

How can you bring
Trust and Security
to Wireless LAN solutions?

November 2002

- Entrust Introduction
- Brief overview of the 802.11b technology/security
- Top vulnerabilities
- Analysis and attack tools
- Entrust & Cisco – delivering a Secure Wireless LAN
- Q & A

→ **First mover in Internet security:**

- PKI (1994)
- PMI - Portal Access (1997)
- Wireless (1999)
- Enhanced Internet Security (2001)

→ **90+ patents** granted or pending

→ **#1 market share in PKI** software globally*

→ **Top 3** in Authorization globally*


Broadest Portfolio in the Industry

Enhanced Security Services



Identification

→ **Protecting and Authenticating** Identity used in Transactions



Entitlements

→ Providing **Personalized** Access and Authorization to Transactions



Privacy

→ Enforcing **Privacy** of Transaction Information




Verification

→ Ensuring Transactions are **Binding** and **Auditable**

... and
Security Management


Broad Range of Solutions

→ Entrust has worked with industry leaders to integrate enhanced security services and deliver solutions that enable business return



Security Management

- Partnered to deploy highly secure VPN and WLAN environments
- Combine enhanced security from Entrust w/ Cisco VPN/WLAN products
 - Use Entrust PKI & certificates for IPsec authentication
- Product integration:
 - Cisco provides VPN/WLAN software & hardware
 - Entrust provides PKI & certificate management software
- Product interoperability



Productivity Gains


- access to real time information anywhere
- users stay connected longer

Increased Flexibility

- go where wire cannot
- access to all corporate resources anytime, anywhere

Cost Effective

- versus dedicated lines
- great ROI
- low TCO



Wireless LANs Increase Productivity


NOP Study –

Based on a survey of 300+ U.S.-based organizations with more than 100 employees:

- End users stayed connected an average of **1¾ hours more per day** to their corporate network
- Average daily time savings: **70 minutes**
- Productivity: **+22%**



WLAN Vendor Ratings



Source: Gartner Research

"30% of enterprises will
suffer serious exposures from deploying WLANs
without implementing the proper
security."

- Gartner 2002

"The greatest security threat
to businesses over the next 12 months will not
be from viruses, outside hackers
penetrating defenses, denial of service,
or inside jobs. It will be the
loss of trust and brand equity."

—Hurwitz Group

Enhanced Security + 802.11b

John Pavelich
Senior Security Architect
Entrust




Wireless LAN Technologies


	802.11b	802.11a	802.11g
Frequency Band	2.4 GHz	5 GHz	2.4 GHz
Availability	Worldwide	US/AP	Worldwide
Maximum Data Rate	11 Mbps	54 Mbps	54 Mbps

PHY Details: 802.11b, a and g

	802.11b	802.11a	802.11g
Modulation Technique	DSSS	OFDM	OFDM
Operating Frequencies	2.4GHz	5GHz	2.4GHz
Maximum Throughput	11Mbps	54Mbps	22Mbps
Ratified Standard	Yes	Yes	No



Basic WLAN Architecture



- Cost of wireless technology decreasing
- Use is rapidly increasing ~ 73% expected growth this year
- Entering more 'sensitive' operational environments
- Training, certification and 'good' information is limited
- Information overload!


(Some) WLAN Security Issues

Default setups:	Work well, but are not secure
WEP:	Broken at any key length
AP Technology:	Many flawed implementations
Rogue APs:	Impact security of wired network
RF Propagation:	Extends network environment beyond the walls
New Attacks:	Radio protocol attacks are nasty (ECM)
Safeguards:	Poorly architected/implemented
Policy:	Monitoring, updating and enforcement
Newness:	Confusion, lots of attacks and variants

HOW DO WE ANALYZE WLAN SECURITY?

Intruder/Safeguard Cycle

Hackers Continually Optimize Attacks



By Default, Wireless Breaches the Perimeter!


“Border guards”



SSL



Employees
Suppliers
Customers



NetStumbler + Utilities ~ War Driving 'Cultism'

Publicized vulnerabilities ~ War Chalking

WEP ~ Passive attacks (AirSnort) getting better

Passive network scans on wireless side ~ Kismet



AP port and protocol scanning and probing

AirJack engine: Client, MITM and DoS attacks


Honey Pot experience: Opportunity attacks and
dedicated attacks

Dispelling Misinformation

Security With Antennas?





