Troubleshooting de MACsec no Catalyst 9000

Introdução

Este documento descreve o recurso MACsec, seus casos de uso e como solucionar problemas do recurso nos switches Catalyst 9000. 

Pré-requisitos

Requisitos

Não existem requisitos específicos para este documento.

Componentes Utilizados

• C9300
• C9400
• C9500
• C9600

Observação: consulte o guia de configuração apropriado para obter os comandos que são usados para habilitar esses recursos em outras plataformas Cisco.

As informações neste documento foram criadas a partir de dispositivos em um ambiente de laboratório específico. Todos os dispositivos utilizados neste documento foram iniciados com uma configuração (padrão) inicial. Se a rede estiver ativa, certifique-se de que você entenda o impacto potencial de qualquer comando.

Informações de Apoio 

O escopo deste documento é o Controle de Segurança de Acesso ao Meio (MACsec - Media Access Security Control) na LAN, entre dois switches/roteadores.

A comunicação de dados em texto claro é susceptível a ameaças à segurança. As violações de segurança podem ocorrer em qualquer camada do modelo OSI. Algumas das violações comuns na camada 2 são farejamento, interceptação de pacotes, violação, injeção, falsificação de endereço MAC, falsificação ARP, ataques de negação de serviço (DoS) contra um servidor DHCP e saltos de VLAN. 

O MACsec é uma tecnologia de criptografia L2 descrita no padrão IEEE 802.1AE. O MACsec protege os dados em meios físicos e torna impossível que os dados sejam comprometidos em camadas superiores. Como resultado, a criptografia MACsec tem prioridade sobre qualquer outro método de criptografia para camadas superiores, como IPsec e SSL.

Vantagens do MACsec

Modo orientado ao cliente: o MACsec é usado em configurações nas quais dois switches que estão fazendo peering entre si podem alternar como um servidor de chave ou um cliente de chave antes de trocar chaves. O servidor de chaves gera e mantém o CAK entre os dois pares.

Verificação de integridade de dados: o MACsec usa o MKA para gerar um valor de verificação de integridade (ICV) para o quadro que chega à porta. Se o ICV gerado for o mesmo que o ICV no quadro, o quadro será aceito; caso contrário, ele será descartado.

Criptografia de dados: o MACsec fornece criptografia em nível de porta nas interfaces dos switches. Isso significa que os quadros enviados da porta configurada são criptografados e os quadros recebidos na porta são descriptografados. O MACsec também fornece um mecanismo no qual você pode configurar se somente quadros criptografados ou todos

quadros (criptografados e simples) são aceitos na interface.

Proteção contra repetição: quando os quadros são transmitidos através da rede, há uma possibilidade de que os quadros saiam da sequência ordenada. O MACsec fornece uma janela configurável que aceita um número especificado de quadros fora de sequência.

MACsec e MTU

O cabeçalho MACsec adiciona até 32 bytes de sobrecarga de cabeçalho. Considere uma MTU (Unidade Máxima de Transmissão) de sistema/interface maior nos switches no caminho para considerar a sobrecarga adicional adicionada pelo cabeçalho MACsec.  Se a MTU for muito baixa, você poderá ver a perda/o atraso de pacotes inesperados para aplicativos que precisam usar uma MTU mais alta. 

Observação: se houver um problema relacionado ao MACsec, verifique se o GBIC (Gigabyte Interface Converter) em ambas as extremidades é suportado pela Matriz de Compatibilidade . 

Onde o MACsec é usado

Casos de uso do campus

• Host para switch
• Entre locais ou edifícios
• Entre andares em uma multilocação

Casos de uso de data center

• Interconexão de data center
• Servidor para switch

Casos de uso de WAN

• Interconexão de data center
• Interconexão do campus
• Hub-Spoke

Terminologia

MKA	Contrato de Chave MACsec	definido no IEEE 802.1X REV-2010 como um protocolo de acordo-chave para descobrir pares MACsec e chaves de negociação
CAK	Chave de Associação de Conectividade	chave primária de vida longa usada para gerar todas as outras chaves usadas para MACsec. As implementações de LAN derivam isso do MSK (gerado durante a troca de EAP)
PMK	Chave Primária do Pairwise	Um dos componentes usados para derivar as chaves de sessão usadas para criptografar o tráfego. Configurado manualmente ou derivado de 802.1X
CKN	nome da chave CAK	usado para configurar o valor de chave ou CAK. Apenas um número par de caracteres HEX é permitido até 64 caracteres.
SAK	Chave de Associação Segura	derivado pelo servidor de chave selecionado do CAK e é a chave usada pelo roteador/dispositivos finais para criptografar o tráfego para uma determinada sessão.
ICV	Chave de valor de verificação de integridade	derivado de CAK e marcado em cada quadro de dados/controle para comprovar que o quadro é de um peer autorizado. 8 a 16 bytes dependendo do conjunto de cifras
KEK	Chave de criptografia de chave	derivado de CAK (a chave pré-compartilhada) e usado para proteger as chaves MACsec
SIC	Identificador de canal seguro	Cada porta virtual recebe um identificador de canal seguro (SCI) exclusivo com base no endereço MAC da interface física concatenada com um ID de porta de 16 bits

Cenário 1: Switch MACsec para segurança de link de switch com SAP em modo de chave pré-compartilhada (PSK)

Topologia

Etapa 1. Valide a configuração em ambos os lados do link. 

