

Update Secure Malware Analytics Appliance Air-Gap mode

Contents

[Introduction](#)

[Prerequisites](#)

[Requirements](#)

[Components Used](#)

[Background Information](#)

[Limitations](#)

[Requirements](#)

[Before You Begin](#)

[Update an Offline \(Airgapped\) Secure Malware Analytics Appliance](#)

[Naming Conventions](#)

[Limitations](#)

[Linux/MAC - ISO Download](#)

[Requirements](#)

[Components Used](#)

[Configure](#)

[Download the ISO using the Desync Command](#)

[Windows - ISO Download](#)

[Download the ISO using the Desync Command](#)

[Verify](#)

[Boot Appliance from USB](#)

[How to find the correct /dev device](#)

[status=progress option](#)

[Boot Sequence for HDD Drives for Offline Upgrades](#)

[Requirement:](#)

Introduction

This document describes the steps to update Secure Malware Analytics Appliance Air-Gap mode.

Prerequisites

Requirements

Cisco recommends that you have knowledge of these topics:

- Basic knowledge of inputs through command line in Windows and Unix/Linux Environment
- Knowledge of Malware Analytic Appliance
- Knowledge of Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC)

Components Used

The information in this document is based on these software and hardware versions:

- Windows 10 and CentOS-8
- RUFUS 2.17
- C220 M4

The information in this document was created from the devices in a specific lab environment. All of the devices used in this document started with a cleared (default) configuration. If your network is live, ensure that you understand the potential impact of any command.

Background Information

Most Secure Malware Analytics appliances are connected to the Internet and thus use the online update process. However, in some cases Secure Malware Analytics appliances are maintained strictly within internal networks, that is, "air-gapped". We do not recommend keeping appliances air-gapped because doing so makes them less effective; however, this tradeoff may be necessary to support additional security or regulatory requirements.

For those users who run their Secure Malware Analytics appliances unconnected to the Internet, we provide the offline update process described in this document. Update media is provided by Secure Malware Analytics Support upon request, see below for details.

Media: Airgap (offline) update media is provided by Secure Malware Analytics Support as an ISO, which can be copied to either a USB media or HDD(Hard Disk Drives) should any of adequate size be available.

Size: The size depends on which versions the update media supports, but it might often be several tens of gigabytes when new VMs are introduced between source and destination releases. With the current releases, it might be around 30 GB since the desync tool helps with updating the VM-related changes incrementally.

Upgrade Boot Cycle: Each time the airgap update media is booted, it determines the next release to upgrade to, and copies the content associated with that next release onto the appliance. A given release may also initiate a package installation if that release does not have any prerequisite checks that must be run while the appliance is running. If the release includes such checks or an override to portions of the update process that could add such checks, then the update does not actually apply until the user logs into OpAdmin and invokes the update with **OpAdmin > Operations > Update Appliance**.

Pre-Installation Hooks: Depending on whether any pre-installation hooks are present for that specific upgrade, it either runs the upgrade immediately or reboots the appliance back into its regular operating mode to allow the user to enter the usual administrative interface and start that upgrade by hand.

Repeat As Needed: Each such media boot cycle thus upgrades (or prepares to upgrade) only one step towards the eventual target release; the user must boot as many times as necessary to upgrade to the desired destination release.


Limitations

CIMC media is not supported for air-gapped updates.

Due to licensing constraints on 3rd-party components used, upgrade media for 1.x releases does no longer be available after UCS M3 hardware has hit EOL (end-of-life). It is thus critical that UCS M3 appliances either be replaced or upgraded prior to EOL.

Requirements

Migrations: If the release notes for releases covered include scenarios where it is mandatory for migration to take place before the next version is installed, the user must follow these steps before rebooting again to avoid putting their appliance in an unusable state.

 **Note:** The first 2.1.x release newer than 2.1.4, in particular, runs several database migrations. It is unsafe to continue until these migrations are complete. For more information, see the [Threat Grid Appliance 2.1.5 Migration Note](#).

If starting from a release prior to 2.1.3, airgap upgrade media uses an encryption key derived from the individual license and thus needs to be customized on a per appliance basis. (The only user-visible effect is that with media built to support pre-2.1.3 origin versions, Secure Malware Analytics needs the licenses installed on those appliances beforehand, and the media won't work on any appliances not in the list for which it was built.)

