Gebruik ASA IKEv2 Debugs voor Site-to-Site VPN met PSK's
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Bijgewerkt:29 april 2025
Document-id:115935
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Over deze vertaling
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Inleiding
In dit document wordt informatie beschreven over fouten in Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) op de Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA).
Voorwaarden
Vereisten
Er zijn geen specifieke vereisten van toepassing op dit document.
Gebruikte componenten
Dit document is niet beperkt tot specifieke software- en hardware-versies.
De informatie in dit document is gebaseerd op de apparaten in een specifieke laboratoriumomgeving. Alle apparaten die in dit document worden beschreven, hadden een opgeschoonde (standaard)configuratie. Als uw netwerk live is, moet u zorgen dat u de potentiële impact van elke opdracht begrijpt.
kernvraagstuk
Het pakketuitwisselingsproces dat in IKEv2 wordt gebruikt, verschilt radicaal van dat in IKEv1. Met IKEv1 is er een duidelijk afgebakende fase1-uitwisseling die bestaat uit zes pakketten en vervolgens is er een fase 2-uitwisseling die bestaat uit drie pakketten. De IKEv2-uitwisseling is variabel.
Tip: Raadpleeg IKEv2 Packet Exchange en Foutopsporing op protocolniveau voor meer gedetailleerde informatie over de verschillen en een uitleg van het pakketuitwisselingsproces.
Gebruikte debugs
Deze twee debugs worden gebruikt voor IKEv2:
debug crypto ikev2 protocol 127
debug crypto ikev2 platform 127
ASA-configuraties
Deze sectie geeft voorbeeldconfiguraties voor ASA1 (de initiator) en ASA2 (de responder).
ASA1
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
nameif outside
security-level 0
ip address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0
interface GigabitEthernet0/2
nameif inside
security-level 100
ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0
crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
protocol esp encryption aes-256
protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1
host 192.168.2.99
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12
host 192.168.2.99
crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.2
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
crypto map outside_map interface outside
crypto ikev2 policy 1
encryption aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 86400
crypto ikev2 enable outside
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 ipsec-attributes
ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****
ASA2
interface GigabitEthernet0/1
nameif outside
security-level 0
ip address 10.0.0.2 255.255.255.0
interface GigabitEthernet0/2
nameif inside
security-level 100
ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0
crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
protocol esp encryption aes-256
protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99
host 192.168.1.1
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99
host 192.168.1.12
crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.1
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
crypto map outside_map interface outside
crypto ikev2 policy 1
encryption aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 86400
crypto ikev2 enable outside
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 ipsec-attributes
ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****
Debugs
In dit gedeelte worden de ASA1 (initiator) en ASA2 (responder) tunnelonderhandelingen en de foutmeldingen en berichtbeschrijvingen van de Child Security Association (SA) beschreven.
tunnelonderhandeling
ASA1 ontvangt een pakket dat overeenkomt met de crypto Access Control List (ACL) voor de peer ASA 10.0.0.2 en initieert de SA-creatie:
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel
group for IP: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.2
using peer IP
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tp_name set to:
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing outgoing negotiating
sa count by one
Het eerste paar berichten dat wordt verzonden, is voor de IKE_SA_INIT-uitwisseling. Deze berichten onderhandelen over de cryptografische algoritmen, wisselen nonces uit en voeren een Diffie-Hellman (DH) -uitwisseling uit.
