be accepted regardless of the validity period of the certificate, or if the certificate meets the specified criteria, revocation checking does not have to be performed. You can also use a certificate-based ACL to ignore the revocation check when the communication with a AAA server is protected with a certificate.
Ignoring Revocation Lists
To allow a trustpoint to enforce CRLs except for specific certificates, enter the matchcertificatecommand with the skiprevocation-check keyword. This type of enforcement is most useful in a hub-and-spoke configuration in which you also want to allow direct spoke-to-spoke connections. In pure hub-and-spoke configurations, all spokes connect only to the hub, so CRL checking is necessary only on the hub. For one spoke to communicate directly with another spoke, the matchcertificatecommand with the skiprevocation-check keyword can be used for neighboring peer certificates instead of requiring a CRL on each spoke.
Ignoring Expired Certificates
To configure your router to ignore expired certificates, enter the matchcertificate command with the allowexpired-certificate keyword. This command has the following purposes:
If the certificate of a peer has expired, this command may be used to “allow” the expired certificate until the peer can obtain a new certificate.
If your router clock has not yet been set to the correct time, the certificate of a peer will appear to be not yet valid until the clock is set. This command may be used to allow the certificate of the peer even though your router clock is not set.
Note
If Network Time Protocol (NTP) is available only via the IPSec connection (usually via the hub in a hub-and-spoke configuration), the router clock can never be set. The tunnel to the hub cannot be “brought up” because the certificate of the hub is not yet valid.
“Expired” is a generic term for a certificate that is expired or that is not yet valid. The certificate has a start and end time. An expired certificate, for purposes of the ACL, is one for which the current time of the router is outside the start and end times specified in the certificate.
Skipping the AAA Check of the Certificate
If the communication with an AAA server is protected with a certificate, and you want to skip the AAA check of the certificate, use the matchcertificate command with the skipauthorization-check keyword. For example, if a virtual private network (VPN) tunnel is configured so that all AAA traffic goes over that tunnel, and the tunnel is protected with a certificate, you can use the matchcertificate command with the skipauthorization-check keyword to skip the certificate check so that the tunnel can be established.
The matchcertificatecommand and the skipauthorization-check keyword should be configured after PKI integration with an AAA server is configured.
Note
If the AAA server is available only via an IPSec connection, the AAA server cannot be contacted until after the IPSec connection is established. The IPSec connection cannot be “brought up” because the certificate of the AAA server is not yet valid.
PKI Certificate Chain Validation
A certificate chain establishes a sequence of trusted certificates --from a peer certificate to the root CA certificate. Within a PKI hierarchy, all enrolled peers can validate the certificate of one another if the peers share a trusted root CA certificate or a common subordinate CA. Each CA corresponds to a trustpoint.
When a certificate chain is received from a peer, the default processing of a certificate chain path continues until the first trusted certificate, or trustpoint, is reached. In Cisco IOS Release 12.4(6)T and later releases, an administrator may configure the level to which a certificate chain is processed on all certificates including subordinate CA certificates.
Configuring the level to which a certificate chain is processed allows for the reauthentication of trusted certificates, the extension of a trusted certificate chain, and the completion of a certificate chain that contains a gap.
Reauthentication of Trusted Certificates
The default behavior is for the router to remove any trusted certificates from the certificate chain sent by the peer before the chain is validated. An administrator may configure certificate chain path processing so that the router does not remove CA certificates that are already trusted before chain validation, so that all certificates in the chain are re-authenticated for the current session.
Extending the Trusted Certificate Chain
The default behavior is for the router to use its trusted certificates to extend the certificate chain if there are any missing certificates in the certificate chain sent by the peer. The router will validate only certificates in the chain sent by the peer. An administrator may configure certificate chain path processing so that the certificates in the peer’s certificate chain and the router’s trusted certificates are validated to a specified point.
Completing Gaps in a Certificate Chain
An administrator may configure certificate chain processing so that if there is a gap in the configured Cisco IOS trustpoint hierarchy, certificates sent by the peer can be used to complete the set of certificates to be validated.
Note
If the trustpoint is configured to require parent validation and the peer does not provide the full certificate chain, the gap cannot be completed and the certificate chain is rejected and invalid.
Note
It is a configuration error if the trustpoint is configured to require parent validation and there is no parent trustpoint configured. The resulting certificate chain gap cannot be completed and the subordinate CA certificate cannot be validated. The certificate chain is invalid.
High-Availability Support
High-availability support for the certificate server is provided by:
Synchronizing revoke commands with the standby certificate server
Sending serial-number commands when new certificates are issued
The means that the standby certificate server is ready to issue certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) if it becomes active.
Further high-availability support is provided by the following synchronizations with the standby:
Certificate-server configuration
Pending requests
Grant and reject commands
For box-to-box high availability, which does not support configuration synchronization, a basic configuration synchronization mechanism is layered over a redundancy facility.
Trustpoint configuration synchronization support.
How to Configure Authorization and Revocation of Certificates for Your PKI
Perform this task to generate a AAA username from the certificate presented by the peer and specify which fields within a certificate should be used to build the AAA database username.
Note
The following restrictions should be considered when using the
all keyword as the subject name for the
authorizationusername command:
Some AAA servers limit the length of the username (for example, to 64 characters). As a result, the entire certificate subject name cannot be longer than the limitation of the server.
Some AAA servers limit the available character set that may be used for the username (for example, a space [ ] and an equal sign [=] may not be acceptable). You cannot use the
all keyword for a AAA server having such a character-set limitation.
The
subject-name command in the trustpoint configuration may not always be the final AAA subject name. If the fully qualified domain name (FQDN), serial number, or IP address of the router are included in a certificate request, the subject name field of the issued certificate will also have these components. To turn off the components, use the
fqdn,
serial-number, and
ip-address commands with the
none keyword.
CA servers sometimes change the requested subject name field when they issue a certificate. For example, CA servers of some vendors switch the relative distinguished names (RDNs) in the requested subject names to the following order: CN, OU, O, L, ST, and C. However, another CA server might append the configured LDAP directory root (for example, O=cisco.com) to the end of the requested subject name.
Depending on the tools you choose for displaying a certificate, the printed order of the RDNs in the subject name could be different. Cisco IOS software always displays the least significant RDN first, but other software, such as Open Source Secure Socket Layer (OpenSSL), does the opposite. Therefore, if you are configuring a AAA server with a full distinguished name (DN) (subject name) as the corresponding username, ensure that the Cisco IOS software style (that is, with the least significant RDN first) is used.
Specifies the following enrollment parameters of the CA:
(Optional) The
mode keyword specifies the registration authority (RA) mode, if your CA system provides an RA. By default, RA mode is disabled.
