




## Security Considerations

This chapter describes the security features and considerations in NFVIS. It gives a high-level overview of security related components in NFVIS to plan a security strategy for deployments specific to you. It also has recommendations on security best practices for enforcing the core elements of network security.

The NFVIS software has security embedded right from installation through all software layers. The subsequent chapters focus on these out-of-the-box security aspects such as credential management, integrity and tamper protection, session management, secure device access and more.



- [Installation, on page 2](#)
- [Secure Unique Device Identification, on page 3](#)
- [Device Access, on page 4](#)

- [Infrastructure Management Network](#), on page 22
- [Locally Stored Information Protection](#), on page 23
- [File Transfer](#), on page 24
- [Logging](#), on page 24
- [Virtual Machine security](#), on page 25
- [VM Isolation and Resource provisioning](#), on page 26
- [Secure Development Lifecycle](#), on page 29

## Installation

To ensure that the NFVIS software has not been tampered with, the software image is verified before installation using the following mechanisms:

## Image Tamper Protection

NFVIS supports RPM signing and signature verification for all RPM packages in the ISO and upgrade images.

### RPM Signing

All RPM packages in the Cisco Enterprise NFVIS ISO and upgrade images are signed to ensure cryptographic integrity and authenticity. This guarantees that the RPM packages have not been tampered with and the RPM packages are from NFVIS. The private key used for signing the RPM packages is created and securely maintained by Cisco.

### RPM Signature Verification

NFVIS software verifies the signature of all the RPM packages before an installation or upgrade. The following table describes the Cisco Enterprise NFVIS behavior when the signature verification fails during an installation or upgrade.

Scenario	Description
Cisco Enterprise NFVIS 3.7.1 and later installations	If the signature verification fails while installing Cisco Enterprise NFVIS, the installation is aborted.
Cisco Enterprise NFVIS upgrade from 3.6.x to Release 3.7.1	The RPM signatures are verified when the upgrade is being performed. If the signature verification fails, an error is logged but the upgrade is completed.
Cisco Enterprise NFVIS upgrade from Release 3.7.1 to later releases	The RPM signatures are verified when the upgrade image is registered. If the signature verification fails, the upgrade is aborted.

### Image Integrity Verification

RPM signing and signature verification can be done only for the RPM packages available in the Cisco NFVIS ISO and upgrade images. To ensure the integrity of all the additional non-RPM files available in the Cisco NFVIS ISO image, a hash of the Cisco NFVIS ISO image is published along with the image. Similarly, a hash of the Cisco NFVIS upgrade image is published along with the image. To verify that the hash of Cisco

NFVIS ISO image or upgrade image matches the hash published by Cisco, run the following command and compare the hash with the published hash:

```
% /usr/bin/sha512sum <ImageFile>  
c2122783efc18b039246aellbccc4eec4e5e027526967b5b809da5632d462dfa6724a9b20ec318c74548c6bd7e9b8217ce96b5ece93dccc74fda5e01bb382ad607  
<ImageFile>
```

## ENCS Secure Boot

Secure boot is part of the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (**UEFI**) standard which ensures that a device boots only using a software that is trusted by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). When NFVIS starts, the firmware checks the signature of the boot software and the operating system. If the signatures are valid, the device boots, and the firmware gives the control to the operating system.

Secure boot is available on the ENCS but is disabled by default. Cisco recommends you to enable secure boot. For more information, see [Secure Boot of Host](#).

## Secure Unique Device Identification

NFVIS uses a mechanism known as Secure Unique Device Identification (SUDI), which provides it with an immutable identity. This identity is used to verify that the device is a genuine Cisco product, and to ensure that the device is well-known to the customer's inventory system.

The SUDI is an X.509v3 certificate and an associated key-pair which are protected in hardware. The SUDI certificate contains the product identifier and serial number and is rooted in Cisco Public Key Infrastructure. The key pair and the SUDI certificate are inserted into the hardware module during manufacturing, and the private key can never be exported.

The SUDI-based identity can be used to perform authenticated and automated configuration using Zero Touch Provisioning (ZTP). This enables secure, remote on-boarding of devices, and ensures that the orchestration server is talking to a genuine NFVIS device. A backend system can issue a challenge to the NFVIS device to validate its identity and the device will respond to the challenge using its SUDI based identity. This allows the backend system to not only verify against its inventory that the right device is in the right location but also provide encrypted configuration that can only be opened by the specific device, thereby ensuring confidentiality in transit.

The following workflow diagrams illustrate how NFVIS uses SUDI:

Figure 1: Plug and Play (PnP) Server authentication





Figure 2: Plug and Play Device Authentication and Authorization



## Device Access

NFVIS provides different access mechanisms including console as well as remote access based on protocols such as HTTPS and SSH. Each access mechanism should be carefully reviewed and configured. Ensure that only the required access mechanisms are enabled and that they are properly secured. The key steps to securing both interactive and management access to NFVIS are to restrict the device accessibility, restrict the capabilities of the permitted users to what is required, and restrict the permitted methods of access. NFVIS ensures that the access is only granted to authenticated users and they can perform just the authorized actions. Device access is logged for auditing and NFVIS ensures the confidentiality of locally stored sensitive data.

It is critical to establish the appropriate controls in order to prevent unauthorized access to NFVIS. The following sections describe the best practices and configurations to achieve this:

## Enforced Password Change at First Login

Default credentials are a frequent source of product security incidents. Customers often forget to change the default login credentials leaving their systems open to attack. To prevent this, the NFVIS user is forced to change the password after the first login using the default credentials (username: admin and password Admin123#).

For more information, see [Accessing NFVIS](#).

## Restricting Login Vulnerabilities

You can prevent the vulnerability to dictionary and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by using the following features.

### Enforcement of Strong password

An authentication mechanism is only as strong as its credentials. For this reason, it is important to ensure users have strong passwords. NFVIS checks that a strong password is configured as per the following rules:

Password must contain:

- At least one uppercase character
- At least one lowercase character
- At least one number
- At least one of these special characters: hash (#), underscore (\_), hyphen (-), asterisk (\*), or question mark (?)
- Seven characters or more
- The password length should be between 7 and 128 characters.

