Uso dei debug ASA IKEv2 per la VPN da sito a sito con PSK

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Aggiornato:4 aprile 2024

ID documento:115935

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Introduzione

In questo documento vengono descritte le informazioni relative ai debug di Internet Key Exchange versione 2 (IKEv2) su Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA).

Prerequisiti

Requisiti

Nessun requisito specifico previsto per questo documento.

Componenti usati

Il documento può essere consultato per tutte le versioni software o hardware.

Le informazioni discusse in questo documento fanno riferimento a dispositivi usati in uno specifico ambiente di emulazione. Su tutti i dispositivi menzionati nel documento la configurazione è stata ripristinata ai valori predefiniti. Se la rete è operativa, valutare attentamente eventuali conseguenze derivanti dall'uso dei comandi.

Problema principale

Il processo di scambio dei pacchetti utilizzato in IKEv2 è radicalmente diverso da quello utilizzato in IKEv1. Con IKEv1, lo scambio di fase 1 è chiaramente delimitato e consiste di sei pacchetti, mentre quello di fase 2 è costituito da tre pacchetti. Lo scambio IKEv2 è variabile.

Suggerimento: per informazioni più dettagliate sulle differenze e una spiegazione del processo di scambio dei pacchetti, fare riferimento a IKEv2 Packet Exchange and Protocol Level Debugging.

Debug usati

I due debug seguenti vengono utilizzati per IKEv2:

debug crypto ikev2 protocol 127
debug crypto ikev2 platform 127

Configurazioni ASA

In questa sezione vengono fornite configurazioni di esempio per ASA1 (l'iniziatore) e ASA2 (il risponditore).

ASA1

interface GigabitEthernet0/0
nameif outside
security-level 0
ip address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0

interface GigabitEthernet0/2
nameif inside 
security-level 100 
ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 

crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
protocol esp encryption aes-256
protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5

access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1 
   host  192.168.2.99
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12 
   host 192.168.2.99 

crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.2
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
crypto map outside_map interface outside

crypto ikev2 policy 1
encryption aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 86400

crypto ikev2 enable outside

tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 ipsec-attributes
ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

ASA2

interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
nameif outside 
security-level 0 
ip address 10.0.0.2 255.255.255.0

interface GigabitEthernet0/2
nameif inside
security-level 100
ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0

crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 
protocol esp encryption aes-256 
protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5

access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
   host 192.168.1.1 
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
   host 192.168.1.12

crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.1 
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 
crypto map outside_map interface outside 

crypto ikev2 policy 1
encryption aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 86400 

crypto ikev2 enable outside 
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 type ipsec-l2l 
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 ipsec-attributes
ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

Debug

In questa sezione vengono descritti la negoziazione del tunnel ASA1 (iniziatore) e ASA2 (risponditore), i debug della Security Association (SA) e le descrizioni dei messaggi.

Negoziazione tunnel

ASA1 riceve un pacchetto che corrisponde all'Access Control List (ACL) crittografico per l'appliance ASA 10.0.0.2 peer e avvia la creazione dell'ASA:

IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel 
     group for IP: 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.2 
     using peer IP
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tp_name set to:
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
  IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
  IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing outgoing negotiating 
   sa count by one

La coppia iniziale di messaggi inviati è destinata allo scambio IKE_SA_INIT. Questi messaggi negoziano gli algoritmi di crittografia, scambiano nonce ed eseguono uno scambio Diffie-Hellman (DH).