(Optional) The
retry period keyword and
minutes argument specifies the period, in minutes, in which the router waits before sending the CA another certificate request. Valid values are from 1 to 60. The default is 1.
(Optional) The
retry count keyword and
number argument specifies the number of times a router will resend a certificate request when it does not receive a response from the previous request. Valid values are from 1 to 100. The default is 10.
The
url argument is the URL of the CA to which your router should send certificate requests.
Note
With the introduction of Cisco IOS Release 15.2(1)T, an IPv6 address can be added to the
http: enrolment method. For example: http://[ipv6-address]:80. The IPv6 address must be enclosed in brackets in the URL. See the
enrollment url (ca-trustpoint) command page for more information on the other enrollment methods that can be used.
(Optional) The
pem keyword adds privacy-enhanced mail (PEM) boundaries to the certificate request.
Step 7
revocation-check method
Example:
Router (ca-trustpoint)# revocation-check crl
(Optional) Checks the revocation status of a certificate.
Step 8
exit
Example:
Router (ca-trustpoint)# exit
Exits ca-trustpoint configuration mode and returns to global configuration mode.
To display debug messages for the trace of interaction (message type) between the CA and the router, use the debugcryptopkitransactionscommand. (See the sample output, which shows a successful PKI integration with AAA server exchange and a failed PKI integration with AAA server exchange.)
Successful Exchange
Router# debug crypto pki transactions
Apr 22 23:15:03.695: CRYPTO_PKI: Found a issuer match
Apr 22 23:15:03.955: CRYPTO_PKI: cert revocation status unknown.
Apr 22 23:15:03.955: CRYPTO_PKI: Certificate validated without revocation check
Each line that shows “CRYPTO_PKI_AAA” indicates the state of the AAA authorization checks. Each of the AAA AV pairs is indicated, and then the results of the authorization check are shown.
Use therevocation-check command to specify at least one method (OCSP, CRL, or skip the revocation check) that is to be used to ensure that the certificate of a peer has not been revoked. For multiple methods, the order in which the methods are applied is determined by the order specified via this command.
If your router does not have the applicable CRL and is unable to obtain one or if the OCSP server returns an error, your router will reject the peer’s certificate--unless you include the none keyword in your configuration. If the none keyword is configured, a revocation check will not be performed and the certificate will always be accepted.
Nonces and Peer Communications with OCSP Servers
When using OCSP, nonces, unique identifiers for OCSP requests, are sent by default during peer communications with your OCSP server. The use of nonces offers a more secure and reliable communication channel between the peer and OCSP server.
If your OCSP server does not support nonces, you may disable the sending of nonces. For more information, check your OCSP server documentation.
Before You Begin
Before issuing any client certificates, the appropriate settings on the server (such as setting the CDP) should be configured.
When configuring an OCSP server to return the revocation status for a CA server, the OCSP server must be configured with an OCSP response signing certificate that is issued by that CA server. Ensure that the signing certificate is in the correct format, or the router will not accept the OCSP response. See your OCSP manual for additional information.
Note
OCSP transports messages over HTTP, so there may be a time delay when you access the OCSP server.
If the OCSP server depends on normal CRL processing to check revocation status, the same time delay that affects CRLs will also apply to OCSP.
The
url argument specifies the URL of an OCSP server so that the trustpoint can check the certificate status. This URL overrides the URL of the OCSP server (if one exists) in the Authority Info Access (AIA) extension of the certificate. All certificates associated with a configured trustpoint are checked by the OCSP server. The URL can be a hostname, IPv4 address, or an IPv6 address.
Step 5
revocation-checkmethod1 [method2method3]]
Example:
Router(ca-trustpoint)# revocation-check ocsp none
Checks the revocation status of a certificate.
crl--Certificate checking is performed by a CRL. This is the default option.
none--Certificate checking is ignored.
ocsp--Certificate checking is performed by an OCSP server.
If a second and third method are specified, each method will be used only if the previous method returns an error, such as a server being down.
Step 6
ocspdisable-nonce
Example:
Router(ca-trustpoint)# ocsp disable-nonce
(Optional) Specifies that a nonce, or an OCSP request unique identifier, will not be sent during peer communications with the OCSP server.
Step 7
exit
Example:
Router(ca-trustpoint)# exit
Returns to global configuration mode.
Step 8
exit
Example:
Router(config)# exit
Returns to privileged EXEC mode.
Step 9
showcryptopkicertificates
Example:
Router# show crypto pki certificates
(Optional) Displays information about your certificates.
Displays information about the trustpoint configured in router.
Configuring Certificate Authorization and Revocation Settings
Perform this task to specify a certificate-based ACL, to ignore revocation checks or expired certificates, to manually override the default CDP location, to manually override the OCSP server setting, to configure CRL caching, or to set session acceptance or rejection based on a certificate serial number, as appropriate.
Configuring Certificate-Based ACLs to Ignore Revocation Checks
To configure your router to use certificate-based ACLs to ignore revocation checks and expired certificates, perform the following steps:
Identify an existing trustpoint or create a new trustpoint to be used when verifying the certificate of the peer. Authenticate the trustpoint if it has not already been authenticated. The router may enroll with this trustpoint if you want. Do not set optional CRLs for the trustpoint if you plan to use the matchcertificate command and skiprevocation-check keyword.
Determine the unique characteristics of the certificates that should not have their CRL checked and of the expired certificates that should be allowed.
Define a certificate map to match the characteristics identified in the prior step.
You can add the matchcertificate command and skiprevocation-check keyword and the matchcertificatecommand and allowexpired-certificate keyword to the trustpoint that was created or identified in the first step.
Note
Certificate maps are checked even if the peer’s public key is cached. For example, when the public key is cached by the peer, and a certificate map is added to the trustpoint to ban a certificate, the certificate map is effective. This prevents a client with the banned certificate, which was once connected in the past, from reconnecting.
Manually Overriding CDPs in a Certificate
Users can override the CDPs in a certificate with a manually configured CDP. Manually overriding the CDPs in a certificate can be advantageous when a particular server is unavailable for an extended period of time. The certificate’s CDPs can be replaced with a URL or directory specification without reissuing all of the certificates that contain the original CDP.
Manually Overriding the OCSP Server Setting in a Certificate
Administrators can override the OCSP server setting specified in the
Authority Information Access (
AIA) field of the client certificate or set by the issuing the ocspurl command. One or more OCSP servers may be manually specified, either per client certificate or per group of client certificates by the matchcertificateoverrideocsp command. The matchcertificateoverrideocspcommand overrides the client certificate AIA field or the ocspurlcommand setting if a client certificate is successfully matched to a certificate map during the revocation check.
Note
Only one OCSP server can be specified per client certificate.