### Configuring Minimum Length for Passwords

Lack of password complexity, particularly password length, significantly reduces the search space when attackers try to guess user passwords, making brute-force attacks much easier.

The admin user can configure the minimum length required for passwords of all users. The minimum length must be between 7 and 128 characters. By default, the minimum length required for passwords is set to 7 characters.

CLI:

```
nfvis(config)# rbac authentication min-pwd-length 9
```

API:

```
/api/config/rbac/authentication/min-pwd-length
```

### Configuring Password Lifetime

The password lifetime determines how long a password can be used before the user is required to change it.

The admin user can configure minimum and maximum lifetime values for passwords for all users and enforce a rule to check these values. The default minimum lifetime value is set to 1 day and the default maximum lifetime value is set to 60 days.

When a minimum lifetime value is configured, the user cannot change the password until the specified number of days have passed. Similarly, when a maximum lifetime value is configured, a user must change the password before the specified number of days pass. If a user does not change the password and the specified number of days have passed, a notification is sent to the user.




---

**Note** The minimum and maximum lifetime values and the rule to check for these values are not applied to the admin user.

---

CLI:

```
configure terminal
rbac authentication password-lifetime enforce true min-days 2 max-days 30
commit
```

API:

```
/api/config/rbac/authentication/password-lifetime/
```

## Limit previous password reuse

Without preventing the use of previous passphrases, password expiry is largely useless since users can simply change the passphrase and then change it back to the original.

NFVIS checks that the new password is not the same as one of the 5 previously used passwords. One exception to this rule is that the admin user can change the password to the default password even if it was one of the 5 previously used passwords.

## Restrict Frequency of login attempts

If a remote peer is allowed to login an unlimited number of times, it may eventually be able to guess the login credentials by brute force. Since passphrases are often easy to guess, this is a common attack. By limiting the rate at which the peer can attempt logins, we prevent this attack. We also avoid spending the system resources on unnecessarily authenticating these brute-force login attempts which could create a Denial of Service attack.

NFVIS enforces a 5 minute user lockdown after 10 failed login attempts.

## Disable inactive user accounts

Monitoring user activity and disabling unused or stale user accounts helps to secure the system from insider attacks. The unused accounts should eventually be removed.

The admin user can enforce a rule to mark unused user accounts as inactive and configure the number of days after which an unused user account is marked as inactive. Once marked as inactive, that user cannot login to the system. To allow the user to login to the system, the admin user can activate the user account.




---

**Note** The inactivity period and the rule to check the inactivity period are not applied to the admin user.

---

The following CLI and API can be used to configure the enforcement of account inactivity.

CLI:

```
configure terminal
rbac authentication account-inactivity enforce true inactivity-days 30
commit
```

API:

```
/api/config/rbac/authentication/account-inactivity/
```

The default value for inactivity-days is 35.

### Activating an Inactive User Account

The admin user can activate the account of an inactive user using the following CLI and API:

CLI:

```
configure terminal
rbac authentication users user guest_user activate
commit
```

API:

```
/api/operations/rbac/authentication/users/user/username/activate
```

## Enforce Setting of BIOS and CIMC Passwords

Table 1: Feature History Table

Feature Name	Release Information	Description
Enforce Setting of BIOS and CIMC Passwords	NFVIS 4.7.1	This feature enforces the user to change the default password for CIMC and BIOS.

### Restrictions for Enforcing Setting of BIOS and CIMC Passwords

- This feature is only supported on Cisco Catalyst 8200 UCPE and Cisco ENCS 5400 platforms.
- This feature is only supported on a fresh install of NFVIS 4.7.1 and later releases. If you upgrade from NFVIS 4.6.1 to NFVIS 4.7.1, this feature is not supported and you are not prompted to reset the BIOS and CIMS passwords, even if the BIOS and CIMC passwords are not configured.

### Information About Enforcing Setting of BIOS and CIMC Passwords

This feature addresses a security gap by enforcing the resetting of the BIOS and CIMC passwords after a fresh install of NFVIS 4.7.1. The default CIMC password is **password** and the default BIOS password is no password.

In order to fix the security gap, you are enforced to configure the BIOS and CIMC passwords in ENCS 5400. During a fresh install of NFVIS 4.7.1, if the BIOS and CIMC passwords have not been changed and still have

the default passwords, then you are prompted to change both the BIOS and CIMC passwords. If only one of them requires reset, you are prompted to reset the password for only that component. Cisco Catalyst 8200 UCPE requires only the BIOS password and hence only the BIOS password reset is prompted, if it has not already been set.



**Note** If you upgrade from any previous release to NFVIS 4.7.1 or later releases, you can change the BIOS and CIMC passwords using the **hostaction change-bios-password newpassword** or **hostaction change-cimc-password newpassword** commands.

For more information about BIOS and CIMC passwords, see [BIOS and CIMC Password](#).

## Configuration Examples for Enforced Resetting of BIOS and CIMC Passwords

1. When you install NFVIS 4.7.1, you must first reset the default admin password.

```
Cisco Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure Software (NFVIS)
```

```
NFVIS Version: 99.99.0-1009
```

```
Copyright (c) 2015-2021 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cisco, Cisco Systems, and Cisco Systems logo are registered trademarks of Cisco
Systems, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and certain other countries.
```

```
The copyrights to certain works contained in this software are owned by other
third parties and used and distributed under third party license agreements.
Certain components of this software are licensed under the GNU GPL 2.0, GPL 3.0,
LGPL 2.1, LGPL 3.0 and AGPL 3.0.
```

```
admin connected from 10.24.109.102 using ssh on nfvis
admin logged with default credentials
Please provide a password which satisfies the following criteria:
  1.At least one lowercase character
  2.At least one uppercase character
  3.At least one number
  4.At least one special character from # _ - * ?
  5.Length should be between 7 and 128 characters
Please reset the password :
Please reenter the password :
```

```
Resetting admin password
```

