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Depurações do ASA IKEv2 para VPN site a site com PSKs

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Atualizado:6 de Março de 2013
ID do documento:115935

Linguagem livre de preconceitos

O conjunto de documentação deste produto faz o possível para usar uma linguagem imparcial. Para os fins deste conjunto de documentação, a imparcialidade é definida como uma linguagem que não implica em discriminação baseada em idade, deficiência, gênero, identidade racial, identidade étnica, orientação sexual, status socioeconômico e interseccionalidade. Pode haver exceções na documentação devido à linguagem codificada nas interfaces de usuário do software do produto, linguagem usada com base na documentação de RFP ou linguagem usada por um produto de terceiros referenciado. Saiba mais sobre como a Cisco está usando a linguagem inclusiva.

Sobre esta tradução

A Cisco traduziu este documento com a ajuda de tecnologias de tradução automática e humana para oferecer conteúdo de suporte aos seus usuários no seu próprio idioma, independentemente da localização. Observe que mesmo a melhor tradução automática não será tão precisa quanto as realizadas por um tradutor profissional. A Cisco Systems, Inc. não se responsabiliza pela precisão destas traduções e recomenda que o documento original em inglês (link fornecido) seja sempre consultado.

Introduction

Este documento fornece informações para entender as depurações de IKEv2 no Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) quando a chave pré-compartilhada (PSKs) é usada.

Prerequisites

Requirements

Não existem requisitos específicos para este documento.

Componentes Utilizados

Este documento não se restringe a versões de software e hardware específicas.

The information in this document was created from the devices in a specific lab environment. All of the devices used in this document started with a cleared (default) configuration. If your network is live, make sure that you understand the potential impact of any command.

Conventions

Consulte as Convenções de Dicas Técnicas da Cisco para obter mais informações sobre convenções de documentos.

Problema principal

A troca de pacotes em IKEv2 é radicalmente diferente do que era em IKEv1. Enquanto no IKEv1 havia uma troca de fase1 claramente demarcada que consistia em 6 pacotes seguidos de uma troca de fase 2 que consistia em 3 pacotes, a troca de IKEv2 é variável. Para obter informações mais detalhadas sobre as diferenças e uma explicação da troca de pacotes, consulte IKEv2 Packet Exchange and Protocol Level Debugging.

Depurações usadas 

debug crypto ikev2 protocol 127
debug crypto ikev2 platform 127

Configurações do ASA

ASA1 

interface GigabitEthernet0/0
 nameif outside
 security-level 0
 ip address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0

interface GigabitEthernet0/2
 nameif inside 
 security-level 100 
 ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 

crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
 protocol esp encryption aes-256
 protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5

access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1 
   host  192.168.2.99
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12 
   host 192.168.2.99 

crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.2
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
crypto map outside_map interface outside

crypto ikev2 policy 1
 encryption aes-256
 integrity sha
 group 2
 prf sha
 lifetime seconds 86400

crypto ikev2 enable outside

tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 ipsec-attributes
 ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
 ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

ASA2 

interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
nameif outside 
security-level 0 
ip address 10.0.0.2 255.255.255.0

interface GigabitEthernet0/2
 nameif inside
 security-level 100
 ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0

crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 
protocol esp encryption aes-256 
protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5

access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
   host 191.168.1.1 
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
   host 191.168.1.12

crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.1 
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 
crypto map outside_map interface outside 

crypto ikev2 policy 1
 encryption aes-256
 integrity sha
 group 2
 prf sha
 lifetime seconds 86400 

crypto ikev2 enable outside 
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 type ipsec-l2l 
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 ipsec-attributes
 ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
 ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

Debugs

Descrição da mensagem do ASA1 (iniciador) Debugs Descrição da mensagem do ASA2 (respondedor)
O ASA1 recebe um pacote que corresponde à ACL de criptografia do par ASA 10.0.0.2. Inicia a criação da SA. 
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel 
   group for IP: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.2 
   using peer IP
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tp_name set to:
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing outgoing negotiating 
   sa count by one
 