Configuring CRL Cache Control
By default, a new CRL will be downloaded after the currently cached CRL expires. Administrators can either configure the maximum amount of time in minutes a CRL remains in the cache by issuing the crlcachedelete-after command or disable CRL caching by issuing the crlcachenone command. Only the crl-cachedelete-aftercommand or the crl-cachenone command may be specified. If both commands are entered for a trustpoint, the last command executed will take effect and a message will be displayed.
Neither the crl-cachenone command nor the crl-cachedelete-after command affects the currently cached CRL. If you configure the crl-cachenone command, all CRLs downloaded after this command is issued will not be cached. If you configure the crl-cachedelete-after command, the configured lifetime will only affect CRLs downloaded after this command is issued.
This functionality is useful is when a CA issues CRLs with no expiration date or with expiration dates days or weeks ahead.
Configuring Certificate Serial Number Session Control
A certificate serial number can be specified to allow a certificate validation request to be accepted or rejected by the trustpoint for a session. A session may be rejected, depending on certificate serial number session control, even if a certificate is still valid. Certificate serial number session control may be configured by using either a certificate map with the
serial-number field or an AAA attribute, with the
cert-serial-not command.
Using certificate maps for session control allows an administrator to specify a single certificate serial number. Using the AAA attribute allows an administrator to specify one or more certificate serial numbers for session control.
Before You Begin
The trustpoint should be defined and authenticated before attaching certificate maps to the trustpoint.
The certificate map must be configured before the CDP override feature can be enabled or the
serial-number command is issued.
The PKI and AAA server integration must be successfully completed to use AAA attributes as described in “PKI and AAA Server Integration for Certificate Status.”
Router(config)# crypto pki certificate map Group 10
Defines values in a certificate that should be matched or not matched and enters ca-certificate-map configuration mode.
Step 4
field-namematch-criteriamatch-value
Example:
Router(ca-certificate-map)# subject-name co MyExample
Specifies one or more certificate fields together with their matching criteria and the value to match.
The
field-name is one of the following case-insensitive name strings or a date:
alt-subject-name
expires-on
issuer-name
name
serial-number
subject-name
unstructured-subject-name
valid-start
Note
Date field format is dd mm yyyy hh:mm:ss or mmm dd yyyy hh:mm:ss.
The
match-criteria is one of the following logical operators:
co --contains (valid only for name fields and serial number field)
eq --equal (valid for name, serial number, and date fields)
ge --greater than or equal (valid only for date fields)
lt --less than (valid only for date fields)
nc --does not contain (valid only for name fields and serial number field)
ne --not equal (valid for name, serial number, and date fields)
The
match-valueis the name or date to test with the logical operator assigned by match-criteria.
Note
Use this command only when setting up a certificate-based ACL--not when setting up a certificate-based ACL to ignore revocation checks or expired certificates.
Step 5
exit
Example:
Router(ca-certificate-map)# exit
Returns to global configuration mode.
Step 6
cryptopkitrustpointname
Example:
Router(config)# crypto pki trustpoint Access2
Declares the trustpoint, given name and enters ca-trustpoint configuration mode.
Step 7
Do one of the following:
crl-cachenone
crl-cachedelete-aftertime
Example:
Router(ca-trustpoint)# crl-cache none
Example:
Router(ca-trustpoint)# crl-cache delete-after 20
(Optional) Disables CRL caching completely for all CRLs associated with the trustpoint.
The
crl-cachenone command does not affect any currently cached CRLs. All CRLs downloaded after this command is configured will not be cached.
(Optional) Specifies the maximum time CRLs will remain in the cache for all CRLs associated with the trustpoint.
time--The amount of time in minutes before the CRL is deleted.
The
crl-cachedelete-after command does not affect any currently cached CRLs. The configured lifetime will only affect CRLs downloaded after this command is configured.
Router(ca-trustpoint)# match certificate Group1 override cdp url http://server.cisco.com
(Optional) Manually overrides the existing CDP entries for a certificate with a URL or directory specification.
certificate-map-label--A user-specified label that must match the
label argument specified in a previously defined
cryptopkicertificatemap command.
url--Specifies that the certificate’s CDPs will be overridden with an HTTP or LDAP URL.
directory--Specifies that the certificate’s CDPs will be overridden with an LDAP directory specification.
string--The URL or directory specification.
Note
Some applications may time out before all CDPs have been tried and will report an error message. The error message will not affect the router, and the Cisco IOS software will continue attempting to retrieve a CRL until all CDPs have been tried.
(Optional) Specifies an OCSP server, either per client certificate or per group of client certificates, and may be issued more than once to specify additional OCSP servers and client certificate settings including alternative PKI hierarchies.
certificate-map-label--The name of an existing certificate map.
trustpoint--The trustpoint to be used when validating the OCSP server certificate.
sequence-number--The order the
matchcertificateoverrideocsp command statements apply to the certificate being verified. Matches are performed from the lowest sequence number to the highest sequence number. If more than one command is issued with the same sequence number, it overwrites the previous OCSP server override setting.
url--The URL of the OCSP server.
When the certificate matches a configured certificate map, the AIA field of the client certificate and any previously issued
ocspurl command settings are overwritten with the specified OCSP server.
If no map-based match occurs, one of the following two cases will continue to apply to the client certificate.
If OCSP is specified as the revocation method, the AIA field value will continue to apply to the client certificate.
If the
ocspurl configuration exists, the
ocspurl configuration settings will continue to apply to the client certificates.
Step 11
exit
Example:
Router(ca-trustpoint)# exit
Returns to global configuration mode.
Step 12
aaanew-model
Example:
Router(config)# aaa new-model
(Optional) Enables the AAA access control model.
Step 13
aaaattributelistlist-name
Example:
Router(config)# aaa attribute list crl
(Optional) Defines an AAA attribute list locally on a router and enters config-attr-list configuration mode.
Step 14
attributetype {name}{value}
Example:
Router(config-attr-list)# attribute type cert-serial-not 6C4A
(Optional) Defines an AAA attribute type that is to be added to an AAA attribute list locally on a router.
To configure certificate serial number session control, an administrator may specify a specific certificate in the
value field to be accepted or rejected based on its serial number where
name is set to
cert-serial-not. If the serial number of the certificate matches the serial number specified by the attribute type setting, the certificate will be rejected.
For a full list of available AAA attribute types, execute the
showaaaattributes command.
Step 15
exit
Example:
Router(ca-trustpoint)# exit
Example:
Router(config-attr-list)# exit
Returns to global configuration mode.
Step 16
exit
Example:
Router(config)# exit
Returns to privileged EXEC mode.
Step 17
showcryptopkicertificates
Example:
Router# show crypto pki certificates
(Optional) Displays the components of the certificates installed on the router if the CA certificate has been authenticated.
