Contents

Introduction

Prerequisites

Requirements

Components Used

Conventions

Background Information

Core Issue

Router Configuration

Troubleshoot

Router Debugs

CHILD_SA Debugs

Tunnel Verification

ISAKMP

IPsec

Related Information

Introduction

This document describes Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) debugs on Cisco IOS® when an unshared key (PSK) is used.

Prerequisites

Requirements

Cisco recommends that you have knowledge of the packet exchange for IKEv2. For more information, refer to IKEv2 Packet Exchange and Protocol Level Debugging.

Components Used

The information in this document is based on these software and hardware versions:

- Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)

- Cisco IOS 15.1(1)T or later

The information in this document was created from the devices in a specific lab environment. All of the devices used in this document started with a cleared (default) configuration. If your network is live, ensure that you understand the potential impact of any command.

Conventions

Refer to Cisco Technical Tips Conventions for more information on document conventions.

Background Information

This document provides information on how to translate certain debug lines in a configuration.

Core Issue

The packet exchange in IKEv2 is radically different from packet exchange in IKEv1. In IKEv1 there was a clearly demarcated phase1 exchange that consisted of six (6) packets with a phase 2 exchange afterward that consisted of three (3) packets; the IKEv2 exchange is variable. For more information on the differences and an explanation of the packet exchange, again, refer to IKEv2 Packet Exchange and Protocol Level Debugging.

Router Configuration

This section lists the configurations used in this document.

Router 1

interface Loopback0

ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0

!

interface Tunnel0

ip address 172.16.0.101 255.255.255.0

tunnel source Ethernet0/0

tunnel mode ipsec ipv4

tunnel destination 10.0.0.2

tunnel protection ipsec profile phse2-prof

!

interface Ethernet0/0

ip address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0

crypto ikev2 proposal PHASE1-prop

encryption 3des aes-cbc-128

integrity sha1

group 2

!

crypto ikev2 policy site-pol

proposal PHASE1-prop

!

crypto ikev2 keyring KEYRNG

peer peer1

address 10.0.0.2 255.255.255.0

hostname host1

pre-shared-key local cisco

pre-shared-key remote cisco

!

crypto ikev2 profile IKEV2-SETUP

match identity remote address 0.0.0.0

authentication remote pre-share

authentication local pre-share

keyring local KEYRNG

lifetime 120

!

crypto ipsec transform-set TS esp-3des esp-sha-hmac

!

crypto ipsec profile phse2-prof

set transform-set TS

set ikev2-profile IKEV2-SETUP

!

ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 10.0.0.2

ip route 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.255 Tunnel0

Router 2

crypto ikev2 proposal PHASE1-prop

encryption 3des aes-cbc-128

integrity sha1

group 2

!

crypto ikev2 keyring KEYRNG

peer peer2

address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0

hostname host2

pre-shared-key local cisco

pre-shared-key remote cisco

!

crypto ikev2 profile IKEV2-SETUP

match identity remote address 0.0.0.0

authentication remote pre-share

authentication local pre-share

keyring local KEYRNG

lifetime 120

!

crypto ipsec transform-set TS esp-3des esp-sha-hmac

!

!

crypto ipsec profile phse2-prof

set transform-set TS

set ikev2-profile IKEV2-SETUP

!

interface Loopback0

ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0

!

interface Ethernet0/0

ip address 10.0.0.2 255.255.255.0

!

interface Tunnel0

ip address 172.16.0.102 255.255.255.0

tunnel source Ethernet0/0

tunnel mode ipsec ipv4

tunnel destination 10.0.0.1

tunnel protection ipsec profile phse2-prof

!

ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 10.0.0.1

ip route 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.255 Tunnel0

Troubleshoot

Router Debugs

These debug commands are used in this document:

deb crypto ikev2 packet

deb crypto ikev2 internal

Router 1 (Initiator) Message Description

Debugs

Router 2 (Responder) Message Description

Router 1 receives a packet that matches the crypto acl for peer ASA 10.0.0.2. Initiates SA creation

*Nov 11 20:28:34.003: IKEv2:Got a packet from dispatcher

*Nov 11 20:28:34.003: IKEv2:Processing an item off the pak queue

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:% Getting preshared key by address 10.0.0.2

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:Adding Proposal PHASE1-prop to toolkit policyle

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(1): Choosing IKE profile IKEV2-SETUP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:New ikev2 sa request admitted

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:Incrementing outgoing negotiating sa count by one

First pair of messages is the IKE_SA_INIT exchange. These messages negotiate cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces, and do a Diffie-Hellman exchange.

