Configuring Authorization and Revocation of Certificates in a PKI

This module describes how to configure authorization and revocation of certificates in a public key infrastructure (PKI). It includes information on high-availability support for the certificate server.

Note

Security threats, as well as the cryptographic technologies to help protect against them, are constantly changing. For more information about the latest Cisco cryptographic recommendations, see the Next Generation Encryption (NGE) white paper.

Finding Feature Information

Your software release may not support all the features documented in this module. For the latest caveats and feature information, see Bug Search Tool and the release notes for your platform and software release. To find information about the features documented in this module, and to see a list of the releases in which each feature is supported, see the feature information table.

Use Cisco Feature Navigator to find information about platform support and Cisco software image support. To access Cisco Feature Navigator, go to www.cisco.com/go/cfn. An account on Cisco.com is not required.
Prerequisites for Authorization and Revocation of Certificates

Plan Your PKI Strategy

It is strongly recommended that you plan your entire PKI strategy before you begin to deploy actual certificates.

Authorization and revocation can occur only after you or a network administrator have completed the following tasks:

• Configured the certificate authority (CA).
• Enrolled peer devices with the CA.
• Identified and configured the protocol (such as IP Security [IPsec] or secure socket layer [SSL]) that is to be used for peer-to-peer communication.

You should decide which authorization and revocation strategy you are going to configure before enrolling peer devices because the peer device certificates might have to contain authorization and revocation-specific information.

“crypto ca” to “crypto pki” CLI Change

As of Cisco IOS Release 12.3(7)T, all commands that begin as “crypto ca” have been changed to begin as “crypto pki.” Although the router will still accept crypto ca commands, all output will be read back as crypto pki.

High Availability

For high availability, IPsec-secured Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) must be configured on both the active and the standby routers. For synchronization to work, the redundancy mode on the certificate servers must be set to ACTIVE/STANDBY after you configure SCTP.

Restrictions for Authorization and Revocation of Certificates

• PKI High Availability (HA) support of intra-chassis stateful switchover (SSO) redundancy is currently not supported on all switches running the Cisco IOS Release 12.2 S software. See Cisco bug CSCtb59872 for more information.
• Depending on your Cisco IOS release, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is supported.
Information About Authorization and Revocation of Certificates

PKI Authorization

PKI authentication does not provide authorization. Current solutions for authorization are specific to the router that is being configured, although a centrally managed solution is often required.

There is not a standard mechanism by which certificates are defined as authorized for some tasks and not for others. This authorization information can be captured in the certificate itself if the application is aware of the certificate-based authorization information. But this solution does not provide a simple mechanism for real-time updates to the authorization information and forces each application to be aware of the specific authorization information embedded in the certificate.

When the certificate-based ACL mechanism is configured as part of the trustpoint authentication, the application is no longer responsible for determining this authorization information, and it is no longer possible to specify for which application the certificate is authorized. In some cases, the certificate-based ACL on the router gets so large that it cannot be managed. Additionally, it is beneficial to retrieve certificate-based ACL indications from an external server.

Current solutions to the real-time authorization problem involve specifying a new protocol and building a new server (with associated tasks, such as management and data distribution).

PKI and AAA Server Integration for Certificate Status

Integrating your PKI with an authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) server provides an alternative online certificate status solution that leverages the existing AAA infrastructure. Certificates can be listed in the AAA database with appropriate levels of authorization. For components that do not explicitly support PKI-AAA, a default label of “all” from the AAA server provides authorization. Likewise, a label of “none” from the AAA database indicates that the specified certificate is not valid. (The absence of any application label is equivalent, but “none” is included for completeness and clarity). If the application component does support PKI-AAA, the component may be specified directly; for example, the application component could be “ipsec,” “ssl,” or “osp.” (ipsec=IP Security, ssl=Secure Sockets Layer, and osp=Open Settlement Protocol.)

Note

Currently, no application component supports specification of the application label.

- There may be a time delay when accessing the AAA server. If the AAA server is not available, the authorization fails.

RADIUS or TACACS+ Choosing a AAA Server Protocol

The AAA server can be configured to work with either the RADIUS or TACACS+ protocol. When you are configuring the AAA server for the PKI integration, you must set the RADIUS or TACACS attributes that are required for authorization.

If the RADIUS protocol is used, the password that is configured for the username in the AAA server should be set to “cisco,” which is acceptable because the certificate validation provides authentication and the AAA database is only being used for authorization. When the TACACS protocol is used, the password that is
configured for the username in the AAA server is irrelevant because TACACS supports authorization without requiring authentication (the password is used for authentication).

In addition, if you are using TACACS, you must add a PKI service to the AAA server. The custom attribute “cert-application=all” is added under the PKI service for the particular user or usergroup to authorize the specific username.

**Attribute-Value Pairs for PKI and AAA Server Integration**

The table below lists the attribute-value (AV) pairs that are to be used when setting up PKI integration with a AAA server. (Note the values shown in the table are possible values.) The AV pairs must match the client configuration. If they do not match, the peer certificate is not authorized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AV Pair</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cisco-avpair=pki:cert-application=all</td>
<td>Valid values are “all” and “none.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cisco-avpair=pki:cert-trustpoint=msca</td>
<td>The value is a Cisco IOS command-line interface (CLI) configuration trustpoint label.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**

Users can sometimes have AV pairs that are different from those of every other user. As a result, a unique username is required for each user. The all parameter (within the *authorization username* command) specifies that the entire subject name of the certificate will be used as the authorization username.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AV Pair</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cisco-avpair=pki:cert-serial=16318DB7000100001671</td>
<td>The value is a certificate serial number.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**

The cert-serial AV pair is normally optional. If it is specified, the Cisco IOS router query must be coming from a certificate trustpoint that has a matching label, and the certificate that is authenticated must have the specified certificate serial number.
The cert-lifetime-end AV pair is available to artificially extend a certificate lifetime beyond the time period that is indicated in the certificate itself. If the cert-lifetime-end AV pair is used, the cert-trustpoint and cert-serial AV pairs must also be specified. The value must match the following form: hours:minutes month day, year.

Note Only the first three characters of a month are used: Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec. If more than three characters are entered for the month, the remaining characters are ignored (for example Janxxxx).

CRLs or OCSP Server Choosing a Certificate Revocation Mechanism

After a certificate is validated as a properly signed certificate, a certificate revocation method is performed to ensure that the certificate has not been revoked by the issuing CA. Cisco IOS software supports two revocation mechanisms—certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). Cisco IOS software also supports AAA integration for certificate checking; however, additional authorization functionality is included. For more information on PKI and AAA certificate authorization and status check, see the PKI and AAA Server Integration for Certificate Status section.

The following sections explain how each revocation mechanism works:

What Is a CRL

A certificate revocation list (CRL) is a list of revoked certificates. The CRL is created and digitally signed by the CA that originally issued the certificates. The CRL contains dates for when each certificate was issued and when it expires.

CAs publish new CRLs periodically or when a certificate for which the CA is responsible has been revoked. By default, a new CRL is downloaded after the currently cached CRL expires. An administrator may also configure the duration for which CRLs are cached in router memory or disable CRL caching completely. The CRL caching configuration applies to all CRLs associated with a trustpoint.

When the CRL expires, the router deletes it from its cache. A new CRL is downloaded when a certificate is presented for verification; however, if a newer version of the CRL that lists the certificate under examination is on the server but the router is still using the CRL in its cache, the router does not know that the certificate has been revoked. The certificate passes the revocation check even though it should have been denied.

When a CA issues a certificate, the CA can include in the certificate the CRL distribution point (CDP) for that certificate. Cisco IOS client devices use CDPs to locate and load the correct CRL. The Cisco IOS client supports multiple CDPs, but the Cisco IOS CA currently supports only one CDP; however, third-party vendor CAs may support multiple CDPs or different CDPs per certificate. If a CDP is not specified in the certificate, the client device uses the default Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) method to retrieve the CRL. (The CDP location can be specified through the cdp-url command.)

When implementing CRLs, you should consider the following design considerations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AV Pair</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cisco-avpair=pki:cert-lifetime-end=1:00 jan 1, 2003</td>
<td>The cert-lifetime-end AV pair is available to artificially extend a certificate lifetime beyond the time period that is indicated in the certificate itself. If the cert-lifetime-end AV pair is used, the cert-trustpoint and cert-serial AV pairs must also be specified. The value must match the following form: hours:minutes month day, year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note</td>
<td>Only the first three characters of a month are used: Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec. If more than three characters are entered for the month, the remaining characters are ignored (for example Janxxxx).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• CRL lifetimes and the security association (SA) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) lifetimes.

• The CRL lifetime determines the length of time between CA-issued updates to the CRL. The default CRL lifetime value, which is 168 hours [1 week], can be changed through the `lifetime crl` command.

• The method of the CDP determines how the CRL is retrieved; some possible choices include HTTP, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), SCEP, or TFTP. HTTP, TFTP, and LDAP are the most commonly used methods. Although Cisco IOS software defaults to SCEP, an HTTP CDP is recommended for large installations using CRLs because HTTP can be made highly scalable.

• The location of the CDP determines from where the CRL is retrieved; for example, you can specify the server and file path from which to retrieve the CRL.