Example
The following is a sample certificate. The OCSP-related extensions are shown using exclamation points.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: v3
Serial Number:0x14
Signature Algorithm:SHAwithRSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4
Issuer:CN=CA server,OU=PKI,O=Cisco Systems
Validity:
Not Before:Thursday, August 8, 2002 4:38:05 PM PST
Not After:Tuesday, August 7, 2003 4:38:05 PM PST
Subject:CN=OCSP server,OU=PKI,O=Cisco Systems
Subject Public Key Info:
Algorithm:RSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1
Public Key:
Exponent:65537
Public Key Modulus:(2048 bits) :
<snip>
Extensions:
Identifier:Subject Key Identifier - 2.5.29.14
Critical:no
Key Identifier:
<snip>
Identifier:Authority Key Identifier - 2.5.29.35
Critical:no
Key Identifier:
<snip>
! Identifier:OCSP NoCheck:- 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.5
Critical:no
Identifier:Extended Key Usage:- 2.5.29.37
Critical:no
Extended Key Usage:
OCSPSigning
!
Identifier:CRL Distribution Points - 2.5.29.31
Critical:no
Number of Points:1
Point 0
Distribution Point:
[URIName:ldap://CA-server/CN=CA server,OU=PKI,O=Cisco Systems]
Signature:
Algorithm:SHAwithRSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4
Signature:
<snip>
The following example shows an excerpt of the running configuration output when adding a
matchcertificateoverrideocsp command to the beginning of an existing sequence:
match certificate map3 override ocsp 5 url http://192.0.2.3/
show running-configuration
.
.
.
match certificate map3 override ocsp 5 url http://192.0.2.3/
match certificate map1 override ocsp 10 url http://192.0.2.1/
match certificate map2 override ocsp 15 url http://192.0.2.2/
The following example shows an excerpt of the running configuration output when an existing
matchcertificateoverrideocsp command is replaced and a trustpoint is specified to use an alternative PKI hierarchy:
match certificate map4 override ocsp trustpoint tp4 10 url http://192.0.2.4/newvalue
show running-configuration
.
.
.
match certificate map3 override ocsp trustpoint tp3 5 url http://192.0.2.3/
match certificate map1 override ocsp trustpoint tp1 10 url http://192.0.2.1/
match certificate map4 override ocsp trustpoint tp4 10 url http://192.0.2.4/newvalue
match certificate map2 override ocsp trustpoint tp2 15 url http://192.0.2.2/
Troubleshooting Tips
If you ignored revocation check or expired certificates, you should carefully check your configuration. Verify that the certificate map properly matches either the certificate or certificates that should be allowed or the AAA checks that should be skipped. In a controlled environment, try modifying the certificate map and determine what is not working as expected.
Configuring Certificate Chain Validation
Perform this task to configure the processing level for the certificate chain path of your peer certificates.
Before You Begin
The device must be enrolled in your PKI hierarchy.
The appropriate key pair must be associated with the certificate.
Note
A trustpoint associated with the root CA cannot be configured to be validated to the next level.
The chain-validation command is configured with the continue keyword for the trustpoint associated with the root CA, an error message will be displayed and the chain validation will revert to the default chain-validationcommand setting.
Configures the level to which a certificate chain is processed on all certificates including subordinate CA certificates.
Use the stopkeyword to specify that the certificate is already trusted. This is the default setting.
Use the continue keyword to specify that the that the subordinate CA certificate associated with the trustpoint must be validated.
The parent-trustpoint argument specifies the name of the parent trustpoint the certificate must be validated against.
Step 5
exit
Example:
Router(ca-trustpoint)# exit
Returns to global configuration mode
Configuring Certificate Servers for High Availability
You can configure certificate servers to synchronize revoke commands
and send serial-number commands when new certificates are issued, preparing the
standby certificate server to issue certificates and CRLs if it becomes active.
13.
Repeat Steps 1-12 on the standby router, configuring the interface with a different IP address from that of the interface on the active router (Step 6).
14.exit
15.exit
16.showredundancystates
DETAILED STEPS
Command or Action
Purpose
Step 1
configureterminal
Example:
Router# configure terminal
Enters global configuration mode.
Step 2
redundancyinter-device
Example:
Router(config)# redundancy inter-device
Configures redundancy and enters interdevice configuration mode.
Step 3
schemestandbystandby-group-name
Example:
Router(config-red-interdevice)# scheme standby SB
Defines the redundancy scheme that is to be used.
The only supported scheme is “standby.”
standby-group-name--Must match the standby name specified in the standbyname interface configuration command. Also, the standby name must be the same on both routers.
Step 4
exit
Example:
Router(config-red-interdevice)# exit
Exits interdevice configuration mode and returns to global configuration mode.
Step 5
interface interface-name
Example:
Router(config)
# interface gigabitethernet0/1
Configures an interface type for the router and enters interface configuration mode.
Step 6
ipaddressip-addressmask
Example:
Router(config-if) ip address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0
Sets the local IP address for the interface.
Step 7
noiproute-cachecef
Example:
Router(config-if)# no ip route cache cef
Disables Cisco Express Forwarding operation on the interface.
Step 8
noiproute-cache
Example:
Router(config-if)# no ip route cache
Disables fast switching on the interface.
Step 9
standby ip
ip-address
Example:
Router(config-if)# standby ip 10.0.0.3
Activates the Hot Standby Router Protocol (HSRP),
Note
Configure the same address on the active and the standby routers.
Step 10
standby priority
priority
Example:
Router(config-if)# standby priority 50
Sets the HSRP priority to 50.
The priority range is from 1 to 255, where 1 denotes the lowest priority and 255 the highest. The router in the HSRP group with the highest priority value becomes the active router.
Step 11
standby name group-name
Example:
Router(config-if)# standby name SB
Configures the name of the standby group.
The name specifies the HSRP group used. The HSRP group name must be unique on the router.
Sets a delay for HSRP group initialization as follows:
The minimum delay after the interface comes up before initializing the HSRP groups is 30 seconds.
The delay after the router has reloaded is 60 seconds.
Step 13
Repeat Steps 1-12 on the standby router, configuring the interface with a different IP address from that of the interface on the active router (Step 6).
--
Step 14
exit
Example:
Router(config-if)# exit
Returns to global configuration mode.
Step 15
exit
Example:
Router(config)# exit
Returns to privileged EXEC mode.
Step 16
showredundancystates
Example:
Router# show redundancy states
(Optional)
Verifies the redundancy states: standby or active.
Configuring SCTP on the Active and Standby Certificate Servers
Perform this task on the active router to configure SCTP on both the active and the standby certificate server.
11.
Repeat Steps 1 through 10 on the standby router, reversing the IP addresses of the local and remote peers specified in Steps 7 and 10.
DETAILED STEPS
Command or Action
Purpose
Step 1
configureterminal
Example:
Router# configure terminal
Enters global configuration mode.
