Implementing IPSec for PDN Access Applications
How IPSec-based PDN Access Configuration Works
| Step | Description |
|---|---|
|
1
|
A subscriber session
or PDP context Request, in GGSN service, arrives
at the system.
|
|
2
|
The system processes
the subscriber session or request as it would typically.
|
|
3
|
Prior to routing the
session packets, the system compares them against configured
Access Control Lists (ACLs).
|
|
4
|
The system determines
that the packet matches the criteria of an ACL that is associated
with a configured crypto map.
|
|
5
|
|
|
6
|
To initiate the IKE
SA negotiation, the system performs a Diffie-Hellman
exchange of the pre-shared key specified in the crypto
map with the specified peer security gateway.
|
|
7
|
The system and the security
gateway negotiate an ISAKMP policy (IKE SA) to
use to protect further communications.
|
|
8
|
Once the IKE SA has
been negotiated, the system negotiates an IPSec SA with
the security gateway using the transform method specified in the
transform sets.
|
|
9
|
Once the IPSec SA has
been negotiated, the system protects the data according
to the IPSec SAs established during step 8 and sends it over the
IPSec tunnel.
|
IMPORTANT:
Implementing IPSec for Mobile IP Applications
How IPSec-based Mobile IP Configuration Works
IMPORTANT:
IMPORTANT:
IMPORTANT:
IMPORTANT:
RADIUS Attributes for IPSec-based Mobile IP Applications
| Attribute | Description | Variable |
|---|---|---|
|
3GPP2-Security-Level
|
Indicates the type of
security that the home network mandates on the visited network.
|
Integer value:
3 – Enables
IPSec for tunnels and registration messages
4 – Disables
IPSec
|
|
3GPP2 -KeyId
|
Contains the opaque
IKE Key Identifier for the FA/HA shared IKE secret.
|
Supported value for
the first eight bytes is the network-order FA IP address
in hexadecimal characters.
Supported value for
the next eight bytes is the network-order HA IP address
in hexadecimal characters.
Supported value for
the final four bytes is a timestamp in network order, indicating
when the key was created, and is the number of seconds since
January 1, 1970, UTC.
|
|
3GPP2-IKE-Secret
|
Contains the FA/HA
shared secret for the IKE protocol. This attribute is salt-encrypted.
|
A binary string of 1
to 127 bytes.
|
|
3GPP2-S
|
Contains the “S” secret
parameter used to make the IKE pre-shared secret.
|
A binary string of the
value of “S” consisting of 1 to 127 characters
|
|
3GPP2- S-Lifetime
|
Contains the lifetime
of the “S” secret parameter used to make the IKE pre-shared
secret.
|
An integer in network
order, indicating the time in seconds since January 1, 1970
00:00 UTC
Note that this is equivalent
to the Unix operating system expression of time.
|
Implementing IPSec for L2TP Applications
How IPSec is Used for Attribute-based L2TP Configurations
| Step | . |
|---|---|
|
1
|
A subscriber session
arrives at the system.
|
|
2
|
The system attempts
to authenticate the subscriber with the AAA server.
|
|
3
|
The profile attributes
returned upon successful authentication by the AAA server indicate
that session data is to be tunneled using L2TP. In addition, attributes
specifying a crypto map name and ISAKMP secret are also supplied
indicating that IP security is also required.
|
|
4
|
The system determines
that the crypto map name supplied matches a configured crypto map.
|
|
5
|
|
|
6
|
To initiate the IKE
SA negotiation, the system performs a Diffie-Hellman
exchange of the ISAKMP secret specified in the profile attribute
with the specified peer LNS (L2TP Network Server) or
security gateway.
|
|
7
|
The system and the LNS
or security gateway negotiate an ISAKMP (IKE) policy
to use to protect further communications.
|
|
8
|
Once the IKE SA has
been negotiated, the system negotiates an IPSec SA with
the LNS or security gateway using the transform method specified
in the transform sets.
|
|
9
|
Once the IPSec SA has
been negotiated, the system protects the L2TP encapsulated
data according to the IPSec SAs established during step 9 and sends
it over the IPSec tunnel.
|
IMPORTANT:
How IPSec is Used for PDSN Compulsory L2TP Configuration
| Step | Description |
|---|---|
|
1
|
A subscriber session
arrives at a PDSN service on the system that is configured to perform
compulsory tunneling. The system uses the LAC service specified
in the PDSN service’s configuration.
|
|
2
|
|
|
3
|
The system determines
that the crypto map name supplied matches a configured crypto map.
|
|
4
|
|
|
5
|
To initiate the IKE
SA negotiation, the system performs a Diffie-Hellman
exchange of the ISAKMP secret specified by the attribute with the
specified peer LNS or security gateway.
|
|
6
|
The system and the LNS
or security gateway negotiate an ISAKMP policy (IKE SA) to
use to protect further communications.
|
|
7
|
Once the IKE SA has
been negotiated, the system negotiates an IPSec SA with
the LNS or security gateway.
|
|
8
|
Once the IPSec SA has
been negotiated, the system protects the L2TP encapsulated data
according to the rules specified in the transform set and sends
it over the IPSec tunnel.
|
IMPORTANT:
How IPSec is Used for L2TP Configurations on the GGSN
| Step | Description |
|---|---|
|
1
|
A subscriber session/PDP
Context Request arrives at the system.