9300_stack#show run interface gig 1/0/1
interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1
description MACsec_manual_3850-2-gi1/0/1
switchport access vlan 10
switchport mode trunk
cts manual 
    no propagate sgt
    sap pmk AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
mode-list gcm-encrypt <-- use full packet encrypt mode 

3850#show run interface gig1/0/1
interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1
description 9300-1gi1/0/1 MACsec manual
switchport access vlan 10
switchport mode trunk
cts manual
   no propagate sgt
   sap pmk AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA mode-list gcm-encrypt


NOTE:
cts manual       <-- Supplies local configuration for Cisco TrustSec parameters
no propagate sgt <-- disable SGT tagging on a manually-configured TrustSec-capable interface, 
if you do not need to propage the SGT tags. 

sap pmk AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA mode-list gcm-encrypt <-- 
Use the sap command to manually specify the Pairwise Primary Key (PMK) and the Security Association Protocol (SAP) 
authentication and encryption modes to negotiate MACsec link encryption between two interfaces.
The default encryption is sap modelist gcm-encrypt null



9300_stack#(config-if-cts-manual)#sap pmk fa mode-list ?
gcm-encrypt GCM authentication, GCM encryption
gmac GCM authentication, no encryption
no-encap No encapsulation
null Encapsulation present, no authentication, no encryption

Use "gcm-encrypt" for full GCM-AES-128 encryption.

These protection levels are supported when you configure SAP pairwise primary key (sap pmk):
SAP is not configured— no protection.
sap mode-list gcm-encrypt gmac no-encap—protection desirable but not mandatory.
sap mode-list gcm-encrypt gmac—confidentiality preferred and integrity required. 
The protection is selected by the supplicant according to supplicant preference.
sap mode-list gmac —integrity only.
sap mode-list gcm-encrypt-confidentiality required.
sap mode-list gmac gcm-encrypt-integrity required and preferred, confidentiality optional.

Etapa 2. Verifique o estado do MACsec e se os parâmetros/contadores estão corretos.

### Ping issued between endpoints to demonstrate counters ###
Host-1#ping 10.10.10.12 <-- sourced from Host-1 IP 10.10.10.11
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

9300_stack#sh MACsec summary
Interface             Transmit SC      Receive SC <-- Secure Channel (SC) flag is set for transmit and receive 
GigabitEthernet1/0/1     1                  1  


9300_stack#sh MACsec interface gigabitEthernet 1/0/1
MACsec is enabled
 Replay protect : enabled
 Replay window : 0
 Include SCI : yes
 Use ES Enable : no
 Use SCB Enable : no
 Admin Pt2Pt MAC : forceTrue(1)
 Pt2Pt MAC Operational : no
 Cipher : GCM-AES-128
 Confidentiality Offset : 0
!
Capabilities
 ICV length : 16
 Data length change supported: yes
 Max. Rx SA : 16
 Max. Tx SA : 16
 Max. Rx SC : 8
 Max. Tx SC : 8
 Validate Frames : strict
 PN threshold notification support : Yes
 Ciphers supported : 
    GCM-AES-128
    GCM-AES-256
    GCM-AES-XPN-128
    GCM-AES-XPN-256
!
Transmit Secure Channels
   SCI : 682C7B9A4D010000
   SC state : notInUse(2)
   Elapsed time : 03:17:50
   Start time : 7w0d
   Current AN: 0
   Previous AN: 1
   Next PN: 185
   SA State: notInUse(2)
   Confidentiality : yes
   SAK Unchanged : no
   SA Create time : 03:58:39
   SA Start time : 7w0d
   SC Statistics
   Auth-only Pkts : 0
   Auth-only Bytes : 0
   Encrypt Pkts : 2077
   Encrypt Bytes : 0
!
SA Statistics
   Auth-only Pkts : 0
   Encrypt Pkts : 184 <-- packets are being encrypted and transmitted on this link
!
Port Statistics
   Egress untag pkts 0
   Egress long pkts 0
!
Receive Secure Channels
   SCI : D0C78970C3810000
   SC state : notInUse(2)
   Elapsed time : 03:17:50
   Start time : 7w0d
   Current AN: 0
   Previous AN: 1
   Next PN: 2503
   RX SA Count: 0
   SA State: notInUse(2)
   SAK Unchanged : no
   SA Create time : 03:58:39
   SA Start time : 7w0d
   SC Statistics
   Notvalid pkts 0
   Invalid pkts 0
   Valid pkts 28312
   Valid bytes 0
   Late pkts 0
   Uncheck pkts 0
   Delay pkts 0
   UnusedSA pkts 0
   NousingSA pkts 0
   Decrypt bytes 0
!
   SA Statistics
      Notvalid pkts 0
      Invalid pkts 0
      Valid pkts 2502 <-- number of valid packets received on this link
      UnusedSA pkts 0
      NousingSA pkts 0
!
Port Statistics
Ingress untag pkts 0
Ingress notag pkts 36
Ingress badtag pkts 0
Ingress unknownSCI pkts 0
Ingress noSCI pkts 0
Ingress overrun pkts 0
!

9300_stack#sh cts interface summary
Global Dot1x feature is Disabled
CTS Layer2 Interfaces
---------------------
Interface  Mode   IFC-state  dot1x-role   peer-id  IFC-cache  Critical-Authentication
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gi1/0/1    MANUAL    OPEN      unknown    unknown    invalid     Invalid

CTS Layer3 Interfaces
---------------------
Interface IPv4 encap IPv6 encap IPv4 policy IPv6 policy
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
!