If starting with release 2.1.3 or after, the airgap media is generic and customer information is not needed.

Before You Begin

- Backup. You must consider backing up your appliance before you proceed with the update.
- Review the Release Notes for the release to update to verify if there are any background migrations *required* before you plan to update to the newer release
- Verify the current version of your appliance: OpAdmin > Operations > Update Appliance
- Review the Secure Malware Analytics appliance version history in the Build Number/Version Lookup Table, which is available in all [Threat Grid appliance documents](#): Release Notes, Migration Notes, Setup and Configuration Guide, and Administrator's Guide.

Update an Offline (Airgapped) Secure Malware Analytics Appliance

First check available Air Gapped version at this page: [Appliance Version Lookup Table](#)

1. Open up a TAC Support Request to get the Offline Update Media. This request should include the appliance serial number as well as the appliance build number.
2. TAC Support supply an updated ISO based on your installation.
3. Burn the ISO image to a bootable USB. Note that USB is the only supported device/method for offline updates.

Naming Conventions

This is the updated filename ex: **TGA Airgap Update 2.13.2-2.14.0.**

This would mean that this media can be used for an appliance running a minimum version: **2.13.2** and upgrade the appliance to version: **2.14.0.**

Limitations

- CIMC media is not supported for air-gapped updates.
- Due to licensing constraints on 3rd-party components used, upgrade media for 1.x releases are no longer be available after UCS M3 hardware has hit EOL (end-of-life). It is thus critical that UCS M3 appliances either be replaced or upgraded prior to EOL.

Linux/MAC - ISO Download

Requirements

Cisco recommends that you have knowledge of these topics:

- A Linux machine with internet access to download the ISO and create the bootable USB install drive.
- The Airgap Download Instructions are provided by Secure Malware Analytics Support.
- GO Programming language. [Download](#)
- The **.caibx** index file (Included in the zip file provided by TAC Support).
- Desync Tool (Included in the zip file provided by Secure Malware Analytics Support).

Components Used

The information in this document is based on a CentOS Linux release 7.6.1810 (Core).

The information in this document was created from the devices in a specific lab environment. All of the devices used in this document started with a cleared (default) configuration. If your network is live, ensure that you understand the potential impact of any command.

Configure

Install the GO Programming Language

```
# wget https://dl.google.com/go/go1.12.2.linux-amd64.tar.gz
# tar -xzf go1.12.2.linux-amd64.tar.gz
# mv go /usr/local
```

Run these three commands after the install, if not the desync command fails

```
# export GOROOT=/usr/local/go
# export GOPATH=$HOME/Projects/Proj1
# export PATH=$GOPATH/bin:$GOROOT/bin:$PATH
```

You can verify the GO Version by:

```
# go version
```

Download the ISO using the Desync Command

Step 1. Copy the contents of the Zip File provided by Secure Malware Analytics Support including the **desync.linux** and **.caibx** file in the same directory locally on the machine.

Step 2. Change to the directory to where you stored the files:

Example:

```
# cd MyDirectory/TG
```

Step 3. Run the **pwd** command to ensure that you are inside the directory.

```
# pwd
```

Step 4. Once you are inside the directory that includes the **desync.linux** command and **.caibx** file, run the command of your choice to begin the download process.

 **Note:** These are the examples for different ISO versions, please reference the **.caibx** file from the instructions provided by Secure Malware Analytics Support.

For version 2.1.3 to 2.4.3.2 ISO:

```
# desync extract -k -s s3+https://s3.amazonaws.com/threatgrid-appliance-airgap-update airgap-update-2.1
```


For version 2.4.3.2 to 2.5 ISO:

```
# desync extract -k -s s3+https://s3.amazonaws.com/threatgrid-appliance-airgap-update airgap-update-2.4
```

For version 2.5 to 2.7.2ag ISO:

```
# desync extract -k -s s3+https://s3.amazonaws.com/threatgrid-appliance-airgap-update airgap-update-2.5
```

Once the download starts, a progress bar is shown.

 **Note:** The download speed and the size of the upgrade media in your environment can impact the time to compose the ISO.
Please make sure to compare the MD5 of the downloaded file to the one available with the bundle provided by support to make validate the integrity of the downloaded ISO.