Di seguito è riportata la configurazione rilevante per ASA1:

crypto ikev2 policy 1
  encryption aes-256
  integrity sha
  group 2
  prf sha
  lifetime seconds 86400
crypto ikev2 enable outside
  
Tunnel Group matching the identity name is present:
  
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 ipsec-attributes
  ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
  ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

Di seguito è riportato l'output del comando debug per questo scambio:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE Event: EV_INIT_SA
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 
     (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_SET_POLICY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI 
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958

ASA1 crea quindi il pacchetto IKE_INIT_SA, che contiene:

Intestazione ISAKMP (SPI/versione/flag)
SAi1 (algoritmo di crittografia supportato dall'iniziatore IKE)
KEi (valore della chiave pubblica DH dell'iniziatore)
N (Iniziatore Nonce)

R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG 
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x0
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     r: 0000000000000000]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 0000000000000000
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
     flags: INITIATOR
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
  SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 48
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 44  Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, 
     SPI size: 0, #trans: 4 
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
     id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
  KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 136
      DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
        19 65 43 45 d2 72 a7 11 b8 a4 93 3f 44 95 6c b8
       6d 5a f0 f8 1f f3 d4 b9 ff 41 7b 0d 13 90 82 cf
       34 2e 74 e3 03 6e 9e 00 88 80 5d 86 2c 4c 79 35
       ee e6 98 91 89 f3 48 83 75 09 02 f1 3c b1 7f f5
       be 05 f1 fa 7e 8a 4c 43 eb a9 2c 3a 47 c0 68 40
       f5 dd 02 9d a5 b5 a2 a6 90 64 95 fc 57 b5 69 e8
       b2 4f 8e f2 a5 05 e3 c7 17 f9 c0 e0 c8 3e 91 ed
       c1 09 23 3e e5 09 4f be 1a 6a d4 d9 fb 65 44 1d
  N  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
       84 8b 80 c2 52 6c 4f c7 f8 08 b8 ed! 52 af a2 f4
       d5 dd d4 f4
  VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 23
  
       43 49 53 43 4f 2d 44 45 4c 45 54 45 2d 52 45 41
       53 4f 4e
  VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 59
  
       43 49 53 43 4f 28 43 4f 50 59 52 49 47 48 54 29
       26 43 6f 70 79 72 69 67 68 74 20 28 63 29 20 32
       30 30 39 20 43 69 73 63 6f 20 53 79 73 74 65 6d
       73 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e
VID  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
     40 48 b7 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3

Il pacchetto IKE_INIT_SA viene quindi inviato da ASA1:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT]
     [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500

ASA2 riceve il pacchetto IKEV_INIT_SA:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_SA_INIT]
      [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500
      InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x0000000000000000
    MID=00000000

ASA2 avvia la creazione dell'associazione di sicurezza per il peer:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 
     10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     r: 0000000000000000]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 0000000000000000
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
     flags: INITIATOR
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
  IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
  IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing incoming negotiating 
     sa count by one
  SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
     #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
     id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
  KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
      DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE 
     Event: EV_RECV_INIT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)

ASA2 verifica ed elabora il messaggio IKE_INIT:

La suite crittografica viene scelta tra quelle offerte da ASA1.
Calcola la propria chiave segreta DH.
Viene inoltre calcolato un valore SKEYID, dal quale è possibile derivare tutte le chiavi per questa classe IKE_SA. Tutte le intestazioni dei messaggi successivi, ad eccezione delle intestazioni, vengono crittografate e autenticate. Le chiavi utilizzate per la crittografia e la protezione dell'integrità derivano da SKEYID e sono note come:
- SK_e viene utilizzato per la crittografia.
- SK_a viene utilizzato per l'autenticazione.
- SK_d viene derivato e utilizzato per derivare ulteriore materiale per le chiavi per CHILD_SA. Per ogni direzione vengono calcolate una SK_e e una SK_a separate.