Hier is de relevante configuratie voor ASA1:
crypto ikev2 policy 1
encryption aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 86400
crypto ikev2 enable outside
Tunnel Group matching the identity name is present:
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 ipsec-attributes
ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****
Hier is de debug-uitvoer voor deze uitwisseling:
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE Event: EV_INIT_SA
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000
(I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
ASA1 bouwt vervolgens het IKE_INIT_SA-pakket, dat het volgende bevat:
- ISAKMP-koptekst (SPI/versie/vlaggen)
- SAi1 (cryptografisch algoritme dat de IKE-initiator ondersteunt)
- KEi (DH public key value van de initiator)
- N (initiator nonce)
R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000
CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0]
m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 -
r: 0000000000000000]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 -
rspi: 0000000000000000
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT,
flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
SA Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0,
length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0,
length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE,
SPI size: 0, #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0,
id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
KE Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0,
length: 136
DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
19 65 43 45 d2 72 a7 11 b8 a4 93 3f 44 95 6c b8
6d 5a f0 f8 1f f3 d4 b9 ff 41 7b 0d 13 90 82 cf
34 2e 74 e3 03 6e 9e 00 88 80 5d 86 2c 4c 79 35
ee e6 98 91 89 f3 48 83 75 09 02 f1 3c b1 7f f5
be 05 f1 fa 7e 8a 4c 43 eb a9 2c 3a 47 c0 68 40
f5 dd 02 9d a5 b5 a2 a6 90 64 95 fc 57 b5 69 e8
b2 4f 8e f2 a5 05 e3 c7 17 f9 c0 e0 c8 3e 91 ed
c1 09 23 3e e5 09 4f be 1a 6a d4 d9 fb 65 44 1d
N Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0,
length: 24
84 8b 80 c2 52 6c 4f c7 f8 08 b8 ed! 52 af a2 f4
d5 dd d4 f4
VID Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0,
length: 23
43 49 53 43 4f 2d 44 45 4c 45 54 45 2d 52 45 41
53 4f 4e
VID Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 59
43 49 53 43 4f 28 43 4f 50 59 52 49 47 48 54 29
26 43 6f 70 79 72 69 67 68 74 20 28 63 29 20 32
30 30 39 20 43 69 73 63 6f 20 53 79 73 74 65 6d
73 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e
VID Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
40 48 b7 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3
Het IKE_INIT_SA pakket wordt vervolgens verzonden door ASA1:
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT]
[10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500
ASA2 ontvangt het IKEV_INIT_SA-pakket:
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_SA_INIT]
[10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500
InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x0000000000000000
MID=00000000
ASA2 initieert de SA-creatie voor die peer:
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R
10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 -
r: 0000000000000000]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 -
rspi: 0000000000000000
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT,
flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing incoming negotiating
sa count by one
SA Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0,
length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0,
#trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0,
id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
KE Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE
Event: EV_RECV_INIT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
ASA2 verifieert en verwerkt het IKE_INIT-bericht:
- Het kiest de crypto-suite uit die welke worden aangeboden door ASA1.
- Het berekent zijn eigen DH geheime sleutel.
- Het berekent ook een SKEYID-waarde, waaruit alle sleutels kunnen worden afgeleid voor deze IKE_SA. Alle headers, behalve de headers van alle berichten die hierna komen, zijn gecodeerd en geverifieerd. De sleutels die worden gebruikt voor de codering en integriteitsbescherming zijn afgeleid van de SKEYID en staan bekend als:
- SK_e wordt gebruikt voor encryptie.
- SK_a wordt gebruikt voor authenticatie.
- SK_d wordt afgeleid en gebruikt voor de afleiding van verder sleutelmateriaal voor CHILD_SA's. Er wordt een afzonderlijke SK_e en SK_a berekend voor elke richting.
- SK_e wordt gebruikt voor encryptie.
Hier is de relevante configuratie voor ASA2:
crypto ikev2 policy 1
encryption aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 86400
crypto ikev2 enable outside
Tunnel Group matching the identity name is present:
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 ipsec-attributes
ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****
Dit is de debug output:
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_INSERT_SA
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Insert SA
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT
Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event:EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT
Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): No NAT found
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT
Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_PKI_SESH_OPEN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Opening a PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT
Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000000
CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG
ASA2 bouwt vervolgens het antwoordbericht op voor de IKE_SA_INIT-uitwisseling, die wordt ontvangen door ASA1. Dit pakket bevat:
- ISAKMP-koptekst (SPI/versie/vlaggen)
- SAr1 (cryptografisch algoritme dat IKE-responder kiest)
- KEr (publieke sleutelwaarde van de responder)
- Responder Nonce
Dit is de debug output:
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-3: IKE Proposal: 1, SPI size: 0
(initial negotiation),
Num. transforms: 4
AES-CBC SHA1 SHA96 DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload:
FRAGMENTATIONIKEv2-PROTO-3:
Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 -
rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT,
flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
SA Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0,
length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0,
#trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0,
id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
KE Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
ASA2 stuurt de respondentboodschap naar ASA1:
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT]
[10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500 InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958
RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 MID=00000000
ASA1 ontvangt het IKE_SA_INIT-responspakket van ASA2:
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT
[IKE_SA_INIT]
[10.0.0.2]:500->
[10.0.0.1]:500
InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958
RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665
MID=00000000
ASA2 start de timer voor het autorisatieproces:
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000
CurState: INIT_DONE
Event: EV_DONE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
Fragmentation is
enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco
DeleteReason Notify
is enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete
SA init exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000
CurState: INIT_DONE
Event: EV_CHK4_ROLE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000
CurState: INIT_DONE Event:
EV_START_TMR
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Starting
timer to wait for auth
message (30 sec)
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000000
CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH
Event: EV_NO_EVENT
ASA1 verifieert en verwerkt de respons:
- De initiator DH geheime sleutel wordt berekend.