O primeiro par de mensagens é a troca IKE_SA_INIT. Essas mensagens negociam algoritmos criptográficos, trocam nonces e fazem uma troca Diffie-Hellman. Configuração relevante: 
crypto ikev2 
   policy 1
encryption 
aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 
  86400
crypto ikev2 
  enable
  outside

Tunnel Group 
 matching the 
 identity name 
 is present:

tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.2 
   type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.2
   ipsec-attributes
ikev2 
   remote-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****
ikev2 
   local-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE Event: EV_INIT_SA
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 
   (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI 
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958
 
O iniciador cria o pacote IKE_INIT_SA. Contém:
  1. Cabeçalho ISAKMP - SPI/versão/flags
  2. algoritmo criptográfico SAi1 que o iniciador IKE suporta
  3. Valor da chave pública KEi-DH do iniciador
  4. N-Initiator Nonce
 
R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG 
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   r: 0000000000000000]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 0000000000000000
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
 SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44  Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, 
   SPI size: 0, #trans: 4 
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 136
    DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
      19 65 43 45 d2 72 a7 11 b8 a4 93 3f 44 95 6c b8
     6d 5a f0 f8 1f f3 d4 b9 ff 41 7b 0d 13 90 82 cf
     34 2e 74 e3 03 6e 9e 00 88 80 5d 86 2c 4c 79 35
     ee e6 98 91 89 f3 48 83 75 09 02 f1 3c b1 7f f5
     be 05 f1 fa 7e 8a 4c 43 eb a9 2c 3a 47 c0 68 40
     f5 dd 02 9d a5 b5 a2 a6 90 64 95 fc 57 b5 69 e8
     b2 4f 8e f2 a5 05 e3 c7 17 f9 c0 e0 c8 3e 91 ed
     c1 09 23 3e e5 09 4f be 1a 6a d4 d9 fb 65 44 1d
N  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
     84 8b 80 c2 52 6c 4f c7 f8 08 b8 ed! 52 af a2 f4
     d5 dd d4 f4
VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 23

     43 49 53 43 4f 2d 44 45 4c 45 54 45 2d 52 45 41
     53 4f 4e
 VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 59

     43 49 53 43 4f 28 43 4f 50 59 52 49 47 48 54 29
     26 43 6f 70 79 72 69 67 68 74 20 28 63 29 20 32
     30 30 39 20 43 69 73 63 6f 20 53 79 73 74 65 6d
     73 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e
 VID  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3
 
O iniciador é enviado. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500
  
— O iniciador enviou IKE_INIT_SA —>
  
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x0000000000000000 
   MID=00000000
O Respondedor recebe IKEV_INIT_SA.
  
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 
   10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   r: 0000000000000000]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 0000000000000000
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing incoming negotiating 
   sa count by one
SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
 KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
    DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE 
   Event: EV_RECV_INIT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
O Respondedor inicia a criação de SA para esse peer .
  
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_INSERT_SA
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Insert SA
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event:EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
   Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): No NAT found
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT  
   Event: EV_PKI_SESH_OPEN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Opening a PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG
O Respondente verifica e processa a mensagem IKE_INIT:
  1. Escolhe o conjunto de criptografia dos oferecidos pelo iniciador.
  2. Calcula sua própria chave secreta DH.
  3. Ele também calcula um valor de skeyid, do qual todas as chaves podem ser derivadas para este IKE_SA. Todos, exceto os cabeçalhos de todas as mensagens a seguir, são criptografados e autenticados. As chaves usadas para a proteção de criptografia e integridade são derivadas da SKEYID e conhecidas como: a. SK_e (criptografia). b. SK_a (autenticação). c. SK_d é derivado e usado para derivação de material de chaveamento adicional para CHILD_SAs. Um SK_e e SK_a separados são computados para cada direção.
Configuração relevante: 
 
crypto ikev2 
   policy 1
encryption 
   aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 
   86400
crypto ikev2 
   enable 
   outside

Tunnel Group 
matching the 
identity name 
is present:

tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.1 
   type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.1 
   ipsec-
   attributes
ikev2 remote-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****
ikev2 local-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****
  
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-3:   IKE Proposal: 1, SPI size: 0 
   (initial negotiation),
Num. transforms: 4
AES-CBC SHA1 SHA96 DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
   FRAGMENTATIONIKEv2-PROTO-3: 
   Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
 SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136

DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
O ASA2 cria a mensagem do respondente para o intercâmbio IKE_SA_INIT, que é recebido pelo ASA1. Este pacote contém:
  1. Cabeçalho ISAKMP(SPI/versão/flags)
  2. SAr1 (algoritmo criptográfico escolhido pelo respondente IKE)
  3. KEr(DH valor de chave pública do respondente)
  4. Respondente Nonce
  
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500 InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
   RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 MID=00000000
O ASA2 envia a mensagem do respondente para o ASA1.
<— Respondente enviou IKE_INIT_SA —
O ASA1 recebe o pacote de resposta IKE_SA_INIT do ASA2. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT 
   [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
   RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000000

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE 
   Event: EV_DONE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): 
   Fragmentation is
   enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco 
   DeleteReason Notify 
   is enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete 
   SA init exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE 
   Event: EV_CHK4_ROLE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000

CurState: INIT_DONE Event: 
   EV_START_TMR
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Starting 
   timer to wait for auth 
   message (30 sec)
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
O Respondedor inicia o temporizador do processo de Autenticação.
O ASA1 verifica e processa a resposta:
  1. A chave secreta DH do iniciador é calculada
  2. O Skeyid do iniciador também é gerado 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338

 SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
 KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
    DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_WAIT_INIT 
   Event: EV_RECV_INIT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): NAT-T is disabled
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_DONE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Fragmentation is enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco DeleteReason Notify is enabled
 
A troca IKE_INIT_SA entre os ASAs está concluída. 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete SA init exchange
  
O iniciador inicia a troca "IKE_AUTH" e inicia a geração do payload de autenticação. O pacote IKE_AUTH contém:
  1. Cabeçalho ISAKMP (SPI/versão/flags) .
  2. IDi (identidade do iniciador) .
  3. payload AUTH .
  4. SAi2 (inicia o SA-similar à troca de conjunto de transformação da fase 2 em IKEv1) .
  5. TSi e TSr (Seletores de tráfego do iniciador e do respondedor): Eles contêm o endereço de origem e de destino do iniciador e do respondedor, respectivamente, para encaminhar/receber tráfego criptografado. O intervalo de endereços especifica que todo o tráfego de e para esse intervalo será encapsulado. Se a proposta for aceitável para o respondente, ele enviará cargas úteis de TS idênticas de volta.
O 1º CHILD_SA é criado para o par proxy_ID que corresponde ao pacote de disparo. Configuração relevante: 
crypto ipsec 
   ikev2 
   ipsec-proposal 
   AES256
 protocol esp 
   encryption 
   aes-256
 protocol esp 
   integrity 
   sha-1 md5

access-list 
   l2l_list 
   extended 
   permit ip 
   host 10.0.0.2 
   host 10.0.0.1
 
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
   CISCO-GRANITE
IKEv2-PROTO-3:   ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
   (IPSec negotiation),
Num. transforms: 4
   AES-CBC   SHA96   MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: INITIAL_CONTACT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Building packet for encryption; 
   contents are:
 VID  Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
    Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

     47 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
    Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

  TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665

IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
 ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 256
Encrypted data: 252 bytes
  
O ASA1 envia o pacote IKE_AUTH para o ASA2. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001
 
— O iniciador enviou IKE_AUTH —>
  
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001
O ASA2 recebe esse pacote do ASA1.
  
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Request has mess_id 1; 
   expected 1 through 1 REAL Decrypted packet:
   Data: 216 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  
   Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
    Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

     47 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
    Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
 TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Stopping timer to wait for auth 
   message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_ID
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Recieved valid parameteres in 
   process id
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_FOR_
   PROF_SEL
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group for 
   ID: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1 using 
   phase 1 ID
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4EAP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_POLREQEAP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH

IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PLAT-2: Build config mode reply: no request stored
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK4_IC
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Processing initial contact
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_REDIRECT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Redirect check is not needed, 
   skipping it
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer is accepted
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map 
   outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
O ASA2 interrompe o temporizador de autenticação e verifica os dados de autenticação recebidos do ASA1. Em seguida, ele gera seus próprios dados de autenticação, exatamente como o ASA1. Configuração relevante: 
crypto ipsec 
   ikev2 
   ipsec-
   proposal 
   AES256
 protocol esp 
   encryption 
   aes-256
 protocol esp 
   integrity 
   sha-1 md5
  
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_MY_AUTH_METHOD
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK4_SIGN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
   CISCO-GRANITE
IKEv2-PROTO-3:   ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 (IPSec 
   negotiation),
Num. transforms: 3
   AES-CBC   SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: 
   ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORTIKEv2-PROTO-5: 
   Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGSIKEv2-PROTO-3:
     (16):
Building packet for encryption; contents are:
 VID  Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
     25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDr  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 12 Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
     51 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 28 Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, 
   reserved: 0x0, length: 40
  Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

 TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
 NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  Next payload: NOTIFY, 
   reserved: 0x0, length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE, 
   spi size: 0, type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
 NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
   type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: 
   RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
 ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 208
Encrypted data: 204 bytes
O pacote IKE_AUTH enviado do ASA2 contém:
  1. Cabeçalho ISAKMP (SPI/versão/flags).
  2. IDr (identidade do respondedor).
  3. Carga útil AUTH.
  4. SAr2 (inicia o SA-similar à troca de conjunto de transformação da fase 2 em IKEv1).
  5. TSi e TSr (Seletores de tráfego do iniciador e do respondedor): Eles contêm o endereço origem e destino do iniciador e do respondedor, respectivamente, para encaminhar/receber tráfego criptografado. O intervalo de endereços especifica que todo o tráfego de e para esse intervalo será encapsulado. Esses parâmetros são idênticos ao que foi recebido do ASA1.
  
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001
O Respondedor envia a resposta para IKE_AUTH.
<— Respondente enviada —
O iniciador recebe uma resposta do respondedor. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
   RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
   RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: 
   Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing  
   the PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): 
   SA created; 
   inserting SA into database
O Respondedor insere uma entrada no SAD.
O ASA1 verifica e processa os dados de autenticação neste pacote. Em seguida, o ASA1 insere essa SA em seu SAD. 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 168 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  
   Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDr  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
    Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

     51 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
    Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

   TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload: 
   ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  
   Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
    Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
   type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload: 
   NON_FIRST_FRAGS NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload:
   NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
    Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
   type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
Decrypted packet:Data: 236 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Process auth response notify
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_
   FOR_PROF_SEL
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PLAT-3: connection initiated with tunnel 
   group 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_EAP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_IKE_ONLY
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing the PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): SA created; inserting SA into 
   database
 
O túnel está ativo no Iniciador. 
CONNECTION 
    STATUS: UP... 
   peer: 10.0.0.2:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION

CONNECTION 
   STATUS: UP... 
   peer: 10.0.0.1:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION
O túnel está ativo no Respondedor. O túnel do Respondedor geralmente aparece antes do Iniciador.
Processo de registro IKEv2. 
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
   connection 
   auth hdl set to 15
IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn 
   attribute retrieval 
   successfully queued 
   for register session 
   request.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle 
   timeout set to: 30
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session 
   timeout set to: 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   policy set to 
   DfltGrpPolicy
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class 
   attr set
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel 
   protocol set to: 0x5c
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter 
   ID not configured 
   for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   lock set to: none
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID 
   not configured 
   for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
   connection attribues 
   set valid to TRUE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully 
   retrieved conn attrs
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session 
   registration after conn 
   attr retrieval 
   PASSED, No error
IKEv2-PLAT-3:
CONNECTION STATUS: 
   REGISTERED... 
   peer: 10.0.0.2:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.2

IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
   connection 
   auth hdl set to 15
IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn 
   attribute retrieval 
   successfully queued for 
   register session request.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle 
   timeout 
   set to: 30
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session 
   timeout 
   set to: 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   policy set to 
   DfltGrpPolicy
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class 
   attr set
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel 
   protocol set to: 0x5c
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter ID 
   not configured 
   for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   lock set to: none
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID 
   not configured 
   for connection
   attribues set 
   valid to TRUE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully 
   retrieved conn attrs
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session 
   registration after conn 
   attr retrieval PASSED, 
   No error
IKEv2-PLAT-3:
CONNECTION STATUS: 
   REGISTERED... 
   peer: 10.0.0.1:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.1
Processo de registro IKEv2.