Di seguito è riportata la configurazione rilevante per ASA2:

crypto ikev2 policy 1
  encryption aes-256
  integrity sha
  group 2
  prf sha
  lifetime seconds 86400
crypto ikev2 enable outside
  
Tunnel Group matching the identity name is present:
  
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 ipsec-attributes
  ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
  ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

Di seguito è riportato l'output del comando debug:

MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_INSERT_SA
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Insert SA
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
     Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event:EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
     Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): No NAT found
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_SET_POLICY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT  
     Event: EV_PKI_SESH_OPEN
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Opening a PKI session
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG

ASA2 crea quindi il messaggio del risponditore per lo scambio IKE_SA_INIT, ricevuto da ASA1. Il pacchetto contiene:

Intestazione ISAKMP (SPI/versione/flag)
SAr1 (algoritmo di crittografia scelto dal risponditore IKE)
KEr (valore della chiave pubblica DH del risponditore)
Nonce risponditore

Di seguito è riportato l'output del comando debug:

IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-3:   IKE Proposal: 1, SPI size: 0 
     (initial negotiation),
  Num. transforms: 4
  AES-CBC SHA1 SHA96 DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
     FRAGMENTATIONIKEv2-PROTO-3: 
     Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
     flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
  SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
     #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
     id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
  
  KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
  
DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

ASA2 invia il messaggio del risponditore ad ASA1:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT] 
     [10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500 InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
   RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 MID=00000000

ASA1 riceve il pacchetto di risposta IKE_SA_INIT da ASA2:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT 
     [IKE_SA_INIT] 
     [10.0.0.2]:500->
     [10.0.0.1]:500 
     InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
     RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000000

ASA2 avvia il timer per il processo di autorizzazione:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE 
     Event: EV_DONE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): 
     Fragmentation is
     enabled
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco 
     DeleteReason Notify 
     is enabled
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete 
     SA init exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE 
     Event: EV_CHK4_ROLE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000
  
  CurState: INIT_DONE Event: 
     EV_START_TMR
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Starting 
     timer to wait for auth 
     message (30 sec)
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT

ASA1 verifica ed elabora la risposta:

Viene calcolata la chiave segreta DH dell'iniziatore.
Viene generato l'SKEYID iniziatore.

Di seguito è riportato l'output del comando debug:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x0
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
     flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
  
  SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
     #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
     id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
  KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
      DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_WAIT_INIT 
     Event: EV_RECV_INIT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Processing initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): NAT-T is disabled
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_DONE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Fragmentation is enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco DeleteReason Notify is enabled

Lo scambio IKE_INIT_SA tra le appliance ASA è ora completato:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete SA init exchange

ASA1 avvia lo scambio IKE_AUTH e inizia a generare il payload di autenticazione. Il pacchetto IKE_AUTH contiene:

Intestazione ISAKMP (SPI/versione/flag)
IDi (identità iniziatore)
payload AUTH
SAi2 (avvia l'associazione di protezione - simile allo scambio del set di trasformazioni di fase 2 in IKEv1)
TSi e TSr (initiator e responder traffic selectors)

Nota: TSi e TSr contengono rispettivamente l'indirizzo di origine e l'indirizzo di destinazione dell'iniziatore e del risponditore per inoltrare/ricevere traffico crittografato. L'intervallo di indirizzi specifica che tutto il traffico da e verso l'intervallo è tunneling. Se la proposta è accettabile per il risponditore, restituisce payload di Servizi terminal identici.

Inoltre, viene creata la prima associazione di sicurezza CHILD_SA per la coppia proxy_ID che corrisponde al pacchetto di trigger.

Di seguito è riportata la configurazione rilevante per ASA1:

crypto ipsec 
     ikev2 
     ipsec-proposal 
     AES256
  protocol esp 
     encryption 
     aes-256
  protocol esp 
     integrity 
     sha-1 md5
  
  access-list 
     l2l_list 
     extended 
     permit ip 
     host 10.0.0.2 
   host 10.0.0.1

Di seguito è riportato l'output del comando debug:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1, 
     key len 5
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
     CISCO-GRANITE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3:   ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
     (IPSec negotiation),
  Num. transforms: 4
     AES-CBC   SHA96   MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: INITIAL_CONTACT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Building packet for encryption; 
     contents are:
  VID  Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
  
       dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
  IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
      Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
  
       47 01 01 01
  AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
      Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
  Auth data&colon; 20 bytes
  SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
     #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
    TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
      Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
  TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
      Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x1
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
  ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 256
Encrypted data&colon; 252 bytes

ASA1 invia il pacchetto IKE_AUTH ad ASA2:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
     [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
     InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001

ASA2 riceve questo pacchetto da ASA1:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
     [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
     InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001

ASA2 arresta il timer di autorizzazione e verifica i dati di autenticazione ricevuti da ASA1. e quindi genera i propri dati di autenticazione, esattamente come avviene con ASA1.