2. On Cisco Catalyst 8200 UCPE and Cisco ENCS 5400 platforms when you do a fresh install of NFVIS 4.7.1 or later releases, you must change the default BIOS and CIMC passwords. If the BIOS and CIMC passwords are not previously configured, the system prompts you the reset the BIOS and CIMC passwords for Cisco ENCS 5400 and only the BIOS password for Cisco Catalyst 8200 UCPE.

```
New admin password is set
```

```
Please provide the BIOS password which satisfies the following criteria:
  1. At least one lowercase character
  2. At least one uppercase character
  3. At least one number
  4. At least one special character from #, @ or _
  5. Length should be between 8 and 20 characters
  6. Should not contain any of the following strings (case sensitive): bios
  7. First character cannot be a #
```



```

Please reset the BIOS password :
Please reenter the BIOS password :
Please provide the CIMC password which satisfies the following criteria:
    1. At least one lowercase character
    2. At least one uppercase character
    3. At least one number
    4. At least one special character from #, @ or _
    5. Length should be between 8 and 20 characters
    6. Should not contain any of the following strings (case sensitive): admin
Please reset the CIMC password :
Please reenter the CIMC password :

```

## Verify BIOS and CIMC Passwords

To verify if the BIOS and CIMC passwords are changed successfully, use the **show log nfvis\_config.log | include BIOS** or **show log nfvis\_config.log | include CIMC** commands:

```

nfvis# show log nfvis_config.log | include BIOS
2021-11-16 15:24:40,102 INFO      [hostaction:/system/settings] [] BIOS password change
is successful

```

You can also download the `nfvis_config.log` file and verify if the passwords are reset successfully.

## Integration with external AAA servers

Users login to NFVIS through ssh or the Web UI. In either case, users need to be authenticated. That is, a user needs to present password credentials in order to gain access.

Once a user is authenticated, all operations performed by that user need to be authorized. That is, certain users may be allowed to perform certain tasks, whereas others are not. This is called authorization.

It is recommended that a centralized AAA server be deployed to enforce per-user, AAA-based login authentication for NFVIS access. NFVIS supports RADIUS and TACACS protocols to mediate network access. On the AAA server, only minimum access privileges should be granted to authenticated users according to their specific access requirements. This reduces the exposure to both malicious and unintentional security incidents.

For more information on external authentication, see [Configuring RADIUS](#) and [Configuring a TACACS+ Server](#).

## Authentication Cache for External Authentication Server

Feature Name	Release Information	Description
Authentication Cache for External Authentication Server	NFVIS 4.5.1	This feature supports TACACS authentication through OTP on NFVIS portal.

The NFVIS portal uses the same One-Time Password (OTP) for all API calls after the initial authentication. The API calls fail as soon as the OTP expires. This feature supports TACACS OTP authentication with the NFVIS portal.

After you have successfully authenticated through the TACACS server using an OTP, NFVIS creates a hash entry using the username and the OTP and stores this hash value locally. This locally stored hash value has

an expiration time stamp associated with it. The time stamp has the same value as the SSH session idle timeout value which is 15 minutes. All the subsequent authentication requests with the same username are authenticated against this local hash value first. If the authentication fails with the local hash, NFVIS authenticates this request with TACACS server and creates a new hash entry when the authentication is successful. If a hash entry already exists, its time stamp is reset to 15 minutes.

If you are removed from the TACACS server after successfully logging into the portal, you can continue to use the portal until the hash entry in NFVIS expires.

When you explicitly log out from the NFVIS portal or are logged out due to idle time, the portal calls a new API to notify NFVIS backend to flush the hash entry. The authentication cache and all of its entries are cleared out after NFVIS reboot, factory reset, or upgrade.

## Role Based Access Control

Limiting network access is important to organizations that have many employees, employ contractors or permit access to third parties, such as customers and vendors. In such a scenario, it is difficult to monitor network access effectively. Instead, it is better to control what is accessible, in order to secure the sensitive data and critical applications.

Role-based access control (RBAC) is a method of restricting network access based on the roles of individual users within an enterprise. RBAC lets users access just the information they need, and prevents them from accessing information that doesn't pertain to them.

An employee's role in the enterprise should be used to determine the permissions granted, in order to ensure that employees with lower privileges can't access sensitive information or perform critical tasks.

The following user roles and privileges are defined in NFVIS

User Role	Privilege
Administrators	Can configure all available features and perform all tasks including changing of user roles. The administrator cannot delete basic infrastructure that is fundamental to NFVIS. The Admin user's role cannot be changed; it is always "administrators".
Operators	Can Start and stop a VM, and view all information.
Auditors	They are the least privileged users. They have Read-only permission and therefore, can't modify any configuration.

### Benefits of RBAC

There are a number of benefits to using RBAC to restrict unnecessary network access based on people's roles within an organization, including:

- Improving operational efficiency.

Having predefined roles in RBAC makes it is easy to include new users with the right privileges or switch roles of existing users. It also cuts down on the potential for error when user permissions are being assigned.

- Enhancing compliance.

Every organization must comply with local, state and federal regulations. Companies generally prefer to implement RBAC systems to meet the regulatory and statutory requirements for confidentiality and privacy because executives and IT departments can more effectively manage how the data is accessed and used. This is particularly important for financial institutions and healthcare companies that manage sensitive data.

- Reducing costs.

By not allowing user access to certain processes and applications, companies may conserve or use resources such as network bandwidth, memory and storage in a cost-effective manner.

- Decreasing risk of breaches and data leakage.

Implementing RBAC means restricting access to sensitive information, thus reducing the potential for data breaches or data leakage.

### Best practices for role-based access control implementations

- As an administrator, determine the list of users and assign the users to the predefined roles. For example, the user "networkadmin" can be created and added to the user group "administrators".

```
configure terminal
rbac authentication users create-user name networkadmin password Test1_pass role
administrators
commit
```



**Note** The user groups or roles are created by the system. You cannot create or modify a user group.

To change the password, use the **rbac authentication users user change-password** command in global configuration mode. To change the user role, use the **rbac authentication users user change-role** command in global configuration mode.

- Terminate accounts for users who no longer require access.

```
configure terminal
rbac authentication users delete-user name test1
```

- Periodically conduct audits to evaluate the roles, the employees who are assigned to them and the access that's permitted for each role. If a user is found to have unnecessary access to a certain system, change the user's role.

