

Cisco Secure Firewall Impact of the Public CA Client Authentication EKU Changes Starting on May 2026 for Secure Communications

Introduction

This document describes the impact of the restrictions on certificate issuance criteria imposed by certificate authorities that comply with the [Chrome Root Certificate program](#), specifically as they relate to the Cisco Secure Firewall products.

Background Information

Publicly trusted TLS certificates are issued by CAs that must comply with industry policies that governs certificate issuance and usage.

The [Chrome Root Program Policy](#), operated by Google, defines requirements that CAs must follow for their certificates to be trusted by the Google Chrome browser. These requirements influence how publicly trusted certificates are issued across the industry. As part of evolving security practices, the Chrome Root Program is introducing stricter guidance around certificate usage.

Many public CAs are therefore moving away from issuing certificates that include Client Authentication EKU and are transitioning toward issuing certificates intended only for server authentication. As a result, newly issued certificates from many public CAs are expected to include Server Authentication EKU only.

The **Extended Key Usage (EKU)**, is a certificate extension that defines the intended function of a public key within a digital certificate. It establishes a structured set of permitted applications, ensuring that the key is used only for specific cryptographic operations. This functionality is governed by **Object Identifiers (OIDs)**—unique numerical identifiers that categorize each allowed usage, such as code signing, server authentication, client authentication, or secure email.

When authentication is certificate-based, the verifying entity reviews the cert to identify the Object Identifier (OID) within the EKU. By embedding the EKU extension, a **Certificate Authority (CA)** restricts the certificate's scope to predefined roles, with each designated purpose explicitly mapped to an OID.

Purpose of EKU Attributes

- **Define Usage:** EKU attributes clarify what types of authentication or encryption the certificate is permitted to perform.
- **Enhance Security:** By restricting certificates to specific uses, EKU helps prevent misuse or unintended application (e.g., a server

certificate cannot be used for client authentication).

- **Compliance:** Ensures certificates are used in accordance with security policies and industry standards.

Main Uses of EKU Attributes

1. TLS Web Client Authentication

- Allows certificates to be used for identifying and authenticating users or devices to a server.

- OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2

- Used in VPNs, mutual TLS, and secure login scenarios.

2. TLS Web Server Authentication

- Permits certificates to be used by servers to prove their identity to clients.

- OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1

- Used in HTTPS, SSL/TLS web servers, and secure API endpoints.

3. Code Signing

- Indicates that the certificate can be used to sign software or executables.

- OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3

- Used in software distribution and integrity checks.

4. Email Protection

- Enables certificates to be used for signing and encrypting email messages.


- OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4

- Used in S/MIME email security.

5. Other Purposes

- Document signing, time stamping, smart card logon, etc., each with their own OIDs.

Browsers and servers only need the serverAuth EKU to establish a secure connection for HTTPS but historically, many TLS server certificates included both the serverAuth and clientAuth EKUs, below is an example of such a certificate:



Why the removal of the Client Authentication EKU from server certs?

- **Security and Scope:** Public TLS certificates are **only supposed to authenticate servers** on the web. The removal provides a clear separation between server and client functionality. The ClientAuth EKU is used for authentication of machines and users with Mutual TLS (mTLS) and other authentication scenarios.
- **Prevent Misconfiguration:** Some systems might trust *any* certificate from a public CA for client authentication if the EKU is present, which could be a security risk.
- **Browser Requirements:** Major browsers do not require or check the clientAuth EKU in a website's certificate.
- **Simplified PKI Architecture:** By separating usages, CAs can maintain distinct certificate hierarchies for server TLS vs.

other purposes.

This is particularly important for products like the Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA), the Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD), the Cisco Secure Firewall Device Manager (FDM) and the Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) that could act as either server or client during the TLS authentication, depending on the use case.

Impact on Server Environments

For the vast majority of server deployments, this change will be **low-impact** or **no-impact**. Here's what to expect:

- **Standard Web Servers (HTTPS):** No impact. The updated certificates will continue to function normally.
- **Existing Certificates:** Any certificate issued *before* the cutoff will continue to function until it expires.
- **Mutual TLS (mTLS) and Client Cert Scenarios:** If you were using a TLS server certificate for **client authentication**, you will need to obtain a separate certificate with the **clientAuth EKU** from another source.
- **Enterprise Systems Requiring Both EKUs:** Some legacy or enterprise systems expected both EKUs. You should verify if updates are needed to comply with the new rules.

Problem Description

Beginning in May 2026, many public certificate authorities (CAs) will stop issuing Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates that include the Client Authentication Extended Key Usage (EKU). Newly issued certificates will typically include Server Authentication EKU only.

