ASA IKEv2-debugs voor Site-to-Site VPN met PSK’s

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Bijgewerkt:6 maart 2013
Document-id:115935

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Over deze vertaling

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Inleiding

Dit document bevat informatie om IKEv2-uitvindingen te begrijpen op de adaptieve security applicatie (ASA) wanneer er preShared Key (PSK's) worden gebruikt.

Voorwaarden

Vereisten

Er zijn geen specifieke vereisten van toepassing op dit document.

Gebruikte componenten

Dit document is niet beperkt tot specifieke software- en hardware-versies.

De informatie in dit document is gebaseerd op de apparaten in een specifieke laboratoriumomgeving. Alle apparaten die in dit document worden beschreven, hadden een opgeschoonde (standaard)configuratie. Als uw netwerk live is, moet u de potentiële impact van elke opdracht begrijpen.

Conventies

Raadpleeg Cisco Technical Tips Conventions (Conventies voor technische tips van Cisco) voor meer informatie over documentconventies.

kernvraagstuk

De pakketuitwisseling in IKEv2 is radicaal verschillend van wat het was in IKEv1. Terwijl in IKEv1 een duidelijk afgebakende fase1-uitwisseling bestond die bestond uit 6 pakketten gevolgd door een fase 2-uitwisseling die bestond uit 3 pakketten, is de IKEv2-uitwisseling variabel. Voor gedetailleerdere informatie over de verschillen en een verklaring van de pakketuitwisseling, raadpleeg IKEv2 Packet Exchange en Protocol Level Debugging.

Gebruikte debugs 

debug crypto ikev2 protocol 127
debug crypto ikev2 platform 127

ASA-configuraties

ASA 1 

interface GigabitEthernet0/0
 nameif outside
 security-level 0
 ip address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0

interface GigabitEthernet0/2
 nameif inside 
 security-level 100 
 ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 

crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
 protocol esp encryption aes-256
 protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5

access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1 
   host  192.168.2.99
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12 
   host 192.168.2.99 

crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.2
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
crypto map outside_map interface outside

crypto ikev2 policy 1
 encryption aes-256
 integrity sha
 group 2
 prf sha
 lifetime seconds 86400

crypto ikev2 enable outside

tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 ipsec-attributes
 ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
 ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

ASA 2 

interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
nameif outside 
security-level 0 
ip address 10.0.0.2 255.255.255.0

interface GigabitEthernet0/2
 nameif inside
 security-level 100
 ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0

crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 
protocol esp encryption aes-256 
protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5

access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
   host 191.168.1.1 
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
   host 191.168.1.12

crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.1 
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 
crypto map outside_map interface outside 

crypto ikev2 policy 1
 encryption aes-256
 integrity sha
 group 2
 prf sha
 lifetime seconds 86400 

crypto ikev2 enable outside 
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 type ipsec-l2l 
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 ipsec-attributes
 ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
 ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

Debugs

ASA1 (Initiator) berichtbeschrijving Debugs ASA2 (Responder) berichtbeschrijving
ASA1 ontvangt een pakket dat overeenkomt met de crypto-verbinding voor peer ASA 10.0.0.2. Initieert SA-creatie. 
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel 
   group for IP: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.2 
   using peer IP
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tp_name set to:
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing outgoing negotiating 
   sa count by one
 
Het eerste paar berichten is de IKE_SA_INIT uitwisseling. Deze berichten onderhandelen over cryptografische algoritmen, wisselen nonces uit en doen een Diffie-Hellman uitwisseling. Relevante configuratie: 
crypto ikev2 
   policy 1
encryption 
aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 
  86400
crypto ikev2 
  enable
  outside

Tunnel Group 
 matching the 
 identity name 
 is present:

tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.2 
   type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.2
   ipsec-attributes
ikev2 
   remote-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****
ikev2 
   local-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE Event: EV_INIT_SA
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 
   (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI 
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
 
Initiator bouwt pakket IKE_INIT_SA. Het bevat:
  1. ISAKMP-header - SPI/versie/vlaggen
  2. SAi1 -cryptografisch algoritme dat door IKE-initiator wordt ondersteund
  3. KEi -DH openbare sleutelwaarde van de initiatiefnemer
  4. N-initiator éénmaal
 