### Querying All CDPs During Revocation Check

When a CDP server does not respond to a request, the Cisco IOS software reports an error, which may result in the peer’s certificate being rejected. To prevent a possible certificate rejection and if there are multiple CDPs in a certificate, the Cisco IOS software will attempt to use the CDPs in the order in which they appear in the certificate. The router will attempt to retrieve a CRL using each CDP URL or directory specification. If an error occurs using a CDP, an attempt will be made using the next CDP.

**Note**

Prior to Cisco IOS Release 12.3(7)T, the Cisco IOS software makes only one attempt to retrieve the CRL, even when the certificate contains more than one CDP.

**Tip**

Although the Cisco IOS software will make every attempt to obtain the CRL from one of the indicated CDPs, it is recommended that you use an HTTP CDP server with high-speed redundant HTTP servers to avoid application timeouts because of slow CDP responses.

### What Is OCSP

OCSP is an online mechanism that is used to determine certificate validity and provides the following flexibility as a revocation mechanism:

• OCSP can provide real-time certificate status checking.

• OCSP allows the network administrator to specify a central OCSP server, which can service all devices within a network.

• OCSP also allows the network administrator the flexibility to specify multiple OCSP servers, either per client certificate or per group of client certificates.

• OCSP server validation is usually based on the root CA certificate or a valid subordinate CA certificate, but may also be configured so that external CA certificates or self-signed certificates may be used. Using external CA certificates or self-signed certificates allows the OCSP servers certificate to be issued and validated from an alternative PKI hierarchy.

A network administrator can configure an OCSP server to collect and update CRLs from different CA servers. The devices within the network can rely on the OCSP server to check the certificate status without retrieving and caching each CRL for every peer. When peers have to check the revocation status of a certificate, they send a query to the OCSP server that includes the serial number of the certificate in question and an optional
unique identifier for the OCSP request, or a nonce. The OCSP server holds a copy of the CRL to determine if the CA has listed the certificate as being revoked; the server then responds to the peer including the nonce. If the nonce in the response from the OCSP server does not match the original nonce sent by the peer, the response is considered invalid and certificate verification fails. The dialog between the OCSP server and the peer consumes less bandwidth than most CRL downloads.

If the OCSP server is using a CRL, CRL time limitations will be applicable; that is, a CRL that is still valid might be used by the OCSP server although a new CRL has been issued by the CRL containing additional certificate revocation information. Because fewer devices are downloading the CRL information on a regular basis, you can decrease the CRL lifetime value or configure the OCSP server not to cache the CRL. For more information, check your OCSP server documentation.

**When to Use an OCSP Server**

OCSP may be more appropriate than CRLs if your PKI has any of the following characteristics:

- Real-time certificate revocation status is necessary. CRLs are updated only periodically and the latest CRL may not always be cached by the client device. For example, if a client does not yet have the latest CRL cached and a newly revoked certificate is being checked, that revoked certificate will successfully pass the revocation check.

- There are a large number of revoked certificates or multiple CRLs. Caching a large CRL consumes large portions of Cisco IOS memory and may reduce resources available to other processes.

- CRLs expire frequently, causing the CDP to handle a larger load of CRLs.

**Note**

As of Cisco IOS Release 12.4(9)T or later, an administrator may configure CRL caching, either by disabling CRL caching completely or setting a maximum lifetime for a cached CRL per trustpoint.

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**When to Use Certificate-Based ACLs for Authorization or Revocation**

Certificates contain several fields that are used to determine whether a device or user is authorized to perform a specified action.

Because certificate-based ACLs are configured on the device, they do not scale well for large numbers of ACLs; however, certificate-based ACLs do provide very granular control of specific device behavior. Certificate-based ACLs are also leveraged by additional features to help determine when PKI components such as revocation, authorization, or a trustpoint should be used. They provide a general mechanism allowing users to select a specific certificate or a group of certificates that are being validated for either authorization or additional processing.

Certificate-based ACLs specify one or more fields within the certificate and an acceptable value for each specified field. You can specify which fields within a certificate should be checked and which values those fields may or may not have.

There are six logical tests for comparing the field with the value—equal, not equal, contains, does not contain, less than, and greater than or equal. If more than one field is specified within a single certificate-based ACL, the tests of all of the fields within the ACL must succeed to match the ACL. The same field may be specified multiple times within the same ACL. More than one ACL may be specified, and ACL will be processed in turn until a match is found or all of the ACLs have been processed.
Ignore Revocation Checks Using a Certificate-Based ACL

Certificate-based ACLs can be configured to instruct your router to ignore the revocation check and expired certificates of a valid peer. Thus, a certificate that meets the specified criteria can be accepted regardless of the validity period of the certificate, or if the certificate meets the specified criteria, revocation checking does not have to be performed. You can also use a certificate-based ACL to ignore the revocation check when the communication with a AAA server is protected with a certificate.

Ignoring Revocation Lists

To allow a trustpoint to enforce CRLs except for specific certificates, enter the `match certificate` command with the `skip revocation-check` keyword. This type of enforcement is most useful in a hub-and-spoke configuration in which you also want to allow direct spoke-to-spoke connections. In pure hub-and-spoke configurations, all spokes connect only to the hub, so CRL checking is necessary only on the hub. For one spoke to communicate directly with another spoke, the `match certificate` command with the `skip revocation-check` keyword can be used for neighboring peer certificates instead of requiring a CRL on each spoke.

Ignoring Expired Certificates

To configure your router to ignore expired certificates, enter the `match certificate` command with the `allow expired-certificate` keyword. This command has the following purposes:

- If the certificate of a peer has expired, this command may be used to “allow” the expired certificate until the peer can obtain a new certificate.

- If your router clock has not yet been set to the correct time, the certificate of a peer will appear to be not yet valid until the clock is set. This command may be used to allow the certificate of the peer even though your router clock is not set.

**Note**

If Network Time Protocol (NTP) is available only via the IPSec connection (usually via the hub in a hub-and-spoke configuration), the router clock can never be set. The tunnel to the hub cannot be “brought up” because the certificate of the hub is not yet valid.

- “Expired” is a generic term for a certificate that is expired or that is not yet valid. The certificate has a start and end time. An expired certificate, for purposes of the ACL, is one for which the current time of the router is outside the start and end times specified in the certificate.

Skipping the AAA Check of the Certificate

If the communication with an AAA server is protected with a certificate, and you want to skip the AAA check of the certificate, use the `match certificate` command with the `skip authorization-check` keyword. For example, if a virtual private network (VPN) tunnel is configured so that all AAA traffic goes over that tunnel, and the tunnel is protected with a certificate, you can use the `match certificate` command with the `skip authorization-check` keyword to skip the certificate check so that the tunnel can be established.

The `match certificate` command and the `skip authorization-check` keyword should be configured after PKI integration with an AAA server is configured.
If the AAA server is available only via an IPSec connection, the AAA server cannot be contacted until after the IPSec connection is established. The IPSec connection cannot be “brought up” because the certificate of the AAA server is not yet valid.

**PKI Certificate Chain Validation**

A certificate chain establishes a sequence of trusted certificates -- from a peer certificate to the root CA certificate. Within a PKI hierarchy, all enrolled peers can validate the certificate of one another if the peers share a trusted root CA certificate or a common subordinate CA. Each CA corresponds to a trustpoint.

When a certificate chain is received from a peer, the default processing of a certificate chain path continues until the first trusted certificate, or trustpoint, is reached. In Cisco IOS Release 12.4(6)T and later releases, an administrator may configure the level to which a certificate chain is processed on all certificates including subordinate CA certificates.

Configuring the level to which a certificate chain is processed allows for the reauthentication of trusted certificates, the extension of a trusted certificate chain, and the completion of a certificate chain that contains a gap.

**Reauthentication of Trusted Certificates**

The default behavior is for the router to remove any trusted certificates from the certificate chain sent by the peer before the chain is validated. An administrator may configure certificate chain path processing so that the router does not remove CA certificates that are already trusted before chain validation, so that all certificates in the chain are re-authenticated for the current session.

**Extending the Trusted Certificate Chain**

The default behavior is for the router to use its trusted certificates to extend the certificate chain if there are any missing certificates in the certificate chain sent by the peer. The router will validate only certificates in the chain sent by the peer. An administrator may configure certificate chain path processing so that the certificates in the peer’s certificate chain and the router’s trusted certificates are validated to a specified point.

**Completing Gaps in a Certificate Chain**

An administrator may configure certificate chain processing so that if there is a gap in the configured Cisco IOS trustpoint hierarchy, certificates sent by the peer can be used to complete the set of certificates to be validated.

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**Note**

If the trustpoint is configured to require parent validation and the peer does not provide the full certificate chain, the gap cannot be completed and the certificate chain is rejected and invalid.

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**Note**

It is a configuration error if the trustpoint is configured to require parent validation and there is no parent trustpoint configured. The resulting certificate chain gap cannot be completed and the subordinate CA certificate cannot be validated. The certificate chain is invalid.
How to Configure Authorization and Revocation of Certificates for Your PKI

Configuring PKI Integration with a AAA Server

Perform this task to generate a AAA username from the certificate presented by the peer and specify which fields within a certificate should be used to build the AAA database username.

The following restrictions should be considered when using the `all` keyword as the subject name for the `authorization username` command:

- Some AAA servers limit the length of the username (for example, to 64 characters). As a result, the entire certificate subject name cannot be longer than the limitation of the server.

- Some AAA servers limit the available character set that may be used for the username (for example, a space [ ] and an equal sign [=] may not be acceptable). You cannot use the `all` keyword for a AAA server having such a character-set limitation.