As a result, if certificates issued by a public CA are renewed under the updated CA policies and then deployed in the Cisco Secure Firewall Products, services where Client Authentication EKU is required will fail. The specific services being impacted are the following:

- When the ASA, FTD, FDM or FMC acts as a client—for example, when connecting to identity providers or authentication servers such as ISE (pxGrid), RADIUS, LDAPS, or Active Directory—certificate-based authentication may fail if the client certificate was generated by a public CA and is missing the Client Authentication EKU. In these scenarios, if the authentication server rejects certificates without the required EKU, connection failures may occur.
- The Cisco Secure Client (formerly AnyConnect) can authenticate to ASA or FTD servers using certificates. However, if the client certificate was generated by a public CA and is missing the Client Authentication EKU, then the Remote Access VPN (RAVPN) connection will fail.
- When the FTD or ASA establishes a site-to-site VPN tunnel—whether to another FTD, ASA, Cisco router, or a third-party VPN peer—using certificate authentication (RSA or ECDSA), the tunnel will fail if the identity certificate generated by a

public CA is missing the Client Authentication EKU attribute. This occurs because the remote VPN peer requires the Client Authentication EKU to be present in the identity certificate.

Chrome Root Program Policy Change

The implementation of the EKU depends on the CA signing the certificate. The use of both Server Authentication and Client Authentication EKU was a common practice. However, as part of the [Chrome Root Program Policy Change](#) CAs aligning to this certificate issuance criteria are discontinuing the signing of TLS certificates that include the Client Authentication Extended Key Usage (EKU). Newly issued certificates include **Server Authentication EKU only**.

Key Policy Requirements

- Public Root CAs must assert Extended Key Usage (EKU) ONLY for Server Authentication (id-kp-serverAuth)
- Certificates must include ONLY **Server Authentication EKU**.
- Including **Client Authentication EKU** in these certificates are prohibited
- Root CAs that continue to issue certificates with Client Authentication EKU are eventually removed from the Chrome Root Store causing the flagging of such certificates as "Untrusted" by the Chrome Browser


Timelines


- September 2025, SSL.com will issue TLS certificates that only include the ServerAuth EKU (and not ClientAuth) for server certificates. In other words, new SSL/TLS certs for your website or server will explicitly be for "Server Authentication" only.
- October 2025: CAs aligning to the program (E.g: DigiCert, Sectigo, and so on.) began issuing server-only certificates by default.
- May 2026: CAs aligning to the program stop issuing Client Authentication EKU certificates
- March 2027: Chrome Root Program Policy becomes fully effective

Impact on Cisco Secure Firewall Products

After the public CAs start to include only the Server Authentication EKU in the issued certificates. This could have the following impact on the next Cisco Secure Firewall product scenarios:

- When the ASA, FTD, FDM or FMC acts as a client—for example, when connecting to identity providers or authentication servers such as ISE (pxGrid), RADIUS, LDAPS, or Active Directory—certificate-based authentication may fail if the client certificate was generated by a public CA and is missing the Client Authentication EKU. In these scenarios, if the authentication server rejects certificates without the required EKU, connection failures may occur.
- The Cisco Secure Client (formerly AnyConnect) can authenticate to ASA or FTD servers using certificates. However, if the client certificate was generated by a public CA and is missing the Client Authentication EKU, then the Remote Access VPN (RAVPN) connection will fail.
- When the FTD or ASA establishes a site-to-site VPN tunnel—whether to another FTD, ASA, Cisco router, or a third-party VPN peer—using certificate authentication (RSA or ECDSA), the tunnel will fail if the identity certificate generated by a public CA is missing the Client Authentication EKU attribute. This occurs because the remote VPN peer requires the Client Authentication EKU to be present in the identity certificate.


 **Note:** If you are integrating FMC or FDM with ISE through pxGrid and the certificates installed on your FMC/FDM lack the Client Authentication EKU attribute, then review the workarounds proposed in this document and the next ISE references: [FN74392](#) and [Prepare Identity Services Engine for Extended Key Usage Restrictions in Certificates Issued by Public Certification Authorities](#).


 **Note:** The removal of the clientAuth EKU from TLS server certificates is an industry-wide policy change that will enhance security and prevent misuse. For most users, there will be no noticeable impact. However, if you rely on the ClientAuth EKU, you should take proactive steps to obtain the correct type of certificate for your needs.


Affected Products


Cisco Secure Firewall Product	Software Version	Impacted Scenarios	Remediations
FTD	All versions	When acts as a client—for example, when connecting to identity providers or authentication servers such as ISE (pxGrid), RADIUS, LDAPS, or Active Directory—certificate-based authentication may fail if the client certificate was generated by a public CA and is missing the Client Authentication EKU. In this scenario, if the authentication server rejects certificates without the required EKU, connection failures may occur.	Option 1. If you are using a TLS server certificate for client authentication, you will need to obtain a certificate with the ClientAuth EKU from another source. OR Option2. Switch to public root CAs (Certificate Authorities) that provide combined EKU (ClientAuth and ServerAuth) certificates.
FDM	All versions		
FMC	All versions		
ASA	All versions		

			NOTE: Please refer to the Workarounds section of this document for additional options.
Cisco Secure Client (formerly AnyConnect)	All versions	The Cisco Secure Client can authenticate to the ASA or FTD servers using certificates. However, if client certificate was generated by a public CA and is missing the Client Authentication EKU, then the Remote Access VPN (RAVPN) connection will fail.	
FTD or ASA	All versions	When the FTD or ASA establishes a site-to-site VPN tunnel—whether to another FTD, ASA, Cisco router, or a third-party VPN peer—using certificate authentication (RSA or ECDSA), the VPN tunnel will fail if the identity certificate generated by a public CA is missing the Client Authentication EKU attribute. This occurs because the remote VPN peer requires the Client Authentication EKU to be present in the identity certificate.	