R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG 
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   r: 0000000000000000]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 0000000000000000
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
 SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44  Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, 
   SPI size: 0, #trans: 4 
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 136
    DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
      19 65 43 45 d2 72 a7 11 b8 a4 93 3f 44 95 6c b8
     6d 5a f0 f8 1f f3 d4 b9 ff 41 7b 0d 13 90 82 cf
     34 2e 74 e3 03 6e 9e 00 88 80 5d 86 2c 4c 79 35
     ee e6 98 91 89 f3 48 83 75 09 02 f1 3c b1 7f f5
     be 05 f1 fa 7e 8a 4c 43 eb a9 2c 3a 47 c0 68 40
     f5 dd 02 9d a5 b5 a2 a6 90 64 95 fc 57 b5 69 e8
     b2 4f 8e f2 a5 05 e3 c7 17 f9 c0 e0 c8 3e 91 ed
     c1 09 23 3e e5 09 4f be 1a 6a d4 d9 fb 65 44 1d
N  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
     84 8b 80 c2 52 6c 4f c7 f8 08 b8 ed! 52 af a2 f4
     d5 dd d4 f4
VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 23

     43 49 53 43 4f 2d 44 45 4c 45 54 45 2d 52 45 41
     53 4f 4e
 VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 59

     43 49 53 43 4f 28 43 4f 50 59 52 49 47 48 54 29
     26 43 6f 70 79 72 69 67 68 74 20 28 63 29 20 32
     30 30 39 20 43 69 73 63 6f 20 53 79 73 74 65 6d
     73 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e
 VID  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3
 
De initiatiefnemer wordt verzonden. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500
  
— Initiator verstuurd IKE_INIT_SA —>
  
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x0000000000000000 
   MID=00000000
Responder ontvangt IKEV_INIT_SA.
  
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 
   10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   r: 0000000000000000]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 0000000000000000
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing incoming negotiating 
   sa count by one
SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
 KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
    DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE 
   Event: EV_RECV_INIT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
Responder initieert SA creatie voor dat peer.
  
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_INSERT_SA
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Insert SA
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event:EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
   Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): No NAT found
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT  
   Event: EV_PKI_SESH_OPEN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Opening a PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG
Responder verifieert en verwerkt het IKE_INIT-bericht:
  1. Kies de crypto suite van de initiator.
  2. berekent zijn eigen DH geheime sleutel.
  3. Het compileert ook een zeer belangrijke waarde, waarvan alle sleutels voor deze IKE_SA kunnen worden afgeleid. Alle behalve de kopregels van alle volgende berichten worden versleuteld en geauthentiseerd. De sleutels die gebruikt worden voor de bescherming tegen encryptie en integriteit zijn afgeleid van SKEYID en staan bekend als: a. SK_e (encryptie). b. SK_a (authenticatie). c. SK_d wordt afgeleid en gebruikt voor de afleiding van verder stuurmateriaal voor KINDEREN_SA's. Een afzonderlijke SK_e en SK_a worden voor elke richting berekend.
Relevante configuratie: 
 
crypto ikev2 
   policy 1
encryption 
   aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 
   86400
crypto ikev2 
   enable 
   outside

Tunnel Group 
matching the 
identity name 
is present:

tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.1 
   type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.1 
   ipsec-
   attributes
ikev2 remote-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****
ikev2 local-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****
  
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-3:   IKE Proposal: 1, SPI size: 0 
   (initial negotiation),
Num. transforms: 4
AES-CBC SHA1 SHA96 DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
   FRAGMENTATIONIKEv2-PROTO-3: 
   Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
 SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136

DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
ASA2 bouwt het antwoordbericht voor IKE_SA_INIT uitwisseling, dat door ASA1 wordt ontvangen. Dit pakket bevat:
  1. ISAKMP-header (SPI/versie/vlaggen)
  2. SAr1 (cryptografisch algoritme dat IKE-responder kiest)
  3. KEr (DH publieke hoofdwaarde van de responder)
  4. Opnieuw nadenken
  
