



# Implementing Trustworthy Systems

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This chapter describes the key components that form the trustworthy security system in Cisco 8000 Series Routers.

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## Need for Trustworthy Systems

Global service providers, enterprises, and government networks rely on the unimpeded operation of complex computing and communications networks. The integrity of the data and IT infrastructure is foundational to maintaining the security of these networks and user trust. With the evolution to anywhere, anytime access to personal data, users expect the same level of access and security on every network. The threat landscape is also changing, with adversaries becoming more aggressive. Protecting networks from attacks by malevolent actors and from counterfeit and tampered products becomes even more crucial.


Routers are the critical components of the network infrastructure and must be able to protect the network and report on system integrity. A “trustworthy solution” is one that does what it is *expected* to do in a *verifiable* way. Building trustworthy solutions requires that security is a primary design consideration. Routers that constitute trustworthy systems are a function of security, and trust is about preventing as well as knowing whether systems have been tampered with.

In trustworthy systems, trust starts at the lowest levels of hardware and is carried through the boot process, into the operating system (OS) kernel, and finally into runtime in the OS.

The main components of implementing a trustworthy system are:

- Enabling trust in hardware with Hardware root-of-trust and secure JTag
- Enabling trust in software with secure boot and secure iPXE
- Enabling and maintaining trust at steady state with SELinux, Secure install, and SSD Encryption

Figure 1: Ecosystem of Trustworthy Systems



Trustworthy systems must have methods to securely measure hardware, firmware, and software components and to securely attest to these secure measurements.

For information on key concepts used in this chapter, see the [Understanding Key Concepts in Security](#).

## Enable Trust in Hardware

Trust in the hardware is enabled through:

### Enable Trust in Hardware

Because software alone can't prove a system's integrity, truly establishing trust must also be done in the hardware using a hardware-anchored root of trust. Without a hardware root of trust, no amount of software signatures or secure software development can protect the underlying system from becoming compromised. To be effective, this root of trust must be based on an immutable hardware component that establishes a chain of trust at boot-time. Each piece of code in the boot process measures and checks the signature of the next stage of the boot process before the software boots.

A hardware-anchored root of trust is achieved through:

- **Anti-counterfeit chip:** All modules that include a CPU, as well as the chassis, are fitted with an anti-counterfeit chip, which supports co-signed secure boot, secure storage, and boot-integrity-visibility. The chip ensures that the device's software and hardware are authentic and haven't been tampered with or modified in any way. It also helps to prevent unauthorized access to the device's sensitive data by enforcing strong authentication and access control policies.
- **Secure Unique Device Identifier (SUDI):** The X.509 SUDI certificate installed at manufacturing provides a unique device identifier. SUDI helps to enable anti-counterfeit checks along with authentication and remote provisioning. The SUDI is generated using a combination of the device's unique hardware identifier (such as its serial number or MAC address) and a private key that is securely stored within the device. This ensures that each SUDI is unique and cannot be easily duplicated or forged. When a device attempts to connect to a network, the network uses the SUDI to authenticate the device, and ensure that it's authorized to connect. This helps to prevent unauthorized access to the network and ensures that only trusted devices are allowed to connect.

- **Secure JTag:** The secure JTAG interface is used for debugging and downloading firmware. This interface with asymmetric-key based authentication and verification protocols prevents attackers from modifying firmware or stealing confidential information. Secure JTAG typically involves a combination of hardware and software-based security measures. For example, it may include the use of encryption and authentication protocols to secure communications between the JTAG interface and the debugging tool. It may also involve the use of access control policies and permissions to restrict access to the JTAG interface to authorized users only.




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**Note** Hardware-anchored root of trust is enabled by default on Cisco 8000 Series routers.

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## Chip Guard

Attacks can come from various sources – starting from the CPUs or ASICs containing Trojan or malware. Sometimes, the chips may have a Trojan in form of an added die in the package assembly.

Cisco's Chip Guard feature mitigates this threat with the use of unique identifiers buried inside the Trusted Anchor module (TAM) devices as a way to identify and track components throughout the lifecycle of products.