Once the download is completed, the ISOs are created in the same directory.

Plug in the USB to the machine and run the **dd** command to create the bootable USB Drive.

```
# dd if=airgap-update.iso of=/dev/<MY_USB> bs=64M
```

Where *<MY_USB>* is the name of your USB key (leave off the angle brackets).

Insert the USB drive and turn on or reboot the appliance. At the Cisco boot up screen, press **F6** to enter the **Boot Menu**.



Tip:

Run the download after office hours or off-peak hours as it might affect bandwidth.
In order to stop the tool, either close the terminal or press **Ctrl+c/Ctrl+z**.
In order to continue, run the same command to resume the download.

Windows - ISO Download

Install the GO Programming Language

#1: Download required GO programming language. Install from <https://golang.org/dl/> In my case I pick the Featured Version. Restart your CMD and test with

The screenshot shows the golang.org/dl/ website. The 'Featured downloads' section is highlighted with a red box. Below it, there are four download options: Microsoft Windows (119MB), Apple macOS (125MB), Linux (123MB), and Source (20MB). A red arrow points to the Microsoft Windows download button.

Close and re-open CMD run command to verify:

```
go version
```

```
C:\Users\rvalenta>go version
go version go1.16.6 windows/amd64
```


Download the ISO using the Desync Command

#2: Install the **DESYNC** tool. After the execution of the command, you can notice a bunch of download prompts. Roughly after 2-3 minutes, the download should be done .

```
go install github.com/folbricht/desync/cmd/desync@latest
```

In case desync is not working using above command then change directory to C drive and run this command

```
git clone https://github.com/folbricht/desync.git
```



Note: If git command is not working then you could download and install Git from here :
<https://git-scm.com/download/win>.


Then run below two commands one by one :

cd desync/cmd/desync

go install

```
C:\Users\rvalenta>go install github.com/folbricht/desync/cmd/desync@latest
go: downloading github.com/folbricht/tempfile v0.0.1
go: downloading github.com/go-ini/ini v1.62.0
go: downloading github.com/minio/minio-go/v6 v6.0.57
go: downloading github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1
go: downloading github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.7.0
go: downloading github.com/spf13/cobra v1.1.1
go: downloading github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.5
go: downloading golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20201221181555-ee23a3978ad
go: downloading github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.8.1
go: downloading gopkg.in/chegga/pb.v1 v1.0.28
go: downloading github.com/spf13/cobra v1.2.1
go: downloading github.com/minio/minio-go v1.0.0
go: downloading cloud.google.com/go v0.72.0
go: downloading github.com/DataDog/zstd v1.4.5
go: downloading github.com/boljen/go-bitmap v0.0.0-20151001105940-23cd2fb0ce7d
go: downloading github.com/dchest/siphash v1.2.2
go: downloading github.com/hanwen/go-fuse v1.0.0
go: downloading github.com/klauspost/compress v1.11.4
go: downloading github.com/DataDog/zstd v1.4.8
go: downloading github.com/hanwen/go-fuse/v2 v2.0.3
go: downloading github.com/pkg/sftp v1.12.0
go: downloading golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210711020723-a769d52b0f97
go: downloading github.com/minio/minio-go v6.0.14+incompatible
go: downloading github.com/pkg/sftp v1.13.2
go: downloading github.com/pkg/xattr v0.4.3
go: downloading golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-202012072232520-09787c993a3a
go: downloading google.golang.org/api v0.36.0
go: downloading github.com/hanwen/go-fuse/v2 v2.1.0
go: downloading golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20210220032951-036812b2e83c
go: downloading github.com/mattn/go-runewidth v0.0.9
go: downloading golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201201145000-ef89a241ccb3
```

#3: Navigate to **go --> bin** location. In my case it was **C:\Users\rvalenta\go\bin** and copy/paste there TAC provided **.caibx** index file.



