



Configure MACSec

This module describes how to configure Media Access Control Security (MACSec) encryption on the NCS 5500 Network Convergence System Routers. MACSec is a Layer 2 IEEE 802.1AE standard for encrypting packets between two MACSec-capable routers.

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Understanding MACsec Encryption

Security breaches can occur at any layer of the OSI model. At Layer 2, some of the common breaches are MAC address spoofing, ARP spoofing, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against a DHCP server, and VLAN hopping.


MACsec secures data on physical media, making it impossible for data to be compromised at higher layers. As a result, MACsec encryption takes priority over any other encryption method such as IPsec and SSL at higher layers. MACsec is configured on the Customer Edge (CE) router interfaces that connect to Provider Edge (PE) routers and on all the provider router interfaces.

MKA Authentication Process

MACsec provides the secure MAC Service on a frame-by-frame basis, using GCM-AES algorithm. MACsec uses the MACsec Key Agreement protocol (MKA) to exchange session keys, and manage encryption keys.

The MACsec encryption process is illustrated in the following figure and description.

Figure 1: MKA Encryption Process



Step 1: When a link is first established between two routers, they become peers. Mutual peer authentication takes place by configuring a Pre-shared Key (PSK).

Step 2: On successful peer authentication, a connectivity association is formed between the peers, and a secure Connectivity Association Key Name (CKN) is exchanged. After the exchange, the MKA ICV is validated with a Connectivity Association Key (CAK), which is effectively a secret key.

Step 3: A key server is selected between the routers, based on the configured key server priority. Lower the priority value, higher the preference for the router to become the key server. If no value is configured, the default value of 16 is taken to be the key server priority value for the router. Lowest priority value configures that router as the key server, while the other router functions as a key client. The following rules apply to key server selection:

- Numerically lower values of key server priority and SCI are accorded the highest preference.
- Each router selects a peer advertising the highest preference as its key server provided that peer has not selected another router as its key server or is not willing to function as the key server.
- In the event of a tie for highest preferred key server, the router with the highest priority SCI is chosen as key server (KS).


Step 4: A security association is formed between the peers. The key server generates and distributes the Secure Association Key (SAK) to the key client (peer). Each secure channel is supported by an overlapped sequence of Security Associations (SA). Each SA uses a new Secure Association Key (SAK).

Step 5: Encrypted data is exchanged between the peers.

MACsec Frame Format

The MACsec header in a frame consists of three components as illustrated in the following figure.

Figure 2: MACsec Frame Format



- **SecTAG:** The security tag is 8-16 bytes in length and identifies the SAK to be used for the frame. With Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) encoding, the security tag is 16 bytes in length, and without the encoding, 8 bytes in length (SCI encoding is optional). The security tag also provides replay protection when frames are received out of sequence.
- **Secure Data:** This is the data in the frame that is encrypted using MACsec and can be 2 or more octets in length.
- **ICV:** The ICV provides the integrity check for the frame and is usually 8-16 bytes in length, depending on the cipher suite. Frames that do not match the expected ICV are dropped at the port.

Advantages of Using MACsec Encryption

- **Data Integrity Check:** Integrity check value (ICV) is used to perform integrity check. The ICV is sent with the protected data unit and is recalculated and compared by the receiver to detect data modification.
- **Data Encryption:** Enables a port to encrypt outbound frames and decrypt MACsec-encrypted inbound frames.
- **Replay Protection:** When frames are transmitted through the network, there is a strong possibility of frames getting out of the ordered sequence. MACsec provides a configurable window that accepts a specified number of out-of-sequence frames.
- **Support for Clear Traffic:** If configured accordingly, data that is not encrypted is allowed to transit through the port.

Hardware Support Matrix for MacSec

The MACSec support on Cisco NCS 5500 Series Routers and NCS 5700 Series Routers is compatible with the following platform models, line cards (LCs), and modular port adapters (MPAs).