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 **Caution:** For production environments, it is strongly recommended that customers use certificates with the appropriate EKU attributes. This practice ensures security, compatibility, and adherence to industry standards and best practices. Certificates without EKU attributes should only be considered as a temporary workaround, and only with a clear understanding of the associated risks.


Problem 1. pxGrid integration problem between FMC and ISE, when the FMC certificate lacks of the Client Authentication EKU attribute

In this scenario, the certificate used by the FMC for pxGrid integration with ISE lacks the Client Authentication EKU attribute. As a result, the pxGrid integration fails because the ISE server expects this attribute to be present in the certificate presented by the FMC.

Topology



FMC UI Errors: This is the error message displayed in the FMC, when the certificate used by the FMC lacks of the Client Authentication EKU attribute for the pxGrid integration with ISE.



FMC CLI Errors: Same error messages are found in the FMC /var/log/messages directory.

<#root>

HttpsStringRequest on_read for host 10.31.126.189:8910 failed. error: 336151574:

sslv3 alert certificate unknown

(SSL routines, ssl3_read_bytes)

Mar 27 23:17:17 vFMC3-chherna2 SF-IMS[8074]: [7514] ADI:HttpsEndpoint


[ERROR] Performing request to 10.31.126.189:8910/pxgrid/control/AccountActivate failed: Request failed with a timeout.

Mar 27 23:17:17 vFMC3-chherna2 SF-IMS[8074]: [7514] ADI:ise_connector.PXGrid2ThreadedService

[ERROR] pxgrid2_service was not created for 10.31.126.189. Reason - Request failed with a timeout.

Mar 27 23:17:47 vFMC3-chherna2 SF-IMS[8074]: [7514] ADI:ise_connector.PXGrid2ThreadedService [I
Mar 27 23:17:47 vFMC3-chherna2 SF-IMS[8074]: [7514] ADI:ise_connector.PXGrid2ThreadedService [I

ISE Error: This is the error message displayed in ISE, "*checkClientTrusted exception.message=Extended key usage does not permit use for TLS client authentication principle=CN=vFMC3-chherna2, OU=IT, O=Cisco, L=MX, ST=MX, C=MX*".



Solution: If you are integrating FMC or FDM with ISE through pxGrid and the certificate installed in your FMC/FDM lack the Client Authentication EKU attribute, then review the proposed in this document and the next ISE references: [FN74392](#) and [Prepare Identity Services Engine for Extended Key Usage Restrictions in Certificates Issued by Public Certification Authorities](#) for a successful pxGrid integration.

Note: The FMC pxGrid Client Certificate must either include the ClientAuth EKU attribute or contain no Client or Server EKU attributes at all.

Note: Even though the use of a Public CA-signed certificate is supported for IMS. Cisco recommends using the ISE Internal CA certificate since this communication is only for internal transactions.

Problem 2. FTD or ASA integration problem with an LDAPS server, when the certificate presented lacks of the Client Authentication EKU attribute

In this scenario, the FTD or ASA acts as a client to integrate with an LDAPS server using certificate authentication. If the certificate used by the FTD or ASA lacks the Client Authentication EKU attribute, the integration fails because the LDAPS server requires this attribute to be present in the certificate.

Topology



LDAPS Server Errors: *'TLS certificate verification: Error, unsupported certificate purpose'* and *'TLS trace: SSL3 alert write:fatal:unsupported certificate'*


```
69ceb4f5.157b4993 0x7ff553fff700 TLS trace: SSL_accept:TLSv1.3 write server certificate verify
69ceb4f5.157c01a4 0x7ff553fff700 TLS trace: SSL_accept:SSLv3/TLS write finished
69ceb4f5.157c458a 0x7ff553fff700 TLS trace: SSL_accept:TLSv1.3 early data
69ceb4f5.157c6685 0x7ff553fff700 TLS trace: SSL_accept:error in TLSv1.3 early data
69ceb4f5.15b17eaa 0x7ff5522fc700 connection_get(15): got connid=1004
69ceb4f5.15b1b73f 0x7ff5522fc700 connection_read(15): checking for input on id=1004
69ceb4f5.15b2bf05 0x7ff5522fc700 TLS trace: SSL_accept:TLSv1.3 early data
69ceb4f5.15b4c6c3 0x7ff5522fc700 TLS certificate verification: depth: 0, err: 26, subject: /CN=asa-server-only,69ceb4f5.15b4e8de 0x7ff5522fc700 issuer: /CN=Test-CA
69ceb4f5.15b4f367 0x7ff5522fc700 TLS certificate verification: Error, unsupported certificate purpose
69ceb4f5.15b57df8 0x7ff5522fc700 TLS trace: SSL3 alert write:fatal:unsupported certificate
69ceb4f5.15b5b557 0x7ff5522fc700 TLS trace: SSL_accept:error in error
69ceb4f5.15b66c36 0x7ff5522fc700 TLS: can't accept: error:1417C086:SSL routines:tls_process_client_certificate:certificate verify failed (unsupported certificate purpose).
69ceb4f5.15b70391 0x7ff5522fc700 connection_read(15): TLS accept failure error=-1 id=1004, closing
69ceb4f5.15b747ae 0x7ff5522fc700 connection_close: conn=1004 sd=15
```

Solution: Review the proposed in this document to ensure the FTD or ASA uses the correct identity certificate—including the Client Authentication EKU attribute—for a successful certificate-based authentication with the LDAPS server.