Di seguito è riportata la configurazione rilevante per ASA2:

crypto ipsec 
     ikev2 
     ipsec-
     proposal 
     AES256
  protocol esp 
     encryption 
     aes-256
  protocol esp 
     integrity 
   sha-1 md5

Di seguito è riportato l'output del comando debug:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x1
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Request has mess_id 1; 
     expected 1 through 1 REAL Decrypted packet:
     Data&colon; 216 bytes
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  
     Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
  
       dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
  IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
      Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
  
       47 01 01 01
  AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
      Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
  Auth data&colon; 20 bytes
  SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
     #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
      Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
  TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
      Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Stopping timer to wait for auth 
     message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_ID
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Recieved valid parameteres in 
     process id
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_FOR_
     PROF_SEL
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group for 
     ID: 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1 using 
     phase 1 ID
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
     Event: EV_SET_POLICY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
     Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4EAP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_POLREQEAP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1, 
     key len 5
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PLAT-2: Build config mode reply: no request stored
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK4_IC
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Processing initial contact
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_REDIRECT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Redirect check is not needed, 
     skipping it
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer is accepted
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map 
     outside_map seq 1
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message

ASA2 invia il pacchetto IKE_AUTH, che contiene:

Intestazione ISAKMP (SPI/versione/flag)
IDr. (identità risponditore)
payload AUTH
SAr2 (avvia l'associazione di protezione - simile allo scambio del set di trasformazioni di fase 2 in IKEv1)
TSi e TSr (initiator e responder traffic selectors)

Nota: TSi e TSr contengono rispettivamente l'indirizzo di origine e l'indirizzo di destinazione dell'iniziatore e del risponditore per inoltrare/ricevere traffico crittografato. L'intervallo di indirizzi specifica che tutto il traffico da e verso l'intervallo è tunneling. Questi parametri sono identici a quelli ricevuti da ASA1.

Di seguito è riportato l'output del comando debug:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_MY_AUTH_METHOD
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2, 
     key len 5
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK4_SIGN
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
     CISCO-GRANITE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3:   ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 (IPSec 
     negotiation),
  Num. transforms: 3
     AES-CBC   SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: 
     ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORTIKEv2-PROTO-5: 
     Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGSIKEv2-PROTO-3:
       (16):
  Building packet for encryption; contents are:
  VID  Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
       25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
  IDr  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 12 Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
       51 01 01 01
  AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 28 Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
  Auth data&colon; 20 bytes
  SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 44 IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, 
     reserved: 0x0, length: 40
    Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, #trans: 3
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
  TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
  TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  Next payload: NOTIFY, 
     reserved: 0x0, length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE, 
     spi size: 0, type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
  NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
     type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x1
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: 
     RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
  ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 208
Encrypted data&colon; 204 bytes

ASA2 invia la risposta per il pacchetto IKE_AUTH:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
     [10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500 
     InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001

ASA1 riceve la risposta da ASA2:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
     RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
     [10.0.0.2]:500->
     [10.0.0.1]:500 
     InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
     RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001

ASA2 inserisce una voce nel database SA (SAD):

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
     Event: EV_OK
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: 
     Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
     Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing  
     the PKI session
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
     Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): 
     SA created; 
   inserting SA into database

ASA1 verifica ed elabora i dati di autenticazione in questo pacchetto, quindi inserisce l'associazione di protezione nel relativo DAU:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x1
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, 
     flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
  REAL Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 168 bytes
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  
     Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
  
       25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
  IDr  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
      Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
  
