Configure and Troubleshoot MKA Using Secure Client 5

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Introduction

This document describes the way in which you can configure MACsec encryption in an endpoint using Secure Client 5 as supplicant.

Prerequisites

Cisco recommends knowledge in these topics:

- Identity Services Engine
- 802.1x and Radius
- MACsec MKA encryption
- Secure Client version 5 (Formerly known as Anyconnect)

Components Used

The information in this document is based on these software and hardware versions:

• Identity Services Engine (ISE) version 3.3

- Catalyst 9300 version 17.06.05
- Cisco Secure Client 5.0.4032

Background information

MACSec (Media Access Control Security) is a network security standard that provides encryption and protection for Ethernet frames at layer 2 of the OSI model (Data Link), defined by the IEEE as a standard denominated 802.1AE.

MACSec supplies this encryption in a point-to-point connection that can be switch-to-switch or switch-to-host connections, hence the coverage of this standard is limited to wired connections.

This standard encrypts the entire data except for the Source and Destination MAC address of frames that are transmitted in a layer 2 connection.

The MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) protocol is the mechanism from where MACsec peers are going to negotiate the security keys that are needed to secure the link.

Configure

Network Diagram



Note: This documentation considers that you have already a set-up of rules configured and working

for Radius Authentication for the PCs devices and the Cisco IP phone. To setup a configuration from scratch, please refer to <u>ISE Secure Wired Access Prescriptive Deployment Guide</u> to review the configuration in Identity Services Engine and Switch for Identity-Based Network Access.

Setup of policies on ISE

The first task is to configure the corresponding authorization profiles that are applied for both PCs displayed in the preceding diagram (as well as the Cisco IP Phone).

In this hypothetical scenario, the PCs are going to use 802.1X protocol as the authentication method and the Cisco IP Phone uses Mac Address Bypass (MAB).

ISE communicates with the switch through Radius protocol about the attributes that the switch needs to enforce in the interface from where the endpoint is connected through a Radius session.

For MACsec encryption in hosts, the attribute required is cisco-av-pair = linksec-policy, which has these 3 possible values:

- **Should-not-Secure:** The switch does not perform MKA encryption in the interface where the Radius session is happening.
- **Must-Secure:** The switch needs to enforce encryption in the traffic linked with the Radius session, if the MKA session fails or has a timeout the connection is considered as authorization failure, there is a retrial of MKA session establishment.
- **Should-Secure:** The switch attempts to perform MKA encryption, if the MKA session linked to the Radius session is successful the traffic is encrypted, if the MKA fails or times out, the switch allows that unencrypted traffic linked to that Radius session.

Step 1. As considered in the previous information, in both PCs you can enforce a **should-secure** MKA policy to have flexibility in case a machine with no MKA capabilities connects to the interface Ten 1/0/1.

As an option you can configure a policy for PC2 that enforces a must-secure policy.

In this example configure the policy for the PCs as in **Policy > Policy Elements > Results > Authorization Profiles** then +**Add** or **Edit** an existing profile

≡ :#	sco ^{alt} Identity Servic	es Engine	P
щ	Dictionaries Co	onditions	Results
	Authentication	>	Standard Authorization Profiles
16	Authorization	~	Standard Authonzation Fromes
×	Authorization Profil	es	For Policy Export go to Administration > System > Backup & Restore > Pol
U	Downloadable ACL	S	🖉 Edit 🕂 Add 🖺 Duplicate 🍵 Delete

Step 2. Complete or customize the fields required for the profile.

Ensure that in Common Tasks you have selected **MACSec Policy** and the corresponding policy to apply.

Scroll down and **Save** the configuration.

=	dentity Services Engine	
н	Dictionaries Conditions	Results
15 15	Authentication >	Authorization Profiles > WIRED_CORPORTATE_MKA
*	Authorization ~	* Name WIRED_CORPORTATE_MKA
0	Downloadable ACLs	Description
-file	Profiling >	* Access Type ACCESS_ACCEPT ~
(?)	Client Provisioning >	Network Device Profile 🗰 Cisco 🗸 🕀
•		Service Template □ Track Movement □ Agentless Posture □ Passive Identity Tracking □
		✓ Common Tasks ✓ MACSec Policy should-secure ✓
		NEAT Interface Template Web Authentication (Local Web Auth)
		✓ Advanced Attributes Settings
		ii Select an item ~ ~ - +
		× Attributos Dotails
		Access Type = ACCESS_ACCEPT DACL = PERMIT_ALL_IPV4_TRAFFIC clsco-av-pair = linksec-policy=should-secure

Step 3. Assign the corresponding authorization profile to the authorization rules that are hit by the devices.

