Boot Integrity Visibility

Information About Boot Integrity Visibility

Boot Integrity Visibility allows Cisco's platform identity and software integrity information to be visible and actionable. Platform identity provides the platform's manufacturing installed identity. Software integrity exposes boot integrity measurements that can be used to assess whether the platform has booted trusted code.

During the boot process, the software creates a checksum record of each stage of the bootloader activities.

You can retrieve this record and compare it with a Cisco-certified record to verify if your software image is genuine. If the checksum values do not match, you may be running a software image that is either not certified by Cisco or has been altered by an unauthorized party.

Image Signing and Bootup

The Cisco build servers generate the Cisco IOS XE images. Cisco IOS XE images use the Abraxas image signing system to sign these images securely with the Cisco private RSA keys.

When you copy the Cisco IOS XE image onto a ESS9300, Cisco's ROMMON Boot ROM verifies the image using Cisco release keys. These keys are public keys that correspond to the Cisco release private key that is stored securely on the Abraxas servers. The release key is stored in the ROMMON.

The ESS9300 supports the boot integrity visibility feature. Boot integrity visibility serves as a hardware trust anchor which validates the ROMMON software to ensure that the ROMMON software is not tampered with.

The Cisco IOS XE image is digitally signed during the build time. An SHA-512 hash is generated over the entire binary image file, and then the hash is encrypted with a Cisco RSA 2048-bit private key. The ROMMON verifies the signature using the Cisco public key. If the software is not generated by a Cisco build system, the signature verification fails. The device ROMMON rejects the image and stops booting. If the signature verification is successfully, the device boots the image to the Cisco IOS XE runtime environment.

The ROMMON follows these steps when it verifies a signed Cisco IOS XE image during the bootup:

1. Loads the Cisco IOS XE image into the CPU memory.

2. Examines the Cisco IOS XE package header.
3. Runs a non-secure integrity check on the image to ensure that there is no unintentional file corruption from the disk or TFTP. This is performed using a non-secure SHA-1 hash.
4. Copies the Cisco's RSA 2048-bit public release key from the ROMMON storage and validates that the Cisco's RSA 2048-bit public release key is not tampered.
5. Extracts the Code Signing signature (SHA-512 hash) from the package header and verifies it using Cisco's RSA 2048-bit public release key.
6. Performs the Code Signing validation by calculating the SHA-512 hash of the Cisco IOS XE package and compares it with the Code Signing signature. The Signed package is now validated.
7. Examines the Cisco IOS XE package header to validate the platform type and CPU architecture for compatibility.
8. Extracts the Cisco IOS XE software from the Cisco IOS XE package and boots it.

Note In above process, step 3 is a non-secure check of the image which is intended to confirm the image against inadvertent corruption due to disk errors, file transfer errors, or copying errors. This is not part of the image code signing. This check is not intended to detect deliberate image tampering.

Image Code Signing validation occurs in step 4, 5, and 6. This is a secure code signing check of the image using an SHA-512 hash that is encrypted with a 2048-bit RSA key. This check is intended to detect deliberate image tampering.

Verifying the Software Image and Hardware

This task describes how to retrieve the checksum record that was created during a switch bootup. Enter the following commands in privileged EXEC mode.

Note On executing the following commands, you might see the message **% Please Try After Few Seconds** displayed on the CLI. This does not indicate a CLI failure, but indicates setting up of underlying infrastructure required to get the required output. We recommend waiting for a few minutes and then try the command again.

The messages **% Error retrieving SUDI certificate** and **% Error retrieving integrity data** signify a real CLI failure.

