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Cisco Security Agent

Cisco Security Agent and MPack Enabled Malware

PB417466

Summary

According to various news sources, a widespread Web attack has compromised more than 10,000 legitimate Websites and continues to spread worldwide. The attack was first discovered on June 15, 2007. Legitimate Websites were hacked to include a malicious HTML iFrames tag redirecting visitors to servers armed with an exploit tool called MPack that can target security holes in numerous products. MPack installs a keylogger and a Trojan downloader program on compromised PCs so that the attackers can monitor the compromised system's activity and run other unauthorized programs on the computer.
Cisco® has obtained exploit files, and has confirmed that the Cisco Security Agent is effective in stopping these exploits, using the default security policy configuration. Current supported versions of Cisco Security Agent 4.5.x, 5.0.x, 5.1.x, and 5.2.x are all effective in stopping the exploits seen to date.

Details of the Vulnerability

Details of the vulnerability:

1. HTML_IFRAME is hosted on malicious/hacked sites.

2. When the users visits the affected system, they are directed to an intermediate server that directs them to the site hosting the downloader.

3. This downloader JS_DLOADER.NTJ chooses its exploits based on the target user's browser and operating system. It then downloads another Trojan, TROJ_SMALL.HCK.

4. TROJ_SMALL.HCK, in turn, downloads TROJ_AGENT.UHL and TROJ_PAKES.NC.

5. TROJ_AGENT.UHL acts as a proxy server to allow a remote user to anonymously connect to the Internet through an infected computer. TROJ_PAKES.NC downloads a key logger TSPY_SINOWAL.BJ.1

Various security vendors report that the MPack-enabled malware exploits several well-known vulnerabilities that have already been patched, so it is dangerous to users who are not running an updated version of their browsers.

How Cisco Security Agent Stops the Exploit

Cisco Security Agent default policies contain multiple rules that stop the exploit from doing any damage. No changes to the Cisco Security Agent binaries or default configuration are required to get this protection.
Cisco Security Agent testing was performed from the viewpoint of the Web user who visited the infected Website and had the MPack-enabled malware delivered to their system. Cisco believes that Cisco Security Agent, if installed on the legitimate Web server itself, would have prevented the installation of the MPack kit and prevented the initial infection of the Website altogether.
The following actions have been observed being blocked by Cisco Security Agent running the default security policies:

• The modification of a system file

• The modification of a registry key

• An attempt to invoke a system function from a buffer

This testing is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Cisco Security Agent Default Configuration Stops the MPack-Enabled Exploit (Tested on Cisco Security Agent 5.2)

Note: The exploit was tested at Cisco, with the agent in Test mode, which will cause the agent to alert (but not block) malicious behavior. This was done to observe all possible ways that the Cisco Security Agent default policies would stop the exploit. When the agent is in Protect mode (the typical operational configuration), the first rule would kill the exploit: no subsequent events would be seen, since the exploit would be terminated before it could perform any malicious actions.

Testing was performed against the Cisco Security Agent default policies. No binary or policy update was needed for Cisco Security Agents to be effective. In short, this was a true test of "day-zero" protection. This is similar to what Cisco has seen with earlier exploits and worms-the default Cisco Security Agent configuration stopped the exploit, with no binary or policy updates required. The following is a partial list of prior worms and exploits that Cisco Security Agent has stopped via the default security policy settings:

Exploits

Worms

Exploits

Worms

ANI 0Day

OS vulnerability

MyDoom

E-mail worm

Bagle

E-mail worm

MS06-035

OS vulnerability

BigYellow

Network worm

MS06-040

OS vulnerability

Blackworm

Network worm

MS06-070

OS vulnerability

Blaster

Network worm

MS07-014

Application vulnerabilities

Bugbear

E-mail worm

Excel hlink dll

Application vulnerability

Code Red

Network worm

MS RDS ActiveX

OS vulnerability

Debploit

Network worm

MS XML Core Svs

OS vulnerability

DNS 0Day

OS vulnerability

Nimda

Network worm

Fizzer

E-mail worm

Pentagone/Gonner

E-mail worm

Gator/Gain

Spyware

Sasser

Network worm

Hotbar

Spyware

Sircam

E-mail worm

HTTP Dir Traversal

Web server vulnerability

Sobig

E-mail worm

IE Text Range

Application vulnerability

Storm Trojan

E-mail worm

IE VML BO

Application vulnerability

WMF 0day

OS vulnerability

SQL Slammer

Network worm

Word BO

Application vulnerability

SQL Snake

Network worm

W32.Rinbot.H

Network worm

JPEG/GDI+

Malware downloader

Zotob

Network worm

This exploit is only the latest example of new and mutating attacks that can seriously affect an organization's computing and network environments. The key to stopping these new attacks is two-fold: the ability to stop the attack without requiring any changes to the default configuration, and multiple rules in the default policies that provide defense in depth.