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500 InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
   RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 MID=00000000
ASA2 stuurt het antwoordbericht naar ASA1.
<— Responder verzonden IKE_INIT_SA —
ASA1 ontvangt het IKE_SA_INIT responspakket van ASA2. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT 
   [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
   RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000000

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE 
   Event: EV_DONE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): 
   Fragmentation is
   enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco 
   DeleteReason Notify 
   is enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete 
   SA init exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE 
   Event: EV_CHK4_ROLE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000

CurState: INIT_DONE Event: 
   EV_START_TMR
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Starting 
   timer to wait for auth 
   message (30 sec)
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
Responder start de timer voor het Auth-proces.
ASA1 verifieert en verwerkt de respons:
  1. De initiator DH geheven sleutel wordt berekend
  2. De initiator-toets wordt ook gegenereerd 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338

 SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
 KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
    DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_WAIT_INIT 
   Event: EV_RECV_INIT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): NAT-T is disabled
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_DONE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Fragmentation is enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco DeleteReason Notify is enabled
 
De IKE_INIT_SA uitwisseling tussen de ASA's is nu voltooid. 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete SA init exchange
  
De Initiator start de "IKE_AUTH"-uitwisseling en start de opwekking van de authenticatie lading. Het IKE_AUTH-pakket bevat:
  1. ISAKMP-header (SPI/versie/vlaggen).
  2. IDi (identiteit initiator) .
  3. AUTOMATISCHE lading .
  4. SAi2 (initieert de SA-vergelijkbaar met de fase 2 transformatie set-uitwisseling in IKEv1).
  5. TSi en TSr (Initiator en Responder Traffic Selectors): Ze bevatten het bron- en doeladres van de initiator- en antwoordapparaat om versleuteld verkeer door te sturen/ontvangen. Het adresbereik specificeert dat al het verkeer naar en van dat bereik gekanaliseerd zal worden. Als het voorstel aanvaardbaar is voor de respondent, stuurt het identieke TS-terugbetalingen.
Het 1ste KIND_SA wordt gemaakt voor de proxy_ID paar dat het trigger pakje aanpast. Relevante configuratie: 
crypto ipsec 
   ikev2 
   ipsec-proposal 
   AES256
 protocol esp 
   encryption 
   aes-256
 protocol esp 
   integrity 
   sha-1 md5

access-list 
   l2l_list 
   extended 
   permit ip 
   host 10.0.0.2 
   host 10.0.0.1
 
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
   CISCO-GRANITE
IKEv2-PROTO-3:   ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
   (IPSec negotiation),
Num. transforms: 4
   AES-CBC   SHA96   MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: INITIAL_CONTACT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Building packet for encryption; 
   contents are:
 VID  Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
    Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

     47 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
    Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

  TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665

IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
 ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 256
Encrypted data: 252 bytes
  
ASA1 stuurt het IKE_AUTH-pakket naar ASA2. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001
 
— Initiator verzonden IKE_AUTH —>
  
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001
ASA2 ontvangt dit pakket van ASA1.
  
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Request has mess_id 1; 
   expected 1 through 1 REAL Decrypted packet:
   Data: 216 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  
   Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
    Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

     47 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
    Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
 TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Stopping timer to wait for auth 
   message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_ID
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Recieved valid parameteres in 
   process id
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_FOR_
   PROF_SEL
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group for 
   ID: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1 using 
   phase 1 ID
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4EAP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_POLREQEAP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH

IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PLAT-2: Build config mode reply: no request stored
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK4_IC
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Processing initial contact
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_REDIRECT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Redirect check is not needed, 
   skipping it
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer is accepted
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map 
   outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
ASA2 stopt de auth timer en verifieert de verificatiegegevens van ASA1. Dan genereert het zijn eigen verificatiegegevens, precies zoals ASA1. Relevante configuratie: 
crypto ipsec 
   ikev2 
   ipsec-
   proposal 
   AES256
 protocol esp 
   encryption 
   aes-256
 protocol esp 
   integrity 
   sha-1 md5
  