Step 2
ipczonedefault
Example:
Router(config)# ipc zone default
Configures the interdevice communication protocol, Inter-Process Communication (IPC), and enters IPC zone configuration mode.
Use this command to initiate the communication link between the active router and the standby router.
Step 3
associationassociation-ID
Example:
Router(config-ipczone)# association 1
Configures an association between the two devices and enters IPC association configuration mode.
Step 4
noshutdown
Example:
Router(config-ipczone-assoc)# no shutdown
Ensures that the server association is in the default (enabled) state.
Step 5
protocolsctp
Example:
Router(config-ipczone-assoc)# protocol sctp
Configures SCTP as the transport protocol and enters SCTP protocol configuration mode.
Step 6
local-portlocal-port-number
Example:
Router(config-ipc-protocol-sctp)# local-port 5000
Defines the local SCTP port number that is used to communicate with the redundant peer and enters IPC transport SCTP local configuration mode.
local-port-number--There is not a default value. This argument must be configured for the local port to enable interdevice redundancy. Valid port values: 1 to 65535.
The
local port numbershould
be the same as the remote port number on the peer router.
Defines at least one local IP address that is used to communicate with the redundant peer.
The local IP addresses must match the remote IP addresses on the peer router. There can be either one or two IP addresses, which must be in global VPN routing and forwarding (VRF). A virtual IP address cannot be used.
Step 8
exit
Example:
Router(config-ipc-local-sctp)# exit
Exits IPC transport - SCTP local configuration mode.
Defines the remote SCTP port number that is used to communicate with the redundant peer and enters IPC transport SCTP remote configuration mode.
Note
remote-port-number--There is not a default value. This argument must be configured for the remote port to enable interdevice redundancy. Valid port values: 1 to 65535.
The
remote port number
should be the same as the local port number on the peer router.
Generates an RSA key pair named HA for the certificate server.
Note
Specifying the
redundancy keyword means that the keys will be non-exportable.
Step 3
exit
Example:
Router(config)# exit
Returns to privileged EXEC mode.
Step 4
show crypto key mypubkey rsa
Example:
Router# show crypto key mypubkey rsa
Verifies that redundancy is enabled.
Step 5
configure terminal
Example:
Router# configure terminal
Enters global configuration mode.
Step 6
ip http server
Example:
Router(config)# ip http server
Enables the HTTP server on your system.
Step 7
crypto pki servercs-label
Example:
Router(config)# crypto pki server HA
Specifies the RSA key pair generated in Step 2 as the label for the certificate server and enters certificate server configuration mode.
Step 8
redundancy
Example:
Router (cs-server)# redundancy
Ensures that the server is synchronized to the standby server.
Step 9
no shutdown
Example:
Router(cs-server)# no shutdown
Enables the certificate server.
Note
If the router interface with the SCTP traffic is not secure, you should ensure that the SCTP traffic between the high-availability devices is secured with IPsec.
Configuration Examples for Setting Up Authorization and Revocation of Certificates
The following
showrunning-configcommand output shows the working configuration of a router that is set up to authorize VPN connections using the PKI Integration with AAA Server feature:
Debug of a Successful PKI AAA Authorization Example
The following showdebugging command output shows a successful authorization using the PKI Integration with AAA Server feature:
Router# show debugging
General OS:
TACACS access control debugging is on
AAA Authentication debugging is on
AAA Authorization debugging is on
Cryptographic Subsystem:
Crypto PKI Trans debugging is on
Router#
May 28 19:36:11.117: CRYPTO_PKI: Trust-Point EM-CERT-SERV picked up
May 28 19:36:12.789: CRYPTO_PKI: Found a issuer match
May 28 19:36:12.805: CRYPTO_PKI: cert revocation status unknown.
May 28 19:36:12.805: CRYPTO_PKI: Certificate validated without revocation check
May 28 19:36:12.813: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: checking AAA authorization (ACSLab, POD5.example.com, <all>)
May 28 19:36:12.813: AAA/BIND(00000042): Bind i/f
May 28 19:36:12.813: AAA/AUTHOR (0x42): Pick method list 'ACSLab'
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS: Queuing AAA Authorization request 66 for processing
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS: processing authorization request id 66
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS: Protocol set to None .....Skipping
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS: Sending AV service=pki
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS: Authorization request created for 66(POD5.example.com)
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS: Using server 192.0.2.55
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS(00000042)/0/NB_WAIT/203A4628: Started 5 sec timeout
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS(00000042)/0/NB_WAIT: wrote entire 46 bytes request
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS: Would block while reading pak header
May 28 19:36:12.817: TPLUS(00000042)/0/READ: read entire 12 header bytes (expect 27 bytes)
May 28 19:36:12.817: TPLUS(00000042)/0/READ: read entire 39 bytes response
May 28 19:36:12.817: TPLUS(00000042)/0/203A4628: Processing the reply packet
May 28 19:36:12.817: TPLUS: Processed AV cert-application=all
May 28 19:36:12.817: TPLUS: received authorization response for 66: PASS
May 28 19:36:12.817: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-application" = "all")
May 28 19:36:12.817: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: authorization passed
Router#
Router#
May 28 19:36:18.681: %DUAL-5-NBRCHANGE: IP-EIGRP(0) 101: Neighbor 192.0.2.171 (Tunnel0) is up: new adjacency
Router#
Router# show crypto isakmp sa
dst src state conn-id slot
192.0.2.22 192.0.2.102 QM_IDLE 84 0
Debugs of a Failed PKI AAA Authorization Example
The following showdebugging command output shows that the router is not authorized to connect using VPN. The messages are typical of those that you might see in such a situation.
In this example, the peer username was configured as not authorized, by moving the username to a Cisco Secure ACS group called VPN_Router_Disabled in Cisco Secure ACS. The router, router7200.example.com, has been configured to check with a Cisco Secure ACS AAA server prior to establishing a VPN connection to any peer.
Router# show debugging
General OS:
TACACS access control debugging is on
AAA Authentication debugging is on
AAA Authorization debugging is on
Cryptographic Subsystem:
Crypto PKI Trans debugging is on
Router#
May 28 19:48:29.837: CRYPTO_PKI: Trust-Point EM-CERT-SERV picked up
May 28 19:48:31.509: CRYPTO_PKI: Found a issuer match
May 28 19:48:31.525: CRYPTO_PKI: cert revocation status unknown.