9300_stack#sh cts interface gigabitEthernet 1/0/1
Global Dot1x feature is Disabled
Interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1:
CTS is enabled, mode: MANUAL
IFC state: OPEN
Interface Active for 04:10:15.723 <--- Uptime of MACsec port 
Authentication Status: NOT APPLICABLE
Peer identity: "unknown"
Peer's advertised capabilities: "sap"
Authorization Status: NOT APPLICABLE
!
SAP Status: SUCCEEDED <-- SAP is successful 
   Version: 2
   Configured pairwise ciphers:
   gcm-encrypt
!
Replay protection: enabled
Replay protection mode: STRICT
!
Selected cipher: gcm-encrypt
!
Propagate SGT: Disabled
Cache Info:
Expiration : N/A
Cache applied to link : NONE
!
Statistics:
   authc success: 0
   authc reject: 0
   authc failure: 0
   authc no response: 0
   authc logoff: 0
   sap success: 1  <-- Negotiated once 
   sap fail: 0     <-- No failures 
   authz success: 0
   authz fail: 0
   port auth fail: 0
   L3 IPM: disabled

Etapa 3. Revise as depurações de software quando o link for ativado. 

### Verify CTS and SAP events ###
debug cts sap events
debug cts sap packets

### Troubleshoot MKA session bring up issues ###
debug mka event
debug mka errors
debug mka packets

### Troubleshoot MKA keep-alive issues ###
debug mka linksec-interface
debug mka MACsec
debug MACsec

*May 8 00:48:04.843: %LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1, changed state to down
*May 8 00:48:05.324:  interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1 is UP
*May 8 00:48:05.324: CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): Session started (new).
*May 8 00:48:05.324: cts_sap_session_start CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1) peer:0000.0000.0000
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): Old state: [waiting to restart],
event: [restart timer expired], action: [send message #0] succeeded.
New state: [waiting to receive message #1].
*May 8 00:48:05.449: CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): EAPOL-Key message from D0C7.8970.C381   <-- MAC of peer switch/router
*May 8 00:48:05.449: CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): EAPOL-Key message #0 parsed and validated.
*May 8 00:48:05.449: CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): Our MAC = 682C.7B9A.4D01                <-- MAC of local interface
peer's MAC = D0C7.8970.C381.
CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): Old state: [waiting to receive message #1],
event: [received message #0], action: [break tie] succeeded.
New state: [determining role].
*May 8 00:48:05.449: cts_sap_generate_pmkid_and_sci CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1) auth:682c.7b9a.4d01 supp:d0c7.8970.c381,
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): Old state: [determining role],
event: [change to authenticator], action: [send message #1] succeeded.
New state: [waiting to receive message #2].
*May 8 00:48:05.457: CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): EAPOL-Key message from D0C7.8970.C381.
CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): New keys derived:
KCK = 700BEF1D 7A8E10F7 1243A168 883C74FB,
KEK = C207177C B6091790 F3C5B4B1 D51B75B8,
TK = 1B0E17CD 420D12AE 7DE06941 B679ED22,
*May 8 00:48:05.457: CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): EAPOL-Key message #2 parsed and validated.
*May 8 00:48:05.457: CTS-SAP ev: cts_sap_action_program_msg_2: (Gi1/0/1) GCM is allowed.
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-IPC: sending clear_frames_option
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-IPC: geting switch number
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-IPC: switch number is 1
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-IPC: clear_frame send msg success
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-IPC: getting MACsec clear frames response
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-IPC: watched boolean waken up
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-CTS: create_sa invoked for SA creation
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-CTS: Set up TxSC and RxSC before we installTxSA and RxSA
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-CTS: create_tx_sc, avail=yes sci=682C7B9A
*May 8 00:48:05.457: NGWC-MACsec: create_tx_sc vlan invalid
*May 8 00:48:05.457: NGWC-MACsec: create_tx_sc client vlan=1, sci=0x682C7B9A4D010000
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-IPC: sending create_tx_sc
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-IPC: geting switch number
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-IPC: switch number is 1
*May 8 00:48:05.457: MACsec-IPC: create_tx_sc send msg success
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec API blocking the invoking context
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec-IPC: getting MACsec sa_sc response
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec_blocking_callback
*May 8 00:48:05.458: Wake up the blocking process
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec-CTS: create_rx_sc, avail=yes sci=D0C78970
*May 8 00:48:05.458: NGWC-MACsec: create_rx_sc client vlan=1, sci=0xD0C78970C3810000
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec-IPC: sending create_rx_sc
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec-IPC: geting switch number
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec-IPC: switch number is 1
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec-IPC: create_rx_sc send msg success
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec API blocking the invoking context
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec-IPC: getting MACsec sa_sc response
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec_blocking_callback
*May 8 00:48:05.458: Wake up the blocking process
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec-CTS: create_tx_rx_sa, txsci=682C7B9A, an=0
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec-IPC: sending install_tx_sa
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec-IPC: geting switch number
*May 8 00:48:05.458: MACsec-IPC: switch number is 1
*May 8 00:48:05.459: MACsec-IPC: install_tx_sa send msg success
*May 8 00:48:05.459: NGWC-MACsec:Sending authorized event to port SM
*May 8 00:48:05.459: MACsec API blocking the invoking context
*May 8 00:48:05.459: MACsec-IPC: getting MACsec sa_sc response
*May 8 00:48:05.459: MACsec_blocking_callback
*May 8 00:48:05.459: Wake up the blocking process
*May 8 00:48:05.459: MACsec-CTS: create_tx_rx_sa, rxsci=D0C78970, an=0
*May 8 00:48:05.459: MACsec-IPC: sending install_rx_sa
*May 8 00:48:05.459: MACsec-IPC: getting switch number
*May 8 00:48:05.459: MACsec-IPC: switch number is 1
*May 8 00:48:05.460: MACsec-IPC: install_rx_sa send msg success
*May 8 00:48:05.460: MACsec API blocking the invoking context
*May 8 00:48:05.460: MACsec-IPC: getting MACsec sa_sc response
*May 8 00:48:05.460: MACcsec_blocking_callback
*May 8 00:48:05.460: Wake up the blocking process
CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): Old state: [waiting to receive message #2],
event: [received message #2], action: [program message #2] succeeded.
New state: [waiting to program message #2].
CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): Old state: [waiting to program message #2],
event: [data path programmed], action: [send message #3] succeeded.
New state: [waiting to receive message #4].
*May 8 00:48:05.467: CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): EAPOL-Key message from D0C7.8970.C381.
*May 8 00:48:05.467: CTS SAP ev (Gi1/0/1): EAPOL-Key message #4 parsed and validated.
*May 8 00:48:05.473: CTS-SAP ev: cts_sap_sync_sap_info: incr sync msg sent for Gi1/0/1
*May 8 00:48:07.324: %LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1, changed state to up