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_MY_AUTH_METHOD
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK4_SIGN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
   CISCO-GRANITE
IKEv2-PROTO-3:   ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 (IPSec 
   negotiation),
Num. transforms: 3
   AES-CBC   SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: 
   ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORTIKEv2-PROTO-5: 
   Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGSIKEv2-PROTO-3:
     (16):
Building packet for encryption; contents are:
 VID  Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
     25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDr  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 12 Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
     51 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 28 Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, 
   reserved: 0x0, length: 40
  Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

 TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
 NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  Next payload: NOTIFY, 
   reserved: 0x0, length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE, 
   spi size: 0, type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
 NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
   type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: 
   RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
 ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 208
Encrypted data: 204 bytes
Het IKE_AUTH-pakket dat van ASA2 is verzonden bevat:
  1. ISAKMP-header (SPI/versie/vlaggen).
  2. IDr. (identiteit van de responder).
  3. AUTO-lading.
  4. SAr2 (initieert de SA-vergelijkbaar met de fase 2 transformatie set exchange in IKEv1).
  5. TSi en TSr (Initiator en Responder Traffic Selectors): Ze bevatten het bron- en doeladres van de Initiator en respectievelijk Responder om versleuteld verkeer door te sturen/ontvangen. Het adresbereik specificeert dat al het verkeer naar en van dat bereik gekanaliseerd zal worden. Deze parameters zijn identiek aan de parameters die van ASA1 werden ontvangen.
  
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001
Responder verstuurt de reactie op IKE_AUTH.
<— Responder verzonden —
De initiator ontvangt een antwoord van Responder. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
   RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
   RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: 
   Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing  
   the PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): 
   SA created; 
   inserting SA into database
Responder voegt een ingang in SAD in.
ASA1 verifieert en verwerkt de authenticatiegegevens in dit pakket. ASA1 plaatst deze SA in zijn SAD. 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 168 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  
   Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDr  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
    Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

     51 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
    Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

   TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload: 
   ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  
   Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
    Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
   type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload: 
   NON_FIRST_FRAGS NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload:
   NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
    Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
   type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
Decrypted packet:Data: 236 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Process auth response notify
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_
   FOR_PROF_SEL
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PLAT-3: connection initiated with tunnel 
   group 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_EAP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_IKE_ONLY
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing the PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): SA created; inserting SA into 
   database
 
De tunnel staat op de Initiator. 
CONNECTION 
    STATUS: UP... 
   peer: 10.0.0.2:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION

CONNECTION 
   STATUS: UP... 
   peer: 10.0.0.1:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION
De tunnel staat op de Responder. De Respondertunnel komt meestal voor de Initiator.
IKEv2-registratieproces. 
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
   connection 
   auth hdl set to 15
IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn 
   attribute retrieval 
   successfully queued 
   for register session 
   request.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle 
   timeout set to: 30
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session 
   timeout set to: 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   policy set to 
   DfltGrpPolicy
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class 
   attr set
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel 
   protocol set to: 0x5c
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter 
   ID not configured 
   for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   lock set to: none
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID 
   not configured 
   for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
   connection attribues 
   set valid to TRUE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully 
   retrieved conn attrs
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session 
   registration after conn 
   attr retrieval 
   PASSED, No error
IKEv2-PLAT-3:
CONNECTION STATUS: 
   REGISTERED... 
   peer: 10.0.0.2:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.2

IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
   connection 
   auth hdl set to 15
IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn 
   attribute retrieval 
   successfully queued for 
   register session request.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle 
   timeout 
   set to: 30
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session 
   timeout 
   set to: 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   policy set to 
   DfltGrpPolicy
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class 
   attr set
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel 
   protocol set to: 0x5c
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter ID 
   not configured 
   for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   lock set to: none
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID 
   not configured 
   for connection
   attribues set 
   valid to TRUE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully 
   retrieved conn attrs
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session 
   registration after conn 
   attr retrieval PASSED, 
   No error
IKEv2-PLAT-3:
CONNECTION STATUS: 
   REGISTERED... 
   peer: 10.0.0.1:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-registratieproces.

Uitrusting voor kinderbeveiliging

Deze uitwisseling bestaat uit één enkel verzoek/responpaar en werd aangeduid als fase 2-uitwisseling in IKEv1. Het zou kunnen worden geïnitieerd door één van beide eind van de IKE_SA nadat de eerste uitwisselingen zijn voltooid.