During the manufacturing phase, hashes of known good values (KGV) of the components are burnt into the TAM. At every boot of the system, the components are validated by matching their observed values with the KGV of that component present on the TAM.

If the values do not match, the system fails to boot up. In which case, the operator must perform a remote attestation to query the TAM and identify the cause of bootup failure.

## Attestation

Proof of hardware integrity is recorded in the TAM as part of Chip Guard. This proof is made available through the following commands:




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**Note** The same data is also available through NETCONF for a remote attestation server: Cisco-IOS-XR-remote-attestation-act.yang.

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```
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios# show platform security ?
attest Attest the information
health Match and report any inconsistencies in secure variables across nodes
integrity System Integrity
tam Tam Device Details
variable Show secure variables from secure certificate storage
```

```
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios# show platform security integrity ?
dossier Ask me anything dossier
hardware Fetch System Hardware integrity
log Integrity Logs
```

```
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios# show platform security attest ?
PCR PCR quotes and value
certificate Fetch System Certificates
```

```
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios# show platform security attest PCR ?
WORD PCR register number. Specify multiple PCRs separated by ','
```

```

RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios# show platform security attest PCR 0 ?
location Certificates from which location
trustpoint CiscoSUDI/CiscoAIK to be used for PCR quote
| Output Modifiers

RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios# show platform security attest PCR 0 location ?
0/RP0/CPU0 Fully qualified location specification
WORD Fully qualified location specification
all all locations

RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios# show platform security attest PCR 0 location 0/RP0/CPU0 trustpoint locaion
0/RP0/CPU0 tr
CiscoAIK Cisco AIK Certificate
CiscoSUDI Cisco SUDI Certificate

RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios# show platform security attest certificate ?
CiscoAIK Cisco AIK Certificate
CiscoSUDI Cisco SUDI Certificate

```

## Enable Trust in Software

In Cisco IOS XR7, trust in the software is enabled through:

## Secure Boot


*Table 1: Feature History Table*

Feature Name	Release Information	Feature Description
Secure Boot Status	Release 7.8.1	<p>You can now verify whether the router is securely booted up with an authentic Cisco software image. We have introduced a <b>show</b> command to verify the secure boot status of the router. If the software image was tampered with, then the secure boot fails, and the router does not boot up. Before this release, there was no provision on the router to verify the secure boot status.</p> <p>The feature introduces these:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CLI: <b>show platform security integrity log secure-boot status</b> command.</li> <li>• YANG Data Model: Cisco-IOS-XR-attestation-agent-oper.yang Cisco native model (see <a href="#">GitHub</a>)</li> </ul>

Cisco Secure Boot helps to ensure that the code that executes as part of the software image boot up on Cisco routers is authentic and unmodified. Cisco IOS XR7 platforms support the hardware-anchored secure boot which is based on the standard Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI). This UEFI-based secure boot

protects the microloader (the first piece of code that boots) in tamper-resistant hardware, establishing a root of trust that helps prevent Cisco network devices from executing tainted network software.

**Figure 2: Secure Boot**



The intent of Secure Boot is to have a trust anchor module (TAM) in hardware that verifies the bootloader code. A fundamental feature of secure boot is the barrier it provides that makes it extremely difficult or nearly impossible to bypass these hardware protections.

Secure boot ensures that the bootloader code is a genuine, unmodified Cisco piece of code and that code is capable of verifying the next piece of code that is loaded onto the system. It is enabled by default.

When secure boot authenticates the software as genuine Cisco in a Cisco device with the TAM, the operating system then queries the TAM to verify whether the hardware is authentic. It verifies by cryptographically checking the TAM for a secure unique device identifier (SUDI) that comes only from Cisco.

The SUDI is permanently programmed into the TAM and logged by Cisco during Cisco's closed, secured, and audited manufacturing processes.

### Booting the System with Trusted Software

In Cisco IOS XR7, the router supports the UEFI-based secure boot with Cisco-signed boot artifact verification. The following takes place:

Step 1: At bootup, the system verifies every artifact using the keys in the TAM.

Step 2: The following packages are verified and executed:

- Bootloader (Grand Unified Bootloader (GRUB), GRUB configuration, Preboot eXecution Environment (PXE), netboot)
- Initial RAM disk (Initrd)
- Kernel (operating system)

Step 3: Kernel is launched.

Step 4: Init process is launched.

Step 5: All Cisco IOS XR RPMs are installed with signature verification.

Step 6: All required services are launched.

## Secure iPXE – Secure Boot Over the Network

The iPXE server is an HTTP server discovered using DHCP that acts as an image repository server. Before downloading the image from the server, the Cisco router must authenticate the iPXE server.




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**Note** A secure iPXE server must support HTTPS with self-signed certificates.

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The Cisco router uses certificate-based authentication to authenticate the iPXE server. The router:

- Downloads the iPXE self-signed certificates
- Uses the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP)
- Acquires the root certificate chain and checks if it's self-signed

The root certificate chain is used to authenticate the iPXE server. After successful authentication, a secure HTTPS channel is established between the Cisco router and the iPXE server. Bootstrapper protocol (Bootp), ISO, binaries, and scripts can now be downloaded on this secure channel.

## Verify Secure Boot Status

### Verify Secure Boot Status

Use the **show platform security integrity log secure-boot status** command to verify the secure boot status of the router. If the router boots up securely, then the **show** command output displays the status as *Enabled*. If the router does not support this secure boot verification functionality, then the status is displayed as *Not Supported*.

