Configure Machine and User Authentication with EAP-TTLS

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Introduction

This document describes how to configure machine and user authentication with EAP-TTLS (EAP-MSCHAPv2) on Secure Client NAM and Cisco ISE.

Prerequisites

Requirements

Cisco recommends that you have knowledge of these topics before proceeding with this deployment:

- Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE)
- Secure Client Network Analysis Module (NAM)
- EAP Protocols


Components Used

The information in this document is based on these software and hardware versions:

- Identity Services Engine (ISE) version 3.4
- C9300 switch with Cisco IOS® XE Software, Version 16.12.01
- Windows 10 Pro Version 22H2 Built 19045.3930

The information in this document was created from the devices in a specific lab environment. All of the devices used in this document started with a cleared (default) configuration. If your network is live, ensure that you understand the potential impact of any command.

Network Topology



Network Topology

Configure


Configurations

Part 1: Download and Install Secure Client NAM (Network Access Manager)

Step 1. Go to Cisco Software Download. In the product search bar, enter Secure Client 5.

This configuration example uses version **5.1.11.388**. The installation is performed using the **pre-deploy method**.

On the download page, locate and download Cisco Secure Client Pre-Deployment Package (Windows).




Note: Cisco AnyConnect has been deprecated and is no longer available on the Cisco Software Download site.

Step 2. Once downloaded and extracted, click**Setup**.

Profiles	File folder					8/14/2025 4:55 PM	
Setup	File folder					8/14/2025 4:56 PM	
😽 cisco-secure-client-win-2.9.0-thou	Windows Installer Package	10,172 KB	No	11,204 K	B 10%	8/14/2025 4:04 PM	
🔂 cisco-secure-client-win-5.1.11.388	Windows Installer Package	19,886 KB	No	22,535 K	B 12%	8/14/2025 4:47 PM	
🔂 cisco-secure-client-win-5.1.11.388	Windows Installer Package	5,404 KB	No	6,956 Ki	B 23%	8/14/2025 4:48 PM	
🔂 cisco-secure-client-win-5.1.11.388	Windows Installer Package	3,470 KB	No	4,738 K	B 27%	8/14/2025 4:31 PM	
🔂 cisco-secure-client-win-5.1.11.388	Windows Installer Package	5,289 KB	No	7,136 K	B 26%	8/14/2025 4:28 PM	
🔂 cisco-secure-client-win-5.1.11.388	Windows Installer Package	22,159 KB	No	24,112 K	B 9%	8/14/2025 4:42 PM	
🔂 cisco-secure-client-win-5.1.11.388	Windows Installer Package	32,457 KB	No	34,035 K	B 5%	8/14/2025 4:27 PM	
😽 cisco-secure-client-win-5.1.11.388	Windows Installer Package	2,080 KB	No	3,082 Ki	B 33%	8/14/2025 4:49 PM	
🔂 cisco-secure-client-win-5.1.11.388	Windows Installer Package	3,955 KB	No	5,287 K	B 26%	8/14/2025 4:39 PM	
🔂 cisco-secure-client-win-5.1.11.214	Windows Installer Package	26,383 KB	No	31,876 K	B 18%	8/14/2025 4:04 PM	
■ Setup	Application	375 KB	No	1,011 K	B 63%	8/14/2025 4:32 PM	
setup	HTML Application	5 KB	No	23 K	B 82%	8/14/2025 4:09 PM	

Step 3. Install the Core & Any Connect VPN, Network Access Manager, and the Diagnostics and Reporting Tool modules.



Secure Client Installer

Click Install Selected.

Step 4. A reboot is required after installation. Click **OK** and restart your device.

Cisco Secure Client Install Selector You must reboot your system for the installed changes to take effect. OK

Reboot Required Pop-up

Part 2: Download and Install Secure Client NAM Profile Editor

Step 1. The Profile Editor can be found on the same downloads page as the Secure Client. This configuration example uses version **5.1.11.388**.