ASA1 CHILD_SA berichtbeschrijving Debugs ASA2 KINDERD_SA berichtbeschrijving
  
IKEv2-PLAT-5: INVALID PSH HANDLE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group 
   for IP: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1 
   using peer IP
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tp_name set to:
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PSH cleanup
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: READY 
   Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_INIT 
   Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for IPSEC rekey
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_BLD_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-3:?ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
   (IPSec negotiation), num. transforms: 4
   AES-CBC?SHA96?MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption; 
   contents are:
   SA?Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, 
   SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:  
  length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
fa b7 f0 48
TSi?Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr?Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12

IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if request will fit in 
   peer window
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
ENCR?Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 152
Encrypted data: 148 bytes
ASA2 start de uitwisseling van CHILD_SA. Dit is het CREATE_CHILD_SA verzoek. Het pakket Kinderslot_SA bevat doorgaans:
  1. SA HDR. (versie.flags/type uitwisseling)
  2. Nonce Ni (optioneel): Als het CHILD_SA wordt gecreëerd als deel van de eerste uitwisseling, moet een tweede KE-lading en één keer NIET worden verstuurd.
  3. SA payload
  4. KEi (Key-optioneel): Het CREATE_CHILD_SA-verzoek kan optioneel een KE-lading bevatten voor een extra DH-uitwisseling om krachtigere garanties van voorwaartse geheimhouding voor het KILD_SA mogelijk te maken. Als de SA verschillende DH-groepen aanbiedt, MOET KEi een onderdeel van de groep zijn waarvan de initiator verwacht dat de responder accepteert.?Als het verkeerd schat, zal de CREATE_CHILD_SA-uitwisseling mislukken. Probeer het met een andere KEi.
  5. N (vermeld de lading-optioneel): The Notify Payload wordt gebruikt om informatieve gegevens, zoals foutenvoorwaarden en staatstransities, naar een IKE peer door te geven. Een loonsom wordt aangegeven in een antwoordbericht (meestal geeft u aan waarom een verzoek is afgewezen), in een INFORTIONELE ruil (om een fout niet in een IKE-aanvraag te melden) of in een ander bericht om de verzendmogelijkheden aan te geven of om de betekenis van het verzoek te wijzigen. Als deze CREATE_CHILD_SA beurs een bestaande SA behalve de IKE_SA opnieuw probeert te activeren, moet de toonaangevende N payload van type REKEY_SA de SA identificeren die wordt opgewaardeerd.?Als deze CREATE_CHILD_SA beurs een bestaande SA niet opnieuw aanprobeert, moet de N payload worden weggelaten.
  6. TSi en TSr (optioneel): Dit toont de verkeerselectie waarvoor de SA is gemaakt. In dit geval is het tussen gastheren 192.168.1.12 en 192.168.2.1999.
ASA1 ontvangt dit pakje. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
   RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx 
   [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 
   10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT 
   [CREATE_CHILD_SA]
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_I_WAIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
 ASA2 verstuurt dit pakket en wacht op de reactie.
ASA1 ontvangt dit exacte pakket van ASA2 en verifieert het. 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: INITIATOR 
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Request has mess_id 6; 
   expected 6 through 6
   REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 124 bytes
   SA?Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, 
   SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 ype: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
fa b7 f0 48
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr?Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
Decrypted packet:Data: 180 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: READY 
   Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT 
   Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 urState: CHILD_R_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_CC_TYPE
  