Platform Models

The following platform models support MACSec:

Table 1: NCS5500: Supported Modular Chassis for MACSec

Platform Model	Introduced Release for MACSec Support
NCS 5504	Release 6.3.1
NCS 5516	Release 6.1.3

Platform Model	Introduced Release for MACSec Support
NCS 5508	Release 6.0

Table 2: NCS5500: Supported Fixed Chassis for MACSec

Platform Model	Introduced Release for MACSec Support
NCS-55A1-24Q6H-SS	Release 7.2.1
NCS-55A1-24Q6H-S	Release 6.6.2
NCS-55A1-48Q6H	Release 6.6.2
NCS-55A2-MOD-SE-S	Release 6.6.1
NCS-55A2-MOD-S	Release 6.6.1
NCS-55A2-MOD-HD-S	Release 6.6.1
NCS-55A2-MOD-HX-S	Release 6.6.1
NCS-55A1-36H-SE-S	Release 6.3.2
NCS-55A1-36H-S	Release 6.2.2

Table 3: NCS5700: Supported Fixed Chassis for MACSec

	Introduced Release for MACSec Support
NCS-57B1-5DSE-SYS	Release 7.6.1
NCS-57B1-6D24-SYS	Release 7.6.1
NCS-57C1-48Q6-SYS	Release 7.5.2
NCS-57C3-MOD-SYS	Release 7.4.1
NCS-57C3-MODS-SYS	Release 7.4.1

Line Cards

The following line cards support MACSec:

Table 4: NCS5500: Supported Line Cards for MACSec

Line Card	
NC55-MOD-A-SE-S Base	Release 6.6.1 (only for base)
NC55-MOD-A-S Base	Release 6.6.1 (only for base)

Line Card	
NC55-6x200-DWDM-S	Release 6.2.2 (MACSec on all ports)
NC55-36x100G-S	Release 6.1.3 (MACSec on all ports)

Table 5: NCS5700: Supported Line Cards for MACSec

NC57-36H6D-S	Release 7.3.2 Release 7.4.1
NC57-MOD-S Base	Release 7.6.1 (only for base)

MPAs

The following MPAs support MACSec:

Table 6: NCS5500 and NCS5700: Supported MPAs for MACSec

MPA	Hardware in Which Support is Introduced	Introduced Release for MACSec Support
NC55-MPA-12T-S	NCS-57C3-MODS-SYS	Release 7.4.1
	NC57-MOD-S	Release 7.6.1
	NCS-55A2-MOD-HD-S	Release 6.6.1
	NC55-MOD-A-SE-S	Release 6.6.1
NC55-MPA-2TH-S	NCS-57C3-MODS-SYS	Release 7.4.1
	NC57-MOD-S	Release 7.6.1
	NCS-55A2-MOD-HD-S	Release 6.6.1
	NC55-MOD-A-SE-S	Release 6.6.1
NC55-MPA-1TH2H-S	NCS-57C3-MODS-SYS	Release 7.4.1
	NC57-MOD-S	Release 7.6.1
	NCS-55A2-MOD-HD-S	Release 6.6.1
	NC55-MOD-A-SE-S	Release 6.6.1

MPA	Hardware in Which Support is Introduced	Introduced Release for MACSec Support
NC55-MPA-4H-S	NCS-57C3-MODS-SYS	Release 7.4.1
	NC57-MOD-S	Release 7.6.1
	NCS-55A2-MOD-HD-S	Release 6.6.1
	NC55-MOD-A-SE-S	Release 6.6.1
NC57-MPA-2D4H-S	All	Release 7.5.1
NC57-MPA-12L-S	NCS-57C3-MOD-SYS	Release 7.5.1
	NC57-MOD-S	Release 7.5.1

MACsec PSK

A pre-shared key includes a connectivity association key name (CKN) and a connectivity association key (CAK). A pre-shared key is exchanged between two devices at each end of a point-to-point link to enable MACsec using static CAK security mode. The MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) protocol is enabled after the pre-shared keys are successfully verified and exchanged. The pre-shared keys, the CKN and CAK, must match on both ends of a link.

For more information on MACsec PSK configuration, see [Step 3, on page 12](#) of the [Applying MACsec Configuration on an Interface, on page 12](#) section.

Configuring and Verifying MACsec Encryption

MACsec can be configured on physical ethernet interfaces or interface bundles (link bundles), as explained in this section.

The following section describes procedures for configuring and verifying MACsec configuration in the described deployment modes.

Prior to configuring MACsec on a router interface the MACsec keychain must be defined. If you apply the MACsec keychain on the router without specifying a MACsec policy, the default policy is applied. A default MACsec policy is pre-configured with default values. If you need to change any of the pre-configured values, create a different MACsec policy.

Configuring MACsec involves the following steps:

1. Creating a MACsec keychain
2. Creating a user-defined MACsec policy
3. Applying MACsec configuration on physical interfaces

Creating a MACsec Keychain

A MACsec keychain is a collection of keys used to authenticate peers needing to exchange encrypted information. While creating a keychain, we define the key(s), key string with password, the cryptographic algorithm, and the key lifetime.