       51 01 01 01
  AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
      Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
  Auth data&colon; 20 bytes
  SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
     #trans: 3
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
     TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
  TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload: 
     ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  
     Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
      Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
     type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload: 
     NON_FIRST_FRAGS NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload:
     NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
      Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
     type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
  Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 236 bytes
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Process auth response notify
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_
     FOR_PROF_SEL
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: connection initiated with tunnel 
     group 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2, 
     key len 5
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_EAP
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_IKE_ONLY
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_OK
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing the PKI session
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): SA created; inserting SA into 
   database

Il tunnel è ora attivo per ASA1:

CONNECTION 
      STATUS: UP... 
     peer: 10.0.0.2:500, 
     phase1_id: 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION

Il tunnel è ora attivo per ASA2:

CONNECTION 
     STATUS: UP... 
     peer: 10.0.0.1:500, 
     phase1_id: 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION

Nota: il tunnel del risponditore in genere diventa attivo prima del tunnel dell'iniziatore.

Il processo di registrazione di IKEv2 viene eseguito sull'appliance ASA1:

IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
     connection 
     auth hdl set to 15
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn 
     attribute retrieval 
     successfully queued 
     for register session 
     request.
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle 
     timeout set to: 30
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session 
     timeout set to: 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
     policy set to 
     DfltGrpPolicy
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class 
     attr set
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel 
     protocol set to: 0x5c
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter 
     ID not configured 
     for connection
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
     lock set to: none
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID 
     not configured 
     for connection
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
     connection attribues 
     set valid to TRUE
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully 
     retrieved conn attrs
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session 
     registration after conn 
     attr retrieval 
     PASSED, No error
  IKEv2-PLAT-3:
  CONNECTION STATUS: 
     REGISTERED... 
     peer: 10.0.0.2:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.2

Il processo di registrazione di IKEv2 viene eseguito sull'appliance ASA2:

IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
     connection 
     auth hdl set to 15
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn 
     attribute retrieval 
     successfully queued for 
     register session request.
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle 
     timeout 
     set to: 30
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session 
     timeout 
     set to: 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
     policy set to 
     DfltGrpPolicy
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class 
     attr set
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel 
     protocol set to: 0x5c
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter ID 
     not configured 
     for connection
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
     lock set to: none
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID 
     not configured 
     for connection
     attribues set 
     valid to TRUE
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully 
     retrieved conn attrs
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session 
     registration after conn 
     attr retrieval PASSED, 
     No error
  IKEv2-PLAT-3:
  CONNECTION STATUS: 
     REGISTERED... 
     peer: 10.0.0.1:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.1

Debug SA figlio

Nota: questo scambio è costituito da una singola coppia di richiesta e risposta ed è indicato come scambio di fase 2 in IKEv1. Può essere avviata da una delle estremità di IKE_SA una volta completati gli scambi iniziali.

ASA2 avvia lo scambio CHILD_SA. Richiesta CREATE_CHILD_SA. Il pacchetto CHILD_SA contiene in genere:

SA HDR - Contiene il version.flags e il tipo di scambio.
Nonce Ni (facoltativo) - Se CHILD_SA viene creato come parte dello scambio iniziale, non è necessario inviare un secondo payload KE (Key Exchange) e un nonce.
Payload SA
KEi (Key-optional) - La richiesta CREATE_CHILD_SA può facoltativamente contenere un payload KE per uno scambio DH aggiuntivo per consentire maggiori garanzie di segretezza di inoltro per CHILD_SA. Se l'associazione di protezione include gruppi DH diversi, KEi deve essere un elemento del gruppo che l'iniziatore si aspetta venga accettato dal risponditore. Se non è corretto, lo scambio CREATE_CHILD_SA non riesce e deve riprovare con un KEi diverso.
N (Notifica payload, facoltativo) - Il payload di notifica viene utilizzato per trasmettere dati informativi, ad esempio condizioni di errore e transizioni di stato, a un peer IKE. Un payload di notifica può essere visualizzato in un messaggio di risposta (in genere specifica il motivo per cui una richiesta viene rifiutata), in uno scambio di informazioni (per segnalare un errore non in una richiesta IKE) o in qualsiasi altro messaggio per indicare le capacità del mittente o per modificare il significato della richiesta. Se lo scambio di Create_CHILD_SA reimposta le chiavi di un'associazione di protezione corrente diversa da IKE_SA, il payload N lead di tipo REKEY_SA deve identificare l'associazione di protezione che viene reimpostata. Se lo scambio CREATE_CHILD_SA non reimposta una chiave per l'associazione di protezione corrente, il payload N deve essere omesso.
TSi e TSr (facoltativo): mostra i selettori di traffico per cui è stata creata l'associazione di protezione. In questo caso, è compreso tra gli host 192.168.1.12 e 192.168.2.99.