```
Router#show platform security integrity log secure-boot status
Wed Aug 10 15:39:17.871 UTC

+-----+
| Node location: node0_RP0_CPU0 |
+-----+
Secure Boot Status: Enabled
Router#
```

If the software image was tampered, then the secure boot fails and the router does not come up. The system displays corresponding error logs at various stages of boot up process. For example,

```
Bad signature file...
/initrd.img verification using Pkcs7 signature failed.
error: Security Violation: /initrd.img failed to load.
System halting...
```

## Establish and Maintain Trust at Steady State

Attackers are seeking long-term compromise of systems and using effective techniques to compromise and persist within critical infrastructure devices. Hence, it is critical to establish and maintain trust within the network infrastructure devices at all points during the system runtime.

In Cisco IOS XR7, trust is established and maintained in a steady state through:

## SELinux

Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is a Linux kernel security module that provides a mechanism for supporting access control security policies, including mandatory access controls (MAC).

A kernel integrating SELinux enforces MAC policies that confine user programs and system servers to the minimum amount of privileges they require to do their jobs. This reduces or eliminates the ability of these programs and daemons to cause harm when compromised (for example, through buffer overflows or misconfigurations). This confinement mechanism operates independently of the traditional Linux access control mechanisms. SELinux has no concept of a "root" super-user and does not share the well-known shortcomings of the traditional Linux security mechanisms (such as a dependence on `setuid/setgid` binaries).

On Cisco IOS XR7 software, only Targeted SELinux policies are used, so that only third-party applications are affected by the policies; all Cisco IOS XR programs can run with full root permission.

With Targeted SELinux, using targeted policies, processes that are targeted run in a confined domain. For example, the `httpd` process runs in the `httpd_t` domain. If a confined process is compromised by an attacker, depending on the SELinux policy configuration, the attacker's access to resources and the possible damage that can result is limited.



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**Note** Processes running in unconfined domains fall back to using discretionary access control (DAC) rules.

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DAC is a type of access control defined as a means of restricting access to objects based on the identity of the subjects or the groups (or both) to which they belong.

## Confined and Unconfined Users

Each Linux user is mapped to an SELinux user through an SELinux policy. This allows Linux users to inherit the restrictions placed on SELinux users.

If an unconfined Linux user executes an application, which an SELinux policy defines as an application that can transition from the `unconfined_t` domain to its own confined domain, the unconfined Linux user is subject to the restrictions of that confined domain. The security benefit is that, even though a Linux user is running in unconfined mode, the application remains confined. Therefore, the exploitation of a flaw in the application is limited by the policy.

A confined Linux user is restricted by a confined user domain against the `unconfined_t` domain. The SELinux policy can also define a transition from a confined user domain to its own target confined domain. In such a case, confined Linux users are subject to the restrictions of that target confined domain.

## SELinux Mode

There are three SELinux modes:

- **Enforcing:** When SELinux is running in enforcing mode, it enforces the SELinux policy and denies access based on SELinux policy rules.

SELinux security policy is configured as *enforcing* by default.

- **Permissive:** In permissive mode, the SELinux does not enforce policy, but logs any denials. Permissive mode is used for debugging and policy development.

- Disabled: In disabled mode, no SELinux policy is loaded. The mode may be changed in the boot loader, SELinux config, or at runtime with **setenforce**.

To view security policy mode:

```
[node0_RP0_CPU0:~]$getenforce
Enforcing
```

## Role of the SELinux Policy in Boot Process

SELinux plays an important role during system startup. Because all processes must be labeled with their proper domain, the init process performs essential actions early in the boot process that synchronize labeling and policy enforcement.

After the kernel is loaded during boot, the initial process is assigned the predefined initial SID `kernel_t`. Initial SIDs are used for bootstrapping before the policy is loaded. The init process scans the `/etc/selinux/config` directory for the active policies, such as the targeted policy, and loads the associated file.

After the policy is loaded, the initial SIDs are mapped to security contexts in the policy. In the case of the targeted policy, the new domain is `"user_u:system_r:unconfined_t"`. The kernel begins to get security contexts dynamically from the in-kernel security server.

The init process then re-executes itself so that it can transition to a different domain, if the policy defines it. For the targeted policy, there is no transition defined and the init process remains in the `unconfined_t` domain. At this point, the init process continues with its normal boot process.

## Secure Install

The Cisco IOS XR software is shipped as RPMs. Each RPM consists of one or more processes, libraries, and other files. An RPM represents a collection of software that performs a similar functionality; for example, packages of BGP, OSPF, as well as the Cisco IOS XR Infra libraries and processes.

RPMs can also be installed into the base Linux system outside the Cisco IOS XR domain; however, those RPMs must also be appropriately signed.

All RPMs shipped from Cisco are secured using digitally signed Cisco private keys.

There are three types of packages that can be installed:

- Packages shipped by Cisco (open source or proprietary)
- Customer packages that replace Cisco provided packages
- Customer packages that do not replace Cisco provided packages

## RPM Signing and Validation

RPMs are signed during the build process, when the different RPMs are "constructed" using the packaging instructions of the build process. Any package - process, library, or file - can exist in only one RPM. For example, if BGP is packaged as a separate RPM, then any artifacts related to BGP are present only in the BGP RPM and not, for example, in the Routing RPM.

The install component of the Cisco IOS XR performs various actions on the RPMs, such as verification, activation, deactivation, and removal. Many of these actions invoke the underlying DNF installer. During each of these actions, the DNF verifies the signature of the RPM to ensure that it operates on a legitimate package.



## Third-Party RPMs

The XR Install enforces signature validation using the ‘gpgcheck’ option of DNF. Thus, any Third-Party RPM packages installation fails if done through the XR Install (which uses the DNF). However, Third-Party RPMs can still be installed using the **rpm** command.

## SSD Encryption

*Table 2: Feature History Table*

Feature Name	Release Information	Feature Description
SSD Encryption	Release 7.3.1	This feature enables trust and security in the system’s steady state by encrypting data at the disk level. The encrypted data can be accessed <i>only</i> with a specific key stored in the TAM.

Customers are concerned about the security of sensitive data present on persistent storage media. User passwords are limited in their capability to protect data against attackers who can bypass the software systems and directly access the storage media.

In this case, only encryption can guarantee data confidentiality.

Cisco IOS XR Software introduces SSD encryption that allows encrypting data at the disk level. SSD encryption also ensures that the encrypted data is specific to a system and is accessible *only* with a specific key to decrypt them.

Data that can be encrypted is sensitive information such as, topology data, configuration data, and so on.

Encryption can be achieved through the following:


- DM-Crypt
- CPU with AES-NI support
- CryptSetup

## DM-Crypt

DM-Crypt is a Linux kernel module that provides disk encryption. The module takes advantage of the Linux kernel’s device-mapper (DM) infrastructure. The DM provides a way to create virtual layers of block devices.

DM-crypt is a device-mapper target and provides transparent encryption of block devices using the kernel crypto API. Data written to the block device is encrypted; whereas, data to be read is decrypted. See the following figure.

Figure 3: DM-Crypt Encryption




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## AES-NI Support

Intel's Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions (AES-NI) is a hardware-assisted engine that enables high-speed hardware encryption and decryption. This process leaves the CPU free to do other tasks.

When the input-output operations are started, the read-write requests that are directed at the encrypted block device are passed to the DM-Crypt. DM-Crypt then sends multiple cryptographic requests to the Cryptographic Framework. The crypto framework is designed to take advantage of off-chip hardware accelerators and provides software implementations when accelerators are not available. See the following image.

Figure 4: AES-NI Support



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## CryptSetup

DM-Crypt relies on user space tools, such as `cryptsetup` to set up cryptographic volumes. `Cryptsetup` is a command-line-interface (CLI) tool that interacts with DM-Crypt for creating, accessing, and managing encrypted devices.

## Encrypted Logical Volume

An encrypted logical volume (LV) can be created during software installation