Relevant Configuration: crypto ikev2 proposal PHASE1-prop encryption 3des aes-cbc-128 integrity sha1 group 2crypto ikev2 keyring KEYRNG peer peer1 address 10.0.0.2 255.255.255.0 hostname host1 pre-shared-key local cisco pre-shared-key remote cisco

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE Event: EV_INIT_SA

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event:EV_SET_POLICY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Setting configured policies

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event:EV_GEN_DH_KEY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_NO_EVENT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:IKEv2 initiator - no config data to send in IKE_SA_INIT exch

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:No config data to send to toolkit:

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:Construct Vendor Specific Payload: DELETE-REASON

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:Construct Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM)

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP

Initiator building IKE_INIT_SA packet. It contains: ISAKMP Header (SPI/version/flags), SAi1 (cryptographic algorithm that IKE initiator supports), KEi (DH public Key value of the initiator), and N (Initiator Nonce).

*Nov 11 19:30:34.811: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Next payload: SA, version: 2.0 Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, flags: INITIATOR Message id: 0, length: 344

Payload contents:

SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 56

last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, length: 52

Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, #trans: 5    last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: 3DES

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96

last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 4, reserved: 0x0, id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136

DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

N  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 23

VID  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 21

NOTIFY(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP)  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 28

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP

NOTIFY(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 28

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP

--------------------------------------Initiator sent IKE_INIT_SA ----------------------->

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:Got a packet from dispatcher

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:Processing an item off the pak queue

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:New ikev2 sa request admitted

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:Incrementing incoming negotiating sa count by one

Responder receives IKE_INIT_SA.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:Next payload: SA, version: 2.0 Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, flags: INITIATOR Message id: 0, length: 344

Payload contents:

SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 56

last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, length: 52

Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, #trans: 5    last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: 3DES

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96

last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 4, reserved: 0x0, id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136

DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

N  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:Parse Vendor Specific Payload: CISCO-DELETE-REASON VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 23

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 21

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:Parse Notify Payload: NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP NOTIFY(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP)  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 28

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:Parse Notify Payload: NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP NOTIFY(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 28

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP

Responder initiates SA creation for that peer.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE Event:EV_RECV_INIT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event:EV_VERIFY_MSG

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event:EV_INSERT_SA

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event:EV_GET_IKE_POLICY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:Adding Proposal default to toolkit policy

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event:EV_PROC_MSG

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_DETECT_NAT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Process NAT discovery notify

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Processing nat detect src notify

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Remote address matched

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Processing nat detect dst notify

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Local address matched

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):No NAT found

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_SET_POLICY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Setting configured policies

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_PKI_SESH_OPEN

*Nov 11 19:30:34.814: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Opening a PKI session

*Nov 11 19:30:34.815: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event:EV_GEN_DH_KEY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.815: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_NO_EVENT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.815: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event:EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.815: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:30:34.815: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event:EV_GEN_DH_SECRET

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_NO_EVENT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:% Getting preshared key by address 10.0.0.1

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:Adding Proposal default to toolkit policy

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(2): Choosing IKE profile IKEV2-SETUP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event:EV_GEN_SKEYID

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Generate skeyid

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:IKEv2 responder - no config data to send in IKE_SA_INIT exch

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:No config data to send to toolkit:

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:Construct Vendor Specific Payload: DELETE-REASON

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:Construct Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM)

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED

Responder verifies and processes the IKE_INIT message: (1) Chooses crypto suite from those offered by the initiator, (2) computes its own DH secret key, and (3) it computes a skeyid value, from which all keys can be derived for this IKE_SA. All but the headers of all the messages that come after are encrypted and authenticated. The keys used for the encryption and integrity protection are derived from SKEYID and are known as: SK_e (encryption), SK_a (authentication), SK_d is derived and used for derivation of further keying material for CHILD_SAs, and a separate SK_e and SK_a is computed for each direction.