MACsec Keychain Keyword	Description
Key	The MACsec key or the CKN can be up to 64 characters in length. The key must be of an even number of characters. Entering an odd number of characters will exit the MACsec configuration mode.
Key-string	The MACsec key-string or the CAK can be either 32 characters or 64 characters in length (32 for AES-128, 64 for AES-256).
Lifetime	This field specifies the validity period of a key. It includes a start time, and an expiry time. We recommend you to set the value for expiry time as <i>infinite</i> .

Guidelines for Configuring MACsec Keychain

MACsec keychain management has the following configuration guidelines:

- To establish MKA session, ensure that the MACsec key (CKN) and key-string (CAK) match at both ends.
- MKA protocol uses the latest active key available in the Keychain. This key has the latest Start Time from the existing set of currently active keys. You can verify the values using the **show key chain keychain-name** command.
- Deletion or expiry of current active key brings down the MKA session resulting in traffic hit. We recommend you to configure the keys with infinite lifetime. If fallback is configured, traffic is safeguarded using fallback on expiry or deletion of primary-keychain active key.
- To achieve successful key rollover (CAK-rollover), the new key should be configured such that it is the latest active key, and kicks-in before the current key expires.
- We recommend an overlap of at least one minute for hitless CAK rollover from current key to new key.
- Start time and Expiry time can be configured with future time stamps, which allows bulk configuration for daily CAK rotation without any intervention of management agent.

Procedure

Step 1 Enter the global configuration mode and provide a name for the MACsec keychain; for example, mac_chain.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config)# key chain mac_chain
```

Step 2 Enter the MACsec mode.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_chain)#macsec
```

Step 3 Provide a name for the MACsec key.

The key can be up to 64 characters in length. The key must be of an even number of characters. Entering an odd number of characters will exit the MACsec configuration mode.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_chain-MacSec)#key 1234abcd5678
```

You can also configure a fall-back pre-shared key (PSK) to ensure that a PSK is always available to perform MACsec encryption and decryption. The fallback PSK along with the primary PSK ensures that the session remains active even if the primary PSK is mismatched or there is no active key for the primary PSK.

The configured key is the CKN that is exchanged between the peers.

Note If you are configuring MACsec to interoperate with a MACsec server that is running software prior to Cisco IOS XR Release 6.1.3, then ensure that the MACsec key length is of 64 characters. You can add extra zero characters to the MACsec key so that the length of 64 characters is achieved. If the key length is lesser than 64 characters, authentication will fail.

Step 4 Enter the key string and the cryptographic algorithm to be used for the key.

Example:

The key string is the CAK that is used for ICV validation by the MKA protocol.

! For AES 128-bit encryption

```
RP/0/(config-mac_chain-MacSec-1234abcd5678)#
key-string 12345678123456781234567812345678 cryptographic-algorithm AES-128-CMAC
```

! For AES 256-bit encryption

```
RP/0/(config-mac_chain-MacSec-1234abcd5678)#
key-string 1234567812345678123456781234567812345678123456781234567812345678 cryptographic
-algorithm AES-256-CMAC
```

Note In this example, we have used the AES 256-bit encryption algorithm, and therefore, the key string is 64 hexadecimal characters in length. A 256-bit encryption algorithm uses a larger key that requires more rounds of hacking to be cracked. 256-bit algorithms provide better security against large mass security attacks, and include the security provided by 128-bit algorithms.

Step 5 Enter the validity period for the MACsec key (CKN) also known as the lifetime period.

The lifetime period can be configured, with a duration in seconds, as a validity period between two dates (for example, Jan 01 2014 to Dec 31 2014), or with infinite validity.

The key is valid from the time you configure (in HH:MM:SS format). Duration is configured in seconds.

Example:


```
RP/0/(config-mac_chain-MacSec-1234abcd5678)#lifetime 05:00:00 01
January 2015 duration 1800
```

An example of configuring the lifetime for a defined period:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_chain-MacSec-1234abcd5678)#lifetime 05:00:00 20
february 2015 12:00:00 30 september 2015
```

An example of configuring the lifetime as infinite:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_chain-MacSec-1234abcd5678)#lifetime
05:00:00 01 January 2015 infinite
```

Note When a key has expired, the MACsec session is torn down and running the **show macsec mka session** command does not display any information. If you run the **show macsec mka interface detail** command, the output displays ***** No Active Keys Present ***** in the PSK information.

Step 6 Commit your configuration.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_chain-MacSec-1234abcd5678)#commit
```

This completes the configuration of the MACsec keychain.