Profile Editor

Download and install the **Profile Editor**.

Step 2. Run the MSI file.



Profile Editor Setup Start


Step 3. Use the **Typical** setup option and install the **NAM Profile Editor**.





Choose Setup Type

Choose the setup type that best suits your needs




Profile Editor Setup

Part 3: Allow Windows Cache Credentials to be Accessed by NAM


By default, on Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server 2012, the operating system prevents Network Access Manager (NAM) from retrieving the machine password required for machine authentication. As a result, machine authentication using the machine password does not work unless a registry fix is applied.

To enable NAM to access the machine credentials, apply the <u>Microsoft KB 2743127</u> fix on the client desktop.



Caution: Editing the Windows registry incorrectly can cause serious problems. Make sure you back up the registry before making changes.

Step 1. In the Windows search bar, enter **regedit**, and then click **Registry Editor**.




In this example, the PSN node certificate is issued by varshaah.varshaah.local. Hence, the rule **Common Name ends with .local** is used. This rule validates the certificate that the server presents during the EAP-TTLS flow.

You can also specify the common name of the **Policy Service Node (PSN) EAP authentication certificate**.

• Under Certificate Trusted Authority, two options are available.
In this scenario, the option Trust any Root Certificate Authority (CA) installed on the OS is used instead of adding a specific CA certificate.

With this option, the Windows device trusts any EAP certificate that is signed by a certificate included in **Certificates – Current User > Trusted Root Certification Authorities > Certificates** (managed by the operating system).

• Click **Next** to continue.



NAM Profile Editor Certificates

Step 6. In the Machine Credentials section, select Use Machine Credentials, and then click Next.

Networks Profile: Untitled				
	Machine Identity			
	Unprotected Identif	ty Pattern:	host/anonymous	
	Protected Identity i	Pattern:	host/[username]	
	Machine Credentials			
	 Use Machine Or 	redentials		
	O Use Static Cred	dentials		
	Password:			
				Acti
				Go to
		Next	Cancel	

NAM Profile Editor Credentials

Step 7. Configure **User Auth** section.

- Select **EAP-TTLS** under **EAP Methods**.
- Under Inner Methods, select Use EAP Methods and select EAP-MSCHAPv2.
- Click Next.

Profile: Untitled EAP Methods		
○ EAP-MD5	○ EAP-TLS	
○ EAP-MSCHAPv2	● EAP-TTLS	
○ EAP-GTC	○ PEAP	
	○ EAP-FAST	
Extend user connection	beyond log off	
EAP-TTLS Settings		
☑ Validate Server Identity	1	
☑ Enable Fast Reconnect		
Inner Methods		
 Use EAP Methods 		
□ EAP-MD5		
☑EAP-MSCHAPV2		
O PAP (legacy)	○ MSCHAP (legacy)	
O CUID Assess		
OHAP (legacy)	(Pischerv2 (legacy)	

NAM Profile Editor User Authentication

Step 8. In **Certificates**, configure the same certificate validation rules as described in Step 5.


Step 9. In User Credentials, select Use Single Sign-On Credentials, and then click Done.

anonymous
[username]
Logged On

NAM Profile Editor User Credentials


Part 6: Save the Network Configuration File

Step 1. Click **File > Save**.



NAM Profile Editor Save Network Configuration

Step 2. Save the file as **configuration.xml** in the **newConfigFiles** folder.



Save Network Configuration


Part 7: Configure AAA on the Switch

```
C9300-1#sh run aaa !

aaa authentication dot1x default group labgroup
aaa authorization network default group labgroup
aaa accounting dot1x default start-stop group labgroup
aaa accounting update newinfo periodic 2880 !
!
!
!
aaa server radius dynamic-author
client 10.76.112.135 server-key cisco
!
!
radius server labserver
address ipv4 10.76.112.135 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813
key cisco
!
!
aaa group server radius labgroup
server name labserver
!
```

```
!
!
aaa new-model
aaa session-id common
!
```

C9300-1(config)#dot1x system-auth-control



Note: The dot1x system-auth-control command does not appear in the show running-config output, but it is required to enable 802.1X globally.