- The `subject-name` command in the trustpoint configuration may not always be the final AAA subject name. If the fully qualified domain name (FQDN), serial number, or IP address of the router are included in a certificate request, the subject name field of the issued certificate will also have these components. To turn off the components, use the `fqdn`, `serial-number`, and `ip-address` commands with the `none` keyword.

- CA servers sometimes change the requested subject name field when they issue a certificate. For example, CA servers of some vendors switch the relative distinguished names (RDNs) in the requested subject names to the following order: CN, OU, O, L, ST, and C. However, another CA server might append the configured LDAP directory root (for example, O=cisco.com) to the end of the requested subject name.

- Depending on the tools you choose for displaying a certificate, the printed order of the RDNs in the subject name could be different. Cisco IOS software always displays the least significant RDN first, but other software, such as Open Source Secure Socket Layer (OpenSSL), does the opposite. Therefore, if you are configuring a AAA server with a full distinguished name (DN) (subject name) as the corresponding username, ensure that the Cisco IOS software style (that is, with the least significant RDN first) is used.

or

```
radius-server host  hostname [ key  string]
```

SUMMARY STEPS

1. `enable`
2. `configure terminal`
3. `aaa new-model`
4. `aaa authorization network  listname [method]`
5. `crypto pki trustpoint  name`
6. `enrollment [mode] [retry period minutes] [retry count number] url url [pem]`


### DETAILED STEPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command or Action</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>enable</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Example:.Router> enable | Enables privileged EXEC mode.  
  • Enter your password if prompted. |
| **Step 2**        | **configure terminal** |
| Example:.Router# configure terminal | Enters global configuration mode. |
| **Step 3**        | **aaa new-model** |
| Example:.Router(config)# aaa new-model | Enables the AAA access control model. |
| **Step 4**        | **aaa authorization network listname [method]** |
| Example:.Router (config)# aaa authorization network maxaaa group tacacs+ | Sets the parameters that restrict user access to a network.  
  • *method* --Can be *group radius*, *group tacacs+*, or *group group-name*. |
| **Step 5**        | **crypto pki trustpoint name** |
| Example:.Router (config)# crypto pki trustpoint msca | Declares the trustpoint and a given name and enters ca-trustpoint configuration mode. |
| **Step 6**        | **enrollment [mode] [retry period minutes] [retry count number] url [url] [pem]** |
| Example:.Router (ca-trustpoint)# enrollment url http://caserver.myexample.com  
  - or-  
  Router (ca-trustpoint)# enrollment url http://[2001:DB8:1:1::1]:80 | Specifies the following enrollment parameters of the CA:  
  • (Optional) The **mode** keyword specifies the registration authority (RA) mode, if your CA system provides an RA. By default, RA mode is disabled.  
  • (Optional) The **retry period** keyword and **minutes** argument specifies the period, in minutes, in which the router waits before sending the CA another certificate request. Valid values are from 1 to 60. The default is 1.  
  • (Optional) The **retry count** keyword and **number** argument specifies the number of times a router will resend a certificate request when it does not receive... |
### Command or Action

### Purpose

- a response from the previous request. Valid values are from 1 to 100. The default is 10.

- The `url` argument is the URL of the CA to which your router should send certificate requests.

**Note** With the introduction of Cisco IOS Release 15.2(1)T, an IPv6 address can be added to the `http` enrolment method. For example: `http://[ipv6-address]:80`. The IPv6 address must be enclosed in brackets in the URL. See the Command Reference document for more information on the other enrollment methods that can be used.

- (Optional) The `pem` keyword adds privacy-enhanced mail (PEM) boundaries to the certificate request.

### Step 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>revocation-check method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Example:

```
Router (ca-trustpoint)# revocation-check crl
```

(Optional) Checks the revocation status of a certificate.

### Step 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>exit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Example:

```
Router (ca-trustpoint)# exit
```

Exits ca-trustpoint configuration mode and returns to global configuration mode.

### Step 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>authorization username  subjectname subjectname</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Example:

```
Router (config)# authorization username subjectname serialnumber
```

Sets parameters for the different certificate fields that are used to build the AAA username.

The `subjectname` argument can be any of the following:

- `all` --Entire distinguished name (subject name) of the certificate.
- `commonname` --Certification common name.
- `country` --Certificate country.
- `email` --Certificate e-mail.
- `ipaddress` --Certificate IP address.
- `locality` --Certificate locality.
- `organization` --Certificate organization.
- `organizationalunit` --Certificate organizational unit.
- `postalcode` --Certificate postal code.
- `serialnumber` --Certificate serial number.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command or Action</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• state --Certificate state field.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• streetaddress --Certificate street address.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• title --Certificate title.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• unstructuredname --Certificate unstructured name.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Step 10**

authorization list  

Example:

Route (config)# authorization list maxaaa

**Step 11**

tacacs-server host  

Example:

Router(config)# tacacs-server host 192.0.2.2 key a_secret_key

or

radius-server host hostname [key string]

Example:

Router(config)# radius-server host 192.0.2.1 key another_secret_key

---

**Troubleshooting Tips**

To display debug messages for the trace of interaction (message type) between the CA and the router, use the `debug crypto pki transactions` command. (See the sample output, which shows a successful PKI integration with AAA server exchange and a failed PKI integration with AAA server exchange.)

**Successful Exchange**

Router# debug crypto pki transactions
Apr 22 23:15:03.695: CRYPTO_PKI: Found a issuer match
Apr 22 23:15:03.955: CRYPTO_PKI: cert revocation status unknown.
Apr 22 23:15:03.955: CRYPTO_PKI: Certificate validated without revocation check

Each line that shows “CRYPTO_PKI_AAA” indicates the state of the AAA authorization checks. Each of the AAA AV pairs is indicated, and then the results of the authorization check are shown.

Apr 22 23:15:04.019: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: checking AAA authorization (ipsecca_script_aallist, PKIAAA=1, <all>)
Apr 22 23:15:04.503: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-application" = "all")
Apr 22 23:15:04.503: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-trustpoint" = "CA1")
Apr 22 23:15:04.503: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-serial" = "15DE")
Apr 22 23:15:04.503: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: authorization passed
Apr 22 23:12:30.327: CRYPTO_PKI: Found a issuer match
Failed Exchange

Router# debug crypto pki transactions
Apr 22 23:11:13.703: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: checking AAA authorization =
Apr 22 23:11:14.203: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-application" = "all")
Apr 22 23:11:14.203: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-trustpoint"= "CA1")
Apr 22 23:11:14.203: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-serial" = "233D")
Apr 22 23:11:14.203: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: parsed cert-lifetime-end as: 21:30:00
Apr 22 23:11:14.203: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: cert-lifetime-end is expired

In the above failed exchange, the certificate has expired.

Configuring a Revocation Mechanism for PKI Certificate Status Checking

Perform this task to set up a CRL as the certificate revocation mechanism--CRLs or OCSP--that is used to check the status of certificates in a PKI.

The revocation-check Command

Use the revocation-check command to specify at least one method (OCSP, CRL, or skip the revocation check) that is to be used to ensure that the certificate of a peer has not been revoked. For multiple methods, the order in which the methods are applied is determined by the order specified via this command.

If your router does not have the applicable CRL and is unable to obtain one or if the OCSP server returns an error, your router will reject the peer’s certificate--unless you include the none keyword in your configuration. If the none keyword is configured, a revocation check will not be performed and the certificate will always be accepted.

Nonces and Peer Communications with OCSP Servers

When using OCSP, nonces, unique identifiers for OCSP requests, are sent by default during peer communications with your OCSP server. The use of nonces offers a more secure and reliable communication channel between the peer and OCSP server.

If your OCSP server does not support nonces, you may disable the sending of nonces. For more information, check your OCSP server documentation.

Before you begin

- Before issuing any client certificates, the appropriate settings on the server (such as setting the CDP) should be configured.

- When configuring an OCSP server to return the revocation status for a CA server, the OCSP server must be configured with an OCSP response signing certificate that is issued by that CA server. Ensure that the signing certificate is in the correct format, or the router will not accept the OCSP response. See your OCSP manual for additional information.
• OCSP transports messages over HTTP, so there may be a time delay when you access the OCSP server.
• If the OCSP server depends on normal CRL processing to check revocation status, the same time delay
  that affects CRLs will also apply to OCSP.

---

**SUMMARY STEPS**

1. enable
2. configure terminal
3. crypto pki trustpoint name
4. ocsp url url
5. revocation-check method1 [method2 method3]
6. ocsp disable-nonce
7. exit
8. exit
9. show crypto pki certificates
10. show crypto pki trustpoints [status | label [status]]

---

**DETAILED STEPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command or Action</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong> enable</td>
<td>Enables privileged EXEC mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Router&gt; enable</td>
<td>• Enter your password if prompted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong> configure terminal</td>
<td>Enters global configuration mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Router# configure terminal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 3</strong> crypto pki trustpoint name</td>
<td>Declares the trustpoint and a given name and enters ca-trustpoint configuration mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Router(config)# crypto pki trustpoint hazel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 4</strong> ocsp url url</td>
<td>The url argument specifies the URL of an OCSP server so that the trustpoint can check the certificate status. This URL overrides the URL of the OCSP server (if one exists) in the Authority Info Access (AIA) extension of the certificate. All certificates associated with a configured trustpoint are checked by the OCSP server. The URL can be a hostname, IPv4 address, or an IPv6 address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Router(ca-trustpoint)# ocsp url <a href="http://ocsp-server">http://ocsp-server</a></td>
<td>- or -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Router(ca-trustpoint)# ocsp url <a href="http://10.10.10.1:80">http://10.10.10.1:80</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Configuring Certificate Authorization and Revocation Settings

Perform this task to specify a certificate-based ACL, to ignore revocation checks or expired certificates, to manually override the default CDP location, to manually override the OCSP server setting, to configure CRL caching, or to set session acceptance or rejection based on a certificate serial number, as appropriate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command or Action</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- or -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Router(ca-trustpoint)# ocsp url http://[2001DB8:1:1:2]:80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Step 5

**revocation-check method1 [method2 method3]**

Example:

```
Router(ca-trustpoint)# revocation-check ocsp none
```

Checks the revocation status of a certificate.