Creating a User-Defined MACsec Policy

Procedure

Step 1 Enter the global configuration mode, and enter a name (mac_policy) for the MACsec policy.

Example:

```
RP/0/# configure
RP/0/(config)# macsec-policy mac_policy
```

Step 2 Configure the cipher suite to be used for MACsec encryption.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_policy)# cipher-suite GCM-AES-XPN-256
RP/0/(config-mac_policy)#GCM-AES-128
GCM-AES-256
GCM-AES-XPN-128
GCM-AES-XPN-256
```

Note In this example, we have used the GCM-AES-XPB-256 encryption algorithm. A 256-bit encryption algorithm uses a larger key that requires more rounds of hacking to be cracked. 256-bit algorithms provide better security against large mass security attacks, and include the security provided by 128-bit algorithms. Extended Packet Numbering (XPN) is used to reduce the number of key rollovers while data is sent over high speed links. It is therefore highly recommended to use GCM-AES-XPB-256 encryption algorithm for higher data ports.

Step 3 Configure the confidentiality offset for MACsec encryption.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_policy)# conf-offset CONF-OFFSET-30
```

Note We recommend to change the offset value of the **conf-offset** *<offset_value>* command (MACsec encryption command) in only when the port is in **admin down** state (that is, when the interface is shut down). Changing the offset value otherwise may result in traffic loss.

Step 4 Enter the key server priority.

You can enter a value between 0-255. Lower the value, higher the preference to be selected as the key server.

In this example, a value of 0 configures the router as the key server, while the other router functions as a key client. The key server generates and maintains the SAK between the two routers. The default key server priority value is 16.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_policy)# key-server-priority 0
```

Step 5 Configure the security policy parameters, either Must-Secure or Should-Secure.

Must-Secure: Must-Secure imposes only MACsec encrypted traffic to flow. Hence, until MKA session is not secured, traffic will be dropped.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_policy)# security-policy must-secure
```

Should-Secure: Should-Secure allows unencrypted traffic to flow until MKA session is secured. After the MKA session is secured, Should-Secure policy imposes only encrypted traffic to flow.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_policy)# security-policy should-secure
```

Table 7: MACsec Security Policies

MKA		Secured MKA Session	Unsecured MKA Session
Security Policy	Must-secure	Encrypted traffic	Traffic drop (no Tx and no Rx)
	Should-secure	Encrypted traffic	Plain text or unencrypted traffic

Step 6 Configure the replay protection window size.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_policy)# window-size 64
```

This dictates the maximum out-of-sequence frames that are accepted. You can configure a value between 0 and 1024.

Step 7 Configure the ICV for the frame arriving on the port.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_policy)# include-icv-indicator
```

This parameter configures inclusion of the optional ICV Indicator as part of the transmitted MACsec Key Agreement PDU (MKPDU). This configuration is necessary for MACsec to interoperate with routers that run software prior to IOS XR version 6.1.3. This configuration is also important in a service provider WAN setup where MACsec interoperates with other vendor MACsec implementations that expect ICV indicator to be present in the MKPDU.

Step 8 Commit your configuration and exit the global configuration mode.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-mac_policy)# exit
RP/0/(config)# commit
RP/0/(config)# exit
```

Step 9 Confirm the MACsec policy configuration.

Example:

```
RP/0/# show running-config macsec-policy

macsec-policy mac_policy
conf-offset CONF-OFFSET-30
security-policy must-secure
window-size 64
cipher-suite GCM-AES-XPB-256
key-server-priority 0
include-icv-indicator
```

This completes the configuration of the MACsec policy.



Note

- Small packets might be dropped when Data Delay Protection (DDP) is enabled on many MACsec enabled interfaces of a scaled setup. To avoid this, enable DDP only on the interfaces which are absolutely necessary.
- For to interoperate with Cisco ASR9000 Series Routers that are older than Release 6.2.3, configure a user defined MACsec policy with the `policy-exception lacp-in-clear` command to bring up the MKA sessions over bundle interfaces running in LACP modes.

Applying MACsec Configuration on an Interface

The MACsec service configuration is applied to the host-facing interface of a CE router.

Guidelines for MACsec Interface Configuration

Following are the guidelines for configuring MACsec interface:

- Configure different keychains for primary and fallback PSKs.
- We do not recommend to update both primary and fallback PSKs simultaneously, because fallback PSK is intended to recover MACsec session on primary key mismatch.