Configure the Switch Interface for 802.1X:

```
Current configuration: 242 bytes!
interface GigabitEthernet1/0/44
switchport access vlan 96
switchport mode access
device-tracking
authentication order dot1x mab
authentication priority dot1x mab
authentication port-control auto
authentication host-mode multi-auth
authentication periodic


mab
dot1x pae authenticator
end
```

Part 8: ISE Configurations

Step 1. Configure switch on ISE.


Navigate to **Administration > Network Resources > Network Devices** and click **Add**.

Enter the switch name and IP address here.



Adding Network Device ISE

Enter the RADIUS shared secret, the same as the one configured earlier on the switch.



Step 2. Configure identity source sequence.


- Navigate to Administration > Identity Management > Identity Source Sequences.
- Click **Add** to create a new identity source sequence.
- Configure the identity sources under **Authentication Search List**.

Identity Source Sequences List > EAP_TTLS					
Identity Source Sequence					
√ Identity So	✓ Identity Source Sequence				
* Name	EAP_TTLS				
Description	Description				
 ✓ Certificate Based Authentication ☐ Select Certificate Authentication Profile ☐ Certificate_Profile ✓ 					
∨ Authentication Search List					
A set of identity sources that will be accessed in sequence until first authentication succeeds					
Avail	able	Selected			
All_A	D_Join_Points	varshaah-ad			
bbh		Internal Users			


ISE Identity Source Sequence

Step 3. Configure policy set.

Navigate to **Policy > Policy Sets** and create a new policy set. Configure the conditions as Wired_802.1x OR Wireless_802.1x. For Allowed Protocols, choose **Default Network Access**:




Create the authentication policy for dot1x and choose the identity source sequence created in Step 4.



EAP-TTLS Authentication Policy

For authorization policy, create the rule with three conditions. The first condition checks for the condition that EAP-TTLS tunnel is used. The second condition checks that EAP-MSCHAPv2 is used as the inner EAP method. The third condition checks for the respective AD group.



Dot1x Authorization Policy


Verify

You can reboot the Windows 10 machine or you can sign out and then sign in. Whenever the windows log in screen is displayed, machine authentication is triggered.




Live Log Machine Authentication

When you log in to the PC with credentials, user authentication is triggered.




User Authentication Credentials



Note: This example uses Active Directory user credentials for authentication. Alternatively, you can create an internal user in Cisco ISE and use those credentials for log in.

After the credentials are entered and successfully verified, the endpoint is connected to the network with user authentication.



Live Log User Authentication

Analyze ISE RADIUS Live Logs

This section illustrates the RADIUS live log entries for successful machine and user authentication.

Machine Authentication

Prepared EAP-Request proposing EAP-TTLS with challenge 12978 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-TTLS challenge-response and accepting EAP-TTLS as negotiated 12800 Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started 12805 Extracted TLS ClientHello message 12806 Prepared TLS ServerHello message 12807 Prepared TLS Certificate message 12808 Prepared TLS ServerKeyExchange message 12810 Prepared TLS ServerDone message 12803 Extracted TLS ChangeCipherSpec message 12804 Extracted TLS Finished message 12801 Prepared TLS ChangeCipherSpec message 12802 Prepared TLS Finished message 12816 TLS handshake succeeded 11806