ASA1 bouwt nu het antwoord voor de uitwisseling van KINDEREN_SA. Dit is de CREATE_CHILD_SA Response. Het pakket Kinderslot_SA bevat doorgaans:
  1. SA HDR. (versie.flags/type uitwisseling)
  2. Nonce Ni (optioneel): Als het CHILD_SA wordt gecreëerd als deel van de eerste uitwisseling, moet een tweede KE-lading en één keer NIET worden verstuurd.
  3. SA payload
  4. KEi (Key-optioneel): Het CREATE_CHILD_SA-verzoek kan optioneel een KE-lading bevatten voor een extra DH-uitwisseling om krachtigere garanties van voorwaartse geheimhouding voor de CHILD_SA mogelijk te maken. Als de SA verschillende DH-groepen aanbiedt, MOET KEi een onderdeel van de groep zijn waarvan de initiator verwacht dat de responder accepteert.?Als het verkeerd schat, mislukt de CREATE_CHILD_SA-uitwisseling en zal deze opnieuw met een poging moeten doen andere KEi.
  5. N (vermeld de lading-optioneel): The Notify Payload wordt gebruikt om informatieve gegevens, zoals fout?condities en staatstransities, naar een IKE-peer door te geven.?Een loonsom opgeven kan verschijnen in een antwoordbericht (meestal specificeert waarom een verzoek werd afgewezen), in een INFORTIONELE ruil (om een fout niet in een IKE-verzoek te melden) of in een ander bericht om de verzendmogelijkheden aan te geven of om de betekenis van het verzoek te wijzigen. Als deze CREATE_CHILD_SA beurs een bestaande SA behalve de IKE_SA opnieuw probeert te activeren, moet de toonaangevende N payload van type REKEY_SA de SA identificeren die wordt opgewaardeerd.?Als deze CREATE_CHILD_SA beurs een bestaande SA niet opnieuw aanprobeert, moet de N payload worden weggelaten.
  6. TSi en TSr (optioneel): Dit toont de verkeerselectie waarvoor de SA is gemaakt. In dit geval is het tussen gastheren 192.168.1.12 en 192.168.2.1999.
 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for create child 
   response message type
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child 
   SA exchange
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer 
   is accepted
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map 
   outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000005 
   CurState: EXIT Event: EV_FREE_NEG
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Deleting negotiation context 
   for peer message ID: 0x5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
   CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Requesting SPI from IPSec
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_WAIT_SPI Event: EV_OK_GOT_SPI
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_BLD_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-3:?ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
  (IPSec negotiation),
Num. transforms: 3
AES-CBC?SHA96?
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption; 
   contents are:
SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 40
Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12
type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8
type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x0, 
   reserved: 0x0: length: 8
type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

N?Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24

b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05 
   18 1a 27 a6 cb
01 56 22 ad
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, 
   end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr?Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx 
   [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE 
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172
ENCR?Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 144
Encrypted data: 140 bytes
 
ASA1 stuurt het antwoord. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT 
   [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->
   [10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006
 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
   RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->
   [10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx 
   [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 
   10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
 ASA2 ontvangt dit pakje.
  
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172

REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 116 bytes
SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x0, 
   reserved: 0x0: length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

N?Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24

b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05 18 
   1a 27 a6 cb
01 56 22 ad
TSi?Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, 
   end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, 
   end addr: 192.168.1.12

Decrypted packet:Data: 172 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
   CHILD_I_WAIT Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing any notify-messages 
   in child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (
   I) MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_CHK_IKE_REKEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if IKE SA rekey
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_GEN_LOAD_IPSEC
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Load IPSEC key material
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10
 ASA2 verifieert nu het pakje
ASA1 voegt deze kind SA-ingang in in de veiligheidsassocidatabase. 
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_DONE 
   Event: EV_OK

IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): 
   SA created; inserting 
   SA into database

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
   CHILD_R_DONE 
   Event: EV_START_DEL_NEG_TMR
 
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_I_DONE 
   Event: EV_OK

IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): 
   SA created; 
   inserting SA into database
ASA2 voegt deze kind SA-ingang in in de veiligheidsassocidatabase.