Etapa 4. Revise os rastreamentos no nível da plataforma quando o link for ativado.

9300_stack#sh platform software fed switch 1 ifm mappings
Interface            IF_ID   Inst Asic Core Port SubPort Mac Cntx LPN GPN Type Active
GigabitEthernet1/0/1  0x8     1    0    1    0     0      26  6    1    1  NIF    Y


Note the IF_ID for respective intf
  - This respective IF_ID shows in MACsec FED traces seen here. 

9300_stack#set platform software trace fed switch 1 cts_aci verbose
9300_stack#set platform software trace fed switch 1 MACsec verbose  <-- switch number with MACsec port
9300_stack#request platform software trace rotate all 

/// shut/no shut the MACsec interface ///

9300_stack#show platform software trace message fed switch 1
2019/05/08 01:08:50.688 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): FED sent MACsec_sa_sc_res_msg successfully
2019/05/08 01:08:50.688 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): FED sending MACsec_sa_sc_res_msg
2019/05/08 01:08:50.688 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Running Install RxSA job for SCI: 15044144197663784960 AN:0 if_id: 0x8 lpn: 1
2019/05/08 01:08:50.688 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Processing job type 5
2019/05/08 01:08:50.688 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Install RxSA called for SCI: 15044144197663784960 AN:0 if_id: 0x8 lpn: 1
2019/05/08 01:08:50.688 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Processing SPI message for SA/SC req_type: 5
2019/05/08 01:08:50.688 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): MACSec install RX SA Hdl: destroy message
2019/05/08 01:08:50.688 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): Entering ins_rx_sa: err 0x7f4a709243ac
2019/05/08 01:08:50.688 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [l2tunnel_bcast] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (ERR): port_idMAC 0x8 doesnt exist in vlan list 1
2019/05/08 01:08:50.687 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): FED sent macsec_sa_sc_res_msg successfully
2019/05/08 01:08:50.687 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): FED sending macsec_sa_sc_res_msg
2019/05/08 01:08:50.687 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): if_id = 8, cts_port=1, is_routed_int=0, isolated=0
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Calling Install TxSA SCI: 7506510581566865408 if_id: 0x8lpn: 1 AN: 0
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [sec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): sci=0x682c7b9a4d010000
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Processing job type 4
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Create time of current sa = 1557277730 seconds
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): sci=0x682c7b9a4d010000
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Install TxSA called for SCI: 7506510581566865408 if_id: 0x8lpn: 1 AN: 0
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Processing SPI message for SA/SC req_type: 4
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): MACSec install TX SA Hdl: destroy message
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): Entering ins_tx_sa: err 0x7f4a709243ac
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): FED sent macsec_sa_sc_res_msg successfully
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): FED sending macsec_sa_sc_res_msg
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Conf_Offset in create_rx_sc is 0
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Successfully installed spd entries
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Secy policy handle=040187527
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Install policy
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Attach policy
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Creating drop entry for CTS port handle [4e00004c]
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): if_id = 8, cts_port=1, is_routed_int=0, isolated=0
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): sci=0x682c7b9a4d010000
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Create RxSC called for SCI: 15044144197663784960 if_id: 0x8 lpn: 1 for window size 0: replay_protect 1
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Processing SPI message for SA/SC req_type: 2
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): MACSec create RX SC Hdl: destroy message
2019/05/08 01:08:50.686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): Entering cre_rx_sc: err 0x7f4a709243ac
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): FED sent macsec_sa_sc_res_msg successfully
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): FED sending macsec_sa_sc_res_msg
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): txSC setting xpn mode false 1
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Conf_Offset in MACSec create_tx_sc is 0
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): if_id = 8, cts_port=1, is_routed_int=0, isolated=0
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): secy created successfully for if_id: 0x8 sci: 0x7506510581566865408
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): if_id = 8, cts_port=1, is_routed_int=0, isolated=0
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): if_id = 8, cts_port=1, is_routed_int=0, isolated=0
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): is_remote is 0 for if_id 0x8
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Create TxSC called for SCI: 7506510581566865408 if_id: 0x8 lpn: 1
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Processing SPI message for SA/SC req_type: 0
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): MACSec create TX SC Hdl: destroy message
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): Entering cre_tx_sc: err 0x7f4a709243ac
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): FED sent clear_frames_res_msg successfully
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): FED sending macsec clear_frames_res_msg
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Processing job type 3
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (debug): Processing SPI message for msg_type: 7
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): MACSec clear_frame: destroy message
2019/05/08 01:08:50.685 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [MACsec] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (info): Entering clear_frame: err 0x7f4a709243ac
2019/05/08 01:08:50.527 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [pm_xcvr] [17885]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (note): XCVR POST:XCVR Event:1 Event Status:4 lpn:1req_id:11 Magic:4660 Link_state:LINK_UP Admin Duplex:duplex_auto Oper Duplex:duplex_full Admin Speed:
speed_auto Oper Speed:speed_gbps1 Autoneg Mode:Unknown autonegmode type
2019/05/08 01:08:50.525 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [xcvr] [17885]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (note): ntfy_lnk_status: Notifying FED-PM: lpn: 1, link UP
2019/05/08 01:08:48.142 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [pm_xcvr] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (note): Enable XCVR for port lpn = 1 if_id = if_id: 0x0000000000000008 enable = 1
2019/05/08 01:08:48.142 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [pm_tdl] [16837]: UUID: 0, ra: 0, TID: 0 (note): Received PM port enable message in FED for GigabitEthernet1/0/1 intf

Etapa 5. Verifique o estado da interface MACsec no hardware. 