Prepared EAP-Request for inner method proposing EAP-MSCHAP with challenge 12985 Prepared EAP-Request with another EAP-TTLS challenge 11006 Returned RADIUS Access-Challenge 11001 Received RADIUS Access-Request 12971 Extracted EAP-Response

containing EAP-TTLS challenge-response 11808 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-MSCHAP challenge-response for inner method and accepting EAP-MSCHAP as negotiated 24431 Authenticating machine against Active Directory - varshaah-ad 24325 Resolving identity - host/DESKTOP-QSCE4P3 24343 RPC Logon request succeeded - DESKTOP-QSCE4P3 @varshaah.local 24470 Machine authentication against Active Directory is successful - varshaah-ad 22037 Authentication Passed 12971 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-TTLS challenge-response 11810 Extracted EAP-Response for inner method containing MSCHAP challenge-response 11814 Inner EAP-MSCHAP authentication succeeded 11519 Prepared EAP-Success for inner EAP method 12975 EAP-TTLS authentication succeeded 15036 Evaluating Authorization Policy 24209 Looking up Endpoint in Internal Endpoints IDStore - host/DESKTOP-QSCE4P3 24211 Found Endpoint in Internal Endpoints IDStore 15048 Queried PIP - Network Access.Device IP Address 15048 Queried PIP - Network Access.EapTunnel 15016 Selected Authorization Profile - PermitAccess 11002 Returned RADIUS Access-Accept

User Authentication

11001 Received RADIUS Access-Request 11017 RADIUS created a new session 11507 Extracted EAP-Response/Identity 12983 Prepared EAP-Request proposing EAP-TTLS with challenge 12978 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-TTLS challengeresponse and accepting EAP-TTLS as negotiated 12800 Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started 12805 Extracted TLS ClientHello message 12806 Prepared TLS ServerHello message 12807 Prepared TLS Certificate message 12808 Prepared TLS ServerKeyExchange message 12810 Prepared TLS ServerDone message 12812 Extracted TLS ClientKeyExchange message 12803 Extracted TLS ChangeCipherSpec message 12804 Extracted TLS Finished message 12801 Prepared TLS ChangeCipherSpec message 12802 Prepared TLS Finished message 12816 TLS handshake succeeded 11806 Prepared EAP-Request for inner method proposing EAP-MSCHAP with challenge 12985 Prepared EAP-Request with another EAP-TTLS challenge 11006 Returned RADIUS Access-Challenge 11001 Received RADIUS Access-Request 12971 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-TTLS challenge-response 11808 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-MSCHAP challenge-response for inner method and accepting EAP-MSCHAP as negotiated 24430 Authenticating user against Active Directory - varshaah-ad 24325 Resolving identity - labuser@varshaah.local 24343 RPC Logon request succeeded - labuser@varshaah.local 24402 User authentication against Active Directory succeeded - varshaah-ad 22037 Authentication Passed 12971 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-TTLS challenge-response 11810 Extracted EAP-Response for inner method containing MSCHAP challenge-response 11814 Inner EAP-MSCHAP authentication succeeded 11519 Prepared EAP-Success for inner EAP method 12975 EAP-TTLS authentication succeeded 15036 Evaluating Authorization Policy 24209 Looking up Endpoint in Internal Endpoints IDStore - labuser 24211 Found Endpoint in Internal Endpoints IDStore 15048 Queried PIP - Network Access.Device IP Address 15048 Queried PIP - Network Access.EapTunnel 15016 Selected Authorization Profile - PermitAccess 11002 Returned RADIUS Access-Accept

Analyze NAM Logs

NAM logs, especially after you enable Extended Logging, contains a large amount of data, most of which are irrelevant and can be ignored. This section lists out the debug lines to demonstrate each step NAM takes to establish a network connection. When you work through a log, these key phrases can be helpful to locate part of the log relevant to the issue.