This action needs to be done in **Policy > Policy Sets > (Select Policy Set assigned) > Authorization Policy.**

Associate the authorization rule with the authorization profile with MACsec Settings. Scroll down **Save** your configuration.

≡	dentity Services Eng	jine		Policy / Policy Sets			
н	Bookmarks	Policy Sets→ WIRED DOT1X ACCE	SS				
51	Dashboard	Status Policy Set Name	Conditions				
1d	Context Visibility	0.5					
×	Operations	Q Search					
0	Policy	WIRED DOT1X ACCESS		E Wired_802.1X			
80	Administration						
ก็ไ	Work Centers	> Authorization Policy - Local Exceptions					
		> Authorization Policy - Global Exceptions	0				
٢	Interactive Help	~Authorization Policy(3)					
					Results		
		📀 Status Rule Name	Conditions		Profiles		
Q Search							
		ADMIN ACCESS	AND Network	Access-EapTunnel EQUALS PEAP	WIRED_CORPORATE_MKA		
			A SSPTSEC	MEX-ExternalGroups EQUALS ssptsec.mex/Builtin/Administrators			

Setup of MKA in Catalyst 9300

Step 1. Configure a new MKA policy as this example suggests:

```
!
mka policy MKA_PC
key-server priority 0
no delay-protection
macsec-cipher-suite gcm-aes-128
confidentiality-offset 0
sak-rekey on-live-peer-loss
sak-rekey interval 0
no send-secure-announcements
no include-icv-indicator
no use-updated-eth-header
no ssci-based-on-sci
!
```

Step 2. Enable MACsec encryption in the interface where the PCs are connected.

```
!
interface TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1
macsec
mka policy MKA_PC
!
```

Note: For further information related to the commands and options in MKA configuration, please review the Security configuration guide corresponding the version of switch you use. In this scenario for this example, <u>Security Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Bengaluru 17.6.x (Catalyst 9300 Switches)</u>

Setup of MKA using Network Access Manager Profile Editor.

Step 1. Download and open the Profile Editor from the Ciscoâ€TMs download website that matches the version of Secure Client that you are using.

Once you have installed this program in your computer, proceed to open the **Cisco Secure Client Profile Editor – Network Access Manager.**



Step 2. Select the option **File > Open**.

P	Cisco Secure Client Profile Editor - Network Access Manager -								
File	Help	lelp							
	New	ss Manager	Client Policy						
	Open	cy ation Policy	Profile: Untitled						
	Save	addiffolicy	Connection Settings						
	Save As Broups	Default Connection Timeout (sec.) 40							
	Exit		Connection Attempt:						
		_	O Before user logon						

Step 3. Select the folder system that is being displayed in this image. Within this folder open the file named configuration.xml.

📴 Open		×
Look in:	system ~	🏂 📂 🛄 •
Recent Items	Local Disk (C:) ProgramData Application Data Cisco Cisco Secure Client	
Desktop	Network Access Manager system DVD Drive (D:)	
Documents		
This PC		
I	File name:	Open
Network	Files of type: All Files	✓ Cancel

Step 4. Once the file has been loaded by the Profile Editor, select the option **Authentication Policy**, and ensure that the option related to 802.1x with MACSec is enabled.

📳 Cisco Secure Client Profile Editor - Network Access Manager

File Help



Step 5. Proceed to the section **Networks**, in this part you can **Add** a new profile for a wired connection or **Edit** the default wired profile that is installed with Secure Client 5.0.

In this scenario, we are going to Edit the existing wired profile.

📴 Cisco Secure Client Profile	Editor - Network Ac	cess Manager		-			
File Help							
Network Access Manager	Networks Profile:ecure Client\Network Access Manager\system\configuration.xml						
Networks	Network						
	Name	Media Type	Group*				
	wired	Wired	Global				
				Add			
				Edit			
				Delete			

Step 6. Configure the profile. In the section **Security Level**, adjust the **Key Management** to use MKA followed by an encryption AES GCM 128.

Adjust the other parameters for the authentication dot1x and policies as well.

📳 Cisco Secure Client Profile Editor - Network Access Manager

Network Access Manager Client Policy Authentication Policy	Networks Profile:ecure Client\Network Access Manager\system\configuration.xml							
	Security Level	Open Network						
	Open networks have the least secure typ	e no security, and are o be of network.	pen to anybody within range.	. This is				
	Authenticating Netv Authenticating netw	vork vorks provide the bighes	t level of security and are per	fect for				
	enterprise level net	works. Authentication r	networks require radius server	rs, and				
	other network infras	structure.						
	802.1X Settings authPeriod (sec.)	30	startPeriod (sec.)	3				
	authPeriod (sec.)	30	startPeriod (sec.)	3				
	heldPeriod (sec.)	60	maxStart	2				
		Port Authenti	cation Exception Policy					
		Enable p	ort exceptions					
	Security	Allow data traffic after authentication even if						
	MKA		nt fails					
	AES GCM 128		Success but key managemen					
		Next	Cancel					

Step 7. Configure the remaining sections concerning Connection Type, User Auth and Credentials.