Procedure

	Command or Action	Purpose
Step 1	**show platform sudi certificate** [**sign** [**nonce** *nonce*]] **Example:** `Device# show platform sudi certificate sign nonce`	Displays checksum record for the specific SUDI. • (Optional) **sign** - Show signature • (Optional) **nonce** - Enter a nonce value

	Command or Action	Purpose
	`123`	
Step 2	**show platform integrity** [**sign** [**nonce** *nonce*]] **Example:** `Device# show platform integrity sign nonce 123`	Displays checksum record for boot stages. • (Optional) **sign** - Show signature • (Optional) **nonce** - Enter a nonce value

Verifying Platform Identity and Software Integrity

Verifying Platform Identity

The following example displays the Secure Unique Device Identity (SUDI) chain in PEM format. Encoded into the SUDI is the Product ID and Serial Number of each individual device such that the device can be uniquely identified on a network of thousands of devices. The first certificate is the Cisco Root CA 2048 and the second is the Cisco subordinate CA (ACT2 SUDI CA). Both certificates can be verified to match those published on https://www.cisco.com/security/pki/. The third is the SUDI certificate.

```
Device# show platform sudi certificate sign nonce 123
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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```

```
AQwAMEMwQQYIKwYBBQUHAgEWNWh0dHA6Ly93d3cuY2lzY28uY29tL3NlY3VyaXR5
L3BraS9wb2xpY2llcy9pbmRleC5odG1sMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwDQYJ
KoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAGh1qclr9tx4hzWgDERm371yeuEmqcIfi9b9+GbMSJbi
ZHc/CcCl0lJu0a9zTXA9w47H9/t6leduGxb4WeLxcwCiUgvFtCa51Iklt8nNbcKY
/4dw1ex+7amATUQO4QggIE67wVIPu6bgAE3Ja/nRS3xKYSnj8H5TehimBSv6TECi
i5jUhOWryAK4dVo8hCjkjEkzu3ufBTJapnv89g9OE+H3VKM4L+/KdkUO+52djFKn
hyl47d7cZR4DY4LIuFM2P1As8YyjzoNpK/urSRI14WdIlplR1nH7KNDl5618yfVP
0IFJZBGrooCRBjOSwFv8cpWCbmWdPaCQT2nwIjTfY8c=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

Signature version: 1
Signature:
2AF6EDA39A17403F621BB94E824C4FE00C19D31BF9DFAC00747C0187DF404077505
6E0AE63520E763A5DF0FAEB4FA2B5BF2F9CCF3E8EDE25E7510573CF6669029FC4B22
E4A15841EDA48075ADCBEED6E003C2B6637E0D4ADDBA3754AA1F2EE6AC36AE6FCE00
DD075908148A25767C86F8121AF0DE95534046418A6771323C02801CEB6F412C131AA
31EAB538B39B7143114AB033A3BAD1EA5F02D9A4AF89806BED6EDA0847B310FABD224
7626A9FF150A8D3A82323E17C3DADECF3E2701B03336EA32C371CE88689892423F725
D14919BF777DA60A823008E39A19FF65B8226D8CF4D415212C72A2814A7A7E50CCC759
483B97C1704977B62191741EA5096BE9
```

The optional RSA 2048 signature is across the three certificates, the signature version and the user-provided nonce.

```
RSA PKCS#1v1.5 Sign {<Nonce (UINT64)> || <Signature Version (UINT32)> || <Cisco Root CA
2048 cert (DER)> ||
<Cisco subordinate CA (DER)> || <SUDI certificate (DER)> }
```

Cisco management solutions are equipped with the ability to interpret the above output. However, a simple script using OpenSSL commands can also be used to display the identity of the platform and to verify the signature, thereby ensuring its Cisco unique device identity.

```
[linux-host:~]openssl x509 -in sudicert.pem -subject -noout
subject= /serialNumber=PID:ESS9300 SN:FDO1946BG05/O=Cisco/OU=ACT-2 Lite SUDI/CN=ESS9300
```

Verifying Software Integrity

The following example displays the checksum record for the boot stages. The hash measurements are displayed for each of the three stages of software successively booted. These hashes can be compared against Cisco-provided reference values. An option to sign the output gives a verifier the ability to ensure the output is genuine and is not altered. A nonce can be provided to protect against replay attacks.

Note Boot integrity hashes are not MD5 hashes. For example, if you run **verify /md5 ess9300_iosxe.17.04.01.SPA.bin** command for the bundle file, the hash will not match.

The following is a sample output of the **show platform integrity sign nonce 123** command in install mode. This output includes measurements of each installed package file.