Problem 3. Cisco Secure Client (formerly AnyConnect) may experience connection issues to an FTD or ASA if the client certificate lacks the Client Authentication EKU attribute

In this scenario, the Cisco Secure Client is using certificate authentication to establish an RAVPN tunnel to the FTD or ASA. However, if the client certificate lacks the Client Authentication EKU attribute, the RAVPN session will fail because the ASA or FTD requires this attribute to be present in the client certificate.

Topology



Cisco Secure Client Error: 'Certificate Validation Failure'



Cisco Secure Client DART Errors:The following logs from the **AnyConnectVPN.txt** file in the DART bundle confirm that the Cisco Secure Client rejected the certificate used for the RAVPN certificate-based authentication to the FTD/ASA due to the absence of the Client Authentication EKU attribute (in order to locate the AnyConnectVPN.txt file in the DART bundle, Navigate to **Cisco Secure Client > AnyConnect VPN > Logs > AnyConnectVPN.txt**).

<#root>

Date : 04/07/2026
Time : 03:35:22
Type : Error
Source : csc_vpnapi

Description : Function: CVerifyExtKeyUsage::compareEKUs

File: C:\temp\build\thehoff\Raccoon_MR40.765445939442\Raccoon_MR4\vpn\CommonCrypt\Certificates\VerifyEx
Line: 330

EKU not found in certificate: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2

Date : 04/07/2026
Time : 03:35:22
Type : Information
Source : csc_vpnapi

Description : Function: CCertStore::GetCertificates

File: C:\temp\build\thehoff\Raccoon_MR40.765445939442\Raccoon_MR4\vpn\CommonCrypt\Certificates\CertStor
Line: 225

Ignoring client certificate because it does not contain the required EKU extension.

Certificate details:
Store: [Omitted Output]

Solution: Review the proposed in this document to ensure the Cisco Secure Client uses the correct certificate—including the Client Authentication EKU attribute—for a successful certificate-based authentication with the FTD or ASA.

 **Note:** From the above DART bundle error '*EKU not found in certificate: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2*' , this number '*1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2*' corresponds to the Client Authentication EKU OID.

Problem 4. Site-to-site VPN tunnels with certificate-based authentication fails if the identity certificate is missing the Client Authentication EKU attribute

In this scenario, which involves certificate-based authentication for an IKEv2 site-to-site VPN tunnel, the identity certificate used by FTD/ASA (1) to establish the tunnel to the FTD/ASA (2) peer lacks the Client Authentication EKU attribute. As a result, the VPN tunnel cannot be established because the remote peer, FTD/ASA (2), requires this attribute to be present in the certificate.

Topology



FTD or ASA CLI errors: These are the errors observed on the FTD/ASA (2) during the IKEv2 certificate-based authentication when it rejects the FTD/ASA (1) identity certificate that lacks the Client Authentication ECU attribute.

```
<#root>
```

```
Apr 09 2026 15:59:50:
```

```
%ASA-3-717027: Certificate chain failed validation. Certi. Peer certificate key usage is invalid,
```

```
subject name: CN=ASAv3.cisco.com,OU=IT,O=Cisco,C=US,unstructuredName=ASAv3.cisco.com.
```

```
Apr 09 2026 15:59:50:
```

```
%ASA-3-717027: Certificate chain failed validation. Certificate chain is either invalid or not authorize
```

```
Apr 09 2026 15:59:50: %ASA-3-751006: Local:10.3.3.6:500 Remote:10.3.3.5:500 Username:10.3.3.5
```

```
IKEv2 Certificate authentication failed. Error: Certificate authentication failed
```

```
Apr 09 2026 15:59:50: %ASA-4-750003: Local:10.3.3.6:500 Remote:10.3.3.5:500 Username:10.3.3.5
```


```
IKEv2 Negotiation aborted due to ERROR: Auth exchange failed
```


```
Apr 09 2026 15:59:50: %ASA-4-752012: IKEv2 was unsuccessful at setting up a tunnel. Map Tag = CMAP. M
```

```
Apr 09 2026 15:59:50: %ASA-3-752015: Tunnel Manager has failed to establish an L2L SA. All configured
```

```
Apr 09 2026 15:59:55: %ASA-5-752003: Tunnel Manager dispatching a KEY_ACQUIRE message to IKEv2. Map Ta
```

```
Apr 09 2026 15:59:55: %ASA-5-750001: Local:10.3.3.6:500 Remote:10.3.3.5:500 Username:Unknown IKEv2 Rece
```

 **Note:** In the example above, the FTD/ASA (2) was using an identity certificate that included both the ClientAuth and ServerAuth ECU attributes.

 **Note:** In the example above, the FTD/ASA (2) could also be replaced by a router or a third-party physical or cloud-based VPN concentrator. Then, the same issue will persist, as the VPN peer requires the Client Authentication ECU attribute to be present in the certificate used by the FTD/ASA (1) for successful certificate-based authentication.