May 28 19:48:31.525: CRYPTO_PKI: Certificate validated without revocation check
May 28 19:48:31.533: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: checking AAA authorization (ACSLab, POD5.example.com, <all>)
May 28 19:48:31.533: AAA/BIND(00000044): Bind i/f
May 28 19:48:31.533: AAA/AUTHOR (0x44): Pick method list 'ACSLab'
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS: Queuing AAA Authorization request 68 for processing
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS: processing authorization request id 68
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS: Protocol set to None .....Skipping
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS: Sending AV service=pki
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS: Authorization request created for 68(POD5.example.com)
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS: Using server 192.0.2.55
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS(00000044)/0/NB_WAIT/203A4C50: Started 5 sec timeout
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS(00000044)/0/NB_WAIT: wrote entire 46 bytes request
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS: Would block while reading pak header
May 28 19:48:31.537: TPLUS(00000044)/0/READ: read entire 12 header bytes (expect 6 bytes)
May 28 19:48:31.537: TPLUS(00000044)/0/READ: read entire 18 bytes response
May 28 19:48:31.537: TPLUS(00000044)/0/203A4C50: Processing the reply packet
May 28 19:48:31.537: TPLUS: received authorization response for 68: FAIL
May 28 19:48:31.537: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: authorization declined by AAA, or AAA server not found.
May 28 19:48:31.537: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: No cert-application attribute found. Failing.
May 28 19:48:31.537: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: authorization failed
May 28 19:48:31.537: CRYPTO_PKI: AAA authorization for list 'ACSLab', and user 'POD5.example.com' failed.
May 28 19:48:31.537: %CRYPTO-5-IKMP_INVAL_CERT: Certificate received from 192.0.2.162 is bad: certificate invalid
May 28 19:48:39.821: CRYPTO_PKI: Trust-Point EM-CERT-SERV picked up
May 28 19:48:41.481: CRYPTO_PKI: Found a issuer match
May 28 19:48:41.501: CRYPTO_PKI: cert revocation status unknown.
May 28 19:48:41.501: CRYPTO_PKI: Certificate validated without revocation check
May 28 19:48:41.505: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: checking AAA authorization (ACSLab, POD5.example.com, <all>)
May 28 19:48:41.505: AAA/BIND(00000045): Bind i/f
May 28 19:48:41.505: AAA/AUTHOR (0x45): Pick method list 'ACSLab'
May 28 19:48:41.505: TPLUS: Queuing AAA Authorization request 69 for processing
May 28 19:48:41.505: TPLUS: processing authorization request id 69
May 28 19:48:41.505: TPLUS: Protocol set to None .....Skipping
May 28 19:48:41.505: TPLUS: Sending AV service=pki
May 28 19:48:41.505: TPLUS: Authorization request created for 69(POD5.example.com)
May 28 19:48:41.505: TPLUS: Using server 198.168.244.55
May 28 19:48:41.509: TPLUS(00000045)/0/IDLE/63B22834: got immediate connect on new 0
May 28 19:48:41.509: TPLUS(00000045)/0/WRITE/63B22834: Started 5 sec timeout
May 28 19:48:41.509: TPLUS(00000045)/0/WRITE: wrote entire 46 bytes request
May 28 19:48:41.509: TPLUS(00000045)/0/READ: read entire 12 header bytes (expect 6 bytes)
May 28 19:48:41.509: TPLUS(00000045)/0/READ: read entire 18 bytes response
May 28 19:48:41.509: TPLUS(00000045)/0/63B22834: Processing the reply packet
May 28 19:48:41.509: TPLUS: received authorization response for 69: FAIL
May 28 19:48:41.509: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: authorization declined by AAA, or AAA server not found.
May 28 19:48:41.509: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: No cert-application attribute found. Failing.
May 28 19:48:41.509: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: authorization failed
May 28 19:48:41.509: CRYPTO_PKI: AAA authorization for list 'ACSLab', and user 'POD5.example.com' failed.
May 28 19:48:41.509: %CRYPTO-5-IKMP_INVAL_CERT: Certificate received from 192.0.2.162 is bad: certificate invalid
Router#
Router# show crypto iskmp sa
dst src state conn-id slot
192.0.2.2 192.0.2.102 MM_KEY_EXCH 95 0
Configuring a Revocation Mechanism Examples
This section contains the following configuration examples that can be used when specifying a revocation mechanism for your PKI:
The following example shows how to configure the router to download the CRL from the CDP. If the CRL is unavailable, the OCSP server that is specified in the AIA extension of the certificate will be used. If both options fail, certificate verification will also fail.
The following example shows how to configure your router to use the OCSP server at the HTTP URL “http://myocspserver:81.” If the server is down, the revocation check will be ignored.
Disabling Nonces in Communications with the OCSP Server Example
The following example shows communications when a nonce, or a unique identifier for the OCSP request, is disabled for communications with the OCSP server:
Configuring a Hub Router at a Central Site for Certificate Revocation Checks Example
The following example shows a hub router at a central site that is providing connectivity for several branch offices to the central site.
The branch offices are also able to communicate directly with each other using additional IPSec tunnels between the branch offices.
The CA publishes CRLs on an HTTP server at the central site. The central site checks CRLs for each peer when setting up an IPSec tunnel with that peer.
The example does not show the IPSec configuration--only the PKI-related configuration is shown.
A certificate map is entered on the branch office router.
Router# configure terminal
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
branch1(config)# crypto pki certificate map central-site 10
branch1(ca-certificate-map)#
The output from the showcertificate command on the central site hub router shows that the certificate was issued by the following:
These two lines are combined into one line using a comma (,) to separate them, and the original lines are added as the first criteria for a match.
Router (ca-certificate-map)# issuer-name co cn=Central Certificate Authority, ou=Home Office Inc
!The above line wrapped but should be shown on one line with the line above it.
The same combination is done for the subject name from the certificate on the central site router (note that the line that begins with “Name:” is not part of the subject name and must be ignored when creating the certificate map criteria). This is the subject name to be used in the certificate map.
The configuration is checked (most of configuration is not shown).
Router# write term
!Many lines left out
.
.
.
crypto pki trustpoint home-office
enrollment url http://ca.home-office.com:80/certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll
serial-number none
fqdn none
ip-address none
subject-name o=Home Office Inc,cn=Branch 1
revocation-check crl
match certificate central-site skip revocation-check
!
!
crypto pki certificate map central-site 10
issuer-name co cn = Central Certificate Authority, ou = Home Office Inc
subject-name eq cn = central vpn gateway, o = home office inc
!many lines left out
Note that the issuer-name and subject-name lines have been reformatted to make them consistent for later matching with the certificate of the peer.
If the branch office is checking the AAA, the trustpoint will have lines similar to the following:
crypto pki trustpoint home-office
auth list allow_list
auth user subj commonname
After the certificate map has been defined as was done above, the following command is added to the trustpoint to skip AAA checking for the central site hub.
match certificate central-site skip authorization-check
In both cases, the branch site router has to establish an IPSec tunnel to the central site to check CRLs or to contact the AAA server. However, without the matchcertificatecommand andcentral-siteskipauthorization-check(argumentandkeyword), the branch office cannot establish the tunnel until it has checked the CRL or the AAA server. (The tunnel will not be established unless the matchcertificatecommand andcentral-siteskipauthorization-check argument and keyword are used.)