For more details see, [Users, Roles, and Authentication](#)

### Granular Role-Based Access Control

Starting from NFVIS 4.7.1, the Granular Role-Based Access Control feature is introduced. This feature adds a new resource group policy that manages the VM and VNF and allows you to assign users to a group to control VNF access, during VNF deployment. For more information, see [Granular Role-Based Access Control](#).

## Restrict Device Accessibility

Users have repeatedly been caught unawares by attacks against features they had not protected because they did not know that those features were enabled. Unused services tend to be left with default configurations which are not always secure. These services may also be using default passwords. Some services can give an attacker easy access to information on what the server is running or how the network is setup. The following sections describe how NFVIS avoids such security risks:

### Attack vector reduction

Any piece of software can potentially contain security vulnerabilities. More software means more avenues for attack. Even if there are no publicly known vulnerabilities at the time of inclusion, vulnerabilities will probably be discovered or disclosed in the future. To avoid such scenarios, only those software packages which are essential for the NFVIS functionality are installed. This helps to limit software vulnerabilities, reduce resource consumption, and reduce extra work when problems are found with those packages. All third-party software included in NFVIS is registered at a central database in Cisco so that Cisco is able to perform a company level organized response (Legal, Security, etc). Software packages are periodically patched in every release for known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs).

### Enabling only essential ports by default

Only those services which are absolutely necessary to setup and manage NFVIS are available by default. This removes the user effort needed to configure firewalls and deny access to unnecessary services. The only services that are enabled by default are listed below along with the ports they open.

Open Port	Service	Description
22/TCP	SSH	Secure Socket Shell for remote command-line access to NFVIS
80/TCP	HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol for the NFVIS portal access. All HTTP traffic received by NFVIS is redirected to port 443 for HTTPS
443/TCP	HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure for secure NFVIS portal access
830/TCP	NETCONF-ssh	Port opened for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) over SSH. NETCONF is a protocol used for automated configuration of NFVIS and for receiving asynchronous event notifications from NFVIS.
161/UDP	SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). Used by NFVIS to communicate with remote network-monitoring applications. For more information see, <a href="#">Introduction about SNMP</a>

## Restrict Access To Authorized Networks For Authorized Services

Only authorized originators should be permitted to even attempt device management access, and access should be only to the services they are authorized to use. NFVIS can be configured such that access is restricted to known, trusted sources and expected management traffic profiles. This reduces the risk of unauthorized access and the exposure to other attacks, such as brute force, dictionary, or DoS attacks.

To protect the NFVIS management interfaces from unnecessary and potentially harmful traffic, an admin user can create Access Control Lists (ACLs) for the network traffic that is received. These ACLs specify the source IP addresses/networks from which the traffic originates, and the type of traffic that is permitted or rejected from these sources. These IP traffic filters are applied to each management interface on NFVIS. The following parameters are configured in an IP receive Access Control List (ip-receive-acl)

Parameter	Value	Description
Source network/Netmask	Network/netmask. For example: 0.0.0.0/0 172.39.162.0/24	This field specifies the IP address/network from which the traffic originates
Service	https icmp netconf scp snmp ssh	Type of traffic from the specified source.
Action	accept drop reject	<p>Action to be taken on the traffic from the source network.</p> <p>With <b>accept</b>, new connection attempts will be granted.</p> <p>With <b>reject</b>, connection attempts will not be accepted. If the rule is for a TCP based service such as HTTPS, NETCONF, SCP, SSH, the source will get a TCP reset (RST) packet. For non-TCP rules such as SNMP and ICMP, the packet will be dropped.</p> <p>With <b>drop</b>, all packets will be dropped immediately, there is no information sent to the source.</p>

Parameter	Value	Description
Priority	A numeric value	The <b>priority</b> is used to enforce an order on the rules. Rules with a higher numeric value for priority will be added further down in the chain. If you want to make sure that a rule will be added after another one, use a low priority number for the first and a higher priority number for the following.

The following sample configurations illustrate some scenarios that can be adapted for specific use-cases.

#### Configuring the IP Receive ACL

The more restrictive an ACL, the more limited the exposure to unauthorized access attempts. However, a more restrictive ACL can create a management overhead, and can impact accessibility to perform troubleshooting. Consequently, there is a balance to be considered. One compromise is to restrict access to internal corporate IP addresses only. Each customer must evaluate the implementation of ACLs in relation to their own security policy, risks, exposure, and acceptance thereof.

Reject ssh traffic from a subnet:

```
nfvis(config)# system settings ip-receive-acl 171.70.63.0/24 service ssh action reject
priority 1
```

Removing ACLs:

When an entry is deleted from **ip-receive-acl**, all configurations to that source are deleted since the source IP address is the key. To delete just one service, configure other services again.

```
nfvis(config)# no system settings ip-receive-acl 171.70.63.0/24
```

For more details see, [Configuring the IP Receive ACL](#)

## Privileged Debug Access

The super-user account on NFVIS is disabled by default, to prevent all unrestricted, potentially adverse, system-wide changes and NFVIS does not expose the system shell to the user.

However, for some hard to debug issues on the NFVIS system, the Cisco Technical Assistance Center team (TAC) or development team might require shell access to the customer's NFVIS. NFVIS has a secure unlock infrastructure to ensure that privileged debug access to a device in the field is restricted to authorized Cisco employees. To securely access the Linux shell for this kind of interactive debugging, a challenge-response authentication mechanism is used between NFVIS and the Interactive debugging server maintained by Cisco. The admin user's password is also required in addition to the challenge-response entry to ensure that the device is accessed with the customer's consent.

Steps to access the shell for Interactive Debugging:

1. An admin user initiates this procedure using this hidden command.

```
nfvis# system shell-access
```

- The screen will show a challenge string, for example:


Challenge String (Please copy everything between the asterisk lines exclusively):

```
*****
SPH//wkAABOR1ZJU0VOQ1M1NDA4L0s5AQAAABt+dcx+hB0V06r9RkdMMjEzNTgw
R1Hq7BxeAAA=
DONE.
*****
```

- The Cisco member enters the Challenge string on an Interactive Debug server maintained by Cisco. This server verifies that the Cisco user is authorized to debug NFVIS using the shell, and then returns a response string.
- Enter the response string on the screen below this prompt:  
Input your response when ready:
- When prompted, the customer should enter the admin password.
- You get shell-access if the password is valid.
- Development or TAC team uses the shell to proceed with the debugging.
- To exit shell-access type **Exit**.