Solution: Review the proposed in this document to ensure that FTD/ASA (1) uses the correct identity certificate—including the Client Authentication ECU attribute—for a successful site-to-site VPN tunnel with certificate-based authentication.


Instructions to Confirm Whether Your Certificate Lacks the Client Authentication EKU Attribute

Verify the EKU Attributes from a .cer Certificate using Windows Certificate Manager

Follow next steps to verify the EKU attributes from a .cer certificate using Windows Certificate Manager:


Step 1. Double-click the .cer file to open it in Windows Certificate Manager.




 **Note:** Only .cer files will open directly this way; if your certificate has a .pem extension, rename it to .cer or .crt first.

Step 2. Handle Security Warning (if any), If a security warning prompt appears, click Open to proceed.


Step 3. In the certificate window, click the Details tab.



Step 4. Scroll through the list of fields and select "Enhanced Key Usage" (or Extended Key Usage).




Step 5. Verify the ECU Attributes, you might see entries like "Server Authentication" and "Client Authentication" indicating the ECU values present in the certificate.




Step 6. After verification, click OK to close the certificate window.

Example 1: This .cer certificate is missing the Client Authentication EKU attribute and includes only the Server Authentication EKU attribute.



Example 2: This .cer certificate includes both the Server and Client Authentication EKU attributes.



Verify the EKU Attributes from a PKCS#12, PEM and .cer Certificate using OpenSSL

Follow the next steps to verify the EKU attributes from a .p12 (PKCS#12), .pem (PEM) and .cer certificate:

Step 1. Locate the certificate you need to check, and export it out in .p12 (PKCS#12), .pem (PEM) or .cer format.

For .p12 (PKCS#12) certificates, use openssl to extract the certificate from the .p12 (PKCS#12) file, the .p12 (PKCS#12) file may contain the private key, certificate, and CA certificates.

Use the following command to extract the certificate from a .p12 (PKCS#12) file into a .pem (PEM) file (without the private key or CA chain):

```
openssl pkcs12 -in yourfile.p12 -nokeys -clcerts -out cert.pem
```

- yourfile.p12: Replace with your actual file name.
- You may need to enter the password for the .p12 file.
- cert.pem: Is the certificate extracted (without the private key or CA chain) in .pem (PEM) format.

Step 2. Use the next openssl commands to display the certificate details and EKU attributes.

a) For .pem files, use the next openssl command to display the certificate details and EKU attributes:

```
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -text -noout
```

- cert.pem: Replace with your actual file name.

b) For .cer files, use the next openssl command to display the certificate details and EKU attributes:

```
openssl x509 -in yourfile.cer -text -noout
```

- yourfile.cer: Replace with your actual file name.

Step 3. Then, look for the **X509v3Extended Key Usage** section in the output, you might see entries like "TLS Web Server Authentication" and "TLS Web Client Authentication" indicating the EKU values present in the certificate.

```
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:  
TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
```

OR the EKU attribute OIDs (Object Identifiers):

```
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:  
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
```

- Server Authentication EKU OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1
- Client Authentication EKU OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2

Example 1: This .pem (PEM) certificate is missing the Client Authentication EKU attribute and includes only the Server Authentication EKU attribute.

<#root>

MyHost\$ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -text -noout

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

26:00:00:01:b7:e7:90:48:d6:f9:41:d3:54:00:01:00:00:01:b7

Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: DC=com, DC=aaajcg, CN=aaajcg-WIN-FQAUEA2I25Q-CA

Validity

Not Before: Mar 27 00:31:40 2026 GMT

Not After : Mar 26 00:31:40 2028 GMT

Subject: C=MX, ST=MX, L=MX, O=Cisco, OU=IT, CN=vFMC3-chherna2

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

RSA Public-Key: (2048 bit)

Modulus:

00:cf:a8:a0:ff:dd:34:73:7d:46:86:85:05:b6:0c:
5e:32:8c:6f:6f:88:52:03:58:63:c6:89:d8:fc:55:
c5:58:ba:eb:45:88:b2:21:9e:c5:d8:67:57:39:0f:
91:a5:41:61:fa:94:b1:ad:9e:71:26:87:b6:30:ae:
a7:f6:89:b1:6d:61:ce:fa:47:7f:2a:d8:e8:4d:26:
4f:a7:d3:eb:5a:69:16:46:71:c7:55:cf:87:b4:10:
96:f2:10:6b:c0:a7:3d:3c:49:9d:ee:77:8c:b5:95:
9b:69:81:e0:2d:a0:6e:5c:78:73:22:5a:38:d0:74:
38:b2:ba:e0:ab:c5:44:eb:e1:3c:52:86:b8:2a:4e:
37:44:9c:34:d8:d8:6c:ae:3e:df:12:57:0e:28:52:
57:dc:6d:62:ea:b6:ec:19:4e:90:8f:3f:2c:23:1b:
e2:39:f0:ba:07:08:9a:0b:97:96:05:2e:69:fe:9a:
b2:b2:74:9a:ba:06:25:bc:38:1c:94:87:8e:2a:dc:
2f:0b:a6:31:6c:bf:11:96:2a:71:b3:87:e5:f5:cb:
88:f1:73:cf:88:d7:30:78:24:77:7c:b7:2c:7c:83:
6d:69:5b:bd:d4:21:b9:ee:19:c4:02:be:7b:44:a2:
55:d6:b2:95:11:46:bf:db:3e:4f:9a:8c:d4:ad:8d:
82:f5