- **crl** -- Certificate checking is performed by a CRL. This is the default option.
- **none** -- Certificate checking is ignored.
- **ocsp** -- Certificate checking is performed by an OCSP server.

If a second and third method are specified, each method will be used only if the previous method returns an error, such as a server being down.

### Step 6

**ocsp disable-nonce**

Example:

```
Router(ca-trustpoint)# ocsp disable-nonce
```

(Optional) Specifies that a nonce, or an OCSP request unique identifier, will not be sent during peer communications with the OCSP server.

### Step 7

**exit**

Example:

```
Router(ca-trustpoint)# exit
```

Returns to global configuration mode.

### Step 8

**exit**

Example:

```
Router(config)# exit
```

Returns to privileged EXEC mode.

### Step 9

**show crypto pki certificates**

Example:

```
Router# show crypto pki certificates
```

(Optional) Displays information about your certificates.

### Step 10

**show crypto pki trustpoints [status | label [status]]**

Example:

```
Router# show crypto pki trustpoints
```

Displays information about the trustpoint configured in router.
Configuring Certificate-Based ACLs to Ignore Revocation Checks

To configure your router to use certificate-based ACLs to ignore revocation checks and expired certificates, perform the following steps:

- Identify an existing trustpoint or create a new trustpoint to be used when verifying the certificate of the peer. Authenticate the trustpoint if it has not already been authenticated. The router may enroll with this trustpoint if you want. Do not set optional CRLs for the trustpoint if you plan to use the `match certificate` command and `skip revocation-check` keyword.

- Determine the unique characteristics of the certificates that should not have their CRL checked and of the expired certificates that should be allowed.

- Define a certificate map to match the characteristics identified in the prior step.

- You can add the `match certificate` command and `skip revocation-check` keyword and the `match certificate command` and `allow expired-certificate` keyword to the trustpoint that was created or identified in the first step.

Certificate maps are checked even if the peer’s public key is cached. For example, when the public key is cached by the peer, and a certificate map is added to the trustpoint to ban a certificate, the certificate map is effective. This prevents a client with the banned certificate, which was once connected in the past, from reconnecting.

Manually Overriding CDPs in a Certificate

Users can override the CDPs in a certificate with a manually configured CDP. Manually overriding the CDPs in a certificate can be advantageous when a particular server is unavailable for an extended period of time. The certificate’s CDPs can be replaced with a URL or directory specification without reissuing all of the certificates that contain the original CDP.

Manually Overriding the OCSP Server Setting in a Certificate

Administrators can override the OCSP server setting specified in the Authority Information Access (AIA) field of the client certificate or set by the issuing the `ocsp url` command. One or more OCSP servers may be manually specified, either per client certificate or per group of client certificates by the `match certificate override ocsp` command. The `match certificate override ocsp` command overrides the client certificate AIA field or the `ocsp url` command setting if a client certificate is successfully matched to a certificate map during the revocation check.

Only one OCSP server can be specified per client certificate.

Configuring CRL Cache Control

By default, a new CRL will be downloaded after the currently cached CRL expires. Administrators can either configure the maximum amount of time in minutes a CRL remains in the cache by issuing the `crl cache delete-after` command or disable CRL caching by issuing the `crl cache none` command. Only the `crl-cache`
delete-after command or the crl-cache none command may be specified. If both commands are entered for a trustpoint, the last command executed will take effect and a message will be displayed.

Neither the crl-cache none command nor the crl-cache delete-after command affects the currently cached CRL. If you configure the crl-cache none command, all CRLs downloaded after this command is issued will not be cached. If you configure the crl-cache delete-after command, the configured lifetime will only affect CRLs downloaded after this command is issued.

This functionality is useful is when a CA issues CRLs with no expiration date or with expiration dates days or weeks ahead.

Configuring Certificate Serial Number Session Control

A certificate serial number can be specified to allow a certificate validation request to be accepted or rejected by the trustpoint for a session. A session may be rejected, depending on certificate serial number session control, even if a certificate is still valid. Certificate serial number session control may be configured by using either a certificate map with the serial-number field or an AAA attribute, with the cert-serial-not command.

Using certificate maps for session control allows an administrator to specify a single certificate serial number. Using the AAA attribute allows an administrator to specify one or more certificate serial numbers for session control.

Before you begin

• The trustpoint should be defined and authenticated before attaching certificate maps to the trustpoint.

• The certificate map must be configured before the CDP override feature can be enabled or the serial-number command is issued.

• The PKI and AAA server integration must be successfully completed to use AAA attributes as described in “PKI and AAA Server Integration for Certificate Status.”

SUMMARY STEPS

1. enable
2. configure terminal
3. crypto pki certificate map label sequence-number
4. field-name match-criteria match-value
5. exit
6. crypto pki trustpoint name
7. Do one of the following:
   • crl-cache none
   • crl-cache delete-after time
8. match certificate certificate-map-label [allow expired-certificate | skip revocation-check | skip authorization-check]
9. match certificate certificate-map-label override cdp {url | directory} string
10. match certificate certificate-map-label override ocsp [trustpoint trustpoint-label] sequence-number
    url ocsp-url
11. exit
12. aaa new-model
### DETAILED STEPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Command or Action</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td><code>enable</code></td>
<td>Enables privileged EXEC mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td>Router&gt; enable</td>
<td>• Enter your password if prompted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td><code>configure terminal</code></td>
<td>Enters global configuration mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td>Router# configure terminal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td><code>crypto pki certificate map label sequence-number</code></td>
<td>Defines values in a certificate that should be matched or not matched and enters ca-certificate-map configuration mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td>Router(config)# crypto pki certificate map Group 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td><code>field-name match-criteria match-value</code></td>
<td>Specifies one or more certificate fields together with their matching criteria and the value to match.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td>Router(ca-certificate-map)# subject-name co MyExample</td>
<td>The <code>field-name</code> is one of the following case-insensitive name strings or a date:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• alt-subject-name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• expires-on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• issuer-name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• serial-number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• subject-name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• unstructured-subject-name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• valid-start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note</td>
<td>Date field format is dd mm yyyy hh:mm:ss or mmm dd yyyy hh:mm:ss.</td>
<td>The <code>match-criteria</code> is one of the following logical operators:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command or Action</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>co</strong> --contains (valid only for name fields and serial number field)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>eq</strong> --equal (valid for name, serial number, and date fields)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ge</strong> --greater than or equal (valid only for date fields)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>lt</strong> --less than (valid only for date fields)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>nc</strong> --does not contain (valid only for name fields and serial number field)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ne</strong> --not equal (valid for name, serial number, and date fields)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The *match-value* is the name or date to test with the logical operator assigned by match-criteria.

**Note** Use this command only when setting up a certificate-based ACL—not when setting up a certificate-based ACL to ignore revocation checks or expired certificates.

**Step 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>exit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Example:

```plaintext
Router(config)# exit
```

Returns to global configuration mode.

**Step 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>crypto pki trustpoint  name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Example:

```plaintext
Router(config)# crypto pki trustpoint Access2
```

Declares the trustpoint, given name and enters ca-trustpoint configuration mode.

**Step 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do one of the following:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>crl-cache none</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>crl-cache delete-after</strong> <em>time</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example:

```plaintext
Router(config)# crl-cache none
```

(Optional) Disables CRL caching completely for all CRLs associated with the trustpoint.

The **crl-cache none** command does not affect any currently cached CRLs. All CRLs downloaded after this command is configured will not be cached.

```plaintext
Router(config)# crl-cache delete-after 20
```

(Optional) Specifies the maximum time CRLs will remain in the cache for all CRLs associated with the trustpoint.

- **time** --The amount of time in minutes before the CRL is deleted.