Verify


#4: Go back to your CMD prompt and navigate to the folder **go\bin** and run the download commands. You should immediately see the download proceed. Wait for the download to complete. You should now have the entire **.ISO** file in the same location as the previously copied **.caibx** index file

```
desync extract -k -s s3+https://s3.amazonaws.com/threatgrid-appliance-airgap-update airgap-update-2.12.
```

```
C:\Users\rvalenta>cd go
C:\Users\rvalenta\go>cd bin
C:\Users\rvalenta\go\bin>desync extract -k -s s3+https://s3.amazonaws.com/threatgrid-appliance-airgap-update airgap-update-2.12.3-2.13.2.caibx airgap-update-2.12.3-2.13.2.iso
Error: airgap-update-2.12.3-2.13.2.caibx: open ./airgap-update-2.12.3-2.13.2.caibx: The system cannot find the file specified.
C:\Users\rvalenta\go\bin>desync extract -k -s s3+https://s3.amazonaws.com/threatgrid-appliance-airgap-update airgap-update-2.12.3-2.13.2.caibx airgap-update-2.12.3-2.13.2.iso
[-----] 100.00% 16m52s
C:\Users\rvalenta\go\bin>
```

Then use RUFUS to create a bootable USB. This is very important to use version 2.17. This is the last

version where you can use **dd options** which is very important to create this specific recover USB. You can find all versions of this repository [RUFUS REPOSITORY](#) In case those files are no longer available I also include installers for full and portable versions in this document.



Boot Appliance from USB

Insert the USB drive and turn on or reboot the appliance. At the Cisco boot up screen, select "F6" to enter the Boot Menu. You must be quick! You only have a few seconds to make this selection. If you miss it, you have to reboot and try again.

Figure 1 - Press F6 to Enter the Boot Menu



Press <F2> Setup, <F6> Boot Menu, <F7> Diagnostics, <F8>Cisco IMC Configuration,
<F12> Network Boot


Bios Version : C220M4.2.0.13d.0.0812161113
Platform ID : C220M4

Cisco IMC IPv4 Address : 10.77.1.71
Cisco IMC MAC Address : CC:46:D6:FC:B5:1C

Processor(s) Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2697 v4 @ 2.30GHz
Total Memory = 512 GB Effective Memory = 512 GB
Memory Operating Speed 2400 Mhz
Entering boot selection menu...

Navigate to the USB drive containing the update and press Enter to select:

Figure 2 - Select the Update USB



The update media determines the next release in the upgrade path and copies the content for that release onto the appliance. The appliance either runs the upgrade immediately or reboot back into its regular operating mode to allow you to enter OpAdmin and start that upgrade manually.

Once the ISO boot process is completed, reboot the Secure Malware Analytics appliance back into operation mode.

Log into the portal UI and check for any warnings that speak to whether it's safe to upgrade, etc., before proceeding.

Navigate to the OpAdmin interface and apply the updates, if they were not automatically applied during the reboot: OpAdmin > Operations > Update Appliance NOTE: The update process includes additional reboots as a part of the update, which is made off of the USB media. For example, it's necessary to use the Reboot button on the installation page after updates are installed.

Repeat as needed for each version on the USB.

How to find the correct /dev device

With the USB still not connected to the endpoint run the command "**lsblk | grep -iE 'disk|part'**".

```
xsilenc3x@Alien15:~/testarea/usb$ lsblk | grep -iE 'disk|part'  
sda      8:0    0 931.5G  0 disk
```

```

└─sda1      8:1    0 128M 0 part
└─sda2      8:2    0 931.4G 0 part /media/DATA
nvme0n1    259:0    0 238.5G 0 disk
└─nvme0n1p1 259:1    0 650M 0 part
└─nvme0n1p2 259:2    0 128M 0 part
└─nvme0n1p3 259:3    0 114.1G 0 part
└─nvme0n1p4 259:4    0 525M 0 part /boot
└─nvme0n1p5 259:5    0 7.6G 0 part [SWAP]
└─nvme0n1p6 259:6    0 38.2G 0 part /
└─nvme0n1p7 259:7    0 62.7G 0 part /home
└─nvme0n1p8 259:8    0 13.1G 0 part
└─nvme0n1p9 259:9    0 1.1G 0 part
xsilenc3x@Alien15:~/testarea/usb$