AZIMUTH




ELEVATION

Textbook radiation
patterns of the AP
isotropic monopole
antenna



'Experts' say you can 'place the antenna' to get 'better security' and 'control the perimeter'




Indoor Propagation in a Typical Crowded Office Building:

- Reflections
- Re-Radiation
- Attenuation
- Un-intentional waveguide structures
- Not a 'perfect' environment

Attenuation Factors in Office Buildings


- **Window Non-Metallic Tint ~ 3dB**
- **Window Metallic Tint ~ 7dB**
- **Drywall ~ 7dB**
- **Wood Wall ~ 10dB**
- **Heavy Wall(6 inch) ~ 15dB**
- **Heavy Wall(12 inch) ~ 25dB**

Low Attenuation Permits Leakage!



There are limits to what you can achieve with directional antennas, site surveys are needed if local physical environment requires it

Why Reality is Important



Each **~6db** improvement at 2.4 GHz **doubles** your intercept range

Typical 2.4 GHz WLAN AP has mono-pole antennas with **0dBi** gain.

A Low Profile patch antenna can provide **8 dBi** gain at 2.4 GHz and costs about \$65 US






~12 dB gain,
+/- 2000
calorie
Yagi antenna
\$3.29 + GST


The Result is Effective War Driving

Un-Protected WLANs are proliferating providing a '**target rich**' environment for the **attacker**

The War Driver is really doing a survey of AP's with default or poor security settings

Using network and wireless hacking tools he can **get on the network** from the wireless side and mount other **attacks**






Has your building been chalked?

How to Assess Your Susceptibility to War Driving


Entrust
Securing the Internet



Some 'Experts' say you should use an Agilent Spectrum Analyzer ~ \$50,000

While this is a good measurement instrument it is not a WLAN analysis tool

Free!



Also not a WLAN analysis tool but useful for 'Script Kiddies' and 'Seeing' Relative S/N Ratios 33

```

dragom@gir.lan.nerv-un.net:/home/dragom
--Networks--(First Seen)-----
|  Name          T W Ch Packts  Flags          |
|  - St Francis  G N 07    324          0.0.0.0         |
|  | Z           A N 07    21           0.0.0.0         |
|  | Z           A N 07    3            0.0.0.0         |
|  VBHWOUND     A Y 11    48           0.0.0.0         |
|  + Cenhud-PDK  G N 06   339           0.0.0.0         |
|  <no ssid>    A N 01  1508 U3      10.132.112.0    |
|  cvsretail    A N 11  1091          0.0.0.0         |
|  - IBM-PDK     G Y 00    432          0.0.0.0         |
|  | IBM        A Y 06    123          0.0.0.0         |
|  | IBM        A Y 06    3            0.0.0.0         |
|  | IBM        A Y 01    6            0.0.0.0         |
|  pserwap003   A Y 07    56           0.0.0.0         |
|  linksys      A Y 06   155          0.0.0.0         |
|  <no ssid>    A Y 11   175          0.0.0.0         |
|  tsunamisgt3624t A N 06    4            0.0.0.0         |
|  <no ssid>    A Y 06    58           0.0.0.0         |
|  default     A N 11   284          0.0.0.0         |
|  arlington    A N 06    15           0.0.0.0         |
|  linksys      A Y 06    91           0.0.0.0         |
|  LuoHomeNet   A Y 06  1107          0.0.0.0         |
|  linksys      A N 02   107           0.0.0.0         |
|-----(+ ) Down-----|
| Info-----|
| Ntwrks     24|
| Pckets    9248|
| Cryptd    386|
| Weak       0|
| Noise      0|
| Discrd   1448|
| Elapsed  000305|
|-----|
--Status-----
| Detected new network "afrc21" bssid 00:04:5A:0F:0D:2E WEP N Ch 6 @ 11.00 mbi
| Sorting by time first detected
| Found IP range for "WaveLAN Network" via ARP 10.229.94.0
| Detected new network "WaveLAN Network" bssid 00:02:2D:22:86:C1 WEP N Ch 10 @

```

A good Linux freeware WLAN analysis tool

Professional Security Analysis Has More Refined Requirements

Requires Commercial Tools:

1. Must be able to detect **non-beaconing** devices, **noisy** environments and 802.11b attacks
2. Must be able to **detect and locate**
3. Must be able to **differentiate** rogue from deployed
4. Must scan and **analyze all channels**, not just NA channels
5. Repeatable, accurate, intuitive **results**
6. Simple, low training overhead, field upgradeable, **handheld tool with bulk analysis capability**