You can activate or deactivate the encrypted disk partition on demand. In addition to being activated, all sensitive files are also migrated from the unencrypted disk partition to the encrypted disk partition. The encrypted files can be migrated back during deactivation.

You can activate the data encryption by using the `disk encryption activate location` command.

The encrypted logical volume capacity is 150MB of disk space and is available as `/var/xt/enc` for applications to access.



**Note** Although applications can choose to use this space for storage, that data is not be part of the data migration if the software image is downgraded to a version that does not support encryption.

## SSD Binding

When encryption is activated on a system, each card generates a random encryption key and stores it in its own secure storage—the Trust Anchor module (TAM). During successive reboots, the encryption key is read from the TAM and applied to unlock the encrypted device. Since each card stores its encryption key locally on the TAM, an SSD that is removed from one card and inserted into another cannot be unlocked by the key stored on that card, thereby making the SSD unusable.

If encryption is activated, the encrypted LV can only be unlocked by using the key stored in the TAM. So, if an encrypted SSD is removed and moved to another line card, the SSD cannot be unlocked. In other words, when you activate encryption, the SSD is bound to the card it is inserted in.

## Data Zeroization

Zeroization refers to the process of deleting sensitive data from a cryptographic module.



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**Note** In case of a Return Material Authorization (RMA), you must *factory reset* the data.

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You can perform zeroization by using the `factory reset location` command from the XR prompt.



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**Caution** Running this command while encryption is activated, deletes the master encryption key from the TAM and renders the motherboard unusable after the subsequent reload.

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## Runtime Defences (RTD)

Run Time Defences (RTD) are a collection of tools used at runtime to mitigate common security vulnerabilities. RTD is classified into three groups:

### Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

ASLR is a technique that stops an attacker from getting access to a vulnerable program function, by preventing the attacker from finding out the memory address of the program function within the running process. To make this possible, ASLR randomly distributes the fundamental parts of the process (like the executable base, stack pointers, libraries, etc.) within the memory address space assigned to it by the operating system. Hence, attackers will never know the exact memory address of the program function and will be unable to exploit it. If they try to exploit by brute force, the process will crash.

### Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR)

Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR) is a technique which is very similar to ASLR but it is applicable at the Linux kernel level. KASLR protects the Linux kernel by randomizing the fundamental parts of the kernel process within the kernel memory when the system boots. This stops an attacker from getting a pointer to the kernel memory distribution table in order to exploit it.

## Built-in Object Size Checker (BOSC)

BOSC is a limited buffer overflow protection mechanism provided by the compiler. BOSC helps in avoiding buffer-overflow related security vulnerabilities on common SafeC library functions such as, `strcpy_s` and `memcpy_s`.

## Executable Space Protection (XSpace)

XSpace mitigates malicious code injection attacks by protecting the data and code portions of the program memory. The basic approach of such attacks is to overflow a buffer in the program stack and cause the transfer of control to injected code. Once in the injected code, the application behaves in an unexpected manner.

X-space ensures that the area of the memory where the authentic code exists is write-protected and the area of memory where the data is present is execution-protected. Illegal execution-attempts in the data-portion or write-attempts in the code-portion results in the application crashing.




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**Note** The XSpace functionality should not disabled at any time.

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## RTD Monitor

The RTD Monitor monitors all RTD functionalities on the router.

## Boot Integrity and Trust Visibility

The secure boot first stage is rooted in the chip and all subsequent boot stages are anchored to the first successful boot. The system is, therefore, capable of measuring the integrity of the boot chain. The hash of each software boot image is recorded before it is launched. These integrity records are protected by the TAM. The boot chain integrity measurements are logged and these measurements are extended into the TAM.

Use the **show platform boot-integrity [sign [nonce <nonce>] [trustpoint <AIK trustpoint name>]]** command to view the boot integrity and boot-chain measurements.

You can also use `Cisco-IOS-XR-remote-attestation-act.yang` to fetch the boot integrity over the NETCONF protocol.

The command displays both, the integrity log values and the assurance that these values have not been tampered. These measurements include the following parameters:

- Micro loader hash
- Boot loader hash
- Image signing and management key hashes
- Operating system image hash