Machine Authentication

```
2160: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.696 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11812][comp=SAE]: 80
```

The client receives an EAP-TTLS packet from the network switch, initiating the EAP-TTLS session. This is the starting point for the machine authentication tunnel.

```
2171: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.696 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11812][comp=SAE]: EA 2172: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.696 +0900: %csc_nam-6-INFO_MSG: %[tid=11812][comp=SAE]: CER 2173: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.696 +0900: %csc_nam-6-INFO_MSG: %[tid=11812][comp=SAE]: CER
```

The client receives the **Server Hello** from ISE and begins validating the server certificate (CN=varshaah.varshaah.local). The certificate is found in the client's trust store and added for validation.

```
2222: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.696 +0900: %csc_nam-6-INFO_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Validating th 2223: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.696 +0900: %csc_nam-6-INFO_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Server certif
```

The server certificate is successfully validated, completing TLS tunnel establishment.

```
2563: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.789 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2564: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.789 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11812][comp=SAE]: NE 2565: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.789 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-
```

The client signals that **authentication has passed**. The interface is unblocked, and the internal state machine transitions to *USER_T_NOT_DISCONNECTED*, indicating the machine can now pass traffic.

```
2609: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2610: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11824][comp=SAE]: NE 2611: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2612: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11824][comp=SAE]: NE 2613: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2614: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11824][comp=SAE]: NE 2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11824][comp=SAE]: NE 2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2614: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Network EAP-2615: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.821 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11
```

The adapter reports **authenticated**, and the NAM AccessStateMachine transitions to *ACCESS_AUTHENTICATED*. This confirms the machine has successfully completed authentication and has full network access.

User Authentication

```
100: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:26.669 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Network EAP-TT
```

The NAM client begins the EAP-TTLS connection process.

```
195: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 15:09:11.780 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=3252]: Binding adapte 198: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 15:09:11.780 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=3252]: Network EAP-TT
```

NAM binds the physical adapter to the EAP-TTLS network and moves into the **ACCESS_ATTACHED** state, confirming that the adapter is ready for authentication.

```
204: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 15:09:11.780 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=3252]: Network EAP-TT 247: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 15:09:11.780 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=3680][comp=SAE]: STAT
```

The client transitions from **ATTACHED** to **CONNECTING**, beginning the 802.1X exchange.

```
291: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:15:36.388 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=6644][comp=SAE]: 8021
```

The client sends an **EAPOL-Start** to trigger the authentication process.

```
331: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:15:36.435 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=6644][comp=SAE]: PORT 332: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:15:36.435 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=6644][comp=SAE]: 8021 340: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:15:36.435 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=6644][comp=SAE]: EAP
```

The switch requests an identity, and the client prepares to respond with an outer identity.

```
402: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:15:36.685 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9580]: EAP-CB: creden 422: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:15:36.685 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=6088]: EAP: processin 460: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:15:36.685 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=6088]: EAP: credentia
```

NAM sends the outer identity. By default, this is **anonymous**, indicating that the exchange is for user authentication (not machine).

```
488: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:15:36.497 +0900: %csc_nam-6-INFO_MSG: %[tid=6088]: EAP: EAP sugges: 489: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:15:36.497 +0900: %csc_nam-6-INFO_MSG: %[tid=6088]: EAP: EAP reques: 490: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:15:36.497 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=6088]: EAP: EAP method: 491: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:15:36.497 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=6088]: EAP: credential
```

Both client and server agree to use **EAP-TTLS** as the outer method.

```
660: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:27.185 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=8296][comp=SAE]: EAP 661: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:27.185 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=8296][comp=SAE]: EAP
```

The client sends **Client Hello** and receives the **Server Hello**, which includes the ISE certificate.

```
706: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:31.967 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: 802 717: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:31.967 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EAP 718: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:31.967 +0900: %csc_nam-6-INFO_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: CERT 719: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:31.983 +0900: %csc_nam-6-INFO_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: CERT
```

```
726: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:31.983 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EAP
```

The server certificate is presented. The client looks up the CN varshaah.varshaah.local, finds a match, and validates the certificate. The handshake pauses while the X.509 certificate is checked.

```
729: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:31.983 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EAP 730: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:31.983 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11916][comp=SAE]: EAP 1110: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.044 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9644]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1111: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.044 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9644]: Auth[EAP-TTLS
```