Procedure

Step 1 Enter the global configuration mode.

Example:

```
RP/0/# configure
```

Step 2 Enter the interface configuration mode.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config)# interface Te0/3/0/1/4
```

Step 3 Apply the MACsec configuration on an interface.

MACsec PSK Configuration

To apply MACsec PSK configuration on an interface, use the following command.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-if)# macsec psk-keychain mac_chain policy mac_policy  
RP/0/(config-if)# exit
```

To apply MACsec configuration on a physical interface without the MACsec policy, use the following command.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config-if)# macsec psk-keychain script_key_chain2  
RP/0/(config-if)# exit
```

Step 4 Commit your configuration.

Example:

```
RP/0/(config)# commit
```

MACsec Policy Exceptions

By default, the MACsec security policy uses **must-secure** option, that mandates data encryption. Hence, the packets cannot be sent in clear-text format. To optionally bypass the MACsec encryption or decryption for Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP) packets, and to send the packets in clear-text format, use the **policy-exception lacp-in-clear** command in macsec-policy configuration mode. This functionality is beneficial in scenarios such as, in a network topology with three nodes, where bundles are terminated at the middle node, whereas MACsec is terminated at the end nodes.

This MACsec policy exception is also beneficial in interoperability scenarios where the node at the other end expects the data packets to be in clear text.

How to Create MACsec Policy Exception

Configuration Example

Using the **policy-exception** command:

```
Router#configure
Router(config)#macsec-policy test-macsec-policy
Router(config-macsec-policy)#policy-exception lacp-in-clear
Router(config-macsec-policy)#commit
```

Running Configuration

With the **policy-exception** command:

```
Router#show run macsec-policy test-macsec-policy
macsec-policy test-macsec-policy
  policy-exception lacp-in-clear
  security-policy should-secure
  include-icv-indicator
  sak-rekey-interval seconds 120
!
```

Associated Commands

- **policy-exception lacp-in-clear**

Verifying MACsec Encryption on IOS XR

MACsec encryption on IOS XR can be verified by running relevant commands in the Privileged Executive Mode. The verification steps are the same for MACsec encryption on L2VPN or L3VPN network.

To verify if MACsec encryption has been correctly configured, follow these steps.

Procedure

-
- Step 1** Verify the MACsec policy configuration.

Example:

```
RP/0/#show macsec policy mac_policy
```

```
=====
Policy      Cipher      Key-Svr      Window  Conf
name        Suite       Priority     Size   Offset
=====
mac_policy  GCM-AES-XP  0            64     30
            N-256
```

If the values you see are different from the ones you configured, then check your configuration by running the **show run macsec-policy** command.

Step 2

Verify the MACsec configuration on the respective interface.

You can verify the MACsec encryption on the configured interface bundle (MPLS network).

Example:

```
RP/0/#show macsec mka summary
```

```
NODE: node0_0_CPU0
```

```
=====
Interface    Status    Cipher Suite    KeyChain
=====
Fo0/0/0/1/0  Secured  GCM-AES-XPN-256 mac_chain
```

```
Total MACSec Sessions : 1
  Secured Sessions : 1
  Pending Sessions : 0
```

```
RP/0/# show macsec mka session interface Fo0/0/0/1/0
```

```
=====
Interface      Local-TxSCI      # Peers      Status      Key-Server
=====
Fo0/0/0/1/0    d46d.5023.3709/0001    1            Secured      YES
```

The **Status** field in the output confirms that the respective interface is **Secured**. If MACsec encryption is not successfully configured, you will see a status such as **Pending** or **Init**.

Run the **show run macsec-policy** command in the privileged executive mode to troubleshoot the configuration entered.

Step 3

Verify whether the interface of the router is peering with its neighbor after MACsec configuration.

Example:

The **#Peers** field in the following output confirms the presence of the peer you have configured on the physical interface, **Fo0/0/0/1/0**. If the number of peers is not reflected accurately in this output, run the **show run** command and verify the peer configuration on the interface.