## Secure Interfaces

NFVIS management access is allowed using the interfaces shown in the diagram. The following sections describe security best practices for these interfaces to NFVIS.



### Console

The console port is an asynchronous serial port that allows you to connect to the NFVIS CLI for initial configuration. A user can access the console with either physical access to the NFVIS or remote access through the use of a terminal server. If console port access is required via a terminal server, configure access lists on the terminal server to allow access only from the required source addresses.

### SSH

Users can access the NFVIS CLI by using SSH as a secure means of remote login. The integrity and confidentiality of NFVIS management traffic is essential to the security of the administered network since administration protocols frequently carry information which could be used to penetrate or disrupt the network.

NFVIS uses SSH version 2, which is Cisco's and the Internet's de facto standard protocol for interactive logins and supports strong encryption, hash, and key exchange algorithms recommended by the Security and Trust Organization within Cisco.

## CLI Session timeout

By logging in via SSH, a user establishes a session with NFVIS. While the user is logged in, if the user leaves the logged-in session unattended, this can expose the network to a security risk. Session security limits the risk of internal attacks, such as one user trying to use another user's session.

To mitigate this risk, NFVIS times out CLI sessions after 15 minutes of inactivity. When the session timeout is reached, the user is automatically logged out.

## NETCONF

The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) is a Network Management protocol developed and standardized by the IETF for the automated configuration of network devices.

The NETCONF protocol uses an Extensible Markup Language (XML) based data encoding for the configuration data as well as the protocol messages. The protocol messages are exchanged on top of a secure transport protocol.

NETCONF allows NFVIS to expose an XML-based API that the network operator can use to set and get configuration data and event notifications securely over SSH.

For more information see, [NETCONF Event Notifications](#).

## REST API

NFVIS can be configured using RESTful API over HTTPS. The REST API allow the requesting systems to access and manipulate the NFVIS configuration by using a uniform and predefined set of stateless operations. Details on all the REST APIs can be found in the [NFVIS API Reference guide](#).

When the user issues a REST API, a session is established with NFVIS. In order to limit risks related to denial of service attacks, NFVIS limits the total number of concurrent REST sessions to 100.

## NFVIS Web Portal

The NFVIS portal is a web-based Graphical User Interface that displays information about NFVIS. The portal presents the user with an easy means to configure and monitor NFVIS over HTTPS without having to know the NFVIS CLI and API.

### Session Management

The stateless nature of HTTP and HTTPS requires a method of uniquely tracking users through the use of unique session IDs and cookies.

NFVIS encrypts the user's session. The AES-256-CBC cipher is used to encrypt the session contents with an HMAC-SHA-256 authentication tag. A random 128-bit Initialization Vector is generated for each encryption operation.

An Audit record is started when a portal session is created. Session information is deleted when the user logs out or when the session times out.

The default idle timeout for portal sessions is 15 minutes. However, this can be configured for the current session to a value between 5 and 60 minutes on the Settings page. Auto-logout will be initiated after this



period. Multiple sessions are not permitted in a single browser. The Maximum number of concurrent sessions are set to 30.

The NFVIS portal utilizes cookies to associate data with the user. It uses the following cookie properties for enhanced security:

- **ephemeral** to ensure the cookie expires when the browser is closed
- **httpOnly** to make the cookie inaccessible from JavaScript
- **secureProxy** to ensure the cookie can only be sent over SSL.

Even after authentication, attacks such as Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) are possible. In this scenario, an end user might inadvertently execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they're currently authenticated. To prevent this, NFVIS uses **CSRF** tokens to validate every REST API that is invoked during each session.

### URL Redirection

In typical web servers, when a page is not found on the web server, the user gets a 404 message; for pages that exist, they get a login page. The security impact of this is that an attacker can perform a brute force scan and easily detect which pages and folders exist.

To prevent this on NFVIS, all non-existent URLs prefixed with the device IP are redirected to the portal login page with a 301 status response code. This means that irrespective of the URL requested by an attacker, they will always get the login page to authenticate themselves.

All HTTP server requests are redirected to HTTPS and have the following headers configured:

- X-Content-Type-Options
- X-XSS-Protection
- Content-Security-Policy
- X-Frame-Options
- Strict-Transport-Security
- Cache-Control

### Disabling the Portal

The NFVIS portal access is enabled by default. If you are not planning to use the portal, it is recommended to disable portal access using this command:

```
Configure terminal
System portal access disabled
commit
```

## HTTPS

All the HTTPS data to and from NFVIS uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) to communicate across the network. TLS is the successor to Secure Socket Layer (SSL).

The TLS handshake involves authentication during which the client verifies the server's SSL certificate with the certificate authority that issued it. This confirms that the server is who it says it is, and that the client is interacting with the owner of the domain.

By default, NFVIS uses a self-signed certificate to prove its identity to its clients. This certificate has a 2048-bit public key to increase the security of the TLS encryption, since the encryption strength is directly related to the key size.

### Certificate Management

NFVIS generates a self-signed SSL certificate when first installed. It is a security best practice to replace this certificate with a valid certificate signed by a compliant Certificate Authority (CA).

Use the following steps to replace the default self-signed certificate:

1. Generate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) on NFVIS.

A Certificate Signing request (CSR) is a file with a block of encoded text that is given to a Certificate Authority when applying for an SSL Certificate. This file contains information that should be included in the certificate such as the organization name, common name (domain name), locality, and country. The file also contains the public key that should be included in the certificate. NFVIS uses a 2048-bit public key since encryption strength is higher with a higher key size.

To generate a CSR on NFVIS, run the following command:

```
nfvis# system certificate signing-request [common-name country-code locality
organization organization-unit-name state]
```

The CSR file is saved as */data/intdatastore/download/nfvis.csr*.

2. Get an SSL certificate from a CA using the CSR.

From an external host, use the scp command to download the Certificate Signing Request.

```
[myhost:/tmp] > scp -P 22222 admin@<NFVIS-IP>:/data/intdatastore/download/nfvis.csr
<destination-file-name>
```

Contact a Certificate authority to issue a new SSL server certificate using this CSR.