Depurações de Associação de Segurança Filho

Essa troca consiste em um único par de solicitação/resposta e foi chamada de troca de fase 2 em IKEv1. ELE PODE ser iniciado em qualquer extremidade do IKE_SA depois que as trocas iniciais forem concluídas.

Descrição da mensagem ASA1 CHILD_SA Debugs Descrição da mensagem ASA2 CHILD_SA
  
IKEv2-PLAT-5: INVALID PSH HANDLE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group 
   for IP: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1 
   using peer IP
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tp_name set to:
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PSH cleanup
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: READY 
   Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_INIT 
   Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for IPSEC rekey
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_BLD_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-3:?ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
   (IPSec negotiation), num. transforms: 4
   AES-CBC?SHA96?MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption; 
   contents are:
   SA?Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, 
   SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:  
  length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
fa b7 f0 48
TSi?Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr?Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12

IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if request will fit in 
   peer window
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
ENCR?Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 152
Encrypted data: 148 bytes
O ASA2 inicia a troca CHILD_SA. Esta é a solicitação CREATE_CHILD_SA. O pacote CHILD_SA normalmente contém:
  1. SA HDR (version.flags/exchange type)
  2. Nonce Ni (opcional): Se CHILD_SA for criado como parte da troca inicial, um segundo payload KE e nonce NÃO DEVEM ser enviados.
  3. Carga útil SA
  4. KEi (Chave opcional): A solicitação CREATE_CHILD_SA PODE, opcionalmente, conter um payload KE para uma troca DH adicional para permitir garantias mais fortes de sigilo de encaminhamento para CHILD_SA.?Se as ofertas SA incluírem diferentes grupos DH, KEi DEVE ser um elemento do grupo que o iniciador espera que o respondente aceite.?Se achar errado, a troca CREATE_CHILD_SA falhará, e terá que tentar novamente com outro KEi.
  5. N (Notificar payload-opcional): O Payload Notify é usado para transmitir dados informativos, como condições de erro e transições de estado, para um peer IKE. Um Payload de Notificações pode aparecer em uma mensagem de resposta (normalmente especificando por que uma solicitação foi rejeitada), em um Intercâmbio INFORMATIVO (para relatar um erro que não esteja em uma solicitação IKE) ou em qualquer outra mensagem para indicar recursos do remetente ou para modificar o significado da solicitação. Se esse intercâmbio CREATE_CHILD_SA estiver rekeying de um SA existente diferente do IKE_SA, o payload N líder do tipo REKEY_SA DEVE identificar o SA que está rechaveado.?Se esse intercâmbio CREATE_CHILD_SA não estiver rechaveando um SA existente, o payload N DEVE ser omitido.
  6. TSi e TSr (opcional): Mostra os seletores de tráfego para os quais o SA foi criado. Nesse caso, está entre os hosts 192.168.1.12 e 192.168.2.99.
O ASA1 recebe esse pacote. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
   RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx 
   [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 
   10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT 
   [CREATE_CHILD_SA]
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_I_WAIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
 O ASA2 envia esse pacote e espera pela resposta.
O ASA1 recebe esse pacote exato do ASA2 e o verifica. 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: INITIATOR 
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Request has mess_id 6; 
   expected 6 through 6
   REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 124 bytes
   SA?Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, 
   SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 ype: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
fa b7 f0 48
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr?Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
Decrypted packet:Data: 180 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: READY 
   Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT 
   Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 urState: CHILD_R_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_CC_TYPE
  