Those sections vary depending upon the authentication settings that you select in the Security Level section.

When you finish with the configurations select the option Done.

For this scenario we are using **Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP)** with user credentials.

📴 Cisco Secure Client Profile Editor - Network Access Manager

Networks	User Identity						
🔆 🔆 Network Groups	Unprotected Identity Pattern:	anonymous					
	Protected Identity Pattern:	[username]					
	User Credentials						
	Use Single Sign On Credential	s					
	O Prompt for Credentials						
	O Remember Forever						
	Remember while User	r is Logged On					
	Never Remember						
	O Use Static Credentials						
	Password:						

Step 8. Navigate to the menu File. Proceed with Save as option.

Name the file as configuration.xml and save in a different folder from ProgramData\Cisco\Cisco Secure Client\Network Access Manager\system.

In this example the file was saved in the Documents folder. Save the profile.

📴 Save					×
Save in:	E Document	ş	~	ø 🕫 🖽	-
	📃 Desktop		>		
9-	This PC				
	🔰 3D Ob	ects			
Recent Items	E. Deskto	p			
	🗄 Docum	ents			
	- Downle	oads			
Dealthan	Music				
Desktop	Picture Picture	s	×		
Documents					
This PC					
- (File name:	configuration.xml			Save
Network	Files of type:	All Files		~	Cancel

Step 8. Proceed to the profile location, copy the file, and replace the file that is contained in the folder ProgramData\Cisco\Cisco Secure Client\Network Access Manager\system.

Select the **Replace the file in destination** option.

-	Replace or Skip Files	-	×
	Copying 1 item from Documents to system The destination already has a file named "configuration.xml"		
	\checkmark Replace the file in the destination		
	Skip this file		
	Compare info for both files		
	⊘ More details		

Step 9. To load the profile modified in the Security Client 5.0, select with a right click the **Secure Client** icon located in the right lower taskbar of your Windows machine.

Perform a Network Repair.

~	Open Cisco Secure Client Show Notifications
	Network Network Repair
	Ábout

Note: All the networks configured through the profile editor have privileges of Administrator Network, hence the users are not able to customize/change the content that you configured using this tool.

Setup of MKA networks using Network Access Manager (optional).

Step 1. As an alternative to the MKA setup using the Profile Editor, you can add networks without the use of this tool.

From the Secure Client suite select the gear icon.



Step 2. In the new window displayed, select the option Network.

In the Configuration section select the option **Add** to ingress a network MKA capable with privileges User Network.

uluilu cisco	Secure (Client					
Status Overvie	ew	Network A	ccess Mana	iger			
Network	>	Configuration	Log Settings	Statistics	Message History		
ISE Posture					Netwo	ork Service: Wi-Fi:	Enabled No Wi-Fi adapters
		Saved Netw Name wired	orks:	SSID			
Collect diagnost installed Diag	ic information for all components. mostics	٢		Ad	d	Edit	> Remove

Step 3. In the new configuration window, set up the characteristics of your connection and name the network.

When finished select the **OK** button.

_

Cisco Secure Client

Enter information for the connection.							
Media:	() Wi-Fi	 Wired Connect Automatically Hidden Network Allow Connection Before Logon 					
Descriptive SSID: Security:	e Name:	MKA_USER]				
802. 1X Co	nfiguration	> PEAP →	1				
MACsec Cij	phers CM-128	AES-GCM-256 OK Cancel]				

Verify

Validation on ISE

In ISE, upon the completion of the configuration of this flow, you see the device being authenticated and authorized in Livelogs.

≡	dentity Services i	Engine							Operations /	RADIUS					
н	Bookmarks	Live Log	gs Live Sess	ions											
5	Dashboard														
ιđ	Context Visibility	Mis	configured Supplic	cants 💿			Misconfigured	l Network Devices 🕕		RA	DIUS Drops 🕧				Client S
×	Operations		0					0			4				
0	Policy														
8.	Administration														
di.	Work Centers	ø	Second Repeat C	Counts 🖒 Expo	n To 🧡										
			Time	Status	Details	Repea	Identity	Endpoint ID	Authentication Policy	Authori	Authoriz	IP Address		Network De	Device
3	Interactive Help	>	<				Identity	Endpoint ID	Authentication Policy	Authorizat	Authorizatic	IP Address	×	Network Device	Device
			Aug 05, 2023	•	0	0	roy	8C:4A:56:02:AC:	WRED DOT1X ACCESS	WIRED D	WRED_A				TenGigal
			Aug 05, 2023		ō.		RACSACLE-IP+							switch1	
			Aug 05, 2023	•	0		roy	BC:4A:56:02:AD:	WIRED DOT1X ACCESS	WRED 0	WIRED_A			switch1	TenGigal

Navigate in the **Details** of the authentication and the **Result** section.