3. Install the CA Signed Certificate.

From an external server, use the scp command to upload the certificate file into NFVIS to the */data/intdatastore/uploads/* directory.

```
[myhost:/tmp] > scp -P 22222 <certificate file>
admin@<NFVIS-IP>:/data/intdatastore/uploads
```

Install the certificate in NFVIS using the following command.

```
nfvis# system certificate install-cert path file:///data/intdatastore/uploads/<certificate
file>
```

4. Switch to using the CA Signed Certificate.

Use the following command to start using the CA signed certificate instead of the default self-signed certificate.

```
nfvis(config)# system certificate use-cert cert-type ca-signed
```

## SNMP Access

Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is an Internet Standard protocol for collecting and organizing information about managed devices on IP networks, and for modifying that information to change device behavior.

Three significant versions of SNMP have been developed. NFVIS supports SNMP version 1, version 2c and version 3. SNMP versions 1 and 2 use community strings for authentication, and these are sent in plain-text. So, it is a security best practice to use SNMP v3 instead.

SNMPv3 provides secure access to devices by using three aspects: - users, authentication, and encryption. SNMPv3 uses the USM (User-based Security Module) for controlling access to information available via SNMP. The SNMP v3 user is configured with an authentication type, a privacy type as well as a passphrase. All users sharing a group utilize the same SNMP version, however, the specific security level settings (password, encryption type, etc.) are specified per-user.

The following table summarizes the security options within SNMP

Model	Level	Authentication	Encryption	Outcome
v1	noAuthNoPriv	Community String	No	Uses a community string match for authentication.
v2c	noAuthNoPriv	Community String	No	Uses a community string match for authentication.
v3	noAuthNoPriv	Username	No	Uses a username match for authentication.
v3	authNoPriv	Message Digest 5 (MD5) or Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)	No	Provides authentication based on the HMAC-MD5-96 or HMAC-SHA-96 algorithms.

Model	Level	Authentication	Encryption	Outcome
v3	authPriv	MD5 or SHA	Data Encryption Standard (DES) or Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)	Provides authentication based on the HMAC-MD5-96 or HMAC-SHA-96 algorithms.  Provides DES Cipher algorithm in Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC-DES)  or  AES encryption algorithm used in Cipher FeedBack Mode (CFB), with a 128-bit key size(CFB128-AES-128)

Since its adoption by NIST, AES has become the dominant encryption algorithm throughout the industry. To follow the industry's migration away from MD5 and toward SHA, it is a security best practice to configure the SNMP v3 authentication protocol as SHA and privacy protocol as AES.

For more details on SNMP see, [Introduction about SNMP](#)

## Legal Notification Banners

It is recommended that a legal notification banner is present on all interactive sessions to ensure that users are notified of the security policy being enforced and to which they are subject. In some jurisdictions, civil and/or criminal prosecution of an attacker who breaks into a system is easier, or even required, if a legal notification banner is presented, informing unauthorized users that their use is in fact unauthorized. In some jurisdictions, it may also be forbidden to monitor the activity of an unauthorized user unless they have been notified of the intent to do so.

Legal notification requirements are complex and vary in each jurisdiction and situation. Even within jurisdictions, legal opinions vary. Discuss this issue with your own legal counsel to ensure that the notification banner meets company, local, and international legal requirements. This is often critical to securing appropriate action in the event of a security breach. In cooperation with the company legal counsel, statements which may be included in a legal notification banner include:

- Notification that the system access and use is permitted only by specifically authorized personnel, and perhaps information about who may authorize use.
- Notification that unauthorized access and use of the system is unlawful, and may be subject to civil and/or criminal penalties.
- Notification that access and use of the system may be logged or monitored without further notice, and the resulting logs may be used as evidence in court.
- Additional specific notices required by specific local laws.

From a security rather than a legal point of view, a legal notification banner should not contain any specific information about the device, such as its name, model, software, location, operator or owner because this kind of information may be useful to an attacker.

The following is a sample legal notification banner which can be displayed before login:

```
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THIS DEVICE IS PROHIBITED You must have explicit, authorized permission
to access or configure this device. Unauthorized attempts and actions to access or use
this system may result in civil and/or criminal penalties. All activities performed on this
device are logged and monitored
```



**Note** Present a legal notification banner approved by company legal counsel.

NFVIS allows the configuration of a banner and Message of the Day (MOTD). The banner is displayed before the user logs in. Once the user logs in to NFVIS, a system-defined banner provides Copyright information about NFVIS, and the message-of-the-day (MOTD), if configured, will appear, followed by the command line prompt or portal view, depending on the login method.

It is recommended that a login banner is implemented to ensure that a legal notification banner is presented on all the device management access sessions prior to a login prompt being presented. Use this command to configure the banner and MOTD.

```
nfvis(config)# banner-motd banner <banner-text> motd <message-of-the-day-text>
```

For more information about the banner command, see [Configure Banner, Message of the day and System Time](#).

## Factory Default Reset

Factory Reset removes all the customer specific data that has been added to the device since the time of its shipping. The data erased includes configurations, log files, VM images, connectivity information, and user login credentials.

It provides one command to reset the device to factory-original settings, and is useful in the following scenarios:

- Return Material Authorization (RMA) for a device—If you have to return a device to Cisco for RMA, use Factory Default reset to remove all the customer-specific data.
- Recovering a compromised device— If the key material or credentials stored on a device is compromised, reset the device to factory configuration and then reconfigure the device.
- If the same device needs to be re-used at a different site with a new configuration, perform a Factory Default reset to remove the existing configuration and bring it to a clean state.

NFVIS provides the following options within Factory default reset:

Factory Reset Option	Data Erased	Data Retained
all	All configuration, uploaded image files, VMs and logs.  Connectivity to the device will be lost.	The admin account is retained and the password will be changed to the factory default password.

