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Cisco Personal Assistant may permit unauthorized access to user configuration via the web interface. Once access is granted, user preferences and configuration can be manipulated.
There is a workaround available and a software upgrade is not required to remove the vulnerability.
This issue is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCec87825.
This advisory is available at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20040108-pa
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This section provides details on affected products.
Vulnerable Products
Cisco Personal Assistant versions 1.4(1) and 1.4(2) only are affected. Cisco Personal Assistant versions 1.3(x) and prior are not affected.
To verify the version of Personal Assistant you are running, perform the following steps.
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Log in to Personal Assistant through the web
interface.
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Browse to Help -> About Cisco Personal Assistant.
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Click the Details button and a window appears with
the full version number.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities.
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Log in to Personal Assistant through the web
interface.
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Cisco Personal Assistant is a Microsoft Windows 2000 based application and is part of the AVVID solution. For more information on Personal Assistant, see:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/partner/products/sw/voicesw/ps2026/index.html
This vulnerability is only present if both of the following conditions are met:
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The Personal Assistant administrator has checked the "Allow Only
Cisco CallManager Users" box through System -> Miscellaneous
Settings.
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The Personal Assistant Corporate Directory settings refer to the same
directory service that is used by Cisco CallManager.
If both of the above criteria are met, then password authentication to Personal Assistant user configuration is disabled. This allows anyone to enter a valid User ID with any password and the user will be authorized to make configuration changes to that account.
The default setting for Personal Assistant is that the "Allow Only Cisco CallManager Users" box is unchecked.
Users access Personal Assistant by browsing to the address http://x.x.x.x/pauseradmin where x.x.x.x is the IP address or hostname of the Personal Assistant server.
This vulnerability does not affect access to Personal Assistant through the telephony interface. Users access the telephony interface by dialing the Personal Assistant extension. Personal Assistant uses the user's CallManager Extension Mobility PIN or the Unity Subscriber Phone Password to authenticate users through the telephony interface.
This vulnerability is documented as Cisco bug ID CSCec87825
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The Personal Assistant administrator has checked the "Allow Only
Cisco CallManager Users" box through System -> Miscellaneous
Settings.
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This vulnerability can be removed by de-selecting the checkbox "Allow Only Cisco CallManager Users" on the System -> Miscellaneous Settings page of the Personal Assistant Administration site.
This workaround will have no effect on the behavior of the Personal Assistant as CallManager and Personal Assistant must be configured to use the same directory for this vulnerability to be present. Configuring "Allow Only CallManager Users" while having Personal Assistant and CallManager using the same directory is technically redundant.
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All vulnerabilities listed in this advisory can be removed through configuration of the Personal Assistant server. No software update is required.
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The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
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To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy. This document also contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security vulnerability information from Cisco.
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