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

0D:8E:DA:07:6D:49:EA:51:D2:C7:EF:50:CE:CE:2B:8E:7C:DF:A6:8D

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

keyid:3A:45:60:22:F7:C8:2C:0D:D2:98:5A:BC:E0:98:D4:91:1D:67:32:22

X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:

Full Name:

URI:ldap:///CN=aaajcg-WIN-FQAUEA2I25Q-CA,CN=WIN-FQAUEA2I25Q,CN=CDP,CN=Public%20Key%20

Authority Information Access:

CA Issuers - URI:ldap:///CN=aaajcg-WIN-FQAUEA2I25Q-CA,CN=AIA,CN=Public%20Key%20Services

1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2:

...W.e.b.S.e.r.v.e.r

X509v3 Key Usage: critical

Digital Signature, Key Encipherment

X509v3 Extended Key Usage:

<----- "EKU SECTION"

TLS Web Server Authentication

```
<----- "Server Authentication EKU Attribute Included"
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
2f:27:cd:95:7d:5c:40:fa:29:64:df:75:7d:7a:87:9b:b0:94:
0e:6b:07:4d:d2:7e:83:da:03:08:f3:50:0d:5b:05:8c:1f:54:
46:fe:53:f3:e2:d4:0a:ba:37:4f:cd:a4:49:04:74:79:09:23:
d6:06:af:69:d2:7b:f5:bc:ec:fe:ce:e4:c9:07:31:d7:85:45:
55:78:d3:42:45:f9:ce:cd:bf:43:53:b4:8e:4c:af:64:4b:a6:
dc:47:d0:16:4e:73:62:fd:c8:5e:37:74:cb:68:48:29:7d:f9:
41:b3:d1:46:56:24:83:23:5c:bd:b0:e3:7c:f9:8a:af:da:09:
d0:c2:7d:4a:e6:24:0f:e6:fc:6e:0d:65:8c:96:8c:af:21:b2:
7f:4b:bb:1c:17:33:b1:db:00:f3:12:e3:53:39:d0:e7:6a:48:
4c:c6:4f:29:6f:74:ff:2d:a7:e5:ea:e8:89:fe:a4:2b:cd:e3:
61:6a:9e:11:52:15:57:f2:b8:e8:fa:78:31:20:49:d9:50:f9:
70:3f:1e:aa:9c:1a:bb:0b:59:66:1e:85:bd:76:e7:73:6f:ec:
86:30:b0:dd:86:3c:b3:a0:7b:fb:b7:74:5d:38:88:82:3d:a3:
2d:8c:a5:e4:db:37:eb:be:7f:62:bc:87:7c:35:17:32:fc:52:
c5:d3:c5:8f
```

Example 2: This .pem (PEM) certificate includes both the Client and Server Authentication EKU attributes.

```
<#root>
```

```
MyHost$ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -text -noout
```

```
Certificate:
```

```
Data:
```

```
Version: 3 (0x2)
```

```
Serial Number:
```

```
26:00:00:01:b6:74:fc:b4:1e:99:be:7a:10:00:01:00:00:01:b6
```

```
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
```

```
Issuer: DC=com, DC=aaajcg, CN=aaajcg-WIN-FQAUEA2I25Q-CA
```

```
Validity
```

```
Not Before: Mar 26 23:44:58 2026 GMT
```

```
Not After : Mar 26 23:44:58 2027 GMT
```

```
Subject: C=MX, ST=AD, L=AD, O=Cisco, OU=IT, CN=vFMC3-chherna2
```

```
Subject Public Key Info:
```

```
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
```

```
RSA Public-Key: (2048 bit)
```

```
Modulus:
```

```
00:ab:aa:67:4e:55:19:3b:38:6c:33:2e:ba:fd:19:
```

```
56:e7:68:f8:f7:e9:53:95:1f:53:b4:f1:ce:94:c8:
```

```
ca:41:f1:52:15:eb:a5:35:9f:07:95:9f:c3:8a:5e:
```

```
62:d6:e1:5c:04:c5:c0:27:1c:84:ed:3d:1b:42:50:
```

```
91:4a:a6:86:90:e0:6e:26:7e:37:fd:17:0c:2f:bb:
```

```
fe:58:81:ec:3b:9d:0b:fc:dd:8c:6b:dd:ab:d3:96:
```

```
74:23:0d:78:d7:09:53:61:f9:b0:29:c6:7c:e2:9c:
```

```
2f:74:30:42:0f:45:47:cd:16:59:ed:53:62:8f:60:
```

```
75:f8:24:f5:1f:77:fb:89:85:4b:49:ad:93:43:04:
```

```
6e:4a:b3:59:fc:eb:75:70:39:67:71:60:be:b3:b7:
```

```
86:f7:c5:53:28:1e:bf:8f:b2:52:ec:79:d6:12:b0:
```

```
33:9c:6d:46:7a:9c:5d:53:a5:44:24:da:4b:36:7d:
```

```
c2:ec:61:d7:a0:01:c3:d2:bc:0a:df:a8:f6:0c:82:
```

```
48:30:fb:c6:3e:4a:48:a9:01:13:f5:4e:f2:03:24:
```

```
38:ee:aa:d9:60:78:30:45:ed:3b:76:16:fd:7a:d3:
```

```
b0:16:10:28:75:fc:41:32:e6:6d:cb:c3:96:58:77:
```

```
9e:11:0a:9b:33:c7:92:8d:75:1f:e5:30:29:a4:a5:
```

```

        ba:7d
        Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
  X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
    D2:DF:62:25:17:DB:72:31:D8:D2:D0:41:CB:FB:DD:00:FF:38:BD:BB
  X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
    keyid:3A:45:60:22:F7:C8:2C:0D:D2:98:5A:BC:E0:98:D4:91:1D:67:32:22

  X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:

    Full Name:
      URI:ldap:///CN=aaajcg-WIN-FQAUEA2I25Q-CA,CN=WIN-FQAUEA2I25Q,CN=CDP,CN=Public%20Key%20
Authority Information Access:
  CA Issuers - URI:ldap:///CN=aaajcg-WIN-FQAUEA2I25Q-CA,CN=AIA,CN=Public%20Key%20Services

  X509v3 Key Usage: critical
    Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
  1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.7:
    0-%+.....7.....^..9...
...b.../ ...R...Z..d...