Comprehensive WLAN
Management In a Single
Mobile Application


Site Survey

Security Assessment

Performance Management

Connection Troubleshooting

Wireless Administration



WLAN Security Assessment Tool:

AirMagnet



Security Assessment

Rogue AP Detection

- Detects All Traffic Including Non-Beaconing Devices
- Identify and Locate Rogue APs and Stations with Find Tool
- Highly Mobile Pocket PC
- Able to Scan All Channels

Security Alarms

- AP w/ WEP Disabled
- Un-configured AP
- Spoofed AP MAC
- DoS Attack (AirJack)
- Device Probing for AP
- more...
- Adjustable Alarm Thresholds

Management Tools

- Detects Devices Unprotected by VPN
- Detects Devices Unprotected by 802.1x
- Provides Expert Analysis of Existing Security Threats and Suggests Solutions
- Quickly Drill Down to Detailed Info On Devices That Generate Alarms


→ Pocket Security Guard

→ Support for:


- Rogue AP Detection
- Site Survey
- Deployment Verification
- Connectivity Troubleshooting
- Latency and Capacity Monitoring



Rogue AP Detection and Location



Where is the Access Point?





Where are the hidden APs?
How is the AP configured?

Where do the antennas go?

How should I assign channels?

Do I have rf interference?



Can I connect from everywhere?

What's the signal quality?

Safeguards Against War Drivers, Script Kiddies and Opportunists




Change the defaults!

- **Enable WEP**
- **Change the default SSID**
- **Disable "Broadcast SSID"**
- **Change the default password on the AP**
- **Control access based on the MAC address of the NIC**
- **Turn off DHCP, and change the default IP subnet**


But this is not all you need to do!

Conduct a Building Wireless Survey



Link your coverage to your operational requirement

If your neighbor is on Channel 11, pick 1 or 6 for your network



Even Good AP Settings are Not Good Enough



For Example:

- Passive **attacks** against **WEP** are getting **better** and are slowly being merged with passive WLAN monitoring tools
- AP **port** and protocol **scanning** and **probing** derive **WEP keys** and **AP management passwords**
- AirJack Engine: Client, **MITM** and **DoS attacks**


Improved Attacks on RC4 (WEP)

“In order to carry out the attack, the cryptanalyst needs the first output word of a large number RC4 streams along with the IV that was used to generate each one of them.”

“Since in WEP, the IVs are transmitted in the clear, and the first message word in most packets is a known constant these requirements are satisfied. Optimizations of the attack have lead to deduction of a 128 bit RC4 key in 15 minutes from an actual network.”

RSA Laboratories

Volume 5, No. 2, Summer / Fall 2002



- Management frames **control link characteristics** and physical medium properties
- 802.11b management frames are **NOT authenticated**
- This allows **radio protocol attacks**
- All you need is some extra RF power and you can '**capture**' the victim's **radio receiver** and feed it whatever protocol you want

Denial of Service – De-Authentication

- Spoof MAC address of Access Point
- Send de-authenticate 802.11b management frames

Send them continuously

Client is forced to re-associate and re-authenticate (longer process)

Attacker uses lots of power, ‘pumps’ the victim’s receiver to slow it’s response time

Users are unable to re-associate with valid AP


350 Series Status [X]

Device	= 350 Series PCMCIA
Manufacturer	= Cisco Systems, Inc.
Firmware Version	= V4.25.05
Boot Block Version	= V1.50
NDIS Driver Version	= V6.64.0.2
Server Based Authentication	= None
WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy)	= Disabled
Authentication Type	= Open
Antenna Selection	= Rx->Diversity Tx->Diversity
Channel Set	= North America
Client Name	= FRED
MAC Address (Factory)	= 00:07:85:92:DB:A9
Current Link Speed	= 11 Mbps
Data Rate	= Auto Rate Selection
Current Power Level	= 0 mW
Available Power Levels	= 1, 5, 20, 30, 50, 100 mW
Channel (Frequency)	= 1 (2412 MHz)
Status	= Associated
SSID	= 3Com
Network Type	= Infrastructure
Power Save Mode	= CAM
Associated Access Point Name	= No Name Specified
Associated Access Point MAC	= 00:04:76:A5:D7:F5
Up Time (hh:mm:ss)	= 00:00:31

Current Signal Strength	94%
Current Signal Quality	100%
Overall Link Quality	Excellent