- De initiator SKEYID wordt gegenereerd.
Dit is de debug output:
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0]
m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 -
rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT,
flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
SA Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0,
length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0,
#trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0,
id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
KE Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_WAIT_INIT
Event: EV_RECV_INIT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT
Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT
Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT
Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT
Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): NAT-T is disabled
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT
Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT
Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000
CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000
CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000
CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000
CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_DONE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Fragmentation is enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco DeleteReason Notify is enabled
De IKE_INIT_SA-uitwisseling tussen de ASA's is nu voltooid:
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete SA init exchange
ASA1 start de IKE_AUTH-uitwisseling en begint met het genereren van de authenticatie-payload. Het IKE_AUTH pakket bevat:
- ISAKMP-koptekst (SPI/versie/vlaggen)
- IDi (initiator-identiteit)
- AUTH-nuttige lading
- SAi2 (initieert de SA - vergelijkbaar met de fase 2 transformatie set uitwisseling in IKEv1)
- TSi en TSr (initiator en responder verkeerskiezers)
Opmerking: De TSi en TSr bevatten het bron- en bestemmingsadres van respectievelijk de initiator en de responder om versleuteld verkeer door te sturen/te ontvangen. Het adresbereik geeft aan dat al het verkeer van en naar dat bereik is getunneld. Als het voorstel aanvaardbaar is voor de responder, retourneert het identieke TS-payloads.
Ook wordt het eerste CHILD_SA gemaakt voor het proxy_ID-paar dat overeenkomt met het triggerpakket.
Hier is de relevante configuratie voor ASA1:
crypto ipsec
ikev2
ipsec-proposal
AES256
protocol esp
encryption
aes-256
protocol esp
integrity
sha-1 md5
access-list
l2l_list
extended
permit ip
host 10.0.0.2
host 10.0.0.1
Dit is de debug output:
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1,
key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH
Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH
Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH
Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload:
CISCO-GRANITE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4
(IPSec negotiation),
Num. transforms: 4
AES-CBC SHA96 MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: INITIAL_CONTACT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Building packet for encryption;
contents are:
VID Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
IDi Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
47 01 01 01
AUTH Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
SA Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0,
length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4,
#trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
TSr Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0]
m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 -
rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
ENCR Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 256
Encrypted data: 252 bytes
ASA1 stuurt het IKE_AUTH pakket naar ASA2:
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH]
[10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500
InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665
MID=00000001
ASA2 ontvangt dit pakket van ASA1:
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH]
[10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500
InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665
MID=00000001
ASA2 stopt de autorisatietimer en verifieert de authenticatiegegevens die zijn ontvangen van ASA1. Vervolgens genereert het zijn eigen authenticatiegegevens, precies zoals ASA1.