The **crl-cache delete-after** command does not affect any currently cached CRLs. The configured lifetime will only affect CRLs downloaded after this command is configured.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command or Action</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Step 8** match certificate certificate-map-label [allow expired-certificate | (Optional) Associates the certificate-based ACL (that was defined via the `crypto pki certificate map` command) to a trustpoint.  
- `certificate-map-label` -- Must match the `label` argument specified via the `crypto pki certificate map` command.  
- `allow expired-certificate` -- Ignores expired certificates.  
- `skip revocation-check` -- Allows a trustpoint to enforce CRLs except for specific certificates.  
- `skip authorization-check` -- Skips the AAA check of a certificate when PKI integration with an AAA server is configured. |
| skip] authorization-check | |
| **Example:** | |
| Router(ca-trustpoint)# match certificate Group skip revocation-check | |
| **Step 9** match certificate certificate-map-label override cdp {url | directory} string | (Optional) Manually overrides the existing CDP entries for a certificate with a URL or directory specification.  
- `certificate-map-label` -- A user-specified label that must match the `label` argument specified in a previously defined `crypto pki certificate map` command.  
- `url` -- Specifies that the certificate’s CDPs will be overridden with an HTTP or LDAP URL.  
- `directory` -- Specifies that the certificate’s CDPs will be overridden with an LDAP directory specification.  
- `string` -- The URL or directory specification. |
| **Example:** | |
| Router(ca-trustpoint)# match certificate Group1 override cdp url http://server.cisco.com | |
| **Step 10** match certificate certificate-map-label override ocsp [trustpoint trustpoint-label] sequence-number url ocsp-url | (Optional) Specifies an OCSP server, either per client certificate or per group of client certificates, and may be issued more than once to specify additional OCSP servers and client certificate settings including alternative PKI hierarchies.  
- `certificate-map-label` -- The name of an existing certificate map.  
- `trustpoint` -- The trustpoint to be used when validating the OCSP server certificate. |
| **Example:** | |
| Router(ca-trustpoint)# match certificate mycertmapname override ocsp trustpoint mytp 15 url http://192.0.2.2 | |
**Command or Action** | **Purpose**
--- | ---
| sequence-number -- The order the match certificate override oosp command statements apply to the certificate being verified. Matches are performed from the lowest sequence number to the highest sequence number. If more than one command is issued with the same sequence number, it overwrites the previous OCSP server override setting. | |
| url -- The URL of the OCSP server. | |

When the certificate matches a configured certificate map, the AIA field of the client certificate and any previously issued oosp url command settings are overwritten with the specified OCSP server.

If no map-based match occurs, one of the following two cases will continue to apply to the client certificate.

- If OCSP is specified as the revocation method, the AIA field value will continue to apply to the client certificate.
- If the oosp url configuration exists, the oosp url configuration settings will continue to apply to the client certificates.

**Step 11**

`exit`

**Example:**

```
Router(ca-trustpoint)# exit
```

Returns to global configuration mode.

**Step 12**

`aaa new-model`

**Example:**

```
Router(config)# aaa new-model
```

(Optional) Enables the AAA access control model.

**Step 13**

`aaa attribute list list-name`

**Example:**

```
Router(config)# aaa attribute list crl
```

(Optional) Defines an AAA attribute list locally on a router and enters config-attr-list configuration mode.

**Step 14**

`attribute type name value`

**Example:**

```
Router(config-attr-list)# attribute type cert-serial-not 6C4A
```

(Optional) Defines an AAA attribute type that is to be added to an AAA attribute list locally on a router.

To configure certificate serial number session control, an administrator may specify a specific certificate in the value field to be accepted or rejected based on its serial number where name is set to cert-serial-not. If the serial number of the certificate matches the serial number specified by the attribute type setting, the certificate will be rejected.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command or Action</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>exit</td>
<td>For a full list of available AAA attribute types, execute the <code>show aaa attributes</code> command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 15</td>
<td>Returns to global configuration mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>exit</code></td>
<td>Returns to privileged EXEC mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>show crypto pki certificates</code></td>
<td>(Optional) Displays the components of the certificates installed on the router if the CA certificate has been authenticated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>exit</code></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Example**

The following is a sample certificate. The OCSP-related extensions are shown using exclamation points.

```
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: v3
    Serial Number:0x14
    Signature Algorithm:SHAwithRSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4
    Issuer:CN=CA server,OU=PKI,O=Cisco Systems
    Validity:
      Not Before:Thursday, August 8, 2002 4:38:05 PM PST
      Not After:Tuesday, August 7, 2003 4:38:05 PM PST
    Subject:CN=OCSP server,OU=PKI,O=Cisco Systems
    Subject Public Key Info:
      Algorithm:RSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1
      Public Key:
        Exponent:65537
        Public Key Modulus:(2048 bits) :
        <snip>
    Extensions:
      Identifier:Subject Key Identifier - 2.5.29.14
        Critical:no
        Key Identifier:
        <snip>
      Identifier:Authority Key Identifier - 2.5.29.35
        Critical:no
        Key Identifier:
        <snip>
      !
      Identifier:OCSP NoCheck:- 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.5
        Critical:no
```
Configuring Authorization and Revocation of Certificates in a PKI

Troubleshooting Tips

If you ignored revocation check or expired certificates, you should carefully check your configuration. Verify that the certificate map properly matches either the certificate or certificates that should be allowed or the AAA checks that should be skipped. In a controlled environment, try modifying the certificate map and determine what is not working as expected.

Configuring Certificate Chain Validation

Perform this task to configure the processing level for the certificate chain path of your peer certificates.

Before you begin

- The device must be enrolled in your PKI hierarchy.
• The appropriate key pair must be associated with the certificate.

Note
• A trustpoint associated with the root CA cannot be configured to be validated to the next level.

The `chain-validation` command is configured with the `continue` keyword for the trustpoint associated with the root CA, an error message will be displayed and the chain validation will revert to the default `chain-validation` command setting.

SUMMARY STEPS
1. enable
2. configure terminal
3. crypto pki trustpoint name
4. chain-validation [{stop | continue} [parent-trustpoint]]
5. exit

DETAILED STEPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Command or Action</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>enable</td>
<td>Enables privileged EXEC mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td>Router&gt; enable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>configure terminal</td>
<td>Enters global configuration mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td>Router# configure terminal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>crypto pki trustpoint name</td>
<td>Declares the trustpoint and a given name and enters ca-trustpoint configuration mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td>Router(config)# crypto pki trustpoint ca-sub1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td>chain-validation [{stop</td>
<td>continue} [parent-trustpoint]]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td>Router(ca-trustpoint)# chain-validation continue ca-sub1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Use the <code>stop</code> keyword to specify that the certificate is already trusted. This is the default setting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Use the <code>continue</code> keyword to specify that the the subordinate CA certificate associated with the trustpoint must be validated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The <code>parent-trustpoint</code> argument specifies the name of the parent trustpoint the certificate must be validated against.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Configuration Examples for Setting Up Authorization and Revocation of Certificates

#### Configuring and Verifying PKI AAA Authorization Examples

This section provides configuration examples of PKI AAA authorizations:

**Router Configuration Example**

The following `show running-config` command output shows the working configuration of a router that is set up to authorize VPN connections using the PKI Integration with AAA Server feature:

```plaintext
Router# show running-config
Building configuration...
!
version 12.3
!
hostname router7200
!
aaa new-model
!
aaa authentication login default group tacacs+
aaa authentication login no tacacs enable
aaa authentication ppp default group tacacs+
aaa authorization exec ACSSLab group tacacs+
aaa authorization network ACSSLab group tacacs+
aaa accounting exec ACSSLab start-stop group tacacs+
aaa accounting network default start-stop group ACSSLab
aaa session-id common
!
ip domain name example.com
!
crypto pki trustpoint EM-CERT-SERV
  enrollment url http://192.0.2.33:80
  serial-number
crl optional
rsakeypair STOREVPN 2048
auto-enroll
authorization list ACSSLab
!
crypto pki certificate chain EM-CERT-SERV
certificate 04
  30820214 30820170 A0030201 02020104 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 04050030
  17311530 13060355 0403130C 454D2D43 4552542D 53455256 301E170D 30343031
  31339332 30323535 5A170D30 35303131 38323230 3235355A 3030312E 300E0603
  55040513 07314437 45424434 301C0609 2A864886 F70D0109 02160F37 3230302D
```
Configuring Authorization and Revocation of Certificates in a PKI

Router Configuration Example

312E6772 696C2E63 6F6D3081 9F300D06 092A8648 86F70D01 01010500 03818D00 30818902 818100BD F3B837AA D925F391 2B64DA14 9C2EA031 5A7203C4 92F8D6A8 7D2357A6 BCC8596F A38A9B10 47435626 D59A8F2A 12195BB B5E1AE74 B1AA5AEB 5CA162FF 8C3ACA4F B3EE9F27 8B031642 B618AE1B 40F2E3B4 F966EEF 382C7283 5902A369 2D858561 874AA53F BD4F75EE 3C3EE269 704BD68F FD904043 0F555702 03100001 A3730555 30250603 551D1F04 1E301C30 1AA018A0 16861468 7474703A 2F2F3633 E32347 5E131037 2E933300 B0606551 D0F0404 030205A0 301F0603 551D3040 18301680 420FC4F C0FB15C6 F5BD4C06 8F4D6E7 314A6E21 D1300D06 092A8648 86F70D01 01040500 30818D00 79E97018 FB955108 12F42A56 2A6384BC AC8E22FE F1D6187F DA5D6737 C0E241AC AAAEC75D 3C743F59 08DEFF2B 0B13A737 D79E0FA9 D26DC20D BE2798CD 2C1DC3EC 3B2505A1 3897330C 15A6DS0B 8A13F06D 51043D37 E56E45DF A65F43D7 4E836093 9689784D C45FD61D EC1F160C 1ABCBD03 49FB11B1 DA0BED6C 463E1090 F34C59E4 quit certificate ca 01 30820207 30820170 A003021 02020101 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 04050300 17311530 13060355 0403130C 454D2D43 4552542D 53455526 301E1700 30333132 31363321 34373432 5A170D30 33333132 35323134 3734325A 30173115 30130603 55040313 0C454D2D 43455254 2D534552 5360191F 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 01050003 188D0030 188D001A 188C014D 833641CF D784F516 D6B50C7B 3CB3C9 589223AB 9A070C14 04F74EF2 A8EEEF58 F2F89807 D89E6A1 2C762C69 54A29870 8E7363FF 3CD1991 F5A37CFF 3FDD3DO 9E46C44 A2E34595 C2D0788B E9DE9198 7B33B968 3A9161C0 A8048607 D34B3BC0 64BDC101 161FC103 13C06500 22D6E7B5 7D6C7F13 7E1B515F 32830203 01001A3 63306130 0F060355 1D3101 0F040550 300E6063 51100F01 01FF0404 03020186 301D0603 51100E04 16041420 FC4BFCFB 1C5F58BD 4C060AFD 4E67341A E612D130 1F060355 1D320418 30168014 20FC4BCF 0B1C56F5 BD4C060A FD4E6734 1AE61D21 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 04050001 18810805 D2E836F5 4107116B AD3AC900 CBE84063 5FBA5EB5 BD572026 528BE92E 0F30A02E 1803F2AE AA4C0ED2 0F59180 7B50264F 30442C41 0AF91BCB 78B3C3B5 A0D888E8 E8F36B3D 2441DFD4 DB02AF0C 67D46E5B 3879AA3E 12A8FB1C3 E272BC7B E7461FC 402F2F5CF AA0B439 615A8A5D 6D6DECD 7F9C2C79 3963E363 F2989FB9 795B8A quit 