The attributes set in the authorization profile are sent to the **Network Access Device (NAD)** as well as the consumption of one Essential license.

 \times

cisco-av-pair	linksec-policy=should-secure
cisco-av-pair	ACS:CiscoSecure-Defined-ACL=#ACSACL#-IP- PERMIT_ALL_IPV4_TRAFFIC-57f6b0d3
MS-MPPE-Send-Key	***
MS-MPPE-Recv-Key	***
LicenseTypes	Essential license consumed.

Validation on the Catalyst switch.

These commands can be used to validate the proper functionality of this solution.

switch1#show mka policy

```
switch1#show mka policy
MKA Policy defaults :
         Send-Secure-Announcements: DISABLED
MKA Policy Summary...
Codes : CO - Confidentiality Offset, ICVIND - Include ICV-Indicator,
        SAKR OLPL - SAK-Rekey On-Live-Peer-Loss,
        DP - Delay Protect, KS Prio - Key Server Priority
Policy
                  KS
                              CO SAKR
                                       ICVIND Cipher
                                                               Interfac
                        DP
Name
                  Prio
                                 0LPL
                                               Suite(s)
                                                               Applied
*DEFAULT POLICY*
                        FALSE 0
                                 FALSE TRUE
                                               GCM-AES-128
                  0
MKA_PC
                                                               Te1/0/1
                        FALSE 0
                                 FALSE FALSE
                                               GCM-AES-128
                  0
```

switch1#show mka session

switch1#show	/ mka session							
Total MKA Sessions 2 Secured Sessions 2 Pending Sessions 0								
Interface	Local-TxSCI	Policy—Name	Inherited	Key–Ser				
Port-ID	Peer-RxSCI	MACsec—Peers	Status	CKN				
Te1/0/1	ac7a.5646.4d01/0002	МКА_РС	NO	YES				
2	bc4a.5602.ac25/0000	1	Secured	60E8BC2				
Te1/0/2	ac7a.5646.4d02/0002	MKA_PC	NO	YES				
2	bc4a.5602.ac26/0000	1	Secured	C793008				

switch1#show authentication session interface <interface_ID> detail

switch1#show authentica	tion session inte	rface ten 1/0/2 detail	
Interface:	TenGigabitEthern	et1/0/2	
IIF-ID:	0x19FA2D8B		
MAC Address:	bc4a.5602.ac26		
IPv6 Address:			
IPv4 Address:			
User-Name:	alice		
Status:	Authorized		
Domain:	DATA		
Oper host mode:	multi-domain		
Oper control dir:	both		
Session timeout:	N/A		
Common Session ID:	C5AA580A00000030	CD72CFE6	
Acct Session ID:	0x00000017		
Handle:	0x62000016		
Current Policy:	POLICY_Te1/0/2		
Local Policies:		C POLITCY SHOULD SECURE (DESC	ity 150)
Service remptat	Let DEFAULT_LINKSE	-rolici_should_secore (prior	119 130)
Server Policies:			
Security Policy:	Should Secure		
ACS ACL:	#ACSACL#-IP-PERMI	I_ALL_IPV4_TRAFFIC-57f6b0d3	
Security Status:	Link Secured		
Method status list:	.		
Method	State		
dot1x	Authc Success		
Interface:	TenGigabitEthern	et1/0/2	
IIF-ID:	0x101218F4		
MAC Address:	d4ad.bd2a.cbab		
IPv6 Address:			
IPv4 Address:		_	
User-Name:	D4-AD-BD-2A-CB-A	B	
Status:	Authorized		
Domain:	VOICE		
Oper host mode:	multi-domain		
Oper control dir:	both		
Session timeout:	N/A		
Common Session ID:	C5AA580A00000040	CD8001B3	
Acct Session ID:	0x0000001a		
Handle:	0xa1000018		
Current Policy:	POLICY_Te1/0/2		
Local Policies:			ity 150)
Security Policy	Should Secure	POLICI_SHOULD_SECORE (prior)	ICY 150)
Security Status:	Link Unsecured		
Comuon Dolinion			
ACS ACL:	xACSACLx-IP-DENY_	ALL_IPV4_TRAFFIC-57f6b0d3	
Nothed status list.			
Method status list:			
	State		
Method	State		

Validation on Secure Client.

The authentication is successful with the profile that you created with MACsec encryption. If you click in the

: This section covers the troubleshooting part related to MKA problems that can emerge. If you face an authentication or authorization failure, please refer to <u>ISE Secure Wired Access</u> <u>Prescriptive Deployment Guide - Troubleshooting</u> to investigate further as this guide assumes the authentications are working fine without MACsec encryption.