The matchcertificate command andallowexpired-certificate keyword would be used at the central site if the router at a branch site had an expired certificate and it had to establish a tunnel to the central site to renew its certificate.
Router# show crypto ca certificate
Certificate
Status: Available
Certificate Serial Number: 2F62BE14000000000CA0
Certificate Usage: General Purpose
Issuer:
cn=Central Certificate Authority
o=Home Office Inc
Subject:
Name: Branch 1 Site
cn=Branch 1 Site
o=Home Office Inc
CRL Distribution Points:
http://ca.home-office.com/CertEnroll/home-office.crl
Validity Date:
start date: 00:43:26 GMT Sep 26 2003
end date: 00:53:26 GMT Oct 3 2003
renew date: 00:00:00 GMT Jan 1 1970
Associated Trustpoints: home-office
CA Certificate
Status: Available
Certificate Serial Number: 1244325DE0369880465F977A18F61CA8
Certificate Usage: Signature
Issuer:
cn=Central Certificate Authority
o=Home Office Inc
Subject:
cn=Central Certificate Authority
o=Home Office Inc
CRL Distribution Points:
http://ca.home-office.com/CertEnroll/home-office.crl
Validity Date:
start date: 22:19:29 GMT Oct 31 2002
end date: 22:27:27 GMT Oct 31 2017
Associated Trustpoints: home-office
A certificate map is entered on the central site router.
Router# configure terminal
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
Router (config)# crypto pki certificate map branch1 10
Router (ca-certificate-map)# issuer-name co cn=Central Certificate Authority, ou=Home Office Inc
!The above line wrapped but should be part of the line above it.
Router (ca-certificate-map)# subject-name eq cn=Brahcn 1 Site,o=home office inc
The configuration should be checked (most of the configuration is not shown).
Router# write term
!many lines left out
crypto pki trustpoint VPN-GW
enrollment url http://ca.home-office.com:80/certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll
serial-number none
fqdn none
ip-address none
subject-name o=Home Office Inc,cn=Central VPN Gateway
revocation-check crl
match certificate branch1 allow expired-certificate
!
!
crypto pki certificate map central-site 10
issuer-name co cn = Central Certificate Authority, ou = Home Office Inc
subject-name eq cn = central vpn gateway, o = home office inc
! many lines left out
The matchcertificatecommand and branch1allowexpired-certificate (argument and keyword) and the certificate map should be removed as soon as the branch router has a new certificate.
Configuring Certificate Authorization and Revocation Settings Examples
This section contains the following configuration examples that can be used when specifying a CRL cache control setting or certificate serial number session control:
The current CRL is still cached immediately after executing the example configuration shown above:
Router# showcryptopkicrls
CRL Issuer Name:
cn=name Cert Manager,ou=pki,o=example.com,c=US
LastUpdate: 18:57:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
NextUpdate: 22:57:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
Retrieved from CRL Distribution Point:
ldap://ldap.example.com/CN=name Cert Manager,O=example.com
When the current CRL expires, a new CRL is then downloaded to the router at the next update. The crl-cachenonecommand takes effect and all CRLs for the trustpoint are no longer cached; caching is disabled. You can verify that no CRL is cached by executing the showcryptopkicrls command. No output will be shown because there are no CRLs cached.
The following example shows how to configure the maximum lifetime of 2 minutes for all CRLs associated with the CA1 trustpoint:
The current CRL is still cached immediately after executing the example configuration above for setting the maximum lifetime of a CRL:
Router# showcryptopkicrls
CRL Issuer Name:
cn=name Cert Manager,ou=pki,o=example.com,c=US
LastUpdate: 18:57:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
NextUpdate: 22:57:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
Retrieved from CRL Distribution Point:
ldap://ldap.example.com/CN=name Cert Manager,O=example.com
When the current CRL expires, a new CRL is downloaded to the router at the next update and the crl-cache delete-after
command takes effect. This newly cached CRL and all subsequent CRLs will be deleted after a maximum lifetime of 2 minutes.
You can verify that the CRL will be cached for 2 minutes by executing the show crypto pki crls
command. Note that the NextUpdate time is 2 minutes after the LastUpdate time.
Router# showcryptopkicrls
CRL Issuer Name:
cn=name Cert Manager,ou=pki,o=example.com,c=US
LastUpdate: 22:57:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
NextUpdate: 22:59:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
Retrieved from CRL Distribution Point:
If the match-criteria value is set to eq (equal) instead of co (contains), the serial number must match the certificate map serial number exactly, including any spaces.
The following example shows the configuration of certificate serial number session control using AAA attributes. In this case, all valid certificates will be accepted if the certificate does not have the serial number “4ACA.”
The server log shows that the certificate with the serial number “4ACA” was rejected. The certificate rejection is
shown using exclamation points.
.
.
.
Dec 3 04:24:39.051: CRYPTO_PKI: Trust-Point CA1 picked up
Dec 3 04:24:39.051: CRYPTO_PKI: locked trustpoint CA1, refcount is 1
Dec 3 04:24:39.051: CRYPTO_PKI: unlocked trustpoint CA1, refcount is 0
Dec 3 04:24:39.051: CRYPTO_PKI: locked trustpoint CA1, refcount is 1
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI: validation path has 1 certs
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI: Found a issuer match
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI: Using CA1 to validate certificate
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI: Certificate validated without revocation check
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI: Selected AAA username: 'PKIAAA'
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI: Anticipate checking AAA list:'CRL'
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: checking AAA authorization (CRL, PKIAAA-L1, <all>)
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: pre-authorization chain validation status (0x4)
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: AAA/BIND(00000021): Bind i/f
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: AAA/AUTHOR (0x21): Pick method list 'CRL'
.
.
.
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-application" = "all")
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-trustpoint" = "CA1")
!
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-serial-not" = "4ACA")
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: cert-serial doesn't match ("4ACA" != "4ACA")
!
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: post-authorization chain validation status (0x7)
!
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI: AAA authorization for list 'CRL', and user 'PKIAAA' failed.
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI: chain cert was anchored to trustpoint CA1, and chain validation result was: CRYPTO_PKI_CERT_NOT_AUTHORIZED
!
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: %CRYPTO-5-IKMP_INVAL_CERT: Certificate received from 192.0.2.43 is bad: certificate invalid
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: %CRYPTO-6-IKMP_MODE_FAILURE: Processing of Main mode failed with peer at 192.0.2.43
.
.
.