9300_stack#sh platform pm interface-numbers
interface iif-id gid slot unit slun   HWIDB-Ptr      status   status2   state snmp-if-index
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gi1/0/1     8     1   1    1    1    0x7F2C90D7C600  0x10040  0x20001B   0x4       8


9300_stack#sh pl software fed switch 1 ifm if-id 8 <-- iif-id 8 maps to gig1/0/1
Interface IF_ID : 0x0000000000000008
Interface Name : GigabitEthernet1/0/1
Interface Block Pointer : 0x7f4a6c66b1b8
Interface Block State : READY
Interface State : Enabled
Interface Status : ADD, UPD
Interface Ref-Cnt : 8
Interface Type : ETHER
Port Type : SWITCH PORT
Port Location : LOCAL
Slot : 1
Unit : 0
Slot Unit : 1
SNMP IF Index : 8
GPN : 1
EC Channel : 0
EC Index : 0
Port Handle : 0x4e00004c
LISP v4 Mobility : false
LISP v6 Mobility : false
QoS Trust Type : 3
!
Port Information
Handle ............ [0x4e00004c]
Type .............. [Layer2]
Identifier ........ [0x8]
Slot .............. [1]
Unit .............. [1]

Port Physical Subblock
Affinity .......... [local]
Asic Instance ..... [1 (A:0,C:1)]
AsicPort .......... [0]
AsicSubPort ....... [0]
MacNum ............ [26]
ContextId ......... [6]
LPN ............... [1]
GPN ............... [1]
Speed ............. [1GB]
type .............. [NIF]
PORT_LE ........... [0x7f4a6c676bc8]  <--- port_LE
L3IF_LE ........... [0x0]
DI ................ [0x7f4a6c67d718]
SubIf count ....... [0]

Port L2 Subblock
Enabled ............. [Yes]
Allow dot1q ......... [Yes]
Allow native ........ [Yes]
Default VLAN ........ [1]
Allow priority tag ... [Yes]
Allow unknown unicast [Yes]
Allow unknown multicast[Yes]
Allow unknown broadcast[Yes]
Allow unknown multicast[Enabled]
Allow unknown unicast [Enabled]
Protected ............ [No]
IPv4 ARP snoop ....... [No]
IPv6 ARP snoop ....... [No]
Jumbo MTU ............ [1500]
Learning Mode ........ [1]
Vepa ................. [Disabled]

Port QoS Subblock
Trust Type .................... [0x2]
Default Value ................. [0]
Ingress Table Map ............. [0x0]
Egress Table Map .............. [0x0]
Queue Map ..................... [0x0]
Port Netflow Subblock
Port Policy Subblock
List of Ingress Policies attached to an interface
List of Egress Policies attached to an interface

Port CTS Subblock
Disable SGACL .................... [0x0]
Trust ............................ [0x0]
Propagate ........................ [0x0]
%Port SGT .......................... [-1717360783]

Physical Port Macsec Subblock <-- This block is not present when MACsec is not enabled
MACsec Enable .... [Yes]
MACsec port handle.... [0x4e00004c] <-- Same as PORT_LE
MACsec Virtual port handles....
..........[0x11000005]
MACsec Rx start index.... [0]
MACsec Rx end index.... [6]
MACsec Tx start index.... [0]
MACsec Tx end index.... [6]

Ref Count : 8 (feature Ref Counts + 1)
IFM Feature Ref Counts
FID : 102 (AAL_FEATURE_SRTP), Ref Count : 1
FID : 59 (AAL_FEATURE_NETFLOW_ACL), Ref Count : 1
FID : 95 (AAL_FEATURE_L2_MULTICAST_IGMP), Ref Count : 1
FID : 119 (AAL_FEATURE_PV_HASH), Ref Count : 1
FID : 17 (AAL_FEATURE_PBB), Ref Count : 1
FID : 83 (AAL_FEATURE_L2_MATM), Ref Count : 1
FID : 30 (AAL_FEATURE_URPF_ACL), Ref Count : 1
IFM Feature Sub block information
FID : 102 (AAL_FEATURE_SRTP), Private Data : 0x7f4a6c9a0838
FID : 59 (AAL_FEATURE_NETFLOW_ACL), Private Data : 0x7f4a6c9a00f8
FID : 17 (AAL_FEATURE_PBB), Private Data : 0x7f4a6c9986b8
FID : 30 (AAL_FEATURE_URPF_ACL), Private Data : 0x7f4a6c9981c8


9300_stack# sh pl hard fed switch 1 fwd-asic abstraction print-resource-handle 0x7f4a6c676bc8 1 <-- port_LE handle