Cisco Secure Endpoint

- Enable DART module in the Secure Endpoint suite.
- In this menu, enable Extended Logging to gather more data about the user MKA connection. You can additionally enable a packet capture that is contained in the DART bundle.

Sisco Secure Client	— (
cisco Secure	Client
Status Overview	Network Access Manager
Network >	Configuration Log Settings Statistics Message History
ISE Posture	Use extended logging to collect additional information about product operations.
	IHV: Off ✓ Filter Driver: Off ✓ Credential Provider Packet Capture Maximum Packet Capture File Size (MB): 10
Collect diagnostic information for all installed components. Diagnostics	

• Collect DART bundle to proceed with analysis of configuration.xml and Network access Manager. Refer to the documentation <u>Run DART to Gather Data for Troubleshooting</u>

This example displays how the packets are seen as the information between the host and the switch is encrypted :

Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
C1SCO_02:ac:25	Nearest-non-IPMK-D	EAPUL-MKA	150	MACSEC SAK USE, LIVE PEER LIST, ICV
Cisco_46:4d:01	Nearest-non-TPMR-b	EAPOL-MKA	146	Key Server, MACsec SAK Use, Live Pe
Cisco_02:ac:25	Nearest-non-TPMR-b	EAPOL-MKA	150	MACsec SAK Use, Live Peer List, ICV
Cisco_46:4d:01	Nearest-non-TPMR-b	EAPOL-MKA	146	Key Server, MACsec SAK Use, Live Pe
Cisco_02:ac:25	Nearest-non-TPMR-b	EAPOL-MKA	150	MACsec SAK Use, Live Peer List, ICV
Cisco_46:4d:01	Nearest-non-TPMR-b	EAPOL-MKA	146	Key Server, MACsec SAK Use, Live Pe
Cisco_02:ac:25	Nearest-non-TPMR-b	EAPOL-MKA	150	MACsec SAK Use, Live Peer List, ICV
Cisco_46:4d:01	Nearest-non-TPMR-b	EAPOL-MKA	146	Key Server, MACsec SAK Use, Live Pe
Cisco_02:ac:25	Nearest-non-TPMR-b	EAPOL-MKA	150	MACsec SAK Use, Live Peer List, ICV
Cisco_46:4d:01	Nearest-non-TPMR-b	EAPOL-MKA	146	Key Server, MACsec SAK Use, Live Pe
Cisco_02:ac:25	Nearest-non-TPMR-b	EAPOL-MKA	150	MACsec SAK Use, Live Peer List, ICV
Cisco_46:4d:01	Nearest-non-TPMR-b	EAPOL-MKA	146	Key Server, MACsec SAK Use, Live Pe
		(+-) 150 h		-tured (1900 Lite)
> Frame 15160: 150	bytes on wire (1200 b	its), 150 b	ytes ca	ptured (1200 bits)
<pre>> Frame 15160: 150 > Ethernet II, Src:</pre>	bytes on wire (1200 b Cisco_02:ac:25 (bc:4	its), 150 b a:56:02:ac:	ytes ca 25), Ds	ptured (1200 bits) t: Nearest-non-TPMR-bridge (01:80:c2
<pre>> Frame 15160: 150 > Ethernet II, Src: > 802.1X Authentica</pre>	bytes on wire (1200 b Cisco_02:ac:25 (bc:4 ation	its), 150 b a:56:02:ac:	ytes ca 25), Ds	ptured (1200 bits) t: Nearest-non-TPMR-bridge (01:80:c2
<pre>> Frame 15160: 150 > Ethernet II, Src: > 802.1X Authentica Version: 802.1</pre>	bytes on wire (1200 b Cisco_02:ac:25 (bc:44 ation X-2010 (3)	its), 150 b a:56:02:ac:	ytes ca 25), Ds [:]	ptured (1200 bits) t: Nearest-non-TPMR-bridge (01:80:c2
 > Frame 15160: 150 > Ethernet II, Src: > 802.1X Authentication: 802.1 Type: MKA (5) 	bytes on wire (1200 b Cisco_02:ac:25 (bc:44 ation X-2010 (3)	its), 150 b a:56:02:ac:	ytes ca 25), Ds	ptured (1200 bits) t: Nearest-non-TPMR-bridge (01:80:c2
<pre>> Frame 15160: 150 > Ethernet II, Src: > 802.1X Authentica Version: 802.12 Type: MKA (5) Length: 132</pre>	bytes on wire (1200 b Cisco_02:ac:25 (bc:4 ation X-2010 (3)	its), 150 b a:56:02:ac:	ytes ca 25), Ds [.]	ptured (1200 bits) t: Nearest-non-TPMR-bridge (01:80:c2
<pre>> Frame 15160: 150 > Ethernet II, Src: < 802.1X Authentica Version: 802.11 Type: MKA (5) Length: 132 < MACsec Key Agreem</pre>	bytes on wire (1200 b : Cisco_02:ac:25 (bc:4) ation X-2010 (3) ment	its), 150 b a:56:02:ac:	ytes ca 25), Ds [.]	ptured (1200 bits) t: Nearest-non-TPMR-bridge (01:80:c2
 > Frame 15160: 150 > Ethernet II, Src: > 802.1X Authentication > Version: 802.12 Type: MKA (5) Length: 132 > MACsec Key Agreentication > Basic Parameterication 	bytes on wire (1200 b Cisco_02:ac:25 (bc:44 ation X-2010 (3) ment r set	its), 150 b a:56:02:ac:	ytes ca 25), Ds	ptured (1200 bits) t: Nearest-non-TPMR-bridge (01:80:c2
<pre>> Frame 15160: 150 > Ethernet II, Src: > 802.1X Authentica Version: 802.1 Type: MKA (5) Length: 132 > MACsec Key Agreem > Basic Paramete > MACsec SAK Use</pre>	bytes on wire (1200 b Cisco_02:ac:25 (bc:4 ation X-2010 (3) ment r set parameter set	its), 150 b a:56:02:ac:	oytes ca 25), Ds [.]	ptured (1200 bits) t: Nearest-non-TPMR-bridge (01:80:c2
<pre>> Frame 15160: 150 > Ethernet II, Src: < 802.1X Authentica Version: 802.1 Type: MKA (5) Length: 132 < MACsec Key Agreem > Basic Paramete > MACsec SAK Use > Live Peer List</pre>	bytes on wire (1200 b : Cisco_02:ac:25 (bc:4) ation X-2010 (3) ment r set parameter set Parameter set	its), 150 b a:56:02:ac:	oytes ca 25), Ds [.]	ptured (1200 bits) t: Nearest-non-TPMR-bridge (01:80:c2
<pre>> Frame 15160: 150 > Ethernet II, Src: < 802.1X Authentica Version: 802.1 Type: MKA (5) Length: 132 < MACsec Key Agreem > Basic Paramete > MACsec SAK Use > Live Peer List > Integrity Chec</pre>	bytes on wire (1200 b Cisco_02:ac:25 (bc:4) ation X-2010 (3) ment r set parameter set Parameter set k Value Indicato <u>r</u>	its), 150 b a:56:02:ac:	ytes ca 25), Ds [.]	ptured (1200 bits) t: Nearest-non-TPMR-bridge (01:80:c2