O ASA1 agora cria a resposta para a troca CHILD_SA. Esta é a CREATE_CHILD_SA Response. O pacote CHILD_SA normalmente contém:
  1. SA HDR (version.flags/exchange type)
  2. Nonce Ni (opcional): Se CHILD_SA for criado como parte da troca inicial, um segundo payload KE e nonce NÃO DEVEM ser enviados.
  3. Carga útil SA
  4. KEi (Chave opcional): A solicitação CREATE_CHILD_SA PODE, opcionalmente, conter um payload KE para uma troca DH adicional para permitir garantias mais fortes de sigilo de encaminhamento para CHILD_SA.?Se as ofertas SA incluírem diferentes grupos DH, KEi DEVE ser um elemento do grupo que o iniciador espera que o respondente aceite.?Se achar errado, a troca CREATE_CHILD_SA falhará, e terá que tentar novamente com outro KEi .
  5. N (Notificar payload-opcional): A Carga de Notificação é usada para transmitir dados informativos, como condições de erro e transições de estado, para um peer IKE.?Uma Carga de Notificação pode aparecer em uma mensagem de resposta (normalmente especifica por que uma solicitação foi rejeitada), em um Intercâmbio INFORMATIVO (para relatar um erro não em uma solicitação IKE) ou em qualquer outra mensagem para indicar capacidades do remetente ou para modificar o significado da solicitação. Se esse intercâmbio CREATE_CHILD_SA estiver rekeying de um SA existente diferente do IKE_SA, o payload N líder do tipo REKEY_SA DEVE identificar o SA que está rechaveado.?Se esse intercâmbio CREATE_CHILD_SA não estiver rechaveando um SA existente, o payload N DEVE ser omitido.
  6. TSi e TSr (opcional): Mostra os seletores de tráfego para os quais o SA foi criado. Nesse caso, é entre os hosts 192.168.1.12 e 192.168.2.99.
 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for create child 
   response message type
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child 
   SA exchange
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer 
   is accepted
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map 
   outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000005 
   CurState: EXIT Event: EV_FREE_NEG
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Deleting negotiation context 
   for peer message ID: 0x5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
   CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Requesting SPI from IPSec
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_WAIT_SPI Event: EV_OK_GOT_SPI
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_BLD_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-3:?ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
  (IPSec negotiation),
Num. transforms: 3
AES-CBC?SHA96?
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption; 
   contents are:
SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 40
Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12
type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8
type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x0, 
   reserved: 0x0: length: 8
type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

N?Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24

b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05 
   18 1a 27 a6 cb
01 56 22 ad
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, 
   end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr?Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx 
   [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE 
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172
ENCR?Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 144
Encrypted data: 140 bytes
 
O ASA1 envia a resposta. 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT 
   [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->
   [10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006
 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
   RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->
   [10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx 
   [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 
   10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
 O ASA2 recebe esse pacote.
  
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172

REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 116 bytes
SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:?last transform: 0x0, 
   reserved: 0x0: length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

N?Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24

b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05 18 
   1a 27 a6 cb
01 56 22 ad
TSi?Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, 
   end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, 
   end addr: 192.168.1.12

Decrypted packet:Data: 172 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
   CHILD_I_WAIT Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing any notify-messages 
   in child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (
   I) MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_CHK_IKE_REKEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if IKE SA rekey
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_GEN_LOAD_IPSEC
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Load IPSEC key material
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10
 O ASA2 agora verifica o pacote
O ASA1 insere essa entrada de SA filho no banco de dados de associação de segurança. 
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_DONE 
   Event: EV_OK

IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): 
   SA created; inserting 
   SA into database

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
   CHILD_R_DONE 
   Event: EV_START_DEL_NEG_TMR
 
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_I_DONE 
   Event: EV_OK

IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): 
   SA created; 
   inserting SA into database
O ASA2 insere essa entrada de SA filho no banco de dados de associação de segurança.

Verificação de túnel

ISAKMP

Comando 

show crypto isakmp sa det

Saída

ASA1

ASA1(config)#sh cry isa sa det
There are no IKEv1 SAs

IKEv2 SAs:Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id             Local              Remote     Status         Role
1889403559      10.0.0.1/500        10.0.0.2/500      READY    RESPONDER

      Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
      Life/Active Time: 86400/195 sec
      Session-id: 99220
      Status Description: Negotiation done
      Local spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7       Remote spi: FD366326E1FED6FE
      Local id: 10.0.0.1
      Remote id: 10.0.0.2
      Local req mess id: 14             Remote req mess id: 16
      Local next mess id: 14            Remote next mess id: 16
      Local req queued: 14              Remote req queued: 16
      Local window: 1                   Remote window: 1
      DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
      NAT-T is not detected
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
          AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
          CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
          Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
          ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a
          AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
          CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
          Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
          ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel

ASA2

ASA2(config)#sh cry isa sa det

There are no IKEv1 SAs

IKEv2 SAs:

Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id??????????????? Local?????????????? Remote??? Status??????? Role
472237395???????? 10.0.0.2/500???????? 10.0.0.1/500???? READY?? INITIATOR
????? Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
????? Life/Active Time: 86400/190 sec
????? Session-id: 99220
????? Status Description: Negotiation done
????? Local spi: FD366326E1FED6FE?????? Remote spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
????? Local id: 10.0.0.2
????? Remote id: 10.0.0.1
????? Local req mess id: 16???????????? Remote req mess id: 13
????? Local next mess id: 16??????????? Remote next mess id: 13
????? Local req queued: 16????????????? Remote req queued: 13
????? Local window: 1?????????????????? Remote window: 1
????? DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
????? NAT-T is not detected ?
Child sa: local selector? 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
????????? remote selector 192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
????????? ESP spi in/out: 0x8717a5a/0x8564387d ?
????????? AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0 ?
????????? CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0 ?
????????? Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
????????? ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selector? 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
????????? remote selector 192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
????????? ESP spi in/out: 0xf0d97b2a/0x74756292 ?
????????? AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0 ?
????????? CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0 ?
????????? Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
????????? ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel

IPSec

Comando 

show crypto ipsec sa

Saída

ASA1

ASA1(config)#sh cry ipsec sa
interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1 
        host 192.168.2.99
       local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
          (192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
       remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
          192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
       current_peer: 10.0.0.2

       #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
       #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
       #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
       #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
          #pkts decomp failed: 0
       #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
          #fragments created: 0
       #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, 
          #decapsulated frgs needing reassembly: 0
       #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

       local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto endpt.: 
          10.0.0.2/500
       path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
       current outbound spi: F0D97B2A
       current inbound spi : 74756292

     inbound esp sas:
       spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
          transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
          in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
          slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
          sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4008959/28628)
          IV size: 16 bytes
          replay detection support: Y
          Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4147199/28628)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x00000001

    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12 
        host 192.168.2.99
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
        192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      current_peer: 10.0.0.2
      #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
      #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
        #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
        #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
        reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto 
        endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 08717A5A
      current inbound spi : 8564387D

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28734)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28734)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x00000001

ASA2

ASA2(config)#sh cry ipsec sa
interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 host 
        192.168.1.12
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      current_peer: 10.0.0.1

      #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
      #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
        #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
        #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
        reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto 
        endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 8564387D
      current inbound spi : 08717A5A

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4193279/28770)
         IV size: 16 bytes         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28770)
         IV size: 16 bytes         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x00000001

   Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2

     access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
       host 192.168.1.1
     local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
       192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
     remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
       (192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
     current_peer: 10.0.0.1
     #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
     #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
     #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
     #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
       #pkts decomp failed: 0
     #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
       #fragments created: 0
     #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
       reassembly: 0
     #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

     local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto 
       endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
     path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
     current outbound spi: 74756292
     current inbound spi : F0D97B2A

   inbound esp sas:
     spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
        transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
        in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
        slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28663)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x0000000F
   outbound esp sas:
     spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
        transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
        in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
        slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4331519/28663)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x00000001

Você também pode verificar a saída do comando show crypto ikev2 sa. Isso fornece uma saída idêntica à saída do comando show crypto isakmp sa: 

IKEv2 SAs:

Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id                Local               Remote   Status        Role
1889403559         10.0.0.1/500         10.0.0.2/500    READY   RESPONDER
      Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
      Life/Active Time: 86400/179 sec
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a

Informações Relacionadas

Histórico de revisões

Revisão Data de publicação Comentários
1.0
06-Mar-2013
Versão inicial
TAC Authored

Colaborado por engenheiros da Cisco

  • Anu M Chacko
    Cisco TAC Engineer.

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