Handle:0x7f4a6c676bc8 Res-Type:ASIC_RSC_PORT_LE Res-Switch-Num:0 Asic-Num:1 Feature-ID:AL_FID_IFM Lkp-ftr-id:LKP_FEAT_INGRESS_PRECLASS1_IPV4 ref_count:1
priv_ri/priv_si Handle: (nil)Hardware Indices/Handles: index1:0x0 mtu_index/l3u_ri_index1:0x2 sm handle [ASIC 1]: 0x7f4a6c682a08
Detailed Resource Information (ASIC# 1)

**snip**
LEAD_PORT_ALLOW_CTS value 0 Pass
LEAD_PORT_ALLOW_NON_CTS value 0 Pass
LEAD_PORT_CTS_ENABLED value 1 Pass         <-- Flag = 1 (CTS enabled)
LEAD_PORT_MACsec_ENCRYPTED value 1 Pass    <-- Flag = 1 (MACsec encrypt enabled)
LEAD_PORT_PHY_MAC_SEC_SUB_PORT_ENABLED value 0 Pass
LEAD_PORT_SGT_ALLOWED value 0 Pass
LEAD_PORT_EGRESS_MAC_sec_ENABLE_WITH_SCI value 1 Pass  <-- Flag = 1 (MACsec with SCI enabled)
LEAD_PORT_EGRESS_MAC_sec_ENABLE_WITHOUT_SCI value 0 Pass
LEAD_PORT_EGRESS_MAC_sec_SUB_PORT value 0 Pass
LEAD_PORT_EGRESS_MACsec_ENCRYPTED value 0 Pass
**snip**

Cenário 2: segurança de link de switch a switch MACsec com MKA no modo de chave pré-compartilhada (PSK)

Topologia

Etapa 1. Valide a configuração em ambos os lados do link. 

C9500#sh run | sec key chain

key chain KEY MACsec
 key 01
   cryptographic-algorithm aes-256-cmac
  key-string 7 101C0B1A0343475954532E2E767B3233214105150555030A0004500B514B175F5B05515153005E0E5E505C52564007025859040C27181B5141521317595F052C28
    lifetime local 00:00:00 Aug 21 2019 infinite <-- use NTP to sync the time for key chains

mka policy MKA
key-server priority 200
MACsec-cipher-suite gcm-aes-256
confidentiality-offset 0 


C9500#sh run interface fo1/0/1
interface fo1/0/1
MACsec network-link
mka policy MKA
mka pre-shared-key key-chain KEY


C9300#sh run interface te1/1/3
interface te1/1/3
MACsec network-link
mka policy MKA
mka pre-shared-key key-chain KEY

Etapa 2. Validar se o MACsec está habilitado e se todos os parâmetros/contadores estão corretos.

### This example shows the output from one side, verify on both ends of MACsec tunnel ###

C9500#sh MACsec summary
Interface                   Transmit SC      Receive SC
FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/1       1                1

C9500#sh MACsec interface fortyGigabitEthernet 1/0/1
MACsec is enabled
Replay protect : enabled
Replay window : 0
Include SCI : yes
Use ES Enable : no
Use SCB Enable : no
Admin Pt2Pt MAC : forceTrue(1)
Pt2Pt MAC Operational : no
Cipher : GCM-AES-256
Confidentiality Offset : 0

Capabilities
ICV length : 16
Data length change supported: yes
Max. Rx SA : 16
Max. Tx SA : 16
Max. Rx SC : 8
Max. Tx SC : 8
Validate Frames : strict
PN threshold notification support : Yes
Ciphers supported : GCM-AES-128
GCM-AES-256
GCM-AES-XPN-128
GCM-AES-XPN-256


Transmit Secure Channels

SCI : 0CD0F8DCDC010008
SC state : notInUse(2)
Elapsed time : 00:24:38  
Start time : 7w0d
Current AN: 0
Previous AN: -
Next PN: 2514
SA State: notInUse(2)
Confidentiality : yes
SAK Unchanged : yes
SA Create time : 1d01h
SA Start time : 7w0d

SC Statistics
Auth-only Pkts : 0
Auth-only Bytes : 0
Encrypt Pkts : 3156  <-- can increment with Tx traffic 
Encrypt Bytes : 0

SA Statistics
Auth-only Pkts : 0
Encrypt Pkts : 402  <-- can increment with Tx traffic 

Port Statistics
Egress untag pkts 0
Egress long pkts 0

Receive Secure Channels
SCI : A0F8490EA91F0026
SC state : notInUse(2)
Elapsed time : 00:24:38
Start time : 7w0d
Current AN: 0
Previous AN: -
Next PN: 94
RX SA Count: 0
SA State: notInUse(2)
SAK Unchanged : yes
SA Create time : 1d01h
SA Start time : 7w0d

SC Statistics
Notvalid pkts 0
Invalid pkts 0
Valid pkts 0
Valid bytes 0
Late pkts 0
Uncheck pkts 0
Delay pkts 0
UnusedSA pkts 0
NousingSA pkts 0
Decrypt bytes 0

SA Statistics
Notvalid pkts 0
Invalid pkts 0
Valid pkts 93
UnusedSA pkts 0
NousingSA pkts 0
!