```
RP/0/#show macsec mka session
```

```
NODE: node0_0_CPU0
```



```

=====
Status: Secured - Secured MKA Session with MACsec

Local Tx-SCI           : 008a.96d6.194c/0001
Local Tx-SSCI         : 2
Interface MAC Address  : 008a.96d6.194c
MKA Port Identifier    : 1
Interface Name        : Hu0/2/0/11
CAK Name (CKN)       : 2111
CA Authentication Mode : PRIMARY-PSK
Keychain              : test1
Member Identifier (MI) : 69B39E87B3CBA673401E9891
Message Number (MN)   : 352
Authenticator         : NO
Key Server            : YES
MKA Cipher Suite      : AES-128-CMAC
Configured MACSec Cipher Suite : GCM-AES-XPN-128
Key Distribution Mode  : SAK

Latest SAK Status     : Rx & Tx
Latest SAK AN         : 0
Latest SAK KI (KN)   : 69B39E87B3CBA673401E989100000001 (1)
Old SAK Status        : FIRST-SAK
Old SAK AN            : 0
Old SAK KI (KN)      : FIRST-SAK (0)

SAK Transmit Wait Time : 0s (Not waiting for any peers to respond)
SAK Retire Time        : 0s (No Old SAK to retire)
Time to SAK Rekey      : 456s
Time to exit suspension : NA

MKA Policy Name       : P12
Key Server Priority    : 20
Delay Protection       : TRUE
Replay Window Size    : 100
Include ICV Indicator  : TRUE
Confidentiality Offset : 0
Algorithm Agility      : 80C201
SAK Cipher Suite       : 0080C20001000003 (GCM-AES-XPN-128)
MACsec Capability      : 3 (MACsec Integrity, Confidentiality, & Offset)
MACsec Desired         : YES

# of MACsec Capable Live Peers      : 1
# of MACsec Capable Live Peers Responded : 1

# of MACSec Suspended Peers         : 0

Live Peer List:
-----
          MI              MN              Rx-SCI              SSCI  KS-Priority
-----
42A78BD6243539E917B8C6B2      290      7061.7bea.1df4/0001      1      20

Potential Peer List:
-----
          MI              MN              Rx-SCI              SSCI  KS-Priority
-----

Suspended Peer List:
-----
          Rx-SCI              SSCI
-----

Peers Status:

```



```

Last Tx MKPDU      : 2021 May 18 13:23:29.588
Peer Count        : 1

RxSCI             : 70617BEA1DF40001
MI                : 42A78BD6243539E917B8C6B2
Peer CAK          : Match
Latest Rx MKPDU   : 2021 May 18 13:23:29.847
    
```

MKA Detailed Status for MKA Session

Status: Active - Marked Peer as Live (Waiting for SAK generation/distribution)

```

Local Tx-SCI      : 008a.96d6.194c/0001
Local Tx-SSCI    : 2
Interface MAC Address : 008a.96d6.194c
MKA Port Identifier : 1
Interface Name    : Hu0/2/0/11
CAK Name (CKN)   : 2000
CA Authentication Mode : FALLBACK-PSK
Keychain         : test1f
Member Identifier (MI) : 8F59AD6021FA3E2D5F9E6231
Message Number (MN) : 350
Authenticator    : NO
Key Server       : YES
MKA Cipher Suite : AES-128-CMAC
Configured MACSec Cipher Suite : GCM-AES-XPB-128
Key Distribution Mode : SAK

Latest SAK Status : Rx & Tx
Latest SAK AN     : 0
Latest SAK KI (KN) : 69B39E87B3CBA673401E989100000001 (1)
Old SAK Status    : FIRST-SAK
Old SAK AN        : 0
Old SAK KI (KN)  : FIRST-SAK (0)

SAK Transmit Wait Time : 0s (Not waiting for any peers to respond)
SAK Retire Time        : 0s (No Old SAK to retire)
Time to SAK Rekey     : 456s
Time to exit suspension : NA

MKA Policy Name      : P12
Key Server Priority   : 20
Delay Protection     : TRUE
Replay Window Size   : 100
Include ICV Indicator : TRUE
Confidentiality Offset : 0
Algorithm Agility    : 80C201
SAK Cipher Suite     : 0080C20001000003 (GCM-AES-XPB-128)
MACsec Capability    : 3 (MACsec Integrity, Confidentiality, & Offset)
MACsec Desired       : YES
    
```

```

# of MACsec Capable Live Peers      : 1
# of MACsec Capable Live Peers Responded : 0

# of MACSec Suspended Peers         : 0
    
```

Live Peer List:

MI	MN	Rx-SCI	SSCI	KS-Priority
1BB9428C721F6EE3E538C942	288	7061.7bea.1df4/0001	1	20

Potential Peer List:

```

          MI                MN                Rx-SCI                SSCI  KS-Priority
-----
Suspended Peer List:
-----
          Rx-SCI                SSCI
-----