crypto isakmp policy 10 

cenc aes 
group 14 

crypto ipsec transform-set ISC_TS_1 esp-aes esp-sha-hmac 
crypto ipsec profile ISC_IPSEC_PROFILE_2 
set security-association lifetime kilobytes 530000000 
set security-association lifetime seconds 14400 
set transform-set ISC_TS_1 
ccontroller ISA 1/1 
interface Tunnel0 
description MGRE Interface provisioned by ISC 
bandwidth 10000 
ip address 192.0.2.172 255.255.255.0 
no ip redirects 
ip mtu 1408 
ip nhrp map multicast dynamic 
ip nhrp network-id 101 
ip nhrp holdtime 500 
ip nhrp server-only 
no ip split-horizon eigrp 101 
tunnel source FastEthernet2/1 
tunnel mode gre multipoint
Debug of a Successful PKI AAA Authorization Example

The following `show debugging` command output shows a successful authorization using the PKI Integration with AAA Server feature:

```
Router# show debugging
General OS:
   TACACS access control debugging is on
   AAA Authentication debugging is on
   AAA Authorization debugging is on
Cryptographic Subsystem:
   Crypto PKI Trans debugging is on
Router#
May 28 19:36:11.117: CRYPTO_PKI: Trust-Point EM-CERT-SERV picked up
May 28 19:36:12.789: CRYPTO_PKI: Found an issuer match
May 28 19:36:12.813: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: checking AAA authorization (ACSLab, POD5.example.com, <all>)
May 28 19:36:12.813: AAA/BIND(00000042): Bind i/f
May 28 19:36:12.813: AAA/AUTHOR (0x42): Pick method list 'ACSLab'
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS: processing authorization request id 66
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS: Protocol set to None .....Skipping
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS: Using server 192.0.2.55
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS(00000042)/0/NB_WAIT/203A4628: Started 5 sec timeout
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS(00000042)/0/NB_WAIT: wrote entire 46 bytes request
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS(00000042)/0/READ: read entire 12 header bytes (expect 27 bytes)
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS(00000042)/0/READ: read entire 39 bytes response
May 28 19:36:12.813: TPLUS(00000042)/0/READ: read entire 2 header bytes (expect 27 bytes)
May 28 19:36:12.817: TPLUS(00000042)/0/READ: read entire 39 bytes response
May 28 19:36:12.817: TPLUS(00000042)/0/203A4628: Processing the reply packet
May 28 19:36:12.817: TPLUS: Processing AV cert-application-all
May 28 19:36:12.817: TPLUS: received authorization response for 66: PASS
May 28 19:36:12.817: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-application" = "all")
May 28 19:36:12.817: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: authorization passed
Router#
Router#
May 28 19:36:18.681: %DUAL-5-NBRCHANGE: IP-EIGRP(0) 101: Neighbor 192.0.2.171 (Tunnel0) is up: new adjacency
```
The following `show debugging` command output shows that the router is not authorized to connect using VPN. The messages are typical of those that you might see in such a situation.

In this example, the peer username was configured as not authorized, by moving the username to a Cisco Secure ACS group called VPN_Router_Disabled in Cisco Secure ACS. The router, router7200.example.com, has been configured to check with a Cisco Secure ACS AAA server prior to establishing a VPN connection to any peer.

```
Router# show debugging
General OS:
    TACACS access control debugging is on
    AAA Authentication debugging is on
    AAA Authorization debugging is on
Cryptographic Subsystem:
    Crypto PKI Trans debugging is on

Router#
May 28 19:48:29.837: CRYPTO_PKI: Trust-Point EM-CERT-SERV picked up
May 28 19:48:31.533: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: checking AAA authorization (ACSLab, POD5.example.com, <all>)
May 28 19:48:31.533: AAA/AUTHOR (0x44): Pick method list 'ACSLab'
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS: processing authorization request id 68
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS(00000044)/0/NB_WAIT/203A4C50: Started 5 sec timeout
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS(00000044)/0/NB_WAIT: wrote entire 46 bytes request
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS(00000044)/0/READ: read entire 12 header bytes (expect 6 bytes)
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS(00000044)/0/READ: read entire 18 bytes response
May 28 19:48:31.533: TPLUS(00000044)/0/203A4C50: Processing the reply packet
May 28 19:48:31.537: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: authorization declined by AAA, or AAA server not found.
May 28 19:48:31.537: %CRYPTO-5-IKMP_INVAL_CERT: Certificate received from 192.0.2.55 is bad: certificate invalid
May 28 19:48:41.481: CRYPTO_PKI: Found a issuer match
May 28 19:48:41.505: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: checking AAA authorization (ACSLab, POD5.example.com, <all>)
May 28 19:48:41.505: AAA/AUTHOR (0x45): Pick method list 'ACSLab'
May 28 19:48:41.505: TPLUS: processing authorization request id 69
```
Configuring a Revocation Mechanism Examples

This section contains the following configuration examples that can be used when specifying a revocation mechanism for your PKI:

Configuring an OCSP Server Example

The following example shows how to configure the router to use the OCSP server that is specified in the AIA extension of the certificate:

```
Router(config)# crypto pki trustpoint mytp
Router(ca-trustpoint)# revocation-check ocsp
```

Specifying a CRL and Then an OCSP Server Example

The following example shows how to configure the router to download the CRL from the CDP. If the CRL is unavailable, the OCSP server that is specified in the AIA extension of the certificate will be used. If both options fail, certificate verification will also fail.

```
Router(config)# crypto pki trustpoint mytp
Router(ca-trustpoint)# revocation-check crl ocsp
```

Specifying an OCSP Server Example

The following example shows how to configure your router to use the OCSP server at the HTTP URL “http://myocspserver:81.” If the server is down, the revocation check will be ignored.

```
Router(config)# crypto pki trustpoint mytp
Router(ca-trustpoint)# ocsp url http://myocspserver:81
Router(ca-trustpoint)# revocation-check ocsp none
```
Disabling Nonces in Communications with the OCSP Server Example

The following example shows communications when a nonce, or a unique identifier for the OCSP request, is disabled for communications with the OCSP server:

```
Router(config)# crypto pki trustpoint mytp
Router(ca-trustpoint)# ocsp url http://myocspserver:81
Router(ca-trustpoint)# revocation-check ocsp none
Router(ca-trustpoint)# ocsp disable-nonce
```

Configuring a Hub Router at a Central Site for Certificate Revocation Checks Example

The following example shows a hub router at a central site that is providing connectivity for several branch offices to the central site.

The branch offices are also able to communicate directly with each other using additional IPSec tunnels between the branch offices.

The CA publishes CRLs on an HTTP server at the central site. The central site checks CRLs for each peer when setting up an IPSec tunnel with that peer.

The example does not show the IPSec configuration--only the PKI-related configuration is shown.