Port Statistics
Ingress untag pkts 0
Ingress notag pkts 748
Ingress badtag pkts 0
Ingress unknownSCI pkts 0
Ingress noSCI pkts 0
Ingress overrun pkts 0



C9500#sh mka sessions interface fortyGigabitEthernet 1/0/1
Summary of All Currently Active MKA Sessions on Interface FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/1...
====================================================================================================
Interface    Local-TxSCI       Policy-Name   Inherited   Key-Server
Port-ID      Peer-RxSCI        MACsec-Peers    Status      CKN
====================================================================================================
Fo1/0/1    0cd0.f8dc.dc01/0008    MKA             NO        YES
8          a0f8.490e.a91f/0026    1            Secured01     <-- CKN number must match on both sides

0cd0.f8dc.dc01 <-- MAC of local interface
a0f8.490e.a91f <-- MAC of remote neighbor
8 <-- indicates IIF_ID of respective local port (here IF_ID is 8 for local port fo1/0/1)



C9500#sh platform pm interface-numbers | in iif|1/0/1
interface  iif-id  gid  slot  unit  slun    HWIDB-Ptr     status   status2  state  snmp-if-index
Fo1/0/1      8     1    1     1      1   0x7EFF3F442778  0x10040  0x20001B  0x4        8



C9500#sh mka sessions interface fortyGigabitEthernet 1/0/1 detail
MKA Detailed Status for MKA Session
===================================
Status: SECURED - Secured MKA Session with MACsec
Local Tx-SCI............. 0cd0.f8dc.dc01/0008
Interface MAC Address.... 0cd0.f8dc.dc01
MKA Port Identifier...... 8
Interface Name........... FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/1
Audit Session ID.........
CAK Name (CKN)........... 01
Member Identifier (MI)... DFDC62E026E0712F0F096392
Message Number (MN)...... 536     <-- can increment as message numbers increment
EAP Role................. NA
Key Server............... YES
MKA Cipher Suite......... AES-256-CMAC

Latest SAK Status........ Rx & Tx
Latest SAK AN............ 0
Latest SAK KI (KN)....... DFDC62E026E0712F0F09639200000001 (1)
Old SAK Status........... FIRST-SAK
Old SAK AN............... 0
Old SAK KI (KN).......... FIRST-SAK (0)

SAK Transmit Wait Time... 0s (Not waiting for any peers to respond)
SAK Retire Time.......... 0s (No Old SAK to retire)
SAK Rekey Time........... 0s (SAK Rekey interval not applicable)

MKA Policy Name.......... MKA
Key Server Priority...... 200
Delay Protection......... NO
Delay Protection Timer.......... 0s (Not enabled)

Confidentiality Offset... 0
Algorithm Agility........ 80C201
SAK Rekey On Live Peer Loss........ NO
Send Secure Announcement.. DISABLED
SAK Cipher Suite......... 0080C20001000002 (GCM-AES-256)
MACsec Capability........ 3 (MACsec Integrity, Confidentiality, & Offset)
MACsec Desired........... YES

# of MACsec Capable Live Peers............ 1 <-- Peers capable of MACsec
# of MACsec Capable Live Peers Responded.. 1 <-- Peers that responded to MACsec negotiation 

Live Peers List:
MI                        MN    Rx-SCI (Peer)        KS           RxSA
                                                   Priority      Installed
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACF0BD8ECCA391A197F4DF6B 537  a0f8.490e.a91f/0026    200            YES  <-- One live peer
!
Potential Peers List:
MI                        MN    Rx-SCI (Peer)        KS           RxSA
                                                  Priority      Installed
------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Check the MKA policy and ensure that it is applied to expected interface 

C9500#sh mka policy MKA
MKA Policy defaults :
Send-Secure-Announcements: DISABLED
!
MKA Policy Summary...
!
Codes : CO - Confidentiality Offset, ICVIND - Include ICV-Indicator,
SAKR OLPL - SAK-Rekey On-Live-Peer-Loss,
DP - Delay Protect, KS Prio - Key Server Priority

Policy      KS    DP       CO SAKR    ICVIND  Cipher   Interfaces
Name       Prio               OLPL            Suite(s)   Applied
===============================================================================
MKA        200    FALSE     0 FALSE    TRUE   GCM-AES-256  Fo1/0/1 <-- Applied to Fo1/0/1



### Ensure that PDU counters are incrementing at Tx/Rx at both sides. This is useful to determine the direction of issues at transport. ###

C9500#sh mka statistics | sec PDU
MKPDU Statistics
MKPDUs Validated & Rx...... 2342  <-- can increment
"Distributed SAK"..... 0
"Distributed CAK"..... 0
MKPDUs Transmitted......... 4552  <-- can increment


### MKA Error Counters ###

C9500#show mka statistics
** snip***

MKA Error Counter Totals 
========================
Session Failures
Bring-up Failures................ 0
Reauthentication Failures........ 0
Duplicate Auth-Mgr Handle........ 0
!
SAK Failures
SAK Generation................... 0
Hash Key Generation.............. 0
SAK Encryption/Wrap.............. 0
SAK Decryption/Unwrap............ 0
SAK Cipher Mismatch.............. 0
!
CA Failures
Group CAK Generation............. 0
Group CAK Encryption/Wrap........ 0
Group CAK Decryption/Unwrap...... 0
Pairwise CAK Derivation.......... 0
CKN Derivation................... 0
ICK Derivation................... 0
KEK Derivation................... 0
Invalid Peer MACsec Capability... 0
!
MACsec Failures
Rx SC Creation................... 0
Tx SC Creation................... 0
Rx SA Installation............... 0
Tx SA Installation............... 0
!
MKPDU Failures
MKPDU Tx......................... 0
MKPDU Rx Validation.............. 0
MKPDU Rx Bad Peer MN............. 0
MKPDU Rx Non-recent Peerlist MN.. 0

Etapa 3 a Etapa 5

Use as mesmas instruções mencionadas no Cenário 1.

Aviso: para fins de interoperabilidade, lembre-se de que algumas plataformas preenchem e outras não. Isso pode levar a problemas importantes em que a sessão mka permanece no estado Init. Você pode verificar isso com o comando show mka sessions.

Exemplo de problema de preenchimento

Este caso de uso mostra um Catalyst 9500 e um Nexus 7k no NX-OS 8.2(2), mas também pode ocorrer com dispositivos Catalyst como o C3560CX.