```
platform-pid string Platform ID
Event log [key: event_number]: Ordered list of TCG described event log
                                that extended the PCRs in the order they
                                were logged
  +-- event_number  uint32 Unique event number of this even
  +-- event_type    uint32 log event type
  +-- PCR_index     uint16 PCR index that this event extended
  +-- digest        hex-string The hash of the event data
```



```

+-----+
Node location: node0_RP0_CPU0
+-----+
TPM Name: node0_RP0_CPU0_aikido
Uptime: 495401
Known-good-digests:
Index value
0 3TDUS9iUDCFX3VkICcOnySOQTPA=
observed-digests:
Index value
0 3TDUS9iUDCFX3VkICcOnySOQTPA=
PCRs:
Index value
15 1Y3uKqNv1UJQUNZQxmZkiuG4blk=
    
```

```

RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios# show platform security integrity hardware digest-algorithm SHA256
trustpoint CiscoAIK nonce 4567 location 0/RP0/CPU0
    
```

```

Sun Jun 21 03:09:43.782 UTC
Nonce: 4567
    
```

```

+-----+
Node location: node0_RP0_CPU0
+-----+
TPM Name: node0_RP0_CPU0_aikido
Uptime: 495414
Known-good-digests:
Index value
0 y3n/SsvyNb8g3o7FFRGCZwfbs8EGxvMZg/PeN0NA71k=
observed-digests:
Index value
0 y3n/SsvyNb8g3o7FFRGCZwfbs8EGxvMZg/PeN0NA71k=
    
```

```

PCRs:
Index value
15 oYk8yqzrudIpGB4H++SaV0wMv6ugDSUIuUfeSqbJvbY=
Cisco AIK Certificate used for signing PCR
pcr-quote:
/IRP/ACCG/ltF4HwUjJn7SxCOeA0Gy1rEwACW/AAAAB1AAEF/////AQAAQAAWAAAAQAAWAgel8QYeG6SZU0Ner8VbmgQWCOEhig=
pcr-quote-signature:
q8h0y0MGp+DrzE9qEhKz0K5yK2h/Qzmm0y/IR6/yZ9dYj+eS8s+8E8s/WQzRbHdCVmgN6KUSjJm7YwLdG1Uj7b8G4h+amk3UgDw0P2N=
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios#show platform security integrity hardware digest-algorithm$
Sun Jun 21 03:09:56.794 UTC
Nonce: 4567
    
