



Boot Integrity Visibility

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Feature history for boot integrity visibility

This table provides release and related information for the feature explained in this module.

This feature is also available in all the releases subsequent to the one in which they are introduced in, unless noted otherwise.

Table 1: Feature History for Boot Integrity Visibility

Release	Feature Information
Cisco IOS XE 17.4.1	This feature was introduced.

Boot integrity visibility

Boot integrity visibility is a security feature that

- makes Cisco platform identity and software integrity information visible,
- enables verification of the boot process through checksum evaluation, and
- assists in ensuring that only trusted code is booted on the platform.

Platform identity provides the platform's manufacturing installed identity. Software integrity exposes boot integrity measurements used to assess if trusted code has been booted.

During the boot process, the software creates a checksum record of each bootloader stage, which can be compared against a Cisco-certified record to verify the authenticity of the software image. Mismatched checksum values might indicate a non-Cisco certified or altered software image.

Verify software image and hardware

Verify the integrity of the device's software image and hardware by retrieving and reviewing the checksum records created during switch bootup.

This task describes how to retrieve the checksum record that was created during a switch bootup.

Enter the following commands in privileged EXEC mode. The messages % Error retrieving SUDI certificate and % Error retrieving integrity data signify a real CLI failure.



Note On executing the following commands, you might see the message % Please Try After a Few Seconds displayed on the CLI. This does not indicate a CLI failure, but indicates setting up of underlying infrastructure required to get the required output. We recommend waiting for a few minutes and then try the command again.

Procedure

Step 1 View the checksum record for a specific SUDI

Example:

```
Device# show platform sudi certificate sign nonce 123
```

Displays checksum record for the specific SUDI.

- (Optional) **sign** - Shows signature
- (Optional) **nonce** *nonce* - Enter a nonce value

Step 2 View the checksum record for boot stages

Example:

```
Device# show platform integrity sign nonce 123
```

Displays checksum record for boot stages.

- (Optional) **sign** - Shows signature
- (Optional) **nonce** *nonce* - Enter a nonce value

You obtain the checksum records for the device's software image and hardware, confirming their integrity or identifying any issues.


```
i5jUhOWryAK4dVo8hCjkjEkzu3ufBTJapnv89g9OE+H3VKM4L+/KdkUO+52djFKn
hyl47d7cZR4DY4LIuFM2P1As8YyjoNpK/urSRI14WdI1p1R1nH7KND15618yfVP
0IFJZBGrooCRBjOSwFv8cpWcbmWdPaCQT2nwIjTfY8c=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

Signature version: 1

Signature:

```
30450203040506070809101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899
```

The optional RSA 2048 signature covers the three certificates, the signature version, and the user-provided nonce.

```
RSA PKCS#1v1.5 Sign {<Nonce (UINT64)> || <Signature Version (UINT32)> || <Cisco Root CA
2048 cert (DER)> ||
<Cisco subordinate CA (DER)> || <SUDI certificate (DER)>}
```

Cisco management solutions interpret this output. You can also use a simple script with OpenSSL commands to display platform identity and verify the signature, which helps confirm the Cisco unique device identity..

```
[linux-host:~]openssl x509 -in sudi_id.pem -subject -noout
subject= /serialNumber=PID:C9600-SUP-1 SN:CAT2239L06B/CN=C9600-SUP-1-70b3171eaa00
```

Verify software integrity

The following example shows the checksum record for the boot stages. The hash measurements appear for each of the three software stages when they boot in sequence. Compare these hashes to the Cisco-provided reference values.

Signing the output ensures it is genuine and unaltered. Provide a nonce to protect against replay attacks.



Note Boot integrity hashes are not MD5 hashes. For example, if you run **verify /md5 cat9k_iosxe.16.10.01.SPA.bin** command for the bundle file, the hash will not match.

The following is a sample output of the **show platform integrity sign nonce 123** command. This output includes measurements of each installed package file.

```
Device# show platform integrity sign nonce 123
Platform: C9800-L-F-K9
```

```
Boot 0 Version: R04.1173930452019-06-11
Boot 0 Hash: A6C92C44976FC77DD42234444FFD87798FB9036A2762FAA4999A190A0258B18C
Boot Loader Version: 16.12(1r)
Boot Loader Hash:
#####
OS Version: 2020-03-19_20.26
OS Hashes:
C9800-L-universalk9_wlc.2020-03-19_20.26.SSA.bin:
53E2DF1A1A082E36FA4CAB817C1794EC9D69A0E90BC0BFECF9BC0BCA9385AA9E9372ABF7431E4A08FC5E5B9670131C09D158E5B8A7B457501FE77AB9F1C26D
C9800-L-mono-universalk9_wlc.2020-03-19_20.26.SSA.pkg:
1D3279D53B0311CE42C669824DF86FB5596CD7CA45CA8D7FDC3D10657B8C9A48F4B0508D7BCFFD645CB6571AC1E674A57A82414E3D6E1666BE64E6132F707671
PCR0: EE14A2D5099DA343B3941C54A429C4AC1D3EE8E9B609F1AC00049768A470734E
PCR8: 78794D0F5667F8FA4E425E3CA2AF3CD99B90B219FD90222D622B3D563416BBAA
```



Note Only OS and package hashes are supported.