The tunnel is established. NAM now requests and prepares the **protected identity** and credentials for inner authentication.

```
1527: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.169 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11916][comp=SAE]: EA 1528: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.169 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11916][comp=SAE]: EA 1573: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1574: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: EA 1575: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.184 +0900: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 2
```

The TLS handshake completes. A secure tunnel is now established for inner authentication.

```
1616: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.262 +0900: %csc_nam-6-INFO_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Protected identification: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %[tid=9664]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1689: DESKT
```

The protected identity (username) is sent and accepted by ISE.

```
1708: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 14:01:46.277 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9456][comp=SAE]: EAP 1738: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:01:44.758 +0900: %csc_nam-6-INFO_MSG: %[tid=11768]: Protected pas 1741: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.200 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9644]: Auth[EAP-TTLS
```

ISE requests the password. NAM sends the protected password inside the TLS tunnel.

```
1851: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9644]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1852: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1853: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=9644]: Auth[EAP-TTLS 1854: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Sep 25 2025 13:04:42.262 +0900: %[tid=11932][comp=SAE]: ST 1855: DESK
```

ISE validates the password, sends **EAP-Success**, and NAM transitions to **AUTHENTICATED**. At this

point, user authentication is complete and the client is allowed network access.

Troubleshoot

When troubleshooting Network Access Manager (NAM) issues with Cisco ISE and switch integration, logs must be collected from all three components: **Secure Client (NAM)**, **Cisco ISE**, and the **switch**.

Secure Client (NAM) Logs

- 1. Enable **NAM extended logging** by following these steps.
- 2. Reproduce the issue. If the network profile does not apply, run **Network Repair** in Secure Client.
- 3. Collect the **DART bundle** using the Diagnostics and Reporting Tool (DART).

Cisco ISE Logs

Enable these debugs on ISE to capture authentication and directory interactions:

- runtime-AAA
- nsf
- nsf-session

Switch Logs

Basic Debugs

```
request platform software trace rotate all set platform software trace smd switch active RO radius debug set platform software trace smd switch active RO aaa debug set platform software trace smd switch active RO dot1x-all debug set platform software trace smd switch active RO eap-all debug debug radius all
```

Advanced Debugs (if Required)


```
set platform software trace smd switch active RO epm-all debug set platform software trace smd switch active RO pre-all debug
```

Show Commands

```
show version
show debugging
show running-config aaa
show authentication session interface gix/x details
```


User Authentication Failure due to Invalid Credentials

When a user enters incorrect credentials, Secure Client displays a generic **Password was incorrect for the network: EAP-TTLS** message. The on-screen error does not specify whether the issue is due to an invalid username or password.



Incorrect Password Error

If authentication fails twice consecutively, Secure Client displays this message: An authentication error occurred for network 'EAP-TTLS'. Please try again. If the issue persists, contact your administrator.



User Authentication Issue

To identify the cause, review the NAM logs.

1. Incorrect password:

When a user enters an incorrect password, NAM logs show entries similar to this output:

```
3775: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Oct 02 2025 15:29:39.921 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11300][comp=SAE]: EA 3776: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Oct 02 2025 15:29:39.921 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11300][comp=SAE]: EA 3777: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Oct 02 2025 15:29:39.922 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11300][comp=SAE]: EA
```

In Cisco ISE live logs, the corresponding event appears as:

Event	5400 Authentication failed
Failure Reason	24408 User authentication against Active Directory failed since user has entered the wrong password
Resolution	Check the user password credentials. If the RADIUS request is using PAP for authentication, also check the Shared Secret configured for the Network Device
Root cause	User authentication against Active Directory failed since user has entered the wrong password