Hier is de relevante configuratie voor ASA2:
crypto ipsec
ikev2
ipsec-
proposal
AES256
protocol esp
encryption
aes-256
protocol esp
integrity
sha-1 md5
Dit is de debug output:
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0]
m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 -
rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Request has mess_id 1;
expected 1 through 1 REAL Decrypted packet:
Data: 216 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID
Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
IDi Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
47 01 01 01
AUTH Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
SA Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0,
length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4,
#trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
TSr Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Stopping timer to wait for auth
message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_ID
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Recieved valid parameteres in
process id
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH
Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_FOR_
PROF_SEL
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group for
ID: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1 using
phase 1 ID
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH
Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH
Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001
CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH
Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4EAP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH
Event: EV_CHK_POLREQEAP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH
Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH
Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH
Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1,
key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH
Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PLAT-2: Build config mode reply: no request stored
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH
Event: EV_CHK4_IC
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Processing initial contact
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH
Event: EV_CHK_REDIRECT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Redirect check is not needed,
skipping it
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH
Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer is accepted
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map
outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH
Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH
Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
ASA2 verzendt het IKE_AUTH-pakket, dat het volgende bevat:
- ISAKMP-koptekst (SPI/versie/vlaggen)
- IDr. (identiteit van de respondent)
- AUTH-nuttige lading
- SAr2 (initieert de SA - vergelijkbaar met de fase 2 transformatie set uitwisseling in IKEv1)
- TSi en TSr (initiator en responder verkeerskiezers)
Opmerking: De TSi en TSr bevatten het bron- en bestemmingsadres van respectievelijk de initiator en de responder om versleuteld verkeer door te sturen/te ontvangen. Het adresbereik geeft aan dat al het verkeer van en naar dat bereik is getunneld. Deze parameters zijn identiek aan die welke zijn ontvangen van ASA1.
Dit is de debug output:
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH
Event: EV_MY_AUTH_METHOD
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH
Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH
Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2,
key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH
Event: EV_CHK4_SIGN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH
Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH
Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload:
CISCO-GRANITE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 (IPSec
negotiation),
Num. transforms: 3
AES-CBC SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload:
ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORTIKEv2-PROTO-5:
Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGSIKEv2-PROTO-3:
(16):
Building packet for encryption; contents are:
VID Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
IDr Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0,
length: 12 Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
51 01 01 01
AUTH Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0,
length: 28 Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
SA Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0,
length: 44 IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0,
reserved: 0x0, length: 40
Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0,
length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
TSr Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0,
length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT) Next payload: NOTIFY,
reserved: 0x0, length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE,
spi size: 0, type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS) Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0,
length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0,
type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0]
m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 -
rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags:
RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
ENCR Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 208
Encrypted data: 204 bytes
ASA2 verzendt het antwoord voor het IKE_AUTH pakket:
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH]
[10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500
InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665
MID=00000001
ASA1 ontvangt de respons van ASA2:
IKEv2-PLAT-4:
RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH]
[10.0.0.2]:500->
[10.0.0.1]:500
InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958
RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665
MID=00000001
ASA2 voegt een vermelding in de SA-database (SAD) in:
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001
CurState: AUTH_DONE
Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action:
Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001
CurState: AUTH_DONE
Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing
the PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001
CurState: AUTH_DONE
Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16):
SA created;
inserting SA into database
ASA1 verifieert en verwerkt de authenticatiegegevens in dit pakket en voegt deze SA vervolgens in zijn SAD:
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0]
m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 -
rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH,
flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 168 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID
Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
IDr Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
51 01 01 01
AUTH Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
SA Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0,
length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4,
#trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0,
length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
TSr Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0,
length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload:
ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)
Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0,
type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload:
NON_FIRST_FRAGS NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS) Next payload:
NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0,
type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
Decrypted packet:Data: 236 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Process auth response notify
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH
Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_
FOR_PROF_SEL
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PLAT-3: connection initiated with tunnel
group 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2,
key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_EAP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_IKE_ONLY
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing the PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): SA created; inserting SA into
database
De tunnel is nu actief voor ASA1:
CONNECTION
STATUS: UP...
peer: 10.0.0.2:500,
phase1_id: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000001
CurState: AUTH_DONE
Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION
De tunnel is nu actief voor ASA2:
CONNECTION
STATUS: UP...
peer: 10.0.0.1:500,
phase1_id: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001
CurState: AUTH_DONE
Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION
Opmerking: De respondenttunnel wordt meestal actief vóór de initiatortunnel.