Relevant Configuration: crypto ikev2 proposal PHASE1-prop encryption 3des aes-cbc-128 integrity sha1 group 2 crypto ikev2 keyring KEYRNG peer peer2 address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0 hostname host2 pre-shared-key local cisco pre-shared-key remote cisco

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Next payload: SA, version: 2.0 Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE Message id: 0, length: 449

Payload contents:

SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48

last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, length: 44

Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, #trans: 4    last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96

last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 4, reserved: 0x0, id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136

DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

N  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 23

VID  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 21

NOTIFY(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP)  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 28

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP

NOTIFY(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)  Next payload: CERTREQ, reserved: 0x0, length: 28

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP

CERTREQ  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 105

Cert encoding Hash and URL of PKIX

NOTIFY(HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 8

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED

Router 2 builds the responder message for IKE_SA_INIT exchange, which is received by ASA1. This packet contains: ISAKMP Header(SPI/ version/flags), SAr1(cryptographic algorithm that IKE responder chooses), KEr(DH public Key value of the responder), and Responder Nonce.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_DONE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Cisco DeleteReason Notify is enabled

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_CHK4_ROLE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event:EV_START_TMR

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_NO_EVENT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:New ikev2 sa request admitted

*Nov 11 19:30:34.822: IKEv2:Incrementing outgoing negotiating sa count by one

Router2 sends out the responder message to Router 1.

<-------------------------------Responder sent IKE_INIT_SA ---------------------------

Router 1 receives the IKE_SA_INIT response packet from Router 2.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.823: IKEv2:Got a packet from dispatcher

*Nov 11 19:30:34.823: IKEv2:Got a packet from dispatcher

*Nov 11 19:30:34.823: IKEv2:Processing an item off the pak queue

I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event:EV_START_TMR

Responder starts timer for Auth process.

Router1 verifies and processes the response: (1) The initiator DH secret key is computed, and (2) the initiator skeyid is also generated.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.823: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Next payload: SA, version: 2.0 Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE Message id: 0, length: 449

Payload contents:

SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48

last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, length: 44

Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, #trans: 4    last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96

last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 4, reserved: 0x0, id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136

DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

N  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

*Nov 11 19:30:34.823: IKEv2:Parse Vendor Specific Payload: CISCO-DELETE-REASON VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 23

*Nov 11 19:30:34.823: IKEv2:Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 21

*Nov 11 19:30:34.823: IKEv2:Parse Notify Payload: NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP NOTIFY(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP)  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 28

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:Parse Notify Payload: NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP NOTIFY(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)  Next payload: CERTREQ, reserved: 0x0, length: 28

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP

CERTREQ  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 105

Cert encoding Hash and URL of PKIX

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:Parse Notify Payload: HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED NOTIFY(HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 8

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_WAIT_INIT Event: EV_RECV_INIT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Processing IKE_SA_INIT message

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT Event: EV_PROC_MSG

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT Event: EV_DETECT_NAT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Process NAT discovery notify

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Processing nat detect src notify

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Remote address matched

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Processing nat detect dst notify

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Local address matched

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):No NAT found

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.824: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event:EV_GEN_DH_SECRET

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_NO_EVENT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event:EV_GEN_SKEYID

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Generate skeyid

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_DONE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Cisco DeleteReason Notify is enabled

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_CHK4_ROLE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:Sending config data to toolkit

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_EAP

Initiator starts IKE_AUTH exchange and generates the authentication payload. The IKE_AUTH packet contains: ISAKMP Header (SPI/ version/flags), IDi (initiator identity), AUTH payload, SAi2 (initiates the SA-similar to the phase 2 transform set exchange in IKEv1), and TSi and TSr (Initiator and Responder Traffic selectors). They contain the source and destination address of the initiator and responder respectively for forwarding/receiving encrypted traffic. The address range specifies that all traffic to and from that range is tunneled. If the proposal is acceptable to the responder, it sends identical TS payloads back. The first CHILD_SA is created for the proxy_ID pair that matches the trigger packet.

Relevant Configuration: crypto ipsec transform-set TS esp-3des esp-sha-hmac crypto ipsec profile phse2-prof set transform-set TS set ikev2-profile IKEV2-SETUP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event:EV_GEN_AUTH

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_SEND_AUTH

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:Construct Vendor Specific Payload: CISCO-GRANITE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: INITIAL_CONTACT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: SET_WINDOW_SIZE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGS

Payload contents:

VID  Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12

Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

AUTH  Next payload: CFG, reserved: 0x0, length: 28

Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0

CFG  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 309

cfg type: CFG_REQUEST, reserved: 0x0, reserved: 0x0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.831:  SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 40

last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, length: 36

Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, #trans: 3    last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: 3DES