Peers Status:
Last Tx MKPDU          : 2021 May 18 13:23:29.587
Peer Count              : 1

RxSCI                  : 70617BEA1DF40001
MI                    : 1BB9428C721F6EE3E538C942
Peer CAK               : Match
Latest Rx MKPDU       : 2021 May 18 13:23:29.847

RP/0/#

```

The **Status** field in the output verifies if the MKA session is secured with MACsec encryption. The output also displays information about the interface and other MACsec parameters.

Step 5 Verify the MACsec session counter statistics.

Example:

```
RP/0/# show macsec mka statistics interface Fo0/0/0/1/0
```

```

MKA Statistics for Session on interface (Fo0/0/0/1/0)
=====
Reauthentication Attempts.. 0

CA Statistics
Pairwise CAKs Derived... 0
Pairwise CAK Rekeys..... 0
Group CAKs Generated.... 0
Group CAKs Received..... 0

SA Statistics
SAKs Generated..... 3
SAKs Rekeyed..... 2
SAKs Received..... 0
SAK Responses Received.. 3

MKPDU Statistics
MKPDUs Transmitted..... 5425
"Distributed SAK".. 8
"Distributed CAK".. 0
MKPDUs Validated & Rx... 4932
"Distributed SAK".. 0
"Distributed CAK".. 0

MKA IDB Statistics
MKPDUs Tx Success..... 5425
MKPDUs Tx Fail..... 0
MKPDUs Tx Pkt build fail... 0
MKPDUs Rx CA Not found..... 0
MKPDUs Rx Error..... 0
MKPDUs Rx Success..... 4932

MKPDU Failures
MKPDU Rx Validation (ICV)..... 0

```

```

MKPDU Rx Bad Peer MN..... 0
MKPDU Rx Non-recent Peerlist MN..... 0
MKPDU Rx Drop SAKUSE, KN mismatch..... 0
MKPDU Rx Drop SAKUSE, Rx Not Set..... 0
MKPDU Rx Drop SAKUSE, Key MI mismatch.. 0
MKPDU Rx Drop SAKUSE, AN Not in Use.... 0
MKPDU Rx Drop SAKUSE, KS Rx/Tx Not Set. 0

SAK Failures
SAK Generation..... 0
Hash Key Generation..... 0
SAK Encryption/Wrap..... 0
SAK Decryption/Unwrap..... 0

```

The counters display the MACsec PDUs transmitted, validated, and received. The output also displays transmission errors, if any.

This completes the verification of MACsec encryption on the IOS-XR.

Verifying MACsec Encryption on NCS 5500

MACsec encryption on the router hardware can be verified by running relevant commands in the Privileged Executive Mode.

To verify if MACsec encryption has been correctly configured, follow these steps.

Procedure

Step 1 Verify the MACsec encryption and hardware interface descriptor block (IDB) information on the interface.

Example:

```

RP/0/# show macsec ea idb interface Fo0/0/0/1/0

IDB Details:
if_sname : Fo0/0/0/1/0
if_handle : 0x3480
Replay window size : 64
Local MAC : 00:1d:e5:e9:aa:39
Rx SC Option(s) : Validate-Frames Replay-Protect
Tx SC Option(s) : Protect-Frames Always-Include-SCI
Security Policy : MUST SECURE
Sectag offset : 8
Rx SC 1
Rx SCI : 001de5e9b1bf0019
Peer MAC : 00:1d:e5:e9:b1:bf
Stale : NO
SAK Data
SAK[0] : ***
SAK Len : 32
HashKey[0] : ***
HashKey Len : 16
Conf offset : 30
Cipher Suite : GCM-AES-XPN-256
CtxSalt[0] : 83 c3 7b ad 7b 6f 63 16 09 8f f3 d2

```

```

Rx SA Program Req[0]: 2015 Oct 09 15:20:53.082
Rx SA Program Rsp[0]: 2015 Oct 09 15:20:53.092

Tx SC
Tx SCI : 001de5e9aa39001a
Active AN : 0
Old AN : 255
Next PN : 1, 0, 0, 0
SAK Data
SAK[0] : ***
SAK Len : 32
HashKey[0] : ***
HashKey Len : 16
Conf offset : 30
Cipher Suite : GCM-AES-XPB-256
CtxSalt[0] : 83 c3 7b ae 7b 6f 63 16 09 8f f3 d2
Tx SA Program Req[0]: 2015 Oct 09 15:20:55.053
Tx SA Program Rsp[0]: 2015 Oct 09 15:20:55.064

```

The **if_handle** field provides the IDB instance location.

The **Replay window size** field displays the configured window size.

The **Security Policy** field displays the configured security policy.

The **Local Mac** field displays the MAC address of the router.

The **Peer Mac** field displays the MAC address of the peer. This confirms that a peer relationship has been formed between the two routers.

Step 2 Use the IDB handle retrieved from Step 1 to verify the platform hardware information.

Example:

