Cisco Security Summit

India & SAARC 2023

Driving Cyber Resilience Everywhere

Anthony Grieco

SVP, Chief Information Security Officer, Cisco Systems

Agenda

1. Cisco’s Focus on Security & Trust
2. Resilience Put to the Test
3. Our Keys to Future Resilience
4. Using Innovation to Enhance Our Strategy

Cyber Resilience



The ability to identify, respond, and recover swiftly from an IT security incident.

Building cyber resilience includes making a risk-focused plan that assumes the business will at some point face a breach or an attack.

Cisco Security & Trust Organization

Our Mission

DEFEND Cisco by driving pervasive security throughout our global organization

SECURE Cisco's products through trustworthy technologies and it's secure development lifecycle

PROTECT our customers, keep and earn their trust every single day

People | Process | Technology | Policy

Employee Distribution



Global Cisco Distribution



~1200
Global Labs
(in 60 countries)

~12K
Cloud Accounts

13+
Data Centers

4,000
Applications

11K+
CVO / MVOs

~60K
Daily VPNs

Security Incident

In May 2022 we discovered that an outside actor had compromised an employee's credentials to access our VPN.

Our response to this threat will make us more secure going forward.

Discovery and Mitigation

Cisco implemented our company-wide response process.

In the weeks following the eviction of the attacker from the environment, we observed continuous attempts to re-establish access.

Keys to Our Resilience

1. Visibility
2. Ability to dynamically adjust posture
3. Help desk security procedures
4. Partnerships
5. Communications (executive, employee, customer, industry)

Transparency is the Path to Trust



Jen Easterly
@CISAJen
Huge props to @TalosSecurity for this detailed analysis of a recent cyber attack on Cisco. This level of transparency is incredibly helpful to understand adversary tradecraft & thus contribute to the collective cyber defense of our ecosystem. #JCDC
blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/08/recent...


{
TRUST NO ONE
UNTIL VERIFIED
}
CISCO

Artificial Intelligence: **Hype is Driving Urgency**

AI Readiness Index

Urgency to deploy AI / AI-powered technologies has increased in the past six months.

*61% say it has increased *SIGINIFICANTLY*

Predictive AI

Prediction, Recommendation

Predictive AI focuses on analyzing existing data that can be used **for predictions and automation**

Generative AI

Creation, Reinvention

Generative AI focuses on learning a representation of artifacts from data and using it to **create completely original artifacts** that preserve a likeness to original data

Responsible AI

Three Pillars of AI for a CISO

1

Enable the Business to Use AI

2

Use AI to Defend

3

Think Like an Adversary to Inform Strategy

Enable the Business to Use AI

We are embedding AI into our ways of working.

A Few Examples

- Cisco IT Enterprise Chat AI
- GitHub Copilot for Cisco developers
- Improved results for OneSearch & Cisco.com search
- AI for helpdesk and TAC
- ChatBOT for Available to Renew (ATR) for Sales

Coming Soon

- M365 Copilot
- Windows Copilot
- AI Cluster
- Einstein GPT: Generative AI for Salesforce

Predictive AI: Plays-As-Code for Incident Response

playbook

A prescriptive collection of repeatable queries (reports) against security event data sources that lead to incident detection and response.

Traditional Play

plays-as-code

Detection logic consists of multiple queries, API call, decision points, and ML models to refine and enrich results.

Plays As Code

Current State

- Running at scale 18 detection plays leveraging data science (AI/ML), **analyzing 200 million+** security log events daily
- Digitized security analysis notebooks, **20 automated utility notebooks** to help security analysts and operations
- **Improved incident analysis** leveraging summarization models from past incidents/cases

Generative AI is the best opportunity for security governance in **15 years**!

Recent attacks on LLM

July 2023

- Hacking AI Resume screening with white font
- Adding attack suffix to induce objectionable content
- Prompt injection with control characters
- Competing objectives
- Mismatched generalization
- LLM exploitation of AI-Guardian
- Images and Sound for instruction injection
- Model poisoning via scraping


The Washington Post
Democracy Dies in Darkness

Job applicants are battling AI résumé filters with a hack


Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?

Content Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language.

Alexander Wei, UC Berkeley, awei@berkeley.edu
Nika Haghtalab*, UC Berkeley, nika@berkeley.edu
Jacob Steinhardt*, UC Berkeley, jsteinhardt@berkeley.edu

Abstract

Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity—that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model—and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.


Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models

Andy Zou[1], Zifan Wang[2], J. Zico Kolter[1,3], Matt Fredrikson[1]
[1]Carnegie Mellon University, [2]Center for AI Safety, [3]Bosch Center for AI
andyzou@cmu.edu, zifan@safe.ai, zkolter@cs.cmu.edu, mfredrik@cs.cmu.edu

July 28, 2023

Abstract

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on *aligning* these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures—so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs—these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. Attempts at *automatic* adversarial prompt generation have also achieved limited success. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods.


Don't you (forget NLP): Prompt injection with control characters in ChatGPT


A LLM Assisted Exploitation of AI-Guardian

Nicholas Carlini
Google DeepMind

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) are now highly capable at a diverse range of tasks. This paper studies whether or not GPT-4, one such LLM, is capable of assisting researchers in the field of adversarial machine learning. As a case study, we evaluate the robustness of AI-Guardian, a recent defense to adversarial examples published at IEEE S&P 2023, a top computer security conference. We completely break this defense: the proposed scheme does not increase robustness compared to an undefended baseline.

We write none of the code to attack this model, and instead prompt GPT-4 to implement all attack algorithms following our instructions and guidance. This process was surprisingly effective and efficient, with the language model at times producing code from ambiguous instructions faster than the author of this paper could have done. We conclude by discussing (1) the warning signs present in the evaluation that suggested to us AI-Guardian would be broken, and (2) our experience with designing attacks and performing novel research using the most recent advances in language modeling.

Independently and concurrently, at the same time that attacking defenses to adversarial examples has improved, large language models like GPT-4 [19] have become sufficiently capable that they can reliably solve coding challenges near the level of human programmers [16]. This raises the question how well these models can perform at real-world and useful coding tasks. While these models have been dubbed "early form[s] of AGI" [6], for our purposes we only require they have the ability to act as "word calculators", and automate the repetitive programming aspects involved in conducting machine learning research.

Contributions. In this paper we evaluate the ability of GPT-4 to act as a research assistant and break a published adversarial examples defense. We focus our efforts on breaking AI-Guardian, a recent defense published at IEEE S&P, a top tier computer security venue. Because this defense is completely novel—it was accepted at S&P after all—this acts as an interesting case study for understanding the value of "AI research assistants" that perform experiments at the direction of a human researcher.


(Ab)using Images and Sounds for Indirect Instruction Injection in Multi-Modal LLMs

Eugene Bagdasaryan Tsung-Yin Hsieh Ben Nassi Vitaly Shmatikov
Cornell Tech
eugene@cs.cornell.edu, th542@cornell.edu, bn267@cornell.edu, shmat@cs.cornell.edu

Abstract

We demonstrate how images and sounds can be used for indirect prompt and instruction injection in multi-modal LLMs. An attacker generates an adversarial perturbation corresponding to the prompt and blends it into an image or audio recording. When the user asks the (unmodified, benign) model about the perturbed image or audio, the perturbation steers the model to output the attacker-chosen text and/or make the subsequent dialog follow the attacker's instruction. We illustrate this attack with several proof-of-concept examples targeting LLaVA and PandaGPT.


Forbes

'World Of Warcraft' Players Trick AI-Scraping Games Website Into Publishing Nonsense

How is AI being used by attackers?

- AI is lowering the barrier to entry
- AI is increasing automation and ability to scale
- Reverse engineering binaries
- Buffer overflow prediction
- Password cracking
- Side-channel attacks
- Malware creation
- Detection evasion



Cisco's Responsible AI (RAI) Framework

Risks

- Bias
- IP Infringement
- Personal Data Leakage
- Unanticipated Output
- False Content
- Liability

- Training Quality
- Data Privacy
- Inappropriate Content
- Misinformation
- User Liability

Cisco's RAI Framework

Guidance & Oversight	Controls	Incident Management	Industry Leadership	External Engagement
Org education on transparency, fairness and impact on IP infringement	Mandatory RAI assessments, preferably software driven, as part of product delivery and compliance	All bias, IP infringement, data privacy, content and liability incidents are reported to the RAI committee and handled with Transparency and Fairness	Participate in industry and technology forums to share and learn from other companies. Drive standards and code.	Work with governments to understand global perspectives on AI's benefits and risks. Share how Cisco stands on these issues
Include RAI collateral in Security, Privacy and Trust trainings	Accountability matrix and ownership created for product and service delivery	Processes and software are updated to reflect the learnings from the incident	Continually update governance, process, software based on these learnings and the ever-changing landscape	Continually update governance, process, software based on these learnings and the ever-changing landscape

Source: Cisco Website, CSO Research.

Beware of Bright Shiny Objects

Focus on Risk & Fundamental Gaps

Thank You!

KPM DAS

National Cybersecurity Adviser

Cisco Security Summit

India & SAARC 2023

Thank You