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96

last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id: Do not use ESN

TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0

TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16

start port: 0, end port: 65535

start addr: 0.0.0.0, end addr: 255.255.255.255

TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0

TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16

start port: 0, end port: 65535

start addr: 0.0.0.0, end addr: 255.255.255.255

NOTIFY(INITIAL_CONTACT)  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 8

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: INITIAL_CONTACT

NOTIFY(SET_WINDOW_SIZE)  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 12

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: SET_WINDOW_SIZE

NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 8

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT

NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 8

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0 Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR Message id: 1, length: 556

Payload contents:

ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 528

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_NO_EVENT

-------------------------------------Initiator sent IKE_AUTH ----------------------------->

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:Got a packet from dispatcher

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:Processing an item off the pak queue

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Request has mess_id 1; expected 1 through 1

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0 Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR Message id: 1, length: 556

Payload contents:

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12

Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

AUTH  Next payload: CFG, reserved: 0x0, length: 28

Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0

CFG  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 309

cfg type: CFG_REQUEST, reserved: 0x0, reserved: 0x0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832:    attrib type: internal IP4 DNS, length: 0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832:    attrib type: internal IP4 DNS, length: 0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832:    attrib type: internal IP4 NBNS, length: 0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832:    attrib type: internal IP4 NBNS, length: 0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832:    attrib type: internal IP4 subnet, length: 0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832:    attrib type: application version, length: 257

attrib type: Unknown - 28675, length: 0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832:    attrib type: Unknown - 28672, length: 0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832:    attrib type: Unknown - 28692, length: 0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832:    attrib type: Unknown - 28681, length: 0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832:    attrib type: Unknown - 28674, length: 0

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832:  SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 40

last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, length: 36

Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, #trans: 3    last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: 3DES

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96

last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id: Do not use ESN

TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0

TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16

start port: 0, end port: 65535

start addr: 0.0.0.0, end addr: 255.255.255.255

TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0

TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16

start port: 0, end port: 65535

start addr: 0.0.0.0, end addr: 255.255.255.255

Router 2 receives and verifies the authentication data received from Router 1.

Relevant Configuration: crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 protocol esp encryption aes-256 protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event:  EV_RECV_AUTH

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_ID

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Received valid parameteres in process id

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_FOR_PROF_SEL

*Nov 11 19:30:34.832: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(1): Choosing IKE profile IKEV2-SETUP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:% Getting preshared key by address 10.0.0.1

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:% Getting preshared key by address 10.0.0.1

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:Adding Proposal default to toolkit policy

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Using IKEv2 profile 'IKEV2-SETUP'

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_SET_POLICY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Setting configured policies

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4EAP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_POLREQEAP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH Event: EV_CHK4_IC

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_REDIRECT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Redirect check is not needed, skipping it

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH Event: EV_NOTIFY_AUTH_DONE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:AAA group authorization is not configured

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:AAA user authorization is not configured

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH Event: EV_SET_RECD_CONFIG_MODE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:Received config data from toolkit:

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:Error constructing config reply

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:No config data to send to toolkit:

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_MY_AUTH_METHOD

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_GEN_AUTH

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_CHK4_SIGN

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_SEND_AUTH

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:Construct Vendor Specific Payload: CISCO-GRANITE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: SET_WINDOW_SIZE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGS

Router 2 builds the response to IKE_AUTH packet that it received from Router 1. This response packet contains: ISAKMP Header(SPI/ version/flags), IDr(responder identity), AUTH payload, SAr2(initiates the SA-similar to the phase 2 transform set exchange in IKEv1), and TSi and TSr(Initiator and Responder Traffic selectors). They contain the source and destination address of the initiator and responder respectively for forwarding/receiving encrypted traffic. The address range specifies that all traffic to and from that range are tunnelled. These parameters are identical to the one that was received from ASA1.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0 Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE Message id: 1, length: 252

Payload contents:

ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 224

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_OK

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Closing the PKI session

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_UPDATE_CAC_STATS

*Nov 11 19:30:34.833: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event:EV_INSERT_IKE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:Store mib index ikev2 1, platform 60

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_GEN_LOAD_IPSEC

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Asynchronous request queued

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_NO_EVENT

Responder sends the response for IKE_AUTH.

<------------------------------------Responder sent IKE_AUTH----------------------------

Initiator receives response from Responder.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:Got a packet from dispatcher

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:Processing an item off the pak queue

*Nov 11 19:30:34.840: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_OK_RECD_LOAD_IPSEC

*Nov 11 19:30:34.840: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:30:34.840: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_START_ACCT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.840: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_CHECK_DUPE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.840: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_CHK4_ROLE

Responder inserts an entry into the SAD.