Factory Reset Option	Data Erased	Data Retained
all-except-images	All configuration except image configuration, VMs, and uploaded image files.  Connectivity to the device will be lost.	Image configuration, registered images and logs  The admin account is retained and the password will be changed to the factory default password.
all-except-images-connectivity	All configuration except image, network and connectivity configuration, VMs, and uploaded image files.  Connectivity to the device is available.	Images, network and connectivity related configuration, registered images, and logs.  The admin account is retained and the previously configured admin password will be preserved.
manufacturing	All configuration except image configuration, VMs, uploaded image files, and logs.  Connectivity to the device will be lost.	Image related configuration and registered images  The admin account is retained and the password will be changed to the factory default password.

The user must choose the appropriate option carefully based on the purpose of the Factory Default reset.

For more information, see [Resetting to Factory Default](#).

## Infrastructure Management Network

An infrastructure management network refers to the network carrying the control and management plane traffic (such as NTP, SSH, SNMP, syslog, etc.) for the infrastructure devices. Device access can be through the console, as well as through the Ethernet interfaces. This control and management plane traffic is critical to network operations, providing visibility into and control over the network. Consequently, a well-designed and secure infrastructure management network is critical to the overall security and operations of a network. One of the key recommendations for a secure infrastructure management network is the separation of management and data traffic in order to ensure remote manageability even under high load and high traffic conditions. This can be achieved using a dedicated management interface.

The following are the Infrastructure management network implementation approaches:

### Out-of-band Management

An Out-of-band Management (OOB) management network consists of a network which is completely independent and physically disparate from the data network that it helps to manage. This is also sometimes referred to as a Data Communications Network (DCN). Network devices can connect to the OOB network in different ways: – NFVIS supports a built-in management interface that can be used to connect to the OOB network. NFVIS allows the configuration of a predefined physical interface, the MGMT port on the ENCS, as a dedicated management interface. Restricting management packets to designated interfaces provides greater control over the management of a device, thereby providing more security for that device. Other benefits include improved performance for data packets on non-management interfaces, support for network scalability,

need for fewer access control lists (ACLs) to restrict access to a device, and prevention of management packet floods from reaching the CPU.

Network devices can also connect to the OOB network via dedicated data interfaces. In this case, ACLs should be deployed to ensure that management traffic is only handled by the dedicated interfaces.

For further information, see [Configuring the IP Receive ACL](#) and [Port 22222 and Management Interface ACL](#).

## Pseudo out-of-band Management

A pseudo out-of-band management network uses the same physical infrastructure as the data network but provides logical separation through the virtual separation of traffic, by using VLANs. NFVIS supports creating VLANs and virtual bridges to help identify different sources of traffic and separate traffic between VMs. Having separate bridges and VLANs isolates the virtual machine network's data traffic and the management network, thus providing traffic segmentation between the VMs and the host. For further information see [Configuring VLAN for NFVIS Management Traffic](#).

## In-band Management

An in-band management network uses the same physical and logical paths as the data traffic.

Ultimately, this network design requires a per-customer analysis of risk versus benefits and costs. Some general considerations include:

- An isolated OOB management network maximizes visibility and control over the network even during disruptive events.
- Transmitting network telemetry over an OOB network minimizes the chance for disruption of the very information which provides critical network visibility.
- In-band management access to network infrastructure, hosts, etc. is vulnerable to complete loss in the event of a network incident, removing all the network visibility and control. Appropriate QoS controls should be put in place to mitigate this occurrence.
- NFVIS features interfaces which are dedicated to device management, including serial console ports and Ethernet management interfaces.
- An OOB management network can typically be deployed at a reasonable cost, since management network traffic does not typically demand high bandwidth nor high performance devices, and only requires sufficient port density to support the connectivity to each infrastructure device.

## Locally Stored Information Protection

### Protecting Sensitive Information

NFVIS stores some sensitive information locally, including passwords and secrets. Passwords should generally be maintained and controlled by a centralized AAA server. However, even if a centralized AAA server is deployed, some locally-stored passwords are required for certain cases such as local fallback in the case of AAA servers not being available, special-use usernames, etc. These local passwords and other sensitive

information are stored on NFVIS as hashes so that it is not possible to recover the original credentials from the system. Hashing is a widely accepted industry norm.

## File Transfer

Files which may need to be transferred to NFVIS devices include VM image and NFVIS upgrade files. The secure transfer of files is critical for network infrastructure security. NFVIS supports Secure Copy (SCP) to ensure the security of file transfer. SCP relies on SSH for secure authentication and transport, enabling the secure and authenticated copying of files.

A secure copy from NFVIS is initiated through the scp command. The secure copy (scp) command allows only the admin user to securely copy files from NFVIS to an external system, or from an external system to NFVIS.

The syntax for the scp command is:

```
scp <source> <destination>
```

We use port 22222 for the NFVIS SCP server. By default, this port is closed and users cannot secure copy files into NFVIS from an external client. If there is a need to SCP a file from an external client, the user can open the port using:

```
system settings ip-receive-acl (address)/(mask length) service scpd priority (number) action  
accept  
commit
```

To prevent users from accessing system directories, secure copy can be performed only to or from intdatastore:, extdatastore1:, extdatastore2:, usb:, and nfs:, if available. Secure copy can also be performed from logs: and techsupport:

## Logging

NFVIS access and configuration changes are logged as audit logs to record the following information:

- Who accessed the device
- When did a user log in
- What did a user do in terms of the host configuration and the VM lifecycle
- When did a user log off
- Failed access attempts
- Failed authentication requests
- Failed authorization requests

This information is invaluable for forensic analysis in case of unauthorized attempts or access, as well as for configuration change issues and to help plan group administration changes. It may also be used real time to identify anomalous activities which may indicate that an attack is taking place. This analysis can be correlated with information from additional external sources, such as IDS and firewall logs.




All the key events on the NFVIS are sent as event notifications to NETCONF subscribers and as syslogs to the configured central logging servers. For more information on syslog messages and event notifications, see [Appendix](#).

## Virtual Machine security

This section describes security features related to the registration, deployment and operation of Virtual Machines on NFVIS.

### VNF secure boot

NFVIS supports Open Virtual Machine Firmware (OVMF) to enable UEFI secure boot for Virtual Machines which support secure boot. VNF Secure boot verifies that each layer of the VM boot software is signed, including the bootloader, the operating system kernel, and operating system drivers.



For more information see, [Secure Boot of VNFs](#).