Het IKEv2-registratieproces vindt plaats op ASA1:
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16)
connection
auth hdl set to 15
IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn
attribute retrieval
successfully queued
for register session
request.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I)
MsgID = 00000001
CurState: AUTH_DONE
Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle
timeout set to: 30
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session
timeout set to: 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group
policy set to
DfltGrpPolicy
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class
attr set
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel
protocol set to: 0x5c
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter
ID not configured
for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group
lock set to: none
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID
not configured
for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16)
connection attribues
set valid to TRUE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully
retrieved conn attrs
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session
registration after conn
attr retrieval
PASSED, No error
IKEv2-PLAT-3:
CONNECTION STATUS:
REGISTERED...
peer: 10.0.0.2:500,
phase1_id: 10.0.0.2
Het IKEv2-registratieproces vindt plaats op ASA2:
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16)
connection
auth hdl set to 15
IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn
attribute retrieval
successfully queued for
register session request.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
MsgID = 00000001
CurState: AUTH_DONE
Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle
timeout
set to: 30
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session
timeout
set to: 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group
policy set to
DfltGrpPolicy
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class
attr set
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel
protocol set to: 0x5c
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter ID
not configured
for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group
lock set to: none
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID
not configured
for connection
attribues set
valid to TRUE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully
retrieved conn attrs
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session
registration after conn
attr retrieval PASSED,
No error
IKEv2-PLAT-3:
CONNECTION STATUS:
REGISTERED...
peer: 10.0.0.1:500,
phase1_id: 10.0.0.1
Child SA Debugs
Opmerking: Deze uitwisseling bestaat uit een enkel verzoek- en antwoordpaar en wordt in IKEv1 een fase 2-uitwisseling genoemd. Het kan worden geïnitieerd door beide uiteinden van de IKE_SA nadat de eerste uitwisselingen zijn voltooid.
ASA2 initieert de CHILD_SA uitwisseling. Dit is het CREATE_CHILD_SA-verzoek. Het CHILD_SA-pakket bevat doorgaans:
- SA HDR - Dit bevat de versie.flags en het uitwisselingstype.
- Nonce Ni (optioneel) - Als de CHILD_SA is gemaakt als onderdeel van de initiële uitwisseling, mag een tweede Key Exchange (KE)-lading en nonce niet worden verzonden.
- SA Payload
- KEi (Sleutel-optioneel) - Het CREATE_CHILD_SA-verzoek kan optioneel een KE-payload bevatten voor een extra DH-uitwisseling om sterkere garanties van forward secrecy voor de CHILD_SA mogelijk te maken. Als de SA-aanbiedingen verschillende DH-groepen bevatten, moet de KEi een element zijn van de groep waarvan de initiator verwacht dat de responder deze accepteert. Als het verkeerd raadt, mislukt de CREATE_CHILD_SA-uitwisseling en moet het opnieuw proberen met een andere KEi.
- N (Notify payload, optioneel) - De Notify Payload wordt gebruikt om informatieve gegevens, zoals foutcondities en statusovergangen, naar een IKE-peer te verzenden. Een payload melden kan worden weergegeven in een antwoordbericht (meestal geeft dit aan waarom een verzoek wordt afgewezen), in een informatie-uitwisseling (om een fout niet in een IKE-verzoek te melden) of in een ander bericht om de mogelijkheden van de afzender aan te geven of om de betekenis van het verzoek te wijzigen. Als deze CREATE_CHILD_SA-uitwisseling een andere huidige SA dan de IKE_SA herkent, moet de lead N-payload van het type REKEY_SA de SA identificeren die opnieuw wordt gecodeerd. Als deze CREATE_CHILD_SA-uitwisseling een huidige SA niet opnieuw toetst, moet de N-payload worden weggelaten.
- TSi en TSr (optioneel): Dit toont de verkeerskiezers waarvoor de SA is gemaakt. In dit geval is het tussen hosts 192.168.1.12 en 192.168.2.99.