(A ID de bug da Cisco CSCvs92023 documenta o problema). 

• Se você usar a configuração apresentada no cenário 2, o MKA não poderá estabelecer o túnel devido a uma incompatibilidade de chave.
• Você deve preencher manualmente a chave com 0s no lado do 9500, já que este dispositivo não preenche.

Catalyst 9500

conf t
  key chain MACsec1 MACsec
     key 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 --> device does not do padding automatically
       key-string 12345678901234567890123456789012
       end

Nexus 7K

conf t
  key chain MACsec1 MACsec
    key 01  --> Device does automatic padding.
      key-octet-string 12345678901234567890123456789012
      end

Outras opções de configuração

Segurança de enlace de switch a switch MACsec com MKA na interface de canal de porta/pacote 

• Canais de porta L3 e L2 (LACP, PAgP e Modo ON)
• Tipos de criptografia (AES-128 e AES-256, AES-256 é aplicável para a licença Advantage)
• Troca de chaves MKA PSK apenas 

Plataformas suportadas:

• Catalyst 9200 (somente AES-128)
• Catalyst 9300
• Catalyst 9400
• Catalyst 9500 e Catalyst 9500H
• Catalyst 9600

Exemplo de Configuração de Switch para Switch Etherchannel

A configuração da cadeia de chaves e da política MKA permanece a mesma, conforme mostrado anteriormente na seção de configuração MKA. 

interface <>  <-- This is the physical member link. MACsec encrypts on the individual links 
    MACsec network-link 
    mka policy <policy-name>  
    mka pre-shared-key key-chain <key-chain name> 
    macsec replay-protection window-size frame number
    channel-group 
    
    
      mode active <-- Adding physical member to the port-channel 
    

Segurança de Enlace Switch a Switch MACsec em Switches Intermediários L2, Modo PSK

Esta seção aborda alguns dos cenários de WAN MACsec suportados em que o Cat9K precisa passar pacotes criptografados de forma transparente.

Há casos em que os roteadores não estão diretamente conectados, mas têm switches intermediários L2, e os switches L2 podem ignorar os pacotes criptografados sem qualquer processamento da criptografia.

Os switches Catalyst 9000 encaminham pacotes de forma transparente com Clear Tag a partir da versão 16.10(1)

• A passagem é compatível com MKA/SAP
• Suportado em acesso L2, tronco ou Etherchannels
• Suportado por padrão (sem CLIs de configuração para ativar/desativar)
• Certifique-se de que os roteadores enviem quadros EAPOL com tipo de éter não padrão (0x888E) 

Topologia EoMPLS / VPLS

Plataformas suportadas Cat 9300/9400,9500/9500H como dispositivos PE ou P

• VPLS
• EoMPLS
• Suportado por padrão (sem CLIs de configuração para ativar/desativar)
• Iniciar 16.10(1)

Restrições

Não há suporte para criptografia dupla. O MACsec Fim a Fim com a marca Clear requer que os switches Salto a Salto não sejam ativados nos Links conectados diretamente ao L2.

• ClearTag + EoMPLS com switches intermediários somente de Camada 2, MACsec não pode ativar no link CE-PE
• ClearTag + L3VPN com switches intermediários não suportados

• Não há suporte para Deve Proteger no Modo PSK. Must Secure é o modo padrão.
• A política Must Secure não criptografa somente EAPoL para negociar as configurações MACsec.

Informações operacionais do MACsec

Sequência de Operação

1. Quando o link e ambos os dispositivos finais surgem, eles trocam quadros MKA (ethertype = 0x888E, o mesmo que EAPOL com o tipo de pacote que MKA). É um protocolo de negociação multiponto a multiponto. O valor da chave CAK (normalmente pré-compartilhada estática), o nome da chave (CKN) devem corresponder e o ICV deve ser válido para que os pares sejam descobertos e aceitos.
2. O dispositivo com a prioridade mais baixa do servidor de chaves (padrão = 0) é escolhido como o servidor de chaves. O servidor de chaves gera o SAK e o distribui através de mensagens MKA. Em caso de empate, o valor mais alto do identificador de canal seguro (SCI) vence.
3. Subsequentemente, todos os quadros protegidos por MACsec são criptografados com a criptografia simétrica (SAC). Há canais seguros TX e RX separados criados. Mas a mesma chave SAK é usada para criptografar e descriptografar.
4. Quando um novo dispositivo é detectado em uma LAN multiacesso (através de mensagens EAPOL-MKA), o servidor de chaves gera uma nova chave a ser usada por todos os dispositivos. A nova chave entra em uso depois de ser reconhecida por todos os dispositivos (consulte a seção 9.17.2 do padrão IEEE 802.1X-2010).

Pacotes MACsec

Quadro de controlo (EAPOL-MKA)

• MAC de destino EAPOL = 01:80:C2:00:00:03 para enviar os pacotes por multicast para vários destinos
• Tipo de éter EAPOL = 0x888E

Carga útil de L2 no formato do quadro de Controle.

Quadro de dados 

O MACsec insere duas tags adicionais nos quadros de dados com sobrecarga máxima de 32 bytes (mín. 16 bytes).

•  SecTag = 8 a 16 bytes (SCI de 8 bytes é opcional)
•  ICV = 8 a 16 bytes com base no naipe de cifra (AES128/256)

Negociação SAP

Intercâmbio de chave

MACsec na plataforma

Matriz de compatibilidade do produto

Informações Relacionadas

Guia de configuração de segurança, Cisco IOS® XE Gibraltar 16.12.x (switches Catalyst 9300)