```

After the USB stick is connected.

```

xsilenc3x@Alien15:~/testarea/usb$ lsblk | grep -iE 'disk|part'
.sda      8:0    0 931.5G 0 disk
└─sda1    8:1    0 128M 0 part
└─sda2    8:2    0 931.4G 0 part /media/DATA
sdb      8:16    1 3.7G 0 disk
└─sdb1    8:17    1 3.7G 0 part /media/xsilenc3x/ARCH_201902 <----- not observed when the USB was not
nvme0n1  259:0    0 238.5G 0 disk
└─nvme0n1p1 259:1    0 650M 0 part
└─nvme0n1p2 259:2    0 128M 0 part
└─nvme0n1p3 259:3    0 114.1G 0 part
└─nvme0n1p4 259:4    0 525M 0 part /boot
└─nvme0n1p5 259:5    0 7.6G 0 part [SWAP]
└─nvme0n1p6 259:6    0 38.2G 0 part /
└─nvme0n1p7 259:7    0 62.7G 0 part /home
└─nvme0n1p8 259:8    0 13.1G 0 part
└─nvme0n1p9 259:9    0 1.1G 0 part
xsilenc3x@Alien15:~/testarea/usb$

```

This confirms the USB device in /dev is "/dev/sdb".

Other ways to confirm, after the USB stick is connected :

The command **dmesg** provides some information. After the USB is connected run the command **dmesg | grep -iE 'usb|attached'**.

```

xsilenc3x@Alien15:~/testarea/usb$ dmesg | grep -iE 'usb|attached'
[842717.663757] usb 1-1.1: new high-speed USB device number 13 using xhci_hcd
[842717.864505] usb 1-1.1: New USB device found, idVendor=0781, idProduct=5567
[842717.864510] usb 1-1.1: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3
[842717.864514] usb 1-1.1: Product: Cruzer Blade
[842717.864517] usb 1-1.1: Manufacturer: SanDisk
[842717.864519] usb 1-1.1: SerialNumber: 4C530202420924105393
[842717.865608] usb-storage 1-1.1:1.0: USB Mass Storage device detected
[842717.866074] scsi host1: usb-storage 1-1.1:1.0
[842718.898700] sd 1:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg1 type 0
[842718.922265] sd 1:0:0:0: [sdb] Attached SCSI removable disk <-----
xsilenc3x@Alien15:~/testarea/usb$

```

The command **fdisk** provides information about the size, which can be used to confirm: **sudo fdisk -l /dev/sdb**.

```
xsilenc3x@Alien15:~/testarea/usb$ sudo fdisk -l /dev/sdb
Disk /dev/sdb: 3.7 GiB, 4004511744 bytes, 7821312 sectors  <-----
Units: sectors of 1 * 512 = 512 bytes
Sector size (logical/physical): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
I/O size (minimum/optimal): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
Disklabel type: dos
Disk identifier: 0x63374e06

Device      Boot Start    End Sectors  Size Id Type
/dev/sdb1   *          0 675839   675840  330M 0 Empty
/dev/sdb2             116   8307    8192     4M ef EFI (FAT-12/16/32)
xsilenc3x@Alien15:~/testarea/usb$
```



Note: Remember to unmount the USB before the execution of the "dd" command.

Confirmation the USB device from the example is mounted.

```
xsilenc3x@Alien15:~/testarea/usb$ sudo mount -l | grep -i sdb
/dev/sdb1 on /media/xsilenc3x/ARCH_201902 type vfat (rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,uid=1000,gid=1000,fmask=0
```

In order to unmount the USB device use **sudo umount /dev/sdb1**.

```
xsilenc3x@Alien15:~/testarea/usb$ sudo umount /dev/sdb1
```

Re-check the device is not perceived as "mounted".

```
xsilenc3x@Alien15:~/testarea/usb$ sudo mount -l | grep -i sdb
```

status=progress option

oflag=sync and **status=progress** options in the **dd** command.


When writing numerous data blocks the "status=progress" option provides information of the current writing operations. This is useful to confirm if the "dd" command is currently writing to the page cache; it can be used to show the progress and the complete amount of time in seconds of all the writing operations.