Router 1 verifies and processes the authentication data in this packet. Router 1 then inserts this SA into its SAD.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0 Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE Message id: 1, length: 252

Payload contents:

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

IDr  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12

Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28

Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0

SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 40

last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, length: 36

Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, #trans: 3    last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: 3DES

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96

last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id: Do not use ESN

TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0

TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16

start port: 0, end port: 65535

start addr: 0.0.0.0, end addr: 255.255.255.255

TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0

TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16

start port: 0, end port: 65535

start addr: 0.0.0.0, end addr: 255.255.255.255

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:Parse Notify Payload: SET_WINDOW_SIZE NOTIFY(SET_WINDOW_SIZE)  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 12

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: SET_WINDOW_SIZE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:Parse Notify Payload: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 8

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:Parse Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGS NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 8

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_WAIT_AUTH Event:EV_RECV_AUTH

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event:EV_PROC_MSG

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_FOR_PROF_SEL

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:Adding Proposal PHASE1-prop to toolkit policy

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Using IKEv2 profile 'IKEV2-SETUP'

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.834: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event:EV_VERIFY_AUTH

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_EAP

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event:EV_NOTIFY_AUTH_DONE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:AAA group authorization is not configured

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:AAA user authorization is not configured

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK4_IC

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_IKE_ONLY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_OK

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Closing the PKI session

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_UPDATE_CAC_STATS

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_INSERT_IKE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:Store mib index ikev2 1, platform 60

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_GEN_LOAD_IPSEC

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Asynchronous request queued

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_NO_EVENT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:KMI message 8 consumed. No action taken.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:KMI message 12 consumed. No action taken.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.835: IKEv2:No data to send in mode config set.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.841: IKEv2:Adding ident handle 0x80000002 associated with SPI 0x9506D414 for session 8

*Nov 11 19:30:34.841: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_OK_RECD_LOAD_IPSEC

*Nov 11 19:30:34.841: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:30:34.841: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_START_ACCT

*Nov 11 19:30:34.841: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):Accounting not required

*Nov 11 19:30:34.841: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_CHECK_DUPE

*Nov 11 19:30:34.841: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_CHK4_ROLE

Tunnel is up on the Initiator and the status showsREADY.

*Nov 11 19:30:34.841: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: READYEvent: EV_CHK_IKE_ONLY

*Nov 11 19:30:34.841: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: READY Event: EV_I_OK

*Nov 11 19:30:34.840: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: READY Event: EV_R_OK

*Nov 11 19:30:34.840: IKEv2:(SA ID = 1):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=F074D8BBD5A59F0B R_SPI=F94020DD8CB4B9C4 (R) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: READY Event: EV_NO_EVENT

Tunnel is up on the Responder. The Responder tunnel usually comes up before the Initiator.

CHILD_SA Debugs

This exchange consists of a single request/response pair and was referred to as a phase 2 exchange in IKEv1. It can be initiated by either end of the IKE_SA after the initial exchanges are completed.

Router 1 CHILD_SA Message Description

Debugs

Router 2 CHILD_SA Message Description

Router 1 initiates the CHILD_SA exchange. This is the CREATE_CHILD_SA request. The CHILD_SA packet typically contains:

- SA HDR (version.flags/exchange type)

- Nonce Ni (optional): If the CHILD_SA is created as part of the initial exchange, a second KE payload and nonce must not be sent)

- SA Payload

- KEi (Key-optional): The CREATE_CHILD_SA request can optionally contain a KE payload for an additional DH exchange to enable stronger guarantees of forward secrecy for the CHILD_SA. If the SA offers include different DH groups, KEi must be an element of the group the initiator expects the responder to accept. If it guesses wrong, the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange fails, and it can retry with a different KEi

- N(Notify payload-optional). The Notify Payload, is used to transmit informational data, such as error conditions and state transitions, to an IKE peer. A Notify Payload can appear in a response message (usually it specifies why a request was rejected), in an INFORMATIONAL Exchange (to report an error not in an IKE request), or in any other message to indicate sender capabilities or to modify the meaning of the request.If this CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is rekeying an existing SA other than the IKE_SA, the leading N payload of type REKEY_SA MUST identify the SA being rekeyed. If this CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is not rekeying an existing SA, the N payload MUST be omitted.