```
Device#show platform integrity sign nonce 123
Platform: ess9300
Boot 0 Version: SBOOT0.v27
Boot 0 Hash:
EE98DCD0D6AEA85C8891039F649664FCC3CF709CCFC7A6F248C9D5BA8463528F
Boot Loader Version: System Bootstrap, Version 10.2, DEVELOPMENT SOFTWARE
Boot Loader Hash:
922DB87E7A153A79EE9AE37311A1FDE2313C999E21032F8A1E7EF4935D3E742765 7E4CDEE537E7B3C50E84121C00ED2556786A4EE155D8C0AFF67F63F1A69B
OS Version: 17.04.01
OS Hashes:
ess9300_lite-rpbase.17.04.01.SPA.pkg :
DDD155C1DEFDB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0DDD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0
ess9300_lite-rpboot.17.04.01.SPA.pkg :
AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0DDD155C1DEFDB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0DDD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057
ess9300_lite-srdriver.17.04.01.SPA.pkg :
4EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0DDD155C1DEFDB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0DDD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E211
ess9300_lite-webui.17.04.01.SPA.pkg :
CCCAAA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0DDD155C1DEFDB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0DDD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7
ess9300-wlc.17.04.01.SPA.pkg :
AA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0DDD155C1DEFDB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0DDD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCA
PCR0: 750E5D2EDAE6E3A68050638E0BFD8619BE4EA13066025D39DF79408719F5177E
PCR8: EB6E739A63F53E703B6CDAF3F6188833CEF6D32E2F726006B9AA34E1E73048C4
Signature version: 1
Signature:
[redacted]
```

The following is a sample output of the **show platform integrity sign nonce 123** command in bundle mode. This output includes measurements of the bundle file and each installed package.

```
Device# show platform integrity sign nonce 123
Platform: ESS9300
Boot 0 Version: SBOOT0.v27
Boot 0 Hash:
EE98DCD0D6AEA85C8891039F649664FCC3CF709CCFC7A6F248C9D5BA8463528F
Boot Loader Version: System Bootstrap, Version 10.2, DEVELOPMENT SOFTWARE
Boot Loader Hash:
922DB87E7A153A79EE9AE37311A1FDE2313C999E21032F8A1E7EF4935D3E742765 7E4CDEE537E7B3C50E84121C00ED2556786A4EE155D8C0AFF67F63F1A69B
OS Version: 17.04.01
OS Hashes:
ess9300_lite_iosxe.17.04.01.SPA.bin :
F4CAD08EE1EF841C3A2E3ED854082F08F3CBA9336F38E4569D4D8E15AD15E36E3922AC8B4D0CDB63E2806D6A1EDAE7839DD9D08CD7E366A49ED648C113440
ess9300_lite-rpbase.17.04.01.SPA.pkg :
DDD155C1DEFDB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0DDD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CBDB84E0
ess9300_lite-rpboot.17.04.01.SPA.pkg :
```

```
AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CB0EB84E0DD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CB0EB84E0DD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057
ess9300_lite-srdriver.17.04.01.SPA.pkg :
4EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CB0EB84E0DD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CB0EB84E0DD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E211
ess9300_lite-webui.17.04.01.SPA.pkg :
CCCAAA7ED0AE935CB0EB84E0DD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CB0EB84E0DD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7
ess9300-wlc.17.04.01.SPA.pkg :
AA7ED0AE935CB0EB84E0DD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCAAA7ED0AE935CB0EB84E0DD155C1DEFB03EB0C64057AD6A9673E2114EA7CCCA
PCR0: 750E5D2EDAE6E3A68050638E0BFD8619BE4EA13066025D39DF79408719F5177E
PCR8: EB6E739A63F53E703B6CDAF3F6188833CEF6D32E2F726006B9AA34E1E73048C4
Signature version: 1
Signature:
[redacted]
```

Verifying Image Signing

The following example displays the secure code signing check of the image during bootup using an SHA-512 hash.