Di seguito è riportato l'output del comando debug CREATE_CHILD_SA:

IKEv2-PLAT-5: INVALID PSH HANDLE
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group 
     for IP: 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1 
     using peer IP
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tp_name set to:
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tunn grp type set to: L2L
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: PSH cleanup
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: READY 
     Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_INIT 
     Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
     Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for IPSEC rekey
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
     Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
     Event: EV_BLD_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
     (IPSec negotiation), num. transforms: 4
     AES-CBC SHA96 MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption; 
     contents are:
     SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, 
     SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:  
    length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
  N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  
  2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
  fa b7 f0 48
  TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if request will fit in 
     peer window
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x6
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
     flags: INITIATOR
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
  ENCR Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 152
Encrypted data&colon; 148 bytes

ASA2 invia questo pacchetto e attende la risposta:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT 
     [CREATE_CHILD_SA]
     [10.0.0.2]:500->
     [10.0.0.1]:500 
     InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
     RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
     MID=00000006
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_I_WAIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT

ASA1 riceve il pacchetto:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
     RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
     [10.0.0.2]:500->
     [10.0.0.1]:500 
     InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
     RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
     MID=00000006
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx 
     [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 
     10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6

ASA1 riceve quindi questo pacchetto esatto da ASA2 e lo verifica:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
     flags: INITIATOR 
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Request has mess_id 6; 
     expected 6 through 6
     REAL Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 124 bytes
     SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, 
     SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 ype: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
  N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  
  2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
  fa b7 f0 48
  TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
  Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 180 bytes
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: READY 
     Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT 
     Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT 
     Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 urState: CHILD_R_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_CC_TYPE

ASA1 ora genera la risposta per lo scambio CHILD_SA. Risposta di CREATE_CHILD_SA. Il pacchetto CHILD_SA contiene in genere:

SA HDR - Contiene il version.flags e il tipo di scambio.
Nonce Ni (facoltativo) - Se CHILD_SA viene creato come parte dello scambio iniziale, un secondo payload KE e nonce non devono essere inviati.
Payload SA
KEi (Chiave, facoltativo) - La richiesta CREATE_CHILD_SA può facoltativamente contenere un payload KE per uno scambio DH aggiuntivo per consentire maggiori garanzie di segretezza di inoltro per CHILD_SA. Se l'associazione di protezione include gruppi DH diversi, KEi deve essere un elemento del gruppo che l'iniziatore si aspetta venga accettato dal risponditore. Se non è corretto, lo scambio CREATE_CHILD_SA non riesce e deve essere eseguito un nuovo tentativo con un KEi diverso.
N (Notifica payload, facoltativo) - Il payload di notifica viene utilizzato per trasmettere dati informativi, ad esempio condizioni di errore e transizioni di stato, a un peer IKE. Un payload di notifica può essere visualizzato in un messaggio di risposta (in genere specifica il motivo per cui una richiesta viene rifiutata), in uno scambio di informazioni (per segnalare un errore non presente in una richiesta IKE) o in qualsiasi altro messaggio per indicare le capacità del mittente o per modificare il significato della richiesta. Se lo scambio di Create_CHILD_SA reimposta le chiavi di un'associazione di protezione corrente diversa da IKE_SA, il payload N lead di tipo REKEY_SA deve identificare l'associazione di protezione che viene reimpostata. Se lo scambio CREATE_CHILD_SA non reimposta una chiave per l'associazione di protezione corrente, il payload N deve essere omesso.
TSi e TSr (facoltativo): visualizza i selettori di traffico per cui è stata creata l'associazione di protezione (SA). In questo caso, è compreso tra gli host 192.168.1.12 e 192.168.2.99.