Help OK

This is your connection



This is your connection during an AirJack-based attack

802.11b Frame Attacks

Frame Type (bit 3, bit2)	Subfield (Bits 7,6,5,4)	Frame Function
Management Type 00	0000	Association Request
	0001	Association Response
	0010	Reassociation Request
	0011	Reassociation Response
	0100	Probe Request
	0101	Probe Response
	1000	Beacon
	1001	Announcement Traffic Indication (ATIM)
	1010	Dissassociation
	1011	Authentication
	1100	Deauthentication
Control Type 01	1010	Power-Save (PS) Poll
	1011	Request to Send (RTS)
	1100	Acknowledgement (ACK)
	1110	Contention Free (CF) End
	1111	CF End + CF ACK
Data Type 10	0000	Data
	0001	Data + CF ACK
	0010	Data + CF Poll
	0011	Data + CF ACK + CF Poll
	0100	Null (no data)
	0101	CF ACK
	0110	CF Poll
	0111	CF ACK + CF Poll
Reserved Type 11		


Management Frame Types

AirJack attacks these



Control Frames

What happens if they attack these?



Data Frames

→ MITM Attack

- Take over connections
- Insert attack machine between victim and AP (Power + Antenna)
- Use it to attack the client or the network behind the AP

→ Insert False Management Frames on the RF Channel (Power and antenna)

- This forces de-authentication of the victim from the real AP
 - Send de-authenticate frames to the victim using the access point's MAC address as the source
- Victim's 802.11 card scans channels to search for new AP

- Victim's 802.11 card associates with fake AP on the attack machine
 - Fake AP is on a different channel than the real one
 - Attack machine's fake AP is duplicating MAC address and ESSID of real AP
 - You can attack the victim, scan his hard drive, send him a Trojan horse, etc,
 - Attack machine may optionally associate with real AP
 - Attack machine duplicates MAC address of the victim's machine

Some General Conclusions

802.11b wireless networks are **more vulnerable** to attacks than wired networks

802.11b security solutions are implemented with an **assumption of secure** radio management and control protocols

Inadequate authentication for protection against wireless MITM attacks

Weak management and security

What do we do now?

How can you bring
Trust and Security
to WLAN?

Assess Your Security Requirements

- ✓ **Analyze your environment**
- ✓ **Perform your risk assessment**
- ✓ **Determine your wireless security profile**

Security =

**Knowledge + Strong Authentication + Encryption +
Monitoring + the Other Layers of the Onion**

AP1200 IP Port Filters

Cisco 1200 Series AP 11.40T

CISCO SYSTEMS

Uptime: 1 day, 01:33:36

[Home](#) [Map](#) [Network](#) [Associations](#) [Setup](#) [Logs](#) [Help](#)

Set ID: Set Name:

Existing IP Port Filter Sets:

1	ESP-IPsec	▲
2	AH IPsec	▢
3	DNS Block	▢
4	NetBios-NS	▢
5	NetBios-DGM	▼

[\[Home\]](#) [\[Map\]](#) [\[Login\]](#) [\[Network\]](#) [\[Associations\]](#) [\[Setup\]](#) [\[Logs\]](#) [\[Help\]](#)

Cisco 1200 Series AP 11.40T © Copyright 2002 Cisco Systems, Inc. [credits](#)

This hardens the AP against attack!

Cisco VPN Client/Gateway technology is 'Best in Class' for WLAN Applications

- ✓ Strong encryption, True IPSec VPN
- ✓ Auto-initiate VPN tunnel for WLAN connections
- ✓ Force Security Policy e.g.: 'Disable Split Tunneling'
- ✓ Stateful Inspection Firewall Client AND Gateway
- ✓ Forced Virus scanning
- ✓ Strong, certificate based authentication using Entrust PKI certificates that are securely managed
- ✓ Security Hardware and Software from a 'Mature' vendor

Entrust Secure WLAN Solution Provides Security Infrastructure

Entrust[®]
Securing the Internet

PKI

Entrust[®] Entelligence[™]




Entrust[®] Authority[™]




Directory



Certification
Authority



Securing WLAN: Cisco + Entrust



Enhanced Security is Required When Using WLAN Technology!

Enhanced Security is
needed to **Strongly Identify**
users and devices and to
protect client data



Achieving the benefits of WLAN requires **confidence** that the same level of **privacy & trust** is maintained in the **wireless** world as in the wired world!

Cisco WLAN +

Cisco VPN +

Entrust PKI =

Trusted WLAN transactions and protected networks and clients

For more information

<http://www.entrust.com/wlan>

Thank You!

entrust@entrust.com