Incorrect Password

11001 Received RADIUS Access-Request 11017 RADIUS created a new session 11507 Extracted EAP-Response/Identity 10 12983

Prepared EAP-Request proposing EAP-TTLS with challenge 12978 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-TTLS challengeresponse and accepting EAP-TTLS as negotiated 12800 Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started 12810 Prepared TLS
ServerDone message 12812 Extracted TLS ClientKeyExchange message 12803 Extracted TLS ChangeCipherSpec message 12816

TLS handshake succeeded 11806 Prepared EAP-Request for inner method proposing EAP-MSCHAP with challenge 0 12985

Prepared EAP-Request with another EAP-TTLS challenge 11006 Returned RADIUS Access-Challenge 0 11001 Received RADIUS Access-

Request 12971 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-TTLS challenge-response 0 11808 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-MSCHAP as negotiated 15013 Selected Identity Source - varshaah-ad 0 24430 Authenticating user against Active Directory - varshaah-ad 0 24325 Resolving identity - labuser@varshaah.local 4 24313 Search for matching accounts at join point - varshaah.local 0 24319 Single matching account found in forest - varshaah.local 0 24323 Identity resolution detected single matching account 0 24344 RPC Logon request failed - STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD, ERROR_INVALID_PASSWORD, labuser@varshaah.local 20 24408 User authentication against Active Directory failed since user has entered the wrong password - varshaah-ad 1 11823 EAP-MSCHAP authentication attempt failed 11815 Inner EAP-MSCHAP authentication failed 0 12976 EAP-TTLS authentication failed 0 11003 Returned RADIUS Access-Reject

2. Incorrect Username:

When a user enters an incorrect username, NAM logs show entries similar to this ouput:

```
3788: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Oct 02 2025 15:29:39.923 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11300][comp=SAE]: EA 3789: DESKTOP-QSCE4P3: Oct 02 2025 15:29:39.923 +0900: %csc_nam-7-DEBUG_MSG: %[tid=11300]: EAP-CB: EAP
```

In Cisco ISE live logs, the corresponding event appears as:

Event	5400 Authentication failed
Failure Reason	22056 Subject not found in the applicable identity store(s)
Resolution	Check whether the subject is present in any one of the chosen identity stores. Note that some identity stores may have been skipped due to identity resoultion settings or if they do not support the current authentication protocol.
Root cause	Subject not found in the applicable identity store(s).

Incorrect Username

Prepared EAP-Request proposing EAP-TTLS with challenge 12978 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-TTLS challenge-response and accepting EAP-TTLS as negotiated 12800 Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started 12810 Prepared TLS ServerDone message 12812 Extracted TLS ClientKeyExchange message 12803 Extracted TLS ChangeCipherSpec message 12816 TLS handshake succeeded 11806 Prepared EAP-Request for inner method proposing EAP-MSCHAP with challenge 12985 Prepared EAP-Request with another EAP-TTLS challenge 11006 Returned RADIUS Access-Challenge 11001 Received RADIUS Access-Request 12971 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-TTLS challenge-response 11808 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-MSCHAP as negotiated 15013 Selected Identity Source - All_AD_Join_Points 24430 Authenticating user against Active Directory - varshaah-ad 24325 Resolving identity - user@varshaah.local 24313 Search for matching accounts at join point - varshaah.local 24352 Identity resolution failed - ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER 24412 User not found in Active Directory - varshaah-ad 15013 Selected Identity Source - Internal Users 24210 Looking up User in Internal Users IDStore - user 24216 The user is not found in the internal users identity store 22056 Subject not found in the applicable identity store(s) 22058 The advanced option that is configured for an unknown user is used 22061 The 'Reject' advanced option is configured in case of a failed authentication request 11823 EAP-MSCHAP authentication attempt failed 11815 Inner EAP-MSCHAP authentication failed 12976 EAP-TTLS authentication failed 0 11504 Prepared EAP-Failure 1 11003 Returned RADIUS Access-Reject

Known Defects

Bug ID	Description
Cisco bug ID 63395	ISE 3.0 cannot locate REST ID store after services restart