When not used, "dd" does not provide information about the progress, only the results of the writing operations is provided before "dd" returns:

```
[rootuser@centos8-01 tga-airgap]$ dd if=/dev/zero of=testfile.txt bs=1M count=8192
8192+0 records in
8192+0 records out
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 5.03493 s, 1.7 GB/s
[rootuser@centos8-01 tga-airgap]$
```

When used, real-time information about the writing operations is updated every second.

```
[rootuser@centos8-01 tga-airgap]$ dd if=/dev/zero of=testfile.txt bs=1M count=8192 status=progress
8575254528 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 8 s, 1.1 GB/s <-----
8192+0 records in
8192+0 records out
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 8.03387 s, 1.1 GB/s
[rootuser@centos8-01 tga-airgap]
```

 **Note:** In the official documentation for the TGA offline upgrade process the command that is informed is : **dd if=airgap-update.iso of=/dev/<MY_USB> bs=64M**

After some tests, the following example is observed.

Once a file is created of 10MB with "dd" using the device /dev/zero.


1M x 10 = 10M (10240 kB + previous system data in dirty file page caches = 10304 kB --> this is what is perceived in the dirty page cache at the end of "dd").

```
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$ cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && dd if=/dev/zero of=testfile.txt
count=10 status=progress && cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && date +%s
Dirty:                92 kB
10+0 records in
10+0 records out
10485760 bytes (10 MB, 10 MiB) copied, 0.0138655 s, 756 MB/s
Dirty:                10304 kB <----- dirty page cache after "dd" returned | data still to be written to t
1633260775 <---- epoch time
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$ cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && date +%s
Dirty:                10372 kB
1633260778
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$ cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && date +%s
Dirty:                10380 kB
1633260779
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$ cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && date +%s
Dirty:                10404 kB
1633260781
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$ cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && date +%s
Dirty:                10412 kB
1633260782
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$ cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && date +%s
Dirty:                10424 kB
1633260783
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$ cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && date +%s
Dirty:                10436 kB
1633260785
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$ cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && date +%s
```

```
Dirty:                0 kB <--- data in the dirty page cache flushed = written to the block device
1633260786 <---- epoch time
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$
````
```

1633260786 - 1633260775 = 11 seconds

---

 **Note:** After the "dd" command returned, the writing operation to the block device was not completed, it was perceived 11 seconds after the return.  
If this was the "dd" command when creating the bootable USB with the TGA ISO, AND I had removed the USB from the endpoint before those 11 seconds = I would have a corrupted ISO in the bootable USB.

---

Explanation:

Block devices provide buffered access to hardware devices. This provides a layer of abstraction to applications when working with hardware devices.

Block devices allow an application to read/write by data blocks of different sizes; this read()/writes() is applied on the page caches (buffers) and not directly on the block device.

The kernel ( and not the application doing the read/write ) manages the movement of data from the buffers (page caches) to the block devices.

Therefore:

The application (in this case "dd") does not have control over the flush of the buffers if is not instructed to.

The option "oflag=sync" forces synchronous physical writing (by the kernel) after each output block (provided by "dd") is placed in the page cache.

**oflag=sync** degrades the "dd" performance when compared to not using the option; but, if it is enabled it ensures a physical write to the block device after each write() call from "dd".

Test : Using the "oflag=sync" option of the "dd" command to confirm all writing operations with the dirty page cache data was completed at the return of the "dd" command:


```
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$ cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && dd if=/dev/zero of=testfile.txt
count=10 oflag=sync status=progress && cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && date +%s
Dirty: 60 kB
10+0 records in
10+0 records out
10485760 bytes (10 MB, 10 MiB) copied, 0.0841956 s, 125 MB/s
Dirty: 68 kB <---- No data remaining in the dirty page cache after "dd" returned
1633260819
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$ cat /proc/meminfo | grep -iE 'dirty' && date +%s
Dirty: 36 kB
1633260821
[rootuser@centos8-2 testarea]$
```

No data remains from the writing operation in the dirty page cache.

The write operation was applied before (or at the same instant) the "dd" command returned (not 11 seconds after as the previous test).

Now I am sure that after the "dd" command returned there was no data in the dirty page cache related to the writing operation = no problems in the bootable USB creation (if the ISO checksum is correct).

---

 **Note:** Have into consideration this flag (oflag=sync) of the "dd" command when working on this type of case.

---


## Boot Sequence for HDD Drives for Offline Upgrades

### Requirement:

We need to ensure that the HDD is formatted using the "DD" option using any tool available and the media should be copied afterward to the drive. If we do not use this formatting, we would not be able to read this media.

Once, we have the Media loaded on the HDD/USB using the "DD" formatting, we need to connect that to the TGA Appliance and restart the device.

This is the default Boot Menu selection screen. We need to press "F6" to boot the device to select the boot media



Once the device recognizes our input, it would prompt that the device would enter the boot selection menu.





Press <F2> Setup, <F6> Boot Menu, <F7> Diagnostics, <F8>Cisco IMC Configuration,  
<F12> Network Boot

Bios Version : C220M4.4.1.2c.0.0202211901  
Platform ID : C220M4

Cisco IMC IPv4 Address : 192.168.1.22  
Cisco IMC MAC Address : 70:0F:6A:E8:16:50

Processor(s) Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2697 v4 @ 2.30GHz  
Total Memory = 512 GB Effective Memory = 512 GB  
Memory Operating Speed 2400 Mhz  
Entering boot selection menu...

This is the prompt that can differ between different TGA Models. Ideally, we would see the option to boot using the boot media (upgrade filesystem) from this menu itself but if it is not seen, we need to log into the “EFI Shell”.

Please select boot device:

Appliance

Recovery

**UEFI: Built-in EFI Shell**

UEFI: IP4 0100 Intel(R) I350 Gigabit Network Connection

UEFI: IP4 0101 Intel(R) I350 Gigabit Network Connection

Enter Setup

↑ and ↓ to move selection  
ENTER to select boot device  
ESC to boot using defaults

You would have to press "ESC" before the "startup.sh" script finishes to move into the EFI Shell. Once, we log into the EFI Shell, we would notice that the partitions detected in this case are 3 Filesystems: fs0:, fs1:, fs2.

```
UEFI Interactive Shell v2.0. UEFI v2.40 (American Megatrends, 0x0005000B). Revision 1.02
Mapping table
fs0: Alias(s):HD21a0b0c::blk2:
 PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1D,0x0)/USB(0x0,0x0)/USB(0x1,0x0)/HD(2,MBR,0x00000000,0xC6E244,0x9800)
fs1: Alias(s):HD29a0b::blk4:
 PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x2,0x2)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Ctrl(0x0)/Scsi(0x0,0x0)/HD(1,GPT,22C0970D-0F05-444F-A0F3-EA787035FA1E,0x800,0x4
00000)
fs2: Alias(s):HD29b0b::blk8:
 PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x2,0x2)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Ctrl(0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,GPT,D4C95D76-AC65-421E-9BF9-487B6A2025ED,0x800,0x4
00000)
blk0: Alias(s):
 PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1D,0x0)/USB(0x0,0x0)/USB(0x1,0x0)
blk1: Alias(s):
 PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1D,0x0)/USB(0x0,0x0)/USB(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,MBR,0x00000000,0x40,0xC6E204)
blk3: Alias(s):
 PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x2,0x2)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Ctrl(0x0)/Scsi(0x0,0x0)
blk7: Alias(s):
 PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x2,0x2)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Ctrl(0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)
blk5: Alias(s):
 PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x2,0x2)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Ctrl(0x0)/Scsi(0x0,0x0)/HD(2,GPT,72DF22A3-D885-432E-A8D3-C1B00AB22A8B,0x400800,
0x4000000)
blk6: Alias(s):
 PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x2,0x2)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Ctrl(0x0)/Scsi(0x0,0x0)/HD(3,GPT,F298B3C8-074C-4D38-A346-748EFB9D7F61,0x800800,
0xD5A6FDF)
blk9: Alias(s):
 PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x2,0x2)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Ctrl(0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(2,GPT,0D6976B4-70AE-4B36-8E8A-C7F8D322BFDE,0x400800,
0x2B9A8CFDF)
Press ESC in 3 seconds to skip startup.nsh or any other key to continue.
Shell> _
```

## Important

Identifying the correct filesystem:

- As per the above screenshot, you would be able to see that “fs0:” is the only media with “USB” in their path and hence we can be confident that this filesystem would contain the boot media (upgrade filesystem).

In case of missing filesystems:

- If only fs0: and fs1: are available and there is no fs2:, verify that the boot media (upgrade filesystem) was written in dd mode and is successfully connected.
- Boot media (upgrade filesystem) should always have a lower number than the recovery media, and they should always be next to each other; it's whether the USB-attached drive is at the beginning of the end that is likely to change (so, whether it takes the front position at fs0: or the back position at fs2:) would need to be identified
- In this case in the screenshot below, is the correct “.efi” file as it is under the “\efi\boot” partition and has the naming convention of “bootx64.efi”