### VNC Console Access Protection

NFVIS allows the user to create a Virtual Network Computing (VNC) session to access a deployed VM's remote desktop. To enable this, NFVIS dynamically opens a port to which the user can connect using their web browser. This port is only left open for 60 seconds for an external server to start a session to the VM. If no activity is seen within this time, the port is closed. The port number is assigned dynamically and thereby allows only a one-time access to the VNC console.

```
nfvis# vncconsole start deployment-name 1510614035 vm-name ROUTER
vncconsole-url :6005/vnc_auto.html
```

Pointing your browser to `https://<nfvis ip>:6005/vnc_auto.html` will connect to the ROUTER VM's VNC console.

## Encrypted VM config data variables

During VM deployment, the user provides a day-0 configuration file for the VM. This file can contain sensitive information such as passwords and keys. If this information is passed as clear text, it appears in log files and internal database records in clear text. This feature allows the user to flag a config data variable as sensitive so that its value is encrypted using AES-CFB-128 encryption before it is stored or passed to internal subsystems.

For more information see, [VM Deployment Parameters](#).

## Checksum verification for Remote Image Registration

To register a remotely located VNF image, the user specifies its location. The image will need to be downloaded from an external source, such as an NFS server or a remote HTTPS server.

To know if a downloaded file is safe to install, it is essential to compare the file's checksum before using it. Verifying the checksum helps ensure that the file was not corrupted during network transmission, or modified by a malicious third party before you downloaded it.

NFVIS supports the checksum and checksum\_algorithm options for the user to provide the expected checksum and checksum algorithm (SHA256 or SHA512) to be used to verify the checksum of the downloaded image. Image creation fails if the checksum does not match.

## Certification Validation for Remote Image Registration

To register a VNF image located on a HTTPS server, the image will need to be downloaded from the remote HTTPS server. To securely download this image, NFVIS verifies the SSL certificate of the server. The user needs to specify either the path to the certificate file or the PEM format certificate contents to enable this secure download.

More details can be found at [Section on certificate validation for image registration](#)

## VM Isolation and Resource provisioning


The Network Function Virtualization (NFV) architecture consists of:

- Virtualized network functions (VNFs), which are Virtual Machines running software applications that deliver network functionality such as a router, firewall, load balancer, and so on.
- Network functions virtualization infrastructure, which consists of the infrastructure components—compute, memory, storage, and networking, on a platform that supports the required software and hypervisor.

With NFV, network functions are virtualized so that multiple functions can be run on a single server. As a result, less physical hardware is needed, allowing for resource consolidation. In this environment, it is essential to simulate dedicated resources for multiple VNFs from a single, physical hardware system. Using NFVIS, VMs can be deployed in a controlled manner such that each VM receives the resources it needs. Resources are partitioned as needed from the physical environment to the many virtual environments. The individual VM domains are isolated so they are separate, distinct, and secure environments, which are not contending with each other for shared resources.

VMs cannot use more resources than provisioned. This avoids a Denial of Service condition from one VM consuming the resources. As a result, CPU, memory, network and storage are protected.

## CPU Isolation



The NFVIS system reserves cores for the infrastructure software running on the host. The rest of the cores are available for VM deployment. This guarantees that the VM's performance does not affect the NFVIS host performance.


### Low-latency VMs

NFVIS explicitly assigns dedicated cores to low latency VMs that are deployed on it. If the VM requires 2 vCPUs, it is assigned 2 dedicated cores. This prevents sharing and oversubscription of cores and guarantees the performance of the low-latency VMs. If the number of available cores is less than the number of vCPUs requested by another low-latency VM, the deployment is prevented since we do not have sufficient resources.

### Non low-latency VMs

NFVIS assigns sharable CPUs to non low latency VMs. If the VM requires 2 vCPUs, it is assigned 2 CPUs. These 2 CPUs are shareable among other non low latency VMs. If the number of available CPUs is less than the number of vCPUs requested by another non low-latency VM, the deployment is still allowed because this VM will share the CPU with existing non low latency VMs.


## Memory Allocation



The NFVIS Infrastructure requires a certain amount of memory. When a VM is deployed, there is a check to ensure that the memory available after reserving the memory required for the infrastructure and previously deployed VMs, is sufficient for the new VM. We do not allow memory oversubscription for the VMs.

VMs are not allowed to directly access the host file system and storage.

## Storage Isolation



The ENCS platform supports an internal datastore (M2 SSD) and external disks. NFVIS is installed on the internal datastore. VNFs can also be deployed on this internal datastore. It is a security best practice to store customer data and deploy customer application Virtual Machines on the external disks. Having physically separate disks for the system files vs the application files helps to protect system data from corruption and security issues.

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## Interface Isolation



Single Root I/O Virtualization or SR-IOV is a specification that allows the isolation of PCI Express (PCIe) resources such as an Ethernet port. Using SR-IOV a single Ethernet port can be made to appear as multiple, separate, physical devices known as Virtual Functions. All of the VF devices on that adapter share the same physical network port. A guest can use one or more of these Virtual Functions. A Virtual Function appears to the guest as a network card, in the same way as a normal network card would appear to an operating system.

Virtual Functions have near-native performance and provide better performance than para-virtualized drivers and emulated access. Virtual Functions provide data protection between guests on the same physical server as the data is managed and controlled by the hardware.

NFVIS VNFs can use SR-IOV networks to connect to WAN and LAN Backplane ports.

Each such VM owns a virtual interface and its related resources achieving data protection among VMs.

## Secure Development Lifecycle

NFVIS follows a Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL) for software. This is a repeatable, measurable process designed to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance the security and resilience of Cisco solutions. Cisco SDL applies industry-leading practices and technology to build trustworthy solutions that have fewer field-discovered product security incidents. Every NFVIS release goes through the following processes.

- Following Cisco-internal and market-based Product Security Requirements
- Registering 3rd party software with a central repository at Cisco for vulnerability tracking
- Periodically patching software with known fixes for CVEs.
- Designing software with Security in mind
- Following secure coding practices such as using vetted common security modules like CiscoSSL, running Static Analysis and implementing input validation for Preventing command injection, etc.
- Using Application Security tools such as IBM AppScan, Nessus, and other Cisco internal tools.