```

X509v3 Extended Key Usage:

<----- "EKU SECTION"

TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication

```

<----- "Server & Client EKU Attributes Included"
  1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.10:
    0.0
..+.....0
..+.....
  S/MIME Capabilities:
.....0...+....0050...*.H..
..*.H..
  Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
  3f:66:b1:35:7e:05:b4:69:f1:81:95:b8:18:90:f2:20:bd:8d:
  ff:03:5a:59:ca:02:ba:2d:1d:e0:8d:3f:63:e9:fe:71:3c:9a:
  11:15:5c:3b:fc:62:e4:cf:15:25:4c:74:5e:ad:3f:09:e9:3b:
  d5:08:95:7d:97:7a:ef:c1:16:6d:e0:7a:0b:21:81:46:bc:15:
  c3:76:8c:fe:fb:14:94:36:92:0d:3b:4a:c9:8f:6a:bd:dc:4b:
  0b:24:c3:32:35:27:e7:aa:23:95:85:e4:a9:64:71:f0:98:9e:
  33:aa:6e:bd:7c:dd:dc:4b:cf:dd:0e:a7:ea:e8:aa:61:8f:67:
  84:da:5b:be:8e:05:75:c8:eb:46:13:6f:14:4d:fe:4e:57:3c:
  29:27:cc:0b:5b:25:87:37:24:12:79:b1:c3:78:c8:94:fe:df:
  3c:77:aa:fc:f2:ee:ae:9b:ab:88:29:f9:ee:04:c2:48:5f:21:
  9e:1c:25:cc:c9:c5:9c:23:8f:af:87:76:5e:46:74:ac:73:57:
  01:ba:71:ae:46:e1:87:3c:94:6c:19:f7:fe:8e:66:9d:c7:1f:
  b0:87:4b:65:e2:fc:d6:10:7c:44:57:56:5d:68:bb:df:f0:36:
  0e:07:c5:8a:be:56:86:97:3d:a7:1c:8b:86:df:0b:51:b5:97:
  cc:67:09:8e

```

Workarounds

Administrators can choose from one of the following workaround options.

Option 1. Switch to public root CAs that provide combined ECU certificates

Some public root CAs, such as DigiCert and IdenTrust, issue certificates with combined ECU types (server and client certificates) from an alternative root, which may not be included in the Chrome Root Store. Coordinate with the CA provider to check the availability of such certificates, and, before deploying them, ensure that both the server presenting the certificate and the clients consuming it trust the corresponding root CA.

This approach alleviates the need to upgrade server software to mitigate sunseting of Client Authentication ECU enforced by the Chrome Root Program Policy.

The following table, which shows examples of public root CAs and ECU types, is not an exhaustive list and is for illustrative purposes only.

CA Vendor	ECU Type	Root CA	Issuing/Sub CA
IdenTrust	clientAuth + serverAuth	IdenTrust Public Sector Root CA 1	IdenTrust Public Sector Server CA 1
IdenTrust	clientAuth	IdenTrust Public Sector Root CA 1	TrustID RSA ClientAuth CA 2
IdenTrust	serverAuth (browser trusted)	IdenTrust Commercial Root CA 1	HydrantID Server CA O1
DigiCert	clientAuth + serverAuth	DigiCert Assured ID Root G2	DigiCert Assured ID CA G2
DigiCert	clientAuth	DigiCert Assured ID Root G2	DigiCert Assured ID Client CA G2
DigiCert	serverAuth (browser trusted)	DigiCert Global Root G2	DigiCert Global G2 TLS RSA SHA256

Option 2. Renew Current Certificates to Extend Their Validity

Certificates that are issued by public root CAs before May 2026 that have both Server and Client Authentication ECU will continue to be honored until their term expires. However, it is best to renew combined ECU certificates before the policy sunseting occurs.