*Nov 11 19:31:35.873: IKEv2:Got a packet from dispatcher

*Nov 11 19:31:35.873: IKEv2:Processing an item off the pak queue

*Nov 11 19:31:35.873: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Request has mess_id 3; expected 3 through 7

*Nov 11 19:31:35.873: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0 Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, flags: INITIATOR Message id: 3, length: 396

Payload contents:

SA  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 152

last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, length: 148

Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 8, #trans: 15    last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA512

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA384

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA256

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: MD5

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA512

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA384

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA256

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 4, reserved: 0x0, id: DH_GROUP_1536_MODP/Group 5

last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 4, reserved: 0x0, id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

N  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

KE  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 136

DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:Parse Notify Payload: SET_WINDOW_SIZE NOTIFY(SET_WINDOW_SIZE)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 12

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: SET_WINDOW_SIZE

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: READY Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT Event: EV_CHK_CC_TYPE

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_IKE Event: EV_REKEY_IKESA

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_IKE Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:% Getting preshared key by address 10.0.0.2

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:% Getting preshared key by address 10.0.0.2

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:Adding Proposal PHASE1-prop to toolkit policy

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Using IKEv2 profile 'IKEV2-SETUP'

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_IKE Event: EV_PROC_MSG

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_IKE Event: EV_SET_POLICY

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Setting configured policies

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_NO_EVENT

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:31:35.874: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event:EV_GEN_DH_SECRET

*Nov 11 19:31:35.881: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_NO_EVENT

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_BLD_MSG

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:ConstructNotify Payload: SET_WINDOW_SIZE

Payload contents:

SA  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 56

last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, length: 52

Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 8, #trans: 4    last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96

last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 4, reserved: 0x0, id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

N  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

KE  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 136

DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

NOTIFY(SET_WINDOW_SIZE)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 12

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: SET_WINDOW_SIZE

*Nov 11 19:31:35.869: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0 Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, flags: INITIATOR Message id: 2, length: 460

Payload contents:

ENCR  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 432

*Nov 11 19:31:35.873: IKEv2:Construct Notify Payload: SET_WINDOW_SIZE

Payload contents:

SA  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 152

last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, length: 148

Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 8, #trans: 15    last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA512

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA384

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA256

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: MD5

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA512

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA384

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA256

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 4, reserved: 0x0, id: DH_GROUP_1536_MODP/Group 5

last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 4, reserved: 0x0, id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

N  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

KE  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 136

DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

NOTIFY(SET_WINDOW_SIZE)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 12

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: SET_WINDOW_SIZE

This packet is received by Router 2.

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0 Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE Message id: 3, length: 300

Payload contents:

SA  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 56

last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, length: 52

Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 8, #trans: 4    last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 12

type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1

last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96

last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: length: 8

type: 4, reserved: 0x0, id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

N  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

KE  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 136

DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:Parse Notify Payload: SET_WINDOW_SIZE NOTIFY(SET_WINDOW_SIZE)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 12

Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, type: SET_WINDOW_SIZE

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_WAIT Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_PROC_MSG

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_CHK4_PFS

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_NO_EVENT

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_CHK_IKE_REKEY

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Generate skeyid

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_DONE Event: EV_ACTIVATE_NEW_SA

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_DONE Event: EV_UPDATE_CAC_STATS

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:New ikev2 sa request activated

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:Failed to decrement count for outgoing negotiating

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_DONE Event: EV_CHECK_DUPE

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_I_DONE Event: EV_OK

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: EXIT Event: EV_CHK_PENDING

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Processed response with message id 3, Requests can be sent from range 4 to 8

*Nov 11 19:31:35.890: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (I) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: EXIT Event: EV_NO_EVENT

Router 2 now builds the reply for the CHILD_SA exchange. This is the CREATE_CHILD_SA response. The CHILD_SA packet typically contains:

- SA HDR (version.flags/exchange type)

- Nonce Ni(optional): If the CHILD_SA is created as part of the initial exchange, a second KE payload and nonce must not be sent.

- SA Payload

- KEi (Key-optional): The CREATE_CHILD_SA request can optionally contain a KE payload for an additional DH exchange to enable stronger guarantees of forward secrecy for the CHILD_SA. If the SA offers include different DH groups, KEi must be an element of the group the initiator expects the responder to accept. If it guesses wrong, the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange fails, and it must retry with a different KEi.