Di seguito è riportato l'output del comando debug:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for create child 
     response message type
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC 
     Event: EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child 
     SA exchange
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer 
     is accepted
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map 
     outside_map seq 1
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000005 
     CurState: EXIT Event: EV_FREE_NEG
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Deleting negotiation context 
     for peer message ID: 0x5
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC 
     Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
     CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_OK
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Requesting SPI from IPSec
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_WAIT_SPI Event: EV_OK_GOT_SPI
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_BLD_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
    (IPSec negotiation),
  Num. transforms: 3
  AES-CBC SHA96 
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption; 
     contents are:
  SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 40
  Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
     #trans: 3
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12
  type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8
  type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, 
     reserved: 0x0: length: 8
  type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
  N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  
  b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05 
     18 1a 27 a6 cb
  01 56 22 ad
  TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
     length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.2.99, 
     end addr: 192.168.2.99
  TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
     length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx 
     [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x6
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
     flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE 
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172
  ENCR Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 144
Encrypted data&colon; 140 bytes

ASA1 invia la risposta:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT 
     [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
     [10.0.0.1]:500->
     [10.0.0.2]:500 
     InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
     RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006

ASA2 riceve il pacchetto:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
     RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
     [10.0.0.1]:500->
     [10.0.0.2]:500 
     InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
     RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
     MID=00000006
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx 
     [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 
     10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6

ASA2 ora verifica il pacchetto:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
     flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172
  
  REAL Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 116 bytes
  SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
     #trans: 3
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, 
     reserved: 0x0: length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
  N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  
  b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05 18 
     1a 27 a6 cb
  01 56 22 ad
  TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
     length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.2.99, 
     end addr: 192.168.2.99
  TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
     length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.1.12, 
     end addr: 192.168.1.12
  
  Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 172 bytes
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
     CHILD_I_WAIT Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing any notify-messages 
     in child SA exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
     Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
     Event: EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (
     I) MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
     Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
     Event: EV_CHK_IKE_REKEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if IKE SA rekey
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
     Event: EV_GEN_LOAD_IPSEC
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Load IPSEC key material
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map outside_map seq 1
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10

ASA1 inserisce questa voce SA figlio nel DAU:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_DONE 
     Event: EV_OK
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): 
     SA created; inserting 
     SA into database
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
     CHILD_R_DONE 
   Event: EV_START_DEL_NEG_TMR

ASA2 inserisce questa voce SA figlio nel DAU:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_I_DONE 
     Event: EV_OK
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): 
     SA created; 
   inserting SA into database

Verifica tunnel

Utilizzare le informazioni fornite in questa sezione per verificare le configurazioni del tunnel ISAKMP (Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol) e IPSec.

ISAKMP

Per verificare il protocollo ISAKMP, immettere questo comando:

show crypto isakmp sa det

ASA1

Di seguito è riportato l'output per ASA1:

ASA1(config)#show cry isa sa det
There are no IKEv1 SAs

IKEv2 SAs:Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id Local Remote Status Role
1889403559 10.0.0.1/500 10.0.0.2/500 READY RESPONDER

Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
Life/Active Time: 86400/195 sec
Session-id: 99220
Status Description: Negotiation done
Local spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7 Remote spi: FD366326E1FED6FE
Local id: 10.0.0.1
Remote id: 10.0.0.2
Local req mess id: 14 Remote req mess id: 16
Local next mess id: 14 Remote next mess id: 16
Local req queued: 14 Remote req queued: 16
Local window: 1 Remote window: 1
DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
NAT-T is not detected
Child sa: local selector 192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selector 192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a
AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
ah_hmac: _NONE,, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel

ASA2

Di seguito è riportato l'output per ASA2:

ASA2(config)#show cry isa sa det

  
There are no IKEv1 SAs

IKEv2 SAs:

Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id                Local               Remote    Status        Role
472237395         10.0.0.2/500         10.0.0.1/500     READY   INITIATOR
      Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
      Life/Active Time: 86400/190 sec
      Session-id: 99220
      Status Description: Negotiation done
      Local spi: FD366326E1FED6FE       Remote spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
      Local id: 10.0.0.2
      Remote id: 10.0.0.1
      Local req mess id: 16             Remote req mess id: 13
      Local next mess id: 16            Remote next mess id: 13
      Local req queued: 16              Remote req queued: 13
      Local window: 1                   Remote window: 1
      DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
      NAT-T is not detected  
Child sa: local selector  192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          remote selector 192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x8717a5a/0x8564387d  
          AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0  
          CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0  
          Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
          ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selector  192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          remote selector 192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0xf0d97b2a/0x74756292  
          AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0  
          CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0  
          Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
          ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel

IPSec

Per verificare il protocollo IPSec, immettere il seguente comando:

show crypto ipsec sa

ASA1

Di seguito è riportato l'output per ASA1:

ASA1(config)#show cry ipsec sa

  interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1 
        host 192.168.2.99
       local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
          (192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
       remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
          192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
       current_peer: 10.0.0.2

       #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
       #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
       #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
       #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
          #pkts decomp failed: 0
       #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
          #fragments created: 0
       #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, 
          #decapsulated frgs needing reassembly: 0
       #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

       local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto endpt.: 
          10.0.0.2/500
       path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
       current outbound spi: F0D97B2A
       current inbound spi : 74756292

     inbound esp sas:
       spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
          transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
          in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
          slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
          sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4008959/28628)
          IV size: 16 bytes
          replay detection support: Y
          Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4147199/28628)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x00000001

    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12 
        host 192.168.2.99
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
        192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      current_peer: 10.0.0.2
      #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
      #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
        #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
        #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
        reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto 
        endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 08717A5A
      current inbound spi : 8564387D

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28734)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28734)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
     Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x00000001

ASA2

Di seguito è riportato l'output per ASA2:

ASA2(config)#show cry ipsec sa

  interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 host 
        192.168.1.12
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      current_peer: 10.0.0.1

      #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
      #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
        #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
        #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
        reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto 
        endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 8564387D
      current inbound spi : 08717A5A

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4193279/28770)
         IV size: 16 bytes         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28770)
         IV size: 16 bytes         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x00000001

   Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2

     access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
       host 192.168.1.1
     local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
       192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
     remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
       (192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
     current_peer: 10.0.0.1
     #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
     #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
     #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
     #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
       #pkts decomp failed: 0
     #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
       #fragments created: 0
     #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
       reassembly: 0
     #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

     local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto 
       endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
     path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
     current outbound spi: 74756292
     current inbound spi : F0D97B2A

   inbound esp sas:
     spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
        transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
        in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
        slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28663)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x0000000F
   outbound esp sas:
     spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
        transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
        in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
        slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4331519/28663)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x00000001

È possibile controllare l'output anche dal comando show crypto ikev2 sa, che restituisce un output identico a quello del comando show crypto isakmp sa:

IKEv2 SAs:

Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id                Local               Remote   Status        Role
1889403559         10.0.0.1/500         10.0.0.2/500    READY   RESPONDER
      Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
      Life/Active Time: 86400/179 sec
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a

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Cronologia delle revisioni

Revisione	Data di pubblicazione	Commenti
3.0	04-Apr-2024	Certificazione.
1.0	28-Jan-2013	Versione iniziale

Contributo dei tecnici Cisco

Anu M Chacko
Leader nel marketing tecnico

Uso dei debug ASA IKEv2 per la VPN da sito a sito con PSK

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