- Public CA policy and implementation dates may vary by vendor.
- Check with the CA and plan certificate renewal accordingly.
- After March 15th 2026, public CA-issued certificates are valid only for 200 days.
- Take into consideration that some public CAs have stopped issuing combined ECU certificates.

Option 3. Migrate to private PKI to issue combined ECU (Server and Client) Certificates


Evaluate the feasibility of transitioning to a Private Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and then set up a private

CA to issue single certificates with combined EKU (Server and Client certificates with the required EKUs).

Before issuing or deploying a certificate, ensure that both the server presenting the certificate and all clients consuming it trust the corresponding root CA.

Option 4. Get a publicly trusted certificate with only Client Authentication EKU

Some CAs, like SSL.com, offer dedicated **client authentication certificates**. These are separate from TLS certificates and typically used for enterprise authentication.

 **Caution:** For production environments, it is strongly recommended that customers use certificates with the appropriate EKU attributes. This practice ensures security, compatibility, and adherence to industry standards and best practices. Certificates without EKU attributes should only be considered as a temporary workaround, and only with a clear understanding of the associated risks.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Q1. Do I need to worry about this if I use a private PKI?

A: The policy enforced by private CAs is determined by each organization. If your private CA adopts the same issuance criteria—such as removing the Client Authentication EKU attribute from certificates—the guidelines provided in this document are applicable.

Q2. Can I continue using my existing certificates?

A: Yes, valid certificates with combined EKU can be used until the expiration time.

Q3. What options are available for integrating my FMC or FDM with ISE through pxGrid if the certificate installed on the FMC/FDM lack the Client Authentication EKU attribute?

A: Besides the workarounds proposed in this document, we highly recommend you to check the following ISE references:

- [Field Notice: FN74392 - Cisco Identity Services Engine: Impact on Secure Communications from Public CA Client Authentication EKU Changes Starting in May 2026 - Workaround Provided](#)
- [Prepare Identity Services Engine for Extended Key Usage Restrictions in Certificates Issued by Public Certification Authorities](#)

 **Note:** Even though the use of a Public CA-signed certificate is supported for IMS. Cisco recommends using the ISE Internal CA certificate since this communication is only for internal transactions.

Q4. What is the “Client Authentication” EKU and why was it in my certificate?

A: The “Client Authentication” EKU indicates a certificate can be used by a client to authenticate to a server. Some CAs historically included it in TLS certificates by default, but it was never required for normal website security.

Q5. My current TLS certificate says “Client Authentication” under its Extended Key Usage. Is it now invalid?

A: No, it remains valid. You don’t need to replace it immediately. When you renew, the new certificate simply won’t include the clientAuth EKU.

Q6. How can I check if a certificate has the clientAuth EKU?

A: You can inspect the certificate details using OpenSSL, PowerShell, or GUI tools to check for the **Extended Key Usage** extension.

Q7. Can I still get a publicly trusted certificate with only Client Authentication EKU?

A: Some CAs, like SSL.com, offer dedicated **client authentication certificates**. These are separate from TLS certificates and typically used for enterprise authentication.

Q8. Does this affect other EKUs or certificate types (code signing, email, etc.)?

A: No, this change is specific to **TLS server certificates**. Code signing and email certificates have their own EKU requirements.

Q9. Where can I see the official requirements about this change?

A: The [Google Chrome Root Program Policy](#) provides guidelines on the prohibition of the clientAuth EKU in TLS server certificates.

Q10. Is it safe to use certificates without Client and Server EKU attributes in my production environment?

A: For production environments, it is strongly recommended that customers use certificates with the appropriate EKU attributes. This practice ensures security, compatibility, and adherence to industry standards and best practices. Certificates without EKU attributes should only be considered as a temporary workaround, and only with a clear understanding of the associated risks.

Related Information

- For additional assistance, please contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). A valid support contract is required: [Cisco Worldwide Support Contacts](#).
- Cisco Support & Downloads: [Cisco Technical Support & Downloads](#)

Related Bugs

- [CSCwt94492](#) ENH: FMC should validate presence of Client Authentication ECU attribute in the client certificate used for pxGrid Integration
- [CSCwt94509](#) ENH: FMC should display a message indicating that the Client Authentication ECU attribute is required in the client certificate used for pxGrid integration
- [CSCwt61767](#) May 2026 ECU Server-Only Change - Issue ASA configuration warning if inadequate ECU
- [CSCws83036](#) ECU: Impact assesment of ClientAuth ECU enforcement in ISE

Cisco ISE References

- [Field Notice: FN74392 - Cisco Identity Services Engine: Impact on Secure Communications from Public CA Client Authentication ECU Changes Starting in May 2026 - Workaround Provided](#)
- [Prepare Identity Services Engine for Extended Key Usage Restrictions in Certificates Issued by Public Certification Authorities](#)

External References

- [Chrome Root Program Policy](#)
- [IdenTrust Portal](#)
- [SSL - Removal of the Client Authentication ECU from TLS Server Certificates – What You Need to Know](#)