```

```

+-----+
Node location: node0_RP0_CPU0
+-----+
TPM Name: node0_RP0_CPU0_aikido
Uptime: 495427
Known-good-digests:
Index value
0 3TDUS9iUDCFX3VkICcOnySOQTPA=
observed-digests:
Index value
0 3TDUS9iUDCFX3VkICcOnySOQTPA=
PCRs:
Index value
15 1Y3uKqNv1UJQUNZQxmZkiuG4blk=
    
```

```

RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios#
    
```



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**Note** Use the **show platform security tam** command to view the TAM device details.

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Boot integrity verification consists of the following steps:

1. Report Boot 0 version and look up the expected integrity value for this platform and version.
2. Report bootloader version and look up the expected integrity value for this platform and version.
3. Report OS version and look up the expected integrity value for this platform and version.
4. Using the integrity values obtained from steps 1-3, compute the expected PCR 0 and PCR 8 values
5. Compare the expected PCR values against the actual PCR values.
6. Verify the nonced signature to ensure the liveness of the response data.
7. (Optional) Verify the software image (IOS XR) version is with what is expected to be installed on this platform.

A failure of any of the above steps indicates either a compromised system or an incomplete integrity value database.

## Secure gRPC

gRPC (gRPC Remote Procedure Calls) is an open source remote procedure call (RPC) system that provides features such as, authentication, bidirectional streaming and flow control, blocking or nonblocking bindings, and cancellation and timeouts. For more information, see <https://opensource.google.com/projects/grpc>.

TLS (Transport Layer Security) is a cryptographic protocol that provides end-to-end communications security over networks. It prevents eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

In Cisco IOS XR7, by default, TLS is enabled in gRPC to provide a secure connection between the client and server.

## Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)

The goals of the Linux kernel integrity subsystem are to:

- detect whether files are accidentally or maliciously altered, both remotely and locally
- measure the file by calculating the hash of the file content
- appraise a file's measurement against a known good value stored as an extended attribute
- enforce local file integrity



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**Note** These goals are complementary to the Mandatory Access Control (MAC) protections provided by SELinux.

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IMA maintains a runtime measurement list and—because it is also anchored in the hardware Trusted Anchor module (TAM)—an aggregate integrity value over this list. The benefit of anchoring the aggregate integrity value in the TAM is that the measurement list cannot be compromised by any software attack without being



detectable. As a result, on a trusted boot system, IMA-measurement can be used to attest to the system's runtime integrity.

For more information about IMA, download the IMA whitepaper, [An Overview of The Linux Integrity Subsystem](#).

## IMA Signatures

The IMA appraisal provides local integrity, validation, and enforcement of the measurement against a known good value stored as an extended attribute—`security.ima`. The method for validating file data integrity is based on a digital signature, which in addition to providing file data integrity also provides authenticity. Each file (RPM) shipped in the image is signed by Cisco during the build and packaging process and validated at runtime using the IMA public certificate stored in the TAM.

All RPMs contain Cisco IMA signatures of the files packaged in the RPM, which are embedded in the RPM header. The IMA signature of the individual file is stored in its extended attribute during RPM installation. This protects against modification of the Cisco RPMs.

The IMA signature format used for IMA can have multiple lines and every line has comma-separated fields. Each line entry will have the filename, hash, and signature as illustrated below.

- File – Filename with the full path of the file hashed and signed
- Hash – SHA256 hash of the file
- Signature – RSA2048 key-based signature

## How Trustworthiness is Implemented

The following sequence of events takes place when the Cisco routers that support IOS XR7 operating system are powered up:

1. At power UP, the micro-loader in the chip verifies the digital signature of BIOS using the keys stored in the TAM. The BIOS signature verification is logged and the measurement is extended into a PCR.
2. The BIOS then verifies the signature of the boot-loader using keys stored in TAM. The boot-loader signature verification is logged and the measurement is extended into the PCR.