**Home Office Hub Configuration**

```
crypto pki trustpoint VPN-GW
enrollment url http://ca.home-office.com:80/certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll
serial-number none
fqdn none
ip-address none
subject-name o=Home Office Inc,cn=Central VPN Gateway
revocation-check crl
```

**Central Site Hub Router**

```
Router# show crypto ca certificate
Certificate
Status: Available
Certificate Serial Number: 2F62BE140000000000CA0
Certificate Usage: General Purpose
Issuer:
cn=Central Certificate Authority
o=Home Office Inc
Subject:
Name: Central VPN Gateway
cn=Central VPN Gateway
o=Home Office Inc
CRL Distribution Points:
http://ca.home-office.com/CertEnroll/home-office.crl
Validity Date:
start date: 00:43:26 GMT Sep 26 2003
end date: 00:53:26 GMT Sep 26 2004
renew date: 00:00:00 GMT Jan 1 1970
Associated Trustpoints: VPN-GW
```

```
CA Certificate
Status: Available
```
Certificate Serial Number: 1244325DE0369880465F977A18F61CA8
Certificate Usage: Signature
Issuer:
  cn=Central Certificate Authority
  o=Home Office Inc
Subject:
  cn=Central Certificate Authority
  o=Home Office Inc
CRL Distribution Points:
  http://ca.home-office.com/CertEnroll/home-office.crl
Validity Date:
  start date: 22:19:29 GMT Oct 31 2002
  end date: 22:27:27 GMT Oct 31 2017
Associated Trustpoints: VPN-GW

**Trustpoint on the Branch Office Router**

crypto pki trustpoint home-office
  enrollment url http://ca.home-office.com:80/certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll
  serial-number none
  fqdn none
  ip-address none
  subject-name eq o=Home Office Inc,cn=Branch 1
  revocation-check crl

A certificate map is entered on the branch office router.

```
Router# configure terminal
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
branch1(config)# crypto pki certificate map central-site 10
branch1(ca-certificate-map)#
```

The output from the show certificate command on the central site hub router shows that the certificate was issued by the following:

cn=Central Certificate Authority
  o=Home Office Inc

These two lines are combined into one line using a comma (,) to separate them, and the original lines are added as the first criteria for a match.

```
Router (ca-certificate-map)# issuer-name co cn=Central Certificate Authority, ou=Home Office Inc
```

!The above line wrapped but should be shown on one line with the line above it.

The same combination is done for the subject name from the certificate on the central site router (note that the line that begins with “Name:” is not part of the subject name and must be ignored when creating the certificate map criteria). This is the subject name to be used in the certificate map.

```
cn=Central VPN Gateway
  o=Home Office Inc
```

```
Router (ca-certificate-map)# subject-name eq cn=central vpn gateway, o=home office inc
```

Now the certificate map is added to the trustpoint that was configured earlier.

```
Router (ca-certificate-map)# crypto pki trustpoint home-office
```
Router (ca-trustpoint)# **match certificate central-site skip revocation-check**
Router (ca-trustpoint)# **exit**
Router (config)# **exit**

The configuration is checked (most of configuration is not shown).

Router# **write term**

> Many lines left out

```plaintext
crypto pki trustpoint home-office
enrollment url http://ca.home-office.com:80/certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll
serial-number none
fqdn none
ip-address none
subject-name o=Home Office Inc, cn/Branch 1
revocation-check crl
match certificate central-site skip revocation-check
```

Note that the issuer-name and subject-name lines have been reformatted to make them consistent for later matching with the certificate of the peer.

If the branch office is checking the AAA, the trustpoint will have lines similar to the following:

```plaintext
crypto pki trustpoint home-office
auth list allow_list
auth user subj commonname
```

After the certificate map has been defined as was done above, the following command is added to the trustpoint to skip AAA checking for the central site hub.

```plaintext
match certificate central-site skip authorization-check
```

In both cases, the branch site router has to establish an IPSec tunnel to the central site to check CRLs or to contact the AAA server. However, without the **match certificate** command and **central-site skip authorization-check (argument and keyword)**, the branch office cannot establish the tunnel until it has checked the CRL or the AAA server. (The tunnel will not be established unless the **match certificate** command and **central-site skip authorization-check** argument and keyword are used.)

The **match certificate** command and **allow expired-certificate** keyword would be used at the central site if the router at a branch site had an expired certificate and it had to establish a tunnel to the central site to renew its certificate.

**Trustpoint on the Central Site Router**

```plaintext
crypto pki trustpoint VPN-GW
enrollment url http://ca.home-office.com:80/certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll
serial-number none
fqdn none
ip-address none
subject-name o=Home Office Inc, cn=Central VPN Gateway
revocation-check crl
```
Trustpoint on the Branch 1 Site Router

Router# show crypto ca certificate
Certificate
  Status: Available
  Certificate Serial Number: 2F62BE14000000000CA0
  Certificate Usage: General Purpose
  Issuer:
    cn=Central Certificate Authority
    o=Home Office Inc
  Subject:
    Name: Branch 1 Site
    cn=Branch 1 Site
    o=Home Office Inc
  CRL Distribution Points:
    http://ca.home-office.com/CertEnroll/home-office.crl
  Validity Date:
    start date: 00:43:26 GMT Sep 26 2003
    end date: 00:53:26 GMT Oct 3 2003
    renew date: 00:00:00 GMT Jan 1 1970
  Associated Trustpoints: home-office

CA Certificate
  Status: Available
  Certificate Serial Number: 1244325DE0369880465F977A18F61CA8
  Certificate Usage: Signature
  Issuer:
    cn=Central Certificate Authority
    o=Home Office Inc
  Subject:
    cn=Central Certificate Authority
    o=Home Office Inc
  CRL Distribution Points:
    http://ca.home-office.com/CertEnroll/home-office.crl
  Validity Date:
    start date: 22:19:29 GMT Oct 31 2002
    end date: 22:27:27 GMT Oct 31 2017
  Associated Trustpoints: home-office

A certificate map is entered on the central site router.

Router# configure terminal
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
Router (config)# crypto pki certificate map branch1 10
Router (ca-certificate-map)# issuer-name co cn=Central Certificate Authority, ou=Home Office Inc
!The above line wrapped but should be part of the line above it.
Router (ca-certificate-map)# subject-name eq cn=Branch 1 Site, o=Home Office Inc

The certificate map is added to the trustpoint.

Router (ca-certificate-map)# crypto pki trustpoint VPN-GW
Router (ca-trustpoint)# match certificate branch1 allow expired-certificate
Router (ca-trustpoint)# exit
Router (config) #exit

The configuration should be checked (most of the configuration is not shown).

Router# write term
!many lines left out
crypto pki trustpoint VPN-GW
  enrollment url http://ca.home-office.com:80/certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll
  serial-number none
fqdn none
ip-address none
subject-name o=Home Office Inc,cn=Central VPN Gateway
revocation-check crl
match certificate branch1 allow expired-certificate
!
!
crypto pki certificate map central-site 10
issuer-name co cn = Central Certificate Authority, ou = Home Office Inc
subject-name eq cn = central vpn gateway, o = home office inc
! many lines left out

The `match certificate` command and `branch1 allow expired-certificate` (argument and keyword) and the certificate map should be removed as soon as the branch router has a new certificate.

**Configuring Certificate Authorization and Revocation Settings Examples**

This section contains the following configuration examples that can be used when specifying a CRL cache control setting or certificate serial number session control:

**Configuring CRL Cache Control**

The following example shows how to disable CRL caching for all CRLs associated with the CA1 trustpoint:

```plaintext
crypto pki trustpoint CA1
  enrollment url http://CA1:80
  ip-address FastEthernet0/0
  crl query ldap://ldap_CA1
  revocation-check crl
  crl-cache none
```

The current CRL is still cached immediately after executing the example configuration shown above:

```
Router# show crypto pki crls
```

CRL Issuer Name:
  cn=name Cert Manager,ou=pki,o=example.com,c=US
LastUpdate: 18:57:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
NextUpdate: 22:57:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
Retrieved from CRL Distribution Point:
  ldap://ldap.example.com/CN=name Cert Manager,0=example.com

When the current CRL expires, a new CRL is then downloaded to the router at the next update. The `crl-cache none` command takes effect and all CRLs for the trustpoint are no longer cached; caching is disabled. You can verify that no CRL is cached by executing the `show crypto pki crls` command. No output will be shown because there are no CRLs cached.

The following example shows how to configure the maximum lifetime of 2 minutes for all CRLs associated with the CA1 trustpoint:

```plaintext
crypto pki trustpoint CA1
  enrollment url http://CA1:80
  ip-address FastEthernet0/0
  crl query ldap://ldap_CA1
  revocation-check crl
  crl-cache delete-after 2
```

The current CRL is still cached immediately after executing the example configuration above for setting the maximum lifetime of a CRL:
Router# show crypto pki crls

CRL Issuer Name:
 cn-name Cert Manager,ou=pki,o=example.com,c=US
 LastUpdate: 18:57:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
 NextUpdate: 22:57:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
 Retrieved from CRL Distribution Point:
 ldap://ldap.example.com/CN=name Cert Manager,O=example.com

When the current CRL expires, a new CRL is downloaded to the router at the next update and the `crl-cache delete-after` command takes effect. This newly cached CRL and all subsequent CRLs will be deleted after a maximum lifetime of 2 minutes.

You can verify that the CRL will be cached for 2 minutes by executing the `show crypto pki crls` command. Note that the NextUpdate time is 2 minutes after the LastUpdate time.

Router# show crypto pki crls

CRL Issuer Name:
 cn-name Cert Manager,ou=pki,o=example.com,c=US
 LastUpdate: 22:57:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
 NextUpdate: 22:59:42 GMT Nov 26 2005
 Retrieved from CRL Distribution Point:
 ldap://ldap.example.com/CN=name Cert Manager,O=example.com

**Configuring Certificate Serial Number Session Control**

The following example shows the configuration of certificate serial number session control using a certificate map for the CA1 trustpoint:

```
crypto pki trustpoint CA1
 enrollment url http://CA1
 chain-validation stop
 crl query ldap://ldap_server
 revocation-check crl
 match certificate crl
 |
 crypto pki certificate map crl 10
 serial-number co 279d
```

If the `match-criteria` value is set to `eq` (equal) instead of `co` (contains), the serial number must match the certificate map serial number exactly, including any spaces.