Tunnelverificatie

ISAKMP

Opdracht 

show crypto isakmp sa det

Uitvoer

ASA 1

ASA1(config)#sh cry isa sa det
There are no IKEv1 SAs

IKEv2 SAs:Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id             Local              Remote     Status         Role
1889403559      10.0.0.1/500        10.0.0.2/500      READY    RESPONDER

      Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
      Life/Active Time: 86400/195 sec
      Session-id: 99220
      Status Description: Negotiation done
      Local spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7       Remote spi: FD366326E1FED6FE
      Local id: 10.0.0.1
      Remote id: 10.0.0.2
      Local req mess id: 14             Remote req mess id: 16
      Local next mess id: 14            Remote next mess id: 16
      Local req queued: 14              Remote req queued: 16
      Local window: 1                   Remote window: 1
      DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
      NAT-T is not detected
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
          AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
          CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
          Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
          ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a
          AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
          CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
          Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
          ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel

ASA 2

ASA2(config)#sh cry isa sa det

There are no IKEv1 SAs

IKEv2 SAs:

Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id??????????????? Local?????????????? Remote??? Status??????? Role
472237395???????? 10.0.0.2/500???????? 10.0.0.1/500???? READY?? INITIATOR
????? Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
????? Life/Active Time: 86400/190 sec
????? Session-id: 99220
????? Status Description: Negotiation done
????? Local spi: FD366326E1FED6FE?????? Remote spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
????? Local id: 10.0.0.2
????? Remote id: 10.0.0.1
????? Local req mess id: 16???????????? Remote req mess id: 13
????? Local next mess id: 16??????????? Remote next mess id: 13
????? Local req queued: 16????????????? Remote req queued: 13
????? Local window: 1?????????????????? Remote window: 1
????? DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
????? NAT-T is not detected ?
Child sa: local selector? 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
????????? remote selector 192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
????????? ESP spi in/out: 0x8717a5a/0x8564387d ?
????????? AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0 ?
????????? CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0 ?
????????? Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
????????? ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selector? 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
????????? remote selector 192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
????????? ESP spi in/out: 0xf0d97b2a/0x74756292 ?
????????? AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0 ?
????????? CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0 ?
????????? Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
????????? ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel

IPsec

Opdracht 

show crypto ipsec sa

Uitvoer

ASA 1

ASA1(config)#sh cry ipsec sa
interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1 
        host 192.168.2.99
       local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
          (192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
       remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
          192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
       current_peer: 10.0.0.2

       #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
       #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
       #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
       #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
          #pkts decomp failed: 0
       #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
          #fragments created: 0
       #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, 
          #decapsulated frgs needing reassembly: 0
       #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

       local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto endpt.: 
          10.0.0.2/500
       path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
       current outbound spi: F0D97B2A
       current inbound spi : 74756292

     inbound esp sas:
       spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
          transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
          in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
          slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
          sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4008959/28628)
          IV size: 16 bytes
          replay detection support: Y
          Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4147199/28628)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x00000001

    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12 
        host 192.168.2.99
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
        192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      current_peer: 10.0.0.2
      #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
      #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
        #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
        #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
        reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto 
        endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 08717A5A
      current inbound spi : 8564387D

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28734)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28734)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x00000001

ASA 2

ASA2(config)#sh cry ipsec sa
interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 host 
        192.168.1.12
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      current_peer: 10.0.0.1

      #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
      #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
        #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
        #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
        reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto 
        endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 8564387D
      current inbound spi : 08717A5A

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4193279/28770)
         IV size: 16 bytes         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28770)
         IV size: 16 bytes         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x00000001

   Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2

     access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
       host 192.168.1.1
     local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
       192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
     remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
       (192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
     current_peer: 10.0.0.1
     #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
     #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
     #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
     #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
       #pkts decomp failed: 0
     #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
       #fragments created: 0
     #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
       reassembly: 0
     #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

     local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto 
       endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
     path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
     current outbound spi: 74756292
     current inbound spi : F0D97B2A

   inbound esp sas:
     spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
        transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
        in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
        slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28663)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x0000000F
   outbound esp sas:
     spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
        transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
        in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
        slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4331519/28663)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x00000001

U kunt ook de uitvoer van de show crypto ikev2 als opdracht controleren. Dit geeft een uitvoer die identiek is aan de uitvoer van de show crypto isakmp als opdracht: 

IKEv2 SAs:

Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id                Local               Remote   Status        Role
1889403559         10.0.0.1/500         10.0.0.2/500    READY   RESPONDER
      Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
      Life/Active Time: 86400/179 sec
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a

Gerelateerde informatie

TAC Authored

Bijgedragen door Cisco-engineers

  • Anu M Chacko
    Cisco TAC Engineer.

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