- N (Notify payload-optional): The Notify Payload is used to transmit informational data, such as error conditions and state transitions, to an IKE peer. A Notify Payload can appear in a response message (usually it specifies why a request was rejected), in an informational exchange (to report an error not in an IKE request), or in any other message to indicate sender capabilities or to modify the meaning of the request. If this CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is rekeying an existing SA other than the IKE_SA, the leading N payload of type REKEY_SA must identify the SA being rekeyed. If this CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is not rekeying an existing SA, the N payload must be omitted.

Router 2 sends the response out and completes activating the new CHILD SA.

Router 1 receives the response packet from Router 2 and completes activating the CHILD_SA.

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0 Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE Message id: 3, length: 300

Payload contents:

ENCR  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 272

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event:EV_CHK_IKE_REKEY

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Generate skeyid

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_DONE Event:EV_ACTIVATE_NEW_SA

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:Store mib index ikev2 3, platform 62

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_DONE Event: EV_UPDATE_CAC_STATS

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:New ikev2 sa request activated

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:Failed to decrement count for incoming negotiating

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_DONE Event: EV_CHECK_DUPE

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_DONE Event: EV_OK

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: CHILD_R_DONE Event: EV_START_DEL_NEG_TMR

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Action: Action_Null

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: EXIT Event: EV_CHK_PENDING

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):Sent response with message id 3, Requests can be accepted from range 4 to 8

*Nov 11 19:31:35.882: IKEv2:(SA ID = 2):SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=0C33DB40DBAAADE6 R_SPI=F14E2BBA78024DE3 (R) MsgID = 00000003 CurState: EXIT Event: EV_NO_EVENT

Tunnel Verification

ISAKMP

Command

show crypto ikev2 sa detailed

Router 1 Output

Router1#show crypto ikev2 sa  detailed

IPv4 Crypto IKEv2  SA

Tunnel-id Local                 Remote             fvrf/ivrf         Status

1         10.0.0.1/500          10.0.0.2/500       none/none         READY

Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 128,

Hash: SHA96, DH Grp:2,

Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK

Life/Active Time: 120/10 sec

CE id: 1006, Session-id: 4

Status Description: Negotiation done

Local spi: E58F925107F8B73F     Remote spi: AFD098F4147869DA

Local id: 10.0.0.1

Remote id: 10.0.0.2

Local req msg id:  2       Remote req msg id:  0

Local next msg id: 2       Remote next msg id: 0

Local req queued:  2       Remote req queued:  0

Local window:      5       Remote window:      5

DPD configured for 0 seconds, retry 0

NAT-T is not detected

Cisco Trust Security SGT is disabled

Initiator of SA : Yes

Router 2 Output

Router2#show crypto ikev2 sa detailed

IPv4 Crypto IKEv2  SA

Tunnel-id Local           Remote              fvrf/ivrf          Status

2         10.0.0.2/500    10.0.0.1/500        none/none          READY

Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 128, Hash: SHA96,

DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK

Life/Active Time: 120/37 sec

CE id: 1006, Session-id: 4

Status Description: Negotiation done

Local spi: AFD098F4147869DA       Remote spi: E58F925107F8B73F

Local id: 10.0.0.2

Remote id: 10.0.0.1

Local req msg id:  0              Remote req msg id:  2

Local next msg id: 0              Remote next msg id: 2

Local req queued:  0              Remote req queued:  2

Local window:      5              Remote window:      5

DPD configured for 0 seconds, retry 0

NAT-T is not detected

Cisco Trust Security SGT is disabled

Initiator of SA : No

IPsec

Command

show crypto ipsec sa

Note: In this output, unlike in IKEv1, the PFS DH group value appears as "PFS (Y/N): N, DH group: none" during the first tunnel negotiation, but, after a rekey occurs, the right values appear. This is not a bug, even though the behavior is described in Cisco bug ID CSCug67056. (Only registered Cisco users can access internal Cisco tools or information.)

The difference between IKEv1 and IKEv2 is that, in the latter, the Child SAs are created as part of AUTH exchange itself. The DH Group configured under the crypto map would be used only during rekey. Hence, you would see 'PFS (Y/N): N, DH group: none' until the first rekey.

With IKEv1, you see a different behavior, because Child SA creation happens during Quick Mode, and the CREATE_CHILD_SA message has a provision to carry the Key Exchange payload that specifies the DH parameters to derive a new shared secret.