Configuring Certificate Chain Validation Examples
This section contains the following configuration examples that can be used to specify the level of certificate chain processing for your device certificates:
Configuring Certificate Chain Validation Through a Gap
In the following configuration example, SubCA1 is not in the configured Cisco IOS hierarchy but is expected to have been supplied in the certificate chain presented by the peer.
If the peer supplies the SubCA1 certificate in the presented certificate chain, the following certificates will be validated--the peer, SubCA11, and SubCA1 certificates.
If the peer does not supply the SubCA1 certificate in the presented certificate chain, the chain validation will fail.
Configuring Certificate Servers for High Availability Example
The following example shows the configuration of SCTP and redundancy
on the active and the standby certificate server, and activation of
synchronization betwen them:
On the Active Router
ipc zone default
association 1
no shutdown
protocol sctp
local-port 5000
local-ip 10.0.0.1
exit
remote-port 5000
remote-ip 10.0.0.2
On the Standby Router
ipc zone default
association 1
no shutdown
protocol sctp
local-port 5000
local-ip 10.0.0.2
exit
remote-port 5000
remote-ip 10.0.0.1
On the Active Router
redundancy inter-device
scheme standby SB
interface GigabitEthernet0/1
ip address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0
no ip route-cache cef
no ip route-cache
standby 0 ip 10.0.0.3
standby 0 priority 50
standby 0 name SB
standby delay min 30 reload 60
On the Standby Router
redundancy inter-device
scheme standby SB
interface GigabitEthernet0/1
ip address 10.0.0.2 255.255.255.0
no ip route-cache cef
no ip route-cache
standby 0 ip 10.0.0.3
standby 0 priority 50
standby 0 name SB
standby delay min 30 reload 60
On the Active Router
crypto pki server mycertsaver
crypto pki server mycertsaver redundancy
The Cisco Support and Documentation website provides online resources to download documentation, software, and tools. Use these resources to install and configure the software and to troubleshoot and resolve technical issues with Cisco products and technologies. Access to most tools on the Cisco Support and Documentation website requires a Cisco.com user ID and password.
Feature Information for Certificate Authorization and Revocation
The following table provides release information about the feature or features described in this module. This table lists only the software release that introduced support for a given feature in a given software release train. Unless noted otherwise, subsequent releases of that software release train also support that feature.
Use Cisco Feature Navigator to find information about platform support and Cisco software image support. To access Cisco Feature Navigator, go to
www.cisco.com/go/cfn. An account on Cisco.com is not required.
Table 2 Feature Information for PKI Certificate Authorization and Revocation
Feature Name
Releases
Feature Information
Cache Control Enhancements for Certification Revocation Lists
12.4(9)T
This feature provides users the ability to disable CRL caching or to specify the maximum lifetime for which a CRL will be cached in router memory. It also provides functionality to configure certificate serial number session control.
The following sections provide information about this feature:
The following commands were introduced or modified by this feature:
crl-cachedelete-after,crl-cachenone,cryptopkicertificatemap
Certificate-Complete Chain Validation
12.4(6)T
This feature provides users the ability to configure the level to which a certificate chain is processed on all certificates including subordinate CA certificates.
The following sections provide information about this feature:
The following command was introduced by this feature:
chain-validation
OCSP - Server Certification from Alternate Hierarchy
12.4(6)T
This feature provides users with the flexibility to specify multiple OCSP servers, either per client certificate or per group of client certificates, and provides the capability for OCSP server validation based on external CA certificates or self-signed certificates.
The following sections provide information about this feature:
The following command was introduced by this feature:
matchcertificateoverrideocsp
Optional OCSP Nonce
12.2(33)SR 12.4(4)T
This feature provides users with the ability to configure the sending of a nonce, or unique identifier for an OCSP request, during OCSP communications.
The following sections provide information about this feature:
Certificate Security Attribute-Based Access Control
12.2(15)T 1
Under the IPsec protocol, CA interoperability permits Cisco IOS devices and a CA to communicate so that the Cisco IOS device can obtain and use digital certificates from the CA. Certificates contain several fields that are used to determine whether a device or user is authorized to perform a specified action. This feature adds fields to the certificate that allow specifying an ACL, creating a certificate-based ACL.
The following sections provide information about this feature:
The following commands were introduced or modified by this feature:
cryptopkicertificatemap,
cryptopkitrustpointmatchcertificate
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
12.3(2)T
This feature allows users to enable OCSP instead of CRLs to check certificate status. Unlike CRLs, which provide only periodic certificate status, OCSP can provide timely information regarding the status of a certificate.
The following sections provide information about this feature:
The following command was modified by this feature:
authorizationusername
PKI Integration with AAA Server
12.3(1)
This feature provides additional scalability for authorization by generating a AAA username from the certificate presented by the peer. A AAA server is queried to determine whether the certificate is authorized for use by the internal component. The authorization is indicated by a component-specified label that must be present in the AV pair for the user.
The following sections provide information about this feature:
The following commands were introduced by this feature:
authorizationlist,
authorizationusername
PKI: Query Multiple Servers During Certificate Revocation Check
12.3(7)T
This feature introduces the ability for Cisco IOS software to make multiple attempts to retrieve the CRL, allowing operations to continue when a particular server is not available. In addition, the ability to override the CDPs in a certificate with a manually configured CDP has been introduced. Manually overriding the CDPs in a certificate can be advantageous when a particular server is unavailable for an extended period of time. The certificate’s CDPs can be replaced with a URL or directory specification without reissuing all of the certificates that contain the original CDP.
The following sections provide information about this feature:
The following command was introduced by this feature:
matchcertificateoverridecdp
Using Certificate ACLs to Ignore Revocation Check and Expired Certificates
12.3(4)T
This feature allows a certificate that meets specified criteria to be accepted regardless of the validity period of the certificate, or if the certificate meets the specified criteria, revocation checking does not have to be performed. Certificate ACLs are used to specify the criteria that the certificate must meet to be accepted or to avoid revocation checking. In addition, if AAA communication is protected by a certificate, this feature provides for the AAA checking of the certificate to be ignored.
The following sections provide information about this feature:
The following command was modified by this feature:
matchcertificate
Query Mode Definition Per Trustpoint
Cisco IOS XE Release 2.1
This feature was introduced on the Cisco ASR 1000 series routers.
PKI High Availability
15.0(1)M
The following commands were introduced or modified:
cryptopkiserver,
cryptopkiserverstart,
cryptopkiserverstop,
cryptopkitrustpoint,
cryptokeygeneratersa,
cryptokeyimportpem,cryptokeymoversa,
showcryptokeymypubkeyrsa.
PKI IPv6 Support for VPN Solutions
15.2(1)T
The
enrollment url (ca-trustpoint) command was modified to specify an IPv6 address in the CA URL.
The
ocsp url
command was modified to specify the IPv6 address in a URL for the OCSP server.