Hier is de CREATE_CHILD_SA debug uitvoer:
IKEv2-PLAT-5: INVALID PSH HANDLE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group
for IP: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1
using peer IP
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tp_name set to:
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PSH cleanup
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA:
I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7
(I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: READY
Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA:
I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7
(I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_INIT
Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA:
I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7
(I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC
Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for IPSEC rekey
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA:
I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7
(I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC
Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA:
I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7
(I) MsgID = 00000001
CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA:
I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7
(I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC
Event: EV_BLD_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-3: ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4
(IPSec negotiation), num. transforms: 4
AES-CBC SHA96 MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption;
contents are:
SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0,
length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP,
SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
fa b7 f0 48
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if request will fit in
peer window
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0]
m_id: 0x6
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE -
r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE -
rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA,
flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
ENCR Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 152
Encrypted data: 148 bytes
ASA2 stuurt dit pakket en wacht op de reactie:
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT
[CREATE_CHILD_SA]
[10.0.0.2]:500->
[10.0.0.1]:500
InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe
RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7
MID=00000006
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I)
MsgID = 00000006
CurState: CHILD_I_WAIT
Event: EV_NO_EVENT
ASA1 ontvangt het pakket:
IKEv2-PLAT-4:
RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA]
[10.0.0.2]:500->
[10.0.0.1]:500
InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe
RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7
MID=00000006
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx
[L 10.0.0.1:500/R
10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0]
m_id: 0x6
ASA1 ontvangt vervolgens dit exacte pakket van ASA2 en verifieert het:
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE -
r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE -
rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA,
flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Request has mess_id 6;
expected 6 through 6
REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 124 bytes
SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0,
length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP,
SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12 ype: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
fa b7 f0 48
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
Decrypted packet:Data: 180 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R)
MsgID = 00000006 CurState: READY
Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R)
MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT
Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R)
MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT
Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R)
MsgID = 00000006 urState: CHILD_R_INIT
Event: EV_CHK_CC_TYPE
ASA1 bouwt nu het antwoord voor de CHILD_SA-uitwisseling. Dit is het CREATE_CHILD_SA-antwoord. Het CHILD_SA-pakket bevat doorgaans:
- SA HDR - Dit bevat de versie.flags en het uitwisselingstype.
- Nonce Ni (optioneel) - Als de CHILD_SA is gemaakt als onderdeel van de eerste uitwisseling, mag geen tweede KE-lading en nonce worden verzonden.
- SA Payload
- KEi (sleutel, optioneel) - Het CREATE_CHILD_SA-verzoek kan optioneel een KE-payload bevatten voor een extra DH-uitwisseling om sterkere garanties van forward secrecy voor de CHILD_SA mogelijk te maken. Als de SA-aanbiedingen verschillende DH-groepen bevatten, moet de KEi een element zijn van de groep waarvan de initiator verwacht dat de responder deze accepteert. Als het verkeerd raadt, mislukt de CREATE_CHILD_SA-uitwisseling en moet het opnieuw proberen met een andere KEi.
- N (Notify payload, optioneel) - De Notify Payload wordt gebruikt om informatieve gegevens, zoals foutcondities en toestandsovergangen, naar een IKE-peer te verzenden. Een payload melden kan worden weergegeven in een antwoordbericht (meestal geeft dit aan waarom een verzoek wordt afgewezen), in een informatie-uitwisseling (om een fout te melden die niet in een IKE-verzoek staat) of in een ander bericht om de mogelijkheden van de afzender aan te geven of om de betekenis van het verzoek te wijzigen. Als deze CREATE_CHILD_SA-uitwisseling een andere huidige SA dan de IKE_SA herkent, moet de lead N-payload van het type REKEY_SA de SA identificeren die opnieuw wordt gecodeerd. Als deze CREATE_CHILD_SA-uitwisseling een huidige SA niet opnieuw vastlegt, moet de N-payload worden weggelaten.
- TSi en TSr (optioneel) - Dit toont de verkeerskiezers waarvoor de SA is gemaakt. In dit geval is het tussen hosts 192.168.1.12 en 192.168.2.99.