```
Shell> fs0:
fs0:\> dir
Directory of: fs0:\
01/01/1980 00:00 <DIR> 2,048 efi
 0 File(s) 0 bytes
 1 Dir(s)
fs0:\> cd efi
fs0:\efi\> cd boot
fs0:\efi\boot\> dir
Directory of: fs0:\efi\boot\
01/01/1980 00:00 <DIR> 2,048 .
01/01/1980 00:00 <DIR> 2,048 ..
01/01/1980 00:00 18,703,096 bootx64.efi
 1 File(s) 18,703,096 bytes
 2 Dir(s)
```

In order to boot the device in the boot media (upgrade filesystem), we must execute the “bootx64.efi” file:

```
fs0:\efi\boot\bootx64.efi
```

For your reference, we have displayed the contents of the other filesystems as well below:

fs1: This is the main boot filesystem.

```

fs1:\> fs1:
fs1:\> dir
Directory of: fs1:\
01/01/1980 00:00 43,985,838 initramfs-appliance.img
01/01/1980 00:00 287 initramfs-appliance.img.sig
01/01/1980 00:00 5,490,560 vmlinuz-appliance
01/01/1980 00:00 287 vmlinuz-appliance.sig
01/01/1980 00:00 4 .gitignore
01/01/1980 00:00 <DIR> 4,096 efi
01/01/1980 00:00 149 startup.nsh
01/01/1980 00:00 6,199,680 vmlinuz-linux
 7 File(s) 55,676,805 bytes
 1 Dir(s)
fs1:\> cd efi
fs1:\efi\> dir
Directory of: fs1:\efi\
05/23/2018 17:52 <DIR> 4,096 .
05/23/2018 17:52 <DIR> 0 ..
01/01/1980 00:00 <DIR> 4,096 Appliance
 0 File(s) 0 bytes
 3 Dir(s)
fs1:\efi\> cd Appliance
fs1:\efi\Appliance\> dir
Directory of: fs1:\efi\Appliance\
05/23/2018 17:52 <DIR> 4,096 .
05/23/2018 17:52 <DIR> 4,096 ..
01/01/1980 00:00 r 18,131,752 boot.efi
01/01/1980 00:00 287 boot.efi.sig
 2 File(s) 18,132,039 bytes
 2 Dir(s)

```

fs2: This is the Recovery image boot filesystem.


```
fs2:\> fs2:
fs2:\> dir
Directory of: fs2:\
09/21/2021 23:35 29,856 meta_contents.tar.xz
09/17/2021 13:01 <DIR> 4,096 tmp
10/26/2020 16:00 149 startup.nsh
05/23/2018 17:52 <DIR> 4,096 efi
09/17/2021 13:01 992,755,712 recovery.rosfs
 3 File(s) 992,785,717 bytes
 2 Dir(s)

fs2:\> cd efi
fs2:\efi\> cd Recovery
fs2:\efi\Recovery\> dir
Directory of: fs2:\efi\Recovery\
05/23/2018 17:52 <DIR> 4,096 .
05/23/2018 17:52 <DIR> 4,096 ..
09/10/2021 21:39 19,417,336 boot.efi
 1 File(s) 19,417,336 bytes
 2 Dir(s)
```

### Miscellaneous Instructions:

To verify the correct filesystem which contains the mounted boot media. We can do so by browsing the different filesystems and verify the “.efi” boot file

---

 **Note:** The sequence of the actual boot media (upgrade filesystem) which in this case is “fs0:” can also vary with other devices.  
The name and path might vary but in all the modern images, this should be the same.

---

Checklist which can help to locate the correct boot media (upgrade filesystem):

- If the root of a filesystem contains “*vmlinuz-appliance*”, it is not the boot media (upgrade filesystem).
- If the root of a filesystem contains “*meta\_contents.tar.xz*”, it is not the boot media (upgrade filesystem).
- If a filesystem does not contain “*efi\boot\bootx64.efi*”, it is not the boot media (upgrade filesystem).