```
switch:boot flash:packages.conf
boot: attempting to boot from [flash:packages.conf]
boot: reading file packages.conf
#
Performing Integrity Check ...
boot: parsed image from conf file: ess9300-rpboot.17.04.01.SSA.pkg
[redacted]


Loading image in Verbose mode: 1


Image Base is: 0x100099000
Image Size is: 0x2C83487
Package header rev 3 structure detected
Package type:30001, flags:0x0
IsoSize = 0
Parsing package TLV info:
000: 000000090000001D4B45595F544C565F -         KEY_TLV_
010: 5041434B4147455F434F4D5041544942 - PACKAGE_COMPATIB
020: 494C4954590000000000000090000000B - ILITY
030: 4652555F52505F545950450000000009 - FRU_RP_TYPE
040: 000000184B45595F544C565F5041434B -     KEY_TLV_PACK
050: 4147455F424F4F544152434800000009 - AGE_BOOTARCH
060: 0000000E415243485F693638365F5459 -     ARCH_i686_TY
070: 5045000000000009000000144B45595F - PE          KEY_
080: 544C565F424F4152445F434F4D504154 - TLV_BOARD_COMPAT
090: 0000000900000010424F4152445F6361 -         BOARD_ca
0A0: 74396B5F5459504500000000900000018 - t9k_TYPE
0B0: 4B45595F544C565F43525950544F5F4B - KEY_TLV_CRYPTO_K
0C0: 4559535452494E470000000900000004 - EYSTRING

TLV: T=9, L=29, V=KEY_TLV_PACKAGE_COMPATIBILITY
TLV: T=9, L=11, V=FRU_RP_TYPE
TLV: T=9, L=24, V=KEY_TLV_PACKAGE_BOOTARCH
TLV: T=9, L=14, V=ARCH_i686_TYPE
TLV: T=9, L=20, V=KEY_TLV_BOARD_COMPAT
```

```
TLV: T=9, L=16, V=BOARD_ess9300_TYPE
TLV: T=9, L=24, V=KEY_TLV_CRYPTO_KEYSTRING
TLV: T=9, L=4, V=none
TLV: T=9, L=11, V=CW_BEGIN=$$
TLV: T=9, L=17, V=CW_FAMILY=$ess9300$
TLV: T=9, L=74, V=CW_IMAGE=$ess9300-rpboot.17.02.01.SSA.pkg$
TLV: T=9, L=20, V=CW_VERSION=$17.2.01$
IOS version is 17.2.1
TLV: T=9, L=53, V=CW_FULL_VERSION=$17.2.01.0.869.1580816579..Amsterdam$
TLV: T=9, L=52, V=CW_DESCRIPTION=$Cisco IOS Software, IOS-XE Software$
TLV: T=9, L=9, V=CW_END=$$
Found DIGISIGN TLV type 12 length = 392
RSA Self Test Passed

Expected hash:
DDAF35A193617ABACC417349AE204131
12E6FA4E89A97EA20A9EEEE64B55D39A
2192992A274FC1A836BA3C23A3FEEBBD
454D4423643CE80E2A9AC94FA54CA49F

Obtained hash:
DDAF35A193617ABACC417349AE204131
12E6FA4E89A97EA20A9EEEE64B55D39A
2192992A274FC1A836BA3C23A3FEEBBD
454D4423643CE80E2A9AC94FA54CA49F
Sha512 Self Test Passed
Found package arch type ARCH_i686_TYPE
Found package FRU type FRU_RP_TYPE
Performing Integrity Check ...

RSA Signed DEVELOPMENT Image Signature Verification Successful.
```