3. If the validation is successful, the BIOS launches the bootloader. The bootloader uses the keys loaded by the BIOS to verify the sanctity of the kernel, `initrd` file system, and `grub-config` file. Each verification operation is logged, and the PCR in TAM is extended.
4. The `initrd` is exploded to create the initial file system.
5. The kernel is launched and the kernel keyrings are populated with the appropriate keys from the TAM.
6. Kernel modules are verified. Module verification results are logged and TAM PCR is extended.
7. The `init` process is launched. Whenever an executable or a shared library is invoked, the IMA kernel hook validates the signature using the certificates in IMA keyring, which is then used to validate the signature attached to the file.
8. The Cisco IOS XR7 RPM is installed with the signed verification. The results of RPM verification are logged.
9. Cisco IOS XR7 processes are launched with IMA measurement.

10. TAm services are launched.
11. Cisco IOS XR7 application runs the initial admin user configuration and stores the credentials into TAm secure storage.  
Manual provisioning of user credentials is now complete.

After the sequence is successfully completed, the router is considered trustworthy.

## Understanding Key Concepts in Security

### Attestation

Attestation is a mechanism used to attest the software's integrity. The verifier trusts that the attested data is accurate because it is signed by a TPM whose key is certified by the CA.

### Attestation Identity Key

An Attestation Identity Key (AIK) is a restricted key that is used for signing attestation requests.

### Bootloader

The bootloader is a piece of code that runs before any operating system begins to run. Bootloaders contain several ways to boot the OS kernel and also contain commands for debugging and modifying the kernel environment.

### Certificates and Keys in TAM

All database keys are signed by the KEK. Any update to the keys requires the KEK or PK to sign in, using time-based authentic variables. Some of the keys on the database are:

- Image signing certificate: This is the X.509 certificate corresponding to the public key and is used for validating the signature of grub, initrd, kernel, and kernel modules.
- IOS-XR Key: A public key certificate signed by the KEK. This key is common to all Cisco 8000 Series routers and is used to sign GRUB, initrd, kernel and kernel modules.
- RPM key: Used for signing RPMs.
- IMA public key certificate: Used for Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA), and used to validate the IMA signature of the files.
- BIOS or Firmware Capsule Update key: Used to sign the outer capsule for BIOS or firmware updates. It is the same as the secure boot key.
- Platform key (PK) and Key Enrollment Key (KEK): These are public keys and certificates used to manage other keys in the TAM.
- LDWM Key: In the Cisco IOS XR7, the LDWM key is stored in the hardware trust anchor module and is used for validating the BIOS.

### Golden ISO (GISO)

A GISO image includes a base binary artifact (an ISO) for the Linux distribution that is used on the server fleet, packages, and configuration files that can be used as a base across all servers.

The GISO image for Cisco IOS XR7 software contains the IOS XR RPMs, third-party RPMs, ztp.ini, and secure ZTP certificates .

**GRand Unified Bootloader (GRUB)**

GNU GRUB (or just GRUB) is a boot loader package that loads the kernel and supports multiple operating systems on a device. It is the first software that starts at a system boot.

**Hash Function**

A hash function is any function that is used to map data of arbitrary size onto data of a fixed size.

**Initramfs**

Initramfs, a complete set of directories on a normal root filesystem, is bundled into a single cpio archive and compressed with one of the several compression algorithms. At boot time, the boot loader loads the kernel and the initramfs image into memory and starts the kernel.

**initrd**

initial RAM disk is an initial root file system that is mounted before the real root file system is made available. The initrd is bound to the kernel and loaded as part of the kernel boot procedure.

**JTAG**

JTAG is a common hardware interface that provides a system with a way to communicate directly with the chips on a board. JTAG is used for debugging, programming, and testing on embedded devices.

**Nonce Value**

A nonce value is an arbitrary number that can be used only once in a cryptographic communication. It is a random or pseudo-random number that is issued in an authentication protocol to ensure that the old communications are not reused in replay attacks.

**Platform Configuration Register (PCR)**

PCR is a 256-bit storage location for discrete integrity measurements. It is designed to hold an unlimited number of measurements in the register. It does this by using a cryptographic hash and hashing all updates to a PCR.

**Trust Anchor module (TAm)**

The Cisco Trust Anchor module (TAm) helps verify that Cisco hardware is authentic and provides additional security services.