From the DART bundle, we can find useful information for the authentication 802.1X and the MKA session in the log named **NetworkAccessManager.txt.**

This information is displayed in a successful Authentication with MKA encryption.

```
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: PORT (1) net: RECV (status: UP, AUTO) (portMsg.c 709)
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: 8021X (2) RECEIVED SUCCESS (dot1x_util.c 326)
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: STATE (2) current state = AUTHENTICATING (dot1x_sm.c 323)
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: STATE (2) S_enterStateAux called with state = AUTHENTICATIN
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: STATE (2) staying in 802.1x state: AUTHENTICATING (dot1x_sr
%csc nam-7-DEBUG MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: 8021X (2) smTimer: sec=30 (dot1x util.c 454)
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: STATE (2) eap_type<0>, lengths<4,1496> (dot1x_proto.c 90)
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: 8021X (2) smTimer: paused (dot1x_util.c 484)
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: EAP (0) Received EAP-Success. (eap_auth_client.c 835)
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: EAP (0) tlsAuthOnAuthEnd: clear TLS session (eap_auth_tls_d
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: EAP (0) tlsAuthOnAuthEnd: successful authentication, save p
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: EAP (3) new credential list saved (eapRequest.c 1485)
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: EAP (3) EAP status: AC_EAP_STATUS_EAP_SUCCESS (eapMessage.o
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028]: EAP-CB: EAP status notification: session-id=1, handle=04B2DD44, statu
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028]: EAP-CB: sending EapStatusEvent...
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: PORT (2) EAP response received. <len:400> <res:2> (dot1x_pi
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=2716]: EAP: ...received EapStatusEvent: session-id=1, EAP handle=04B2DD44, s
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: 8021X (2) smTimer: activated (dot1x_util.c 503)
%csc_nam-6-INFO_MSG: %[tid=2716]: EAP: Eap status AC_EAP_STATUS_EAP_SUCCESS.
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: STATE (2) current state = AUTHENTICATING (dot1x_sm.c 323)
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=2716]: EAP: processing EapStatusEvent in the subscriber
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: STATE (2) dot1x->eapSuccess is True (dot1x_sm.c 352)
%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=2716]: Auth[wired:user-auth]: Enabling fast reauthentication
```

%csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: STATE (2) SUCCESS (dot1x_sm.c 358) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: STATE (2) S_enterStateAux called with state = AUTHENTICATE %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: STATE (2) S_enterStateAux calling sm8Event8021x due to auth %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: 8021X (2) smTimer: disabled (dot1x_util.c 460) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: MKA (0) NASP: dot1xAuthSuccessEvt naspStopEapolAnnouncement %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: NASP (0) >> NASP: naspStopEapolAnnouncement (nasp.c 900) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: NASP (0) << NASP: naspStopEapolAnnouncement. err = 0 (nasp</pre> %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: 8021X (2) dot1x->config.useMka = 1 (dot1x_main.c 829) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: INF (2) >> MKA: StartSession (mka.c 511) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: MKA (2) MKA: bUseMka = 1, bUseMacSec = 1706033334, MacsecSu %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: MKA (2) >> MKA: InitializeContext (mka.c 1247) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: INF (2) MKA: Changing state to Unconnected (mka.c 1867) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: INF (2) MKA: Changing Sak State to Idle (mka.c 1271) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=2716]: Auth[wired:user-auth]: Fast reauthentication enabled on authenticatio %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: MKA (2) << MKA: InitializeContext (mka.c 1293) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: MKA (2) MKA: Changing state to Need Server (mka.c 1871) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=2716]: Auth[wired:user-auth]: Sending NOTIFICATION__SUCCESS to subscribers %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: INF (2) >> MKA: CreateKeySet (mka.c 924) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=2716]: Network auth request NOTIFICATION__SUCCESS %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: NASP (0) >> NASP: naspGetNetCipherSuite (nasp.c 569) %csc nam-6-INFO MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: MKA (2) MKA: Key length is 16 bytes (mka.c 954) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=2716]: Auth[wired:user-auth]: Finishing authentication %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: MKA (2) MKA: MyMac (mka.c 971) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=2716]: Auth[wired:user-auth]: Authentication finished %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: API (1) event: STATUS - AC_PORT_STATUS_EAP_SUCCESS (portWork) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: API (1) event: complete (portWorkList.c 130) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: API (1) event: STATUS - AC_PORT_STATUS_MKA_UNCONNECTED (point of the second %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: API (1) event: complete (portWorkList.c 130) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: API (1) event: STATUS - AC_PORT_STATUS_MKA_NEED_SERVER (point of the second %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: API (1) event: complete (portWorkList.c 130) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=8140][comp=SAE]: NET (0) SscfCallback(1): SSCF_NOTIFICATION_CODE_SEND_PACKE %csc nam-7-DEBUG MSG: %[tid=8140][comp=SAE]: NET (0) CIMD Event: evtSeg#=0 msg=4 ifIndex=1 len=36 (cimdf %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=8140][comp=SAE]: NET (1) cdiEvt:(3,0) dataLen=4 (cimdEvt.c 358) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=8140][comp=SAE]: NET (1) cdiEvt:(3,1) dataLen=102 (cimdEvt.c 358) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=8140][comp=SAE]: NET (1) netEvent(1): Recv queued (netEvents.c 91) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: PORT (1) net: RECV (status: UP, AUTO) (portMsg.c 709) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: MKA (2) >> MKA: EapolInput (mka.c 125) %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9028][comp=SAE]: MKA (2) MKA: MKPDU In (mka.c 131)

Cisco IOS Troubleshooting

These commands can be implemented in the **Network Access Device** (**NAD**) to review the MKA encryption between the platform and the supplicant.

For further information on the commands, review the corresponding configuration guide of the platform used as NAD.

```
#show authentication session interface <interface_ID> detail
#show mka summary
#show mka policy
#show mka session interface <interface_ID> detail
#show macsec summary
#show macsec interface <interface_ID>
#debug mka events
#debug mka errors
#debug macsec event
#debug macsec error
```