```

RP/0/# show macsec platform hardware
idb location 0/0/CPU0 | b 3480

if_handle : 0x00003480
NPPort : 099 [0x063]
LdaPort : 016 [0x010] SerdesPort : 000 [0x000]
NetSoftPort : 061 [0x03d] SysSoftPort : 062 [0x03e]
Active AN : 0x00000000 Idle AN : 0x000000ff
Match-All Tx SA : 0x80010001 Match-All Rx SA : 0x00010001
Match-All Tx Flow : 0x80000003 Match-All Rx Flow : 0x00000003
Bypass Tx SA : 0x80000000 Bypass Rx SA : 0x00000000
Tx SA[0] : 0x80020002 Tx Flow[0] : 0x8000000c
Tx SA[1] : 0xffffffff Tx Flow[1] : 0xffffffff
Tx SA[2] : 0xffffffff Tx Flow[2] : 0xffffffff
Tx SA[3] : 0xffffffff Tx Flow[3] : 0xffffffff
Rx SA[0] : 0x00020002 Rx Flow[0] : 0x0000000c
Rx SA[1] : 0xffffffff Rx Flow[1] : 0xffffffff
Rx SA[2] : 0xffffffff Rx Flow[2] : 0xffffffff
Rx SA[3] : 0xffffffff Rx Flow[3] : 0xffffffff

```

Step 3 Use the Transmitter SA retrieved from Step 2 to verify the MACsec SA information programmed in the hardware.

Example:

```

RP/0/# show macsec platform hardware sa

```

```
0x80020002 interface Fo0/0/0/1/0 location 0/0/CPU0
```

```
MACsec HW SA Details:
Action Type : 0x00000003
Direction : Egress
Dest Port : 0x00000000
Conf Offset : 00000030
Drop Type : 0x00000002
Drop NonResvd : 0x00000000
SA In Use : YES
ConfProtect : YES
IncludeSCI : YES
ProtectFrame : YES
UseEs : NO
UseSCB : NO
SCI : 00 1d e5 e9 aa 39 00 05
Replay Window : 64 MacsecCryptoAlgo : 7
Direction : Egress AN : 0
AES Key Len : 256 X-Packet Number : 0x0000000000000000
CtxSalt : f8d88dc3e1c5e6a94ca2299
```

The output displays the details of the encryption, such as the AES key, the Auth key, and other parameters.

Step 4 Verify the MACsec Secure Channel (SC) information programmed in the hardware.

Example:

```
RP/0/# show macsec platform hardware msc
interface Fo0/0/0/1/0 location 0/0/CPU0
```

```
MACsec HW Cfg Details:
Mode : 0x5
Counter Clear on Read : 0x0
SA Fail Mask : 0xffff
Global SecFail Mask : 0xffffffff
Latency : 0xff
StaticBypass : 0x0
Should secure : 0x0
Global Frame Validation : 0x2
Ctrl Pkt CC Bypass : 0x1
NonCtrl Pkt CC Bypass : 0x1
Sequence Number Threshold : 0xbfffffff8
Sequence Number Threshold 64bit : 0x000002fffffffffd
Non Matching Non Control Pkts Programming
    Untagged : Bypass: 0x0 DestPort : 0x2, DropType : 0x2
    Tagged : Bypass: 0x0 DestPort : 0x2, DropType : 0x2
    BadTagged : Bypass: 0x0 DestPort : 0x2, DropType : 0x2
    KayTagged : Bypass: 0x0 DestPort : 0x2, DropType : 0x2
Non Matching Control Pkts Programming
    Untagged : Bypass: 0x1 DestPort : 0x2, DropType : 0xffffffff
    Tagged : Bypass: 0x0 DestPort : 0x2, DropType : 0x2
    BadTagged : Bypass: 0x0 DestPort : 0x2, DropType : 0x2
    KayTagged : Bypass: 0x0 DestPort : 0x2, DropType : 0x2
```

This completes the verification of MACsec encryption on the router hardware.

This completes the configuration and verification of MACsec encryption.