Router 1 Output

Router1#show crypto ipsec sa

interface: Tunnel0

Crypto map tag: Tunnel0-head-0,

local addr 10.0.0.1

protected vrf: (none)

local  ident (addr/mask/prot/port):

(0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0/256/0)

remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port):

(0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0/256/0)

current_peer 10.0.0.2 port 500

PERMIT, flags={origin_is_acl,}

#pkts encaps: 10, #pkts encrypt:

10, #pkts digest: 10

#pkts decaps: 10, #pkts decrypt:

10, #pkts verify: 10

#pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0

#pkts not compressed: 0, #pkts compr. failed: 0

#pkts not decompressed: 0, #pkts decompress failed: 0

#send errors 0, #recv errors 0

local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1,

remote crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2

path mtu 1500, ip mtu 1500, ip mtu idb Ethernet0/0

current outbound spi: 0xF6083ADD(4127734493)

PFS (Y/N): N, DH group: none

inbound esp sas:

spi: 0x6B74CB79(1802816377)

transform: esp-3des esp-sha-hmac ,

in use settings ={Tunnel, }

conn id: 18, flow_id: SW:18,

sibling_flags 80000040,

crypto map: Tunnel0-head-0

sa timing: remaining key lifetime (k/sec):

(4276853/3592)

IV size: 8 bytes

replay detection support: Y

Status: ACTIVE(ACTIVE)

inbound ah sas:

inbound pcp sas:

outbound esp sas:

spi: 0xF6083ADD(4127734493)

transform: esp-3des esp-sha-hmac ,

in use settings ={Tunnel, }

conn id: 17, flow_id: SW:17,

sibling_flags 80000040,

crypto map: Tunnel0-head-0

sa timing: remaining key

lifetime (k/sec): (4276853/3592)

IV size: 8 bytes

replay detection support: Y

Status: ACTIVE(ACTIVE)

outbound ah sas:

outbound pcp sas:

Router 2 Output

Router2#show crypto ipsec sa

interface: Tunnel0

Crypto map tag: Tunnel0-head-0, local addr 10.0.0.2

protected vrf: (none)

local  ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0/256/0)

remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0/256/0)

current_peer 10.0.0.1 port 500

PERMIT, flags={origin_is_acl,}

#pkts encaps: 5, #pkts encrypt: 5, #pkts digest: 5

#pkts decaps: 5, #pkts decrypt: 5, #pkts verify: 5

#pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0

#pkts not compressed: 0, #pkts compr. failed: 0

#pkts not decompressed: 0, #pkts decompress failed: 0

#send errors 0, #recv errors 0

local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2,

remote crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1

path mtu 1500, ip mtu 1500, ip mtu idb Ethernet0/0

current outbound spi: 0x6B74CB79(1802816377)

PFS (Y/N): N, DH group: none

inbound esp sas:

spi: 0xF6083ADD(4127734493)

transform: esp-3des esp-sha-hmac ,

in use settings ={Tunnel, }

conn id: 17, flow_id: SW:17,

sibling_flags 80000040,

crypto map: Tunnel0-head-0

sa timing: remaining key lifetime

(k/sec): (4347479/3584)

IV size: 8 bytes

replay detection support: Y

Status: ACTIVE(ACTIVE)

inbound ah sas:

inbound pcp sas:

outbound esp sas:

spi: 0x6B74CB79(1802816377)

transform: esp-3des esp-sha-hmac ,

in use settings ={Tunnel, }

conn id: 18, flow_id: SW:18,

sibling_flags 80000040,

crypto map: Tunnel0-head-0

sa timing: remaining key

lifetime (k/sec): (4347479/3584)

IV size: 8 bytes

replay detection support: Y

Status: ACTIVE(ACTIVE)

outbound ah sas:

outbound pcp sas:

You can also check the output of the show crypto session command on both routers; this output shows the tunnel session status as UP-ACTIVE.

Router1#show crypto session

Crypto session current status

Interface: Tunnel0

Session status: UP-ACTIVE

Peer: 10.0.0.2 port 500

IKEv2 SA: local 10.0.0.1/500 remote 10.0.0.2/500 Active

IPSEC FLOW: permit ip 0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0

Active SAs: 2, origin: crypto map

Router2#show cry session

Crypto session current status

Interface: Tunnel0

Session status: UP-ACTIVE

Peer: 10.0.0.1 port 500

IKEv2 SA: local 10.0.0.2/500 remote 10.0.0.1/500 Active

IPSEC FLOW: permit ip 0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0

Active SAs: 2, origin: crypto map

Related Information

- IKEv2 Packet Exchange and Protocol Level Debugging

- Cisco Technical Support & Downloads