Dit is de debug output:
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for create child
response message type
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R)
MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC
Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child
SA exchange
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer
is accepted
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map
outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006
CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000005
CurState: EXIT Event: EV_FREE_NEG
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Deleting negotiation context
for peer message ID: 0x5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006
CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC
Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006
CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R)
MsgID = 00000006 CurState:
CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006
CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Requesting SPI from IPSec
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006
CurState: CHILD_R_WAIT_SPI Event: EV_OK_GOT_SPI
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006
CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006
CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_BLD_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-3: ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4
(IPSec negotiation),
Num. transforms: 3
AES-CBC SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption;
contents are:
SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0,
length: 40
Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4,
#trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12
type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8
type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0,
reserved: 0x0: length: 8
type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0,
length: 24
b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05
18 1a 27 a6 cb
01 56 22 ad
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0,
length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0,
length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99,
end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0,
length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0,
length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx
[L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0]
m_id: 0x6
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE -
r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE -
rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA,
flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172
ENCR Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0,
length: 144
Encrypted data: 140 bytes
ASA1 stuurt het antwoord:
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT
[CREATE_CHILD_SA]
[10.0.0.1]:500->
[10.0.0.2]:500
InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe
RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7
MID=00000006
ASA2 ontvangt het pakket:
IKEv2-PLAT-4:
RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA]
[10.0.0.1]:500->
[10.0.0.2]:500
InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe
RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7
MID=00000006
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx
[L 10.0.0.2:500/R
10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0]
m_id: 0x6
ASA2 verifieert nu het pakket:
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE -
r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE -
rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA,
flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172
REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 116 bytes
SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0,
length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4,
#trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:
length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0,
reserved: 0x0: length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0,
length: 24
b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05 18
1a 27 a6 cb
01 56 22 ad
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0,
length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0,
length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99,
end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0,
length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0,
length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12,
end addr: 192.168.1.12
Decrypted packet:Data: 172 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I)
MsgID = 00000006 CurState:
CHILD_I_WAIT Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) MsgID = 00000006
CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing any notify-messages
in child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I)
MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC
Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I)
MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC
Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (
I) MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC
Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA:
I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I)
MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC
Event: EV_CHK_IKE_REKEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if IKE SA rekey
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA:
I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I)
MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC
Event: EV_GEN_LOAD_IPSEC
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Load IPSEC key material
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10
ASA1 voegt dit kind SA-vermelding in het ED in:
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R)
MsgID = 00000006
CurState: CHILD_R_DONE
Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225):
SA created; inserting
SA into database
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R)
MsgID = 00000006 CurState:
CHILD_R_DONE
Event: EV_START_DEL_NEG_TMR
ASA2 voegt dit kind SA-vermelding in het ED in:
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225):
SM Trace->
SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE
R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I)
MsgID = 00000006
CurState: CHILD_I_DONE
Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225):
SA created;
inserting SA into database
tunnelverificatie
Gebruik de informatie die in deze sectie wordt verstrekt om de configuraties van de Internet Security Association en het Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) en de IPSec-tunnel te controleren.
ISAKMP
Voer deze opdracht in om de ISAKMP te verifiëren:
show crypto isakmp sa det
ASA1
Hier is de output voor ASA1:
ASA1(config)#show cry isa sa det
There are no IKEv1 SAs
IKEv2 SAs:Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2
Tunnel-id Local Remote Status Role
1889403559 10.0.0.1/500 10.0.0.2/500 READY RESPONDER
Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
Life/Active Time: 86400/195 sec
Session-id: 99220
Status Description: Negotiation done
Local spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7 Remote spi: FD366326E1FED6FE
Local id: 10.0.0.1
Remote id: 10.0.0.2
Local req mess id: 14 Remote req mess id: 16
Local next mess id: 14 Remote next mess id: 16
Local req queued: 14 Remote req queued: 16
Local window: 1 Remote window: 1
DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