These are debugs of one successfull MKA connection to a host. You can use this as a reference comes up :

```
%LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1, changed state to down
Macsec interface TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1 is UP
MKA-EVENT: Create session event: derived CKN 9F0DC198A9728FB3DA198711B58570E4, len 16
MKA-EVENT EC000025: SESSION START request received...
NGWC-MACSec: pd get port capability is invoked
MKA-EVENT: New MKA Session on Interface TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1 with Physical Port Number 9 is using the
MKA-EVENT: New VP with SCI AC7A.5646.4D01/0002 on interface TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1
MKA-EVENT: Created New CA 0x80007F30A6B46F20 Participant on interface TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1 with SCI /
%MKA-5-SESSION_START: (Te1/0/1 : 2) MKA Session started for RxSCI bc4a.5602.ac25/0000, AuditSessionID C
MKA-EVENT: Started a new MKA Session on interface TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1 for Peer MAC bc4a.5602.ac25 w
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: FSM (Init MKA Session) - Successfully derived CAK.
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: Successfully initialized a new MKA Session (i.e. CA entry) on in
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: FSM (Derive KEK/ICK) - Successfully derived KEK...
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: FSM (Derive KEK/ICK) - Successfully derived ICK...
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: New Live Peer detected, No potential peer so generate the first
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: >> FSM - Generate SAK for CA with CKN 9F0DC198 (Latest AN=0, Old
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: Generation of new Latest SAK succeeded (Latest AN=0, KN=1)...
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: >> FSM - Install RxSA for CA with CKN 9F0DC198 on VP with SCI AC
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: Clean up the Rx for dormant peers
MACSec-IPC: send_xable send msg success for switch=1
MACSec-IPC: blocking enable disable ipc req
MACSec-IPC: watched boolean waken up
MACSec-IPC: geting switch number
MACSec-IPC: switch number is 1
MACSec-IPC: create_tx_sc send msg success
Send create_tx_sc to IOMD successfully
alloc_cache called TxSCI: AC7A56464D010002 RxSCI: BC4A5602AC250000
Enabling replication for slot 1 vlan 330 and the ref count is 1
MACSec-IPC: vlan_replication send msg success
Added replication for data vlan 330
MACSec-IPC: geting switch number
MACSec-IPC: switch number is 1
MACSec-IPC: create_rx_sc send msg success
Sent RXSC request to FED/IOMD
MACSec-IPC: geting switch number
MACSec-IPC: switch number is 1
MACSec-IPC: install_rx_sa send msg success
Sent ins_rx_sa to FED and IOMD
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: Requested to install/enable new RxSA successfully (AN=0, KN=1 SC
%LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1, changed state to up
%LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface Vlan330, changed state to up
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: Sending SAK for AN 0 resp peers 0 cap peers 1
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: SAK Wait Timer started for 6 seconds.
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: (KS) Received new SAK-Use response to Distributed SAK for AN 0,
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: (KS) All 1 peers with the required MACsec Capability have indica
MKA-EVENT: Reqd to Install TX SA for CA 0x80007F30A6B46F20 AN 0 CKN 9F0DC198 - on int(TenGigabitEthernet
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: >> FSM - Install TxSA for CA with CKN 9F0DC198 on VP with SCI AC
MACSec-IPC: geting switch number
MACSec-IPC: switch number is 1
MACSec-IPC: install_tx_sa send msg success
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: Before sending SESSION_SECURED status - SECURED=false, PREVIOUS
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: Successfully sent SECURED status for CA with CKN 9F0DC198.
MKA-EVENT: Successfully updated the CKN handle for interface: TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1 with 9F0DC198 (if
%MKA-5-SESSION_SECURED: (Te1/0/1 : 2) MKA Session was secured for RxSCI bc4a.5602.ac25/0000, AuditSession
MKA-EVENT: MSK found to be same while updating the MSK and EAP Session ID in the subblock
MKA-EVENT bc4a.5602.ac25/0000 EC000025: After sending SESSION_SECURED status - SECURED=true, PREVIOUSLY_
```

Identity Services Engine (ISE) Troubleshooting

The troubleshooting related to this feature is limited to the delivery of the cisco-av-pair attribute **linksec-policy=should-secure.**

Ensure that the authorization result is sending that information to the Radius session linked to the switchports where the devices are being connected.

For further authentication analysis on ISE refer to Troubleshoot and Enable Debugs on ISE

Common Problems

Cipher mismatch

This log can be seen in the MKA debugs in the NAD.

MKA-4-MKA_MACSEC_CIPHER_MISMATCH: (Te1/0/1 : 30) Lower strength MKA-cipher than macsec-cipher for RxSCI

The first thing to verify in this scenario is that the ciphers configured in the MKA policy in the switch and in the Secure Client profile match.

For the case of AES-GCM-256 encryption, these requirements need to be met as per the documentation <u>Cisco Secure Client (including AnyConnect) Administrator Guide, Release 5</u>

Inability to save the configuration.xml.

Profile Write Error				
\bigotimes	Unable to sign and write the profil	le.		
	ОК			

This problem related to Profile Write Error is solved by saving the configuration.xml (as described earlier) named Setup of MKA using Network Access Manager Profile Editor.

The error is related that the file configuration.xml in used cannot be modified, hence you need to save the file in another location to proceed next with the replacement of the profiles.

Related information

- Configuring MACsec Encryption
- <u>Configuring MACsec Switch to Host with Cat9k & ISE</u>