The following example shows the configuration of certificate serial number session control using AAA attributes. In this case, all valid certificates will be accepted if the certificate does not have the serial number “4ACA.”

```
crypto pki trustpoint CA1
 enrollment url http://CA1
 ip-address FastEthernet0/0
 crl query ldap://ldap_CA1
 crl query ldap://ldap_CA2
 revocation-check crl
 aaa new-model
```

---

**Note**

The following example shows the configuration of certificate serial number session control using AAA attributes. In this case, all valid certificates will be accepted if the certificate does not have the serial number “4ACA.”
aaa attribute list crl
attribute-type aaa-cert-serial-not 4ACA

The server log shows that the certificate with the serial number “4ACA” was rejected. The certificate rejection is shown using exclamation points.

Dec 3 04:24:39.051: CRYPTO_PKI: Trust-Point CA1 picked up
Dec 3 04:24:39.051: CRYPTO_PKI: locked trustpoint CA1, refcount is 1
Dec 3 04:24:39.051: CRYPTO_PKI: unlocked trustpoint CA1, refcount is 0
Dec 3 04:24:39.051: CRYPTO_PKI: locked trustpoint CA1, refcount is 1
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI: validation path has 1 certs
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI: Found a issuer match
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI: Using CA1 to validate certificate
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI: Anticipate checking AAA list:'CRL'
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: checking AAA authorization (CRL, PKIAAA-L1, <all>)
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: pre-authorization chain validation status (0x4)
Dec 3 04:24:39.135: AAA/AUTHOR (0x21): Pick method list 'CRL'
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-application" = "all")
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-trustpoint" = "CA1")!
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: reply attribute ("cert-serial-not" = "4ACA")
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: cert-serial doesn't match ("4ACA" != "4ACA")!
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI_AAA: post-authorization chain validation status (0x7)!
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: CRYPTO_PKI: chain cert was anchored to trustpoint CA1, and chain validation result was: CRYPTO_PKI_CERT_NOT_AUTHORIZED!
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: %CRYPTO-5-IKMP_INVAL_CERT: Certificate received from 192.0.2.43 is bad: certificate invalid
Dec 3 04:24:39.175: %CRYPTO-6-IKMP_MODE_FAILURE: Processing of Main mode failed with peer at 192.0.2.43

Configuring Certificate Chain Validation Examples

This section contains the following configuration examples that can be used to specify the level of certificate chain processing for your device certificates:

Configuring Certificate Chain Validation from Peer to Root CA

In the following configuration example, all of the certificates will be validated--the peer, SubCA11, SubCA1, and RootCA certificates.

crypto pki trustpoint RootCA
enrollment terminal
chain-validation stop
revocation-check none
Configuring Certificate Chain Validation from Peer to Subordinate CA

In the following configuration example, the following certificates will be validated—the peer and SubCA1 certificates.

crypto pki trustpoint RootCA
enrollment terminal
chain-validation stop
revocation-check none
rsakeypair RootCA
crypto pki trustpoint SubCA1
enrollment terminal
chain-validation continue RootCA
revocation-check none
rsakeypair SubCA1

Configuring Certificate Chain Validation Through a Gap

In the following configuration example, SubCA1 is not in the configured Cisco IOS hierarchy but is expected to have been supplied in the certificate chain presented by the peer.

If the peer supplies the SubCA1 certificate in the presented certificate chain, the following certificates will be validated—the peer, SubCA11, and SubCA1 certificates.

If the peer does not supply the SubCA1 certificate in the presented certificate chain, the chain validation will fail.

crypto pki trustpoint RootCA
enrollment terminal
chain-validation stop
revocation-check none
rsakeypair RootCA
crypto pki trustpoint SubCA11
enrollment terminal
chain-validation continue RootCA
revocation-check none
rsakeypair SubCA11

rsakeypair RootCA
crypto pki trustpoint SubCA1
enrollment terminal
chain-validation continue RootCA
revocation-check none
rsakeypair SubCA1
crypto pki trustpoint SubCA11
enrollment terminal
chain-validation continue SubCA1
revocation-check none
rsakeypair SubCA11
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Cisco Support and Documentation website provides online resources to download documentation, software, and tools. Use these resources to install and configure the software and to troubleshoot and resolve technical issues with Cisco products and technologies. Access to most tools on the Cisco Support and Documentation website requires a Cisco.com user ID and password.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cisco.com/cisco/web/support/index.html">http://www.cisco.com/cisco/web/support/index.html</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Feature Information for Certificate Authorization and Revocation

The following table provides release information about the feature or features described in this module. This table lists only the software release that introduced support for a given feature in a given software release train. Unless noted otherwise, subsequent releases of that software release train also support that feature.

Use Cisco Feature Navigator to find information about platform support and Cisco software image support. To access Cisco Feature Navigator, go to www.cisco.com/go/cfn. An account on Cisco.com is not required.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature Name</th>
<th>Releases</th>
<th>Feature Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cache Control Enhancements for Certification Revocation Lists</td>
<td>12.4(9)T</td>
<td>This feature provides users the ability to disable CRL caching or to specify the maximum lifetime for which a CRL will be cached in router memory. It also provides functionality to configure certificate serial number session control. The following commands were introduced or modified by this feature: <code>crl-cache delete-after</code>, <code>crl-cache none</code>, <code>crypto pki certificate map</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate-Complete Chain Validation</td>
<td>12.4(6)T</td>
<td>This feature provides users the ability to configure the level to which a certificate chain is processed on all certificates including subordinate CA certificates. The following command was introduced by this feature: <code>chain-validation</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSP - Server Certification from Alternate Hierarchy</td>
<td>12.4(6)T</td>
<td>This feature provides users with the flexibility to specify multiple OCSP servers, either per client certificate or per group of client certificates, and provides the capability for OCSP server validation based on external CA certificates or self-signed certificates. The following command was introduced by this feature: <code>match certificate override ocsp</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optional OCSP Nonce</td>
<td>12.2(33)SR 12.4(4)T</td>
<td>This feature provides users with the ability to configure the sending of a nonce, or unique identifier for an OCSP request, during OCSP communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate Security Attribute-Based Access Control</td>
<td>12.2(15)T1</td>
<td>Under the IPsec protocol, CA interoperability permits Cisco IOS devices and a CA to communicate so that the Cisco IOS device can obtain and use digital certificates from the CA. Certificates contain several fields that are used to determine whether a device or user is authorized to perform a specified action. This feature adds fields to the certificate that allow specifying an ACL, creating a certificate-based ACL. The following commands were introduced or modified by this feature: <code>crypto pki certificate map</code>, <code>crypto pki trustpoint match certificate</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)</td>
<td>12.3(2)T</td>
<td>This feature allows users to enable OCSP instead of CRLs to check certificate status. Unlike CRLs, which provide only periodic certificate status, OCSP can provide timely information regarding the status of a certificate. The following commands were introduced by this feature: <code>ocsp url</code>, <code>revocation-check</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feature Name</td>
<td>Releases</td>
<td>Feature Information</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI AAA Authorization Using the Entire Subject Name</td>
<td>12.3(11)T</td>
<td>This feature provides users with the ability to query the AAA server using the entire subject name from the certificate as a unique AAA username. The following command was modified by this feature: <code>authorization username</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI Integration with AAA Server</td>
<td>12.3(1)</td>
<td>This feature provides additional scalability for authorization by generating a AAA username from the certificate presented by the peer. A AAA server is queried to determine whether the certificate is authorized for use by the internal component. The authorization is indicated by a component-specified label that must be present in the AV pair for the user. The following commands were introduced by this feature: <code>authorization list, authorization username</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI: Query Multiple Servers During Certificate Revocation Check</td>
<td>12.3(7)T</td>
<td>This feature introduces the ability for Cisco IOS software to make multiple attempts to retrieve the CRL, allowing operations to continue when a particular server is not available. In addition, the ability to override the CDPs in a certificate with a manually configured CDP has been introduced. Manually overriding the CDPs in a certificate can be advantageous when a particular server is unavailable for an extended period of time. The certificate’s CDPs can be replaced with a URL or directory specification without reissuing all of the certificates that contain the original CDP. The following command was introduced by this feature: <code>match certificate override cdp</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using Certificate ACLs to Ignore Revocation Check and Expired Certificates</td>
<td>12.3(7)T</td>
<td>This feature allows a certificate that meets specified criteria to be accepted regardless of the validity period of the certificate, or if the certificate meets the specified criteria, revocation checking does not have to be performed. Certificate ACLs are used to specify the criteria that the certificate must meet to be accepted or to avoid revocation checking. In addition, if AAA communication is protected by a certificate, this feature provides for the AAA checking of the certificate to be ignored. The following command was modified by this feature: <code>match certificate</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI High Availability</td>
<td>15.0(1)M</td>
<td>The following commands were introduced or modified: <code>crypto pki server, crypto pki server start, crypto pki server stop, crypto pki trustpoint, crypto key generate rsa, crypto key import pem, crypto key move rsa, show crypto key mypubkey rsa.</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI IPv6 Support for VPN Solutions</td>
<td>15.2(1)T</td>
<td>The <code>enrollment url (ca-trustpoint)</code> command was modified to specify an IPv6 address in the CA URL. The <code>ocsp url</code> command was modified to specify the IPv6 address in a URL for the OCSP server.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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