NAT-T is not detected
Child sa: local selector 192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selector 192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a
AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
ah_hmac: _NONE,, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
ASA2
Hier is de output voor ASA2:
ASA2(config)#show cry isa sa det
There are no IKEv1 SAs
IKEv2 SAs:
Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2
Tunnel-id Local Remote Status Role
472237395 10.0.0.2/500 10.0.0.1/500 READY INITIATOR
Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
Life/Active Time: 86400/190 sec
Session-id: 99220
Status Description: Negotiation done
Local spi: FD366326E1FED6FE Remote spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
Local id: 10.0.0.2
Remote id: 10.0.0.1
Local req mess id: 16 Remote req mess id: 13
Local next mess id: 16 Remote next mess id: 13
Local req queued: 16 Remote req queued: 13
Local window: 1 Remote window: 1
DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
NAT-T is not detected
Child sa: local selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
remote selector 192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
ESP spi in/out: 0x8717a5a/0x8564387d
AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
remote selector 192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
ESP spi in/out: 0xf0d97b2a/0x74756292
AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
IPSEC
Voer deze opdracht in om de IPSec te verifiëren:
show crypto ipsec sa
ASA1
Hier is de output voor ASA1:
ASA1(config)#show cry ipsec sa
interface: outside
Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1
host 192.168.2.99
local ident (addr/mask/prot/port):
(192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
current_peer: 10.0.0.2
#pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
#pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
#pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
#pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0,
#pkts decomp failed: 0
#pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0,
#fragments created: 0
#PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0,
#decapsulated frgs needing reassembly: 0
#send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0
local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto endpt.:
10.0.0.2/500
path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
current outbound spi: F0D97B2A
current inbound spi : 74756292
inbound esp sas:
spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4008959/28628)
IV size: 16 bytes
replay detection support: Y
Anti replay bitmap:
0x00000000 0x0000000F
outbound esp sas:
spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4147199/28628)
IV size: 16 bytes
replay detection support: Y
Anti replay bitmap:
0x00000000 0x00000001
Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12
host 192.168.2.99
local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port):
(192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
current_peer: 10.0.0.2
#pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
#pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
#pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
#pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0,
#pkts decomp failed: 0
#pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0,
#fragments created: 0
#PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing
reassembly: 0
#send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0
local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto
endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500
path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
current outbound spi: 08717A5A
current inbound spi : 8564387D
inbound esp sas:
spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28734)
IV size: 16 bytes
replay detection support: Y
Anti replay bitmap:
0x00000000 0x0000000F
outbound esp sas:
spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28734)
IV size: 16 bytes
replay detection support: Y
Anti replay bitmap:
0x00000000 0x00000001
ASA2
Hier is de output voor ASA2:
ASA2(config)#show cry ipsec sa
interface: outside
Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 host
192.168.1.12
local ident (addr/mask/prot/port):
(192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port):
(192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
current_peer: 10.0.0.1
#pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
#pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
#pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
#pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0,
#pkts decomp failed: 0
#pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0,
#fragments created: 0
#PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing
reassembly: 0
#send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0
local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto
endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
current outbound spi: 8564387D
current inbound spi : 08717A5A
inbound esp sas:
spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4193279/28770)
IV size: 16 bytes replay detection support: Y
Anti replay bitmap:
0x00000000 0x0000000F
outbound esp sas:
spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28770)
IV size: 16 bytes replay detection support: Y
Anti replay bitmap:
0x00000000 0x00000001
Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99
host 192.168.1.1
local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port):
(192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
current_peer: 10.0.0.1
#pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
#pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
#pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
#pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0,
#pkts decomp failed: 0
#pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0,
#fragments created: 0
#PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing
reassembly: 0
#send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0
local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto
endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
current outbound spi: 74756292
current inbound spi : F0D97B2A
inbound esp sas:
spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28663)
IV size: 16 bytes
replay detection support: Y
Anti replay bitmap:
0x00000000 0x0000000F
outbound esp sas:
spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4331519/28663)
IV size: 16 bytes
replay detection support: Y
Anti replay bitmap:
0x00000000 0x00000001
U kunt ook de uitvoer controleren van de opdracht show crypto ikev2 sa, die een uitvoer biedt die identiek is aan de uitvoer van de opdracht show crypto isakmp sa:
IKEv2 SAs:
Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2
Tunnel-id Local Remote Status Role
1889403559 10.0.0.1/500 10.0.0.2/500 READY RESPONDER
Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
Life/Active Time: 86400/179 sec
Child sa: local selector 192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
Child sa: local selector 192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a
Gerelateerde informatie
Revisiegeschiedenis
| Revisie | Publicatiedatum | Opmerkingen |
|---|---|---|
4.0 |
29-Apr-2025
|
Recertificering en bijgewerkte opmaak. |
3.0 |
04-Apr-2024
|
Hercertificering. |
1.0 |
28-Jan-2013
|
Eerste vrijgave |
Bijgedragen door Cisco-engineers
- Anu M ChackoLeider in technische marketing
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