|
|
2
|
The configuration of
the APN accessed by the subscriber indicates that session data is
to be tunneled using L2TP. In addition, attributes
specifying a crypto map name and ISAKMP secret are also supplied
indicating that IP security is also required.
|
|
3
|
The system determines
that the crypto map name supplied matches a configured crypto map.
|
|
4
|
|
|
5
|
To initiate the IKE
SA negotiation, the system performs a Diffie-Hellman
exchange of the ISAKMP secret specified in the profile attribute
with the specified peer LNS or security gateway.
|
|
6
|
The system and the LNS
or security gateway negotiate an ISAKMP (IKE) policy
to use to protect further communications.
|
|
7
|
Once the IKE SA has
been negotiated, the system negotiates an IPSec SA with
the LNS or security gateway using the transform method specified
in the transform sets.
|
|
8
|
Once the IPSec SA has
been negotiated, the system protects the L2TP encapsulated
data according to the IPSec SAs established during step 9 and sends
it over the IPSec tunnel.
|
IMPORTANT:
IPSec for LTE/SAE Networks
Encryption Algorithms
HMAC Functions
Diffie-Hellman Groups
Dynamic Node-to-Node IPSec Tunnels
ACL-based Node-to-Node IPSec Tunnels
Traffic Selectors
X.509 Certificate-based Peer Authentication
| Step | Description |
|---|---|
|
1
|
The peer node initiates
an IKEv2 exchange with the local node, known as the IKE_SA_INIT
exchange, by issuing an IKE_SA_INIT Request
to negotiate cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces, and
perform a Diffie-Hellman exchange with the local node.
|
|
2
|
The local node responds
with an IKE_SA_INIT Response by choosing a cryptographic suite
from the initiator’s offered choices, completing
the Diffie-Hellman and nonce exchanges with the peer node. In
addition, the local node includes the list of CA certificates
that it will accept in its CERTREQ payload. For successful
peer authentication, the CERTREQ payload must contain at
least one CA certificate that is in the trust chain of the peer
certificate. At this point in the negotiation, the
IKE_SA_INIT exchange is complete and all but the
headers of all the messages that follow are encrypted and integrity-protected.
|
|
3
|
The peer node initiates
an IKE_AUTH exchange with the local node by including the
IDi payload, setting the CERT payload to the peer certificate, and
including the AUTH payload containing the signature of the previous
IKE_SA_INIT Request message (in step
1) generated using the private key of the peer certificate. The
authentication algorithm used to generate the AUTH payload is also
included in the AUTH payload. The peer node also includes
the CERTREQ payload containing the list of SHA-1 hash algorithms
for local node authentication. For successful server authentication, the
CERTREQ payload must contain at least one CA certificate that is
in the trust chain of the peer certificate.
|
|
4
|
Using the CA certificate
corresponding to the peer certificate, the local node first
verifies that the peer certificate in the CERT payload has not been
modified and the identity included in the IDi corresponds to the
identity in the peer certificate. If the verification is
successful, using the public key of the peer certificate, the
local node generates the expected AUTH payload and compares it with
the received AUTH payload. If they match, the
authentication of the peer node is successful. Otherwise, the
local node sends an IKEv2 Notification message indicating authentication
failure.
|
|
5
|
The local node responds
with the IKE_AUTH Response, including the IDr
payload, setting the CERT payload to the local node certificate, and
including the AUTH payload containing the signature of the IKE_SA_INIT
Response message (in step 2) generated using the
private key of the local node certificate. The authentication
algorithm used to generate the AUTH payload is also included in
the AUTH payload.
|
|
6
|
Using the CA certificate
corresponding to the local node certificate, the peer node
first verifies that the local node certificate in the CERT payload
has not been modified. If the verification is successful, using
the public key of the local node certificate, the peer
generates the expected AUTH payload and compares it with the received
AUTH payload. If they match, the local node authentication
is successful. This completes the IKE_AUTH exchange.
|
|
7
|
An IPSec SA gets established
between the peer node and the local node. If more IPSec
SAs are needed, either the peer or local node can initiate
the creation of additional Child SAs using a CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchange.
|
Certificate Revocation Lists
Child SA Rekey Support
IKEv2 Keep-Alive Messages (Dead Peer Detection)
E-UTRAN/EPC Logical Network Interfaces Supporting IPSec Tunnels
| Interface | Description |
|---|---|
|
S1-MME Interface
|
This interface is the
reference point for the control plane protocol between the eNodeB
and the MME. The S1-MME interface uses S1-AP (S1- Application
Protocol) over SCTP (Stream Control Transmission
Protocol) as the transport layer protocol for guaranteed
delivery of signaling messages between the MME and the eNodeB (S1).
When configured, the
S1-AP over SCTP signaling traffic gets carried over an
IPSec tunnel.
When a subscriber UE
initiates a connection with the eNodeB, the eNodeB initiates an
IPSec tunnel with the MME, and SCTP signaling for all subsequent
subscriber UEs served by this MME gets carried over the same IPSec
tunnel.
|
|
S1-U Interface
|
This interface is the
reference point for bearer channel tunneling between the eNodeB
and the S-GW.
Typically, the
eNodeB initiates an IPSec tunnel with the S-GW over this
interface for subscriber data traffic. But the S-GW
may also initiate an IPSec tunnel with the eNodeB, if required.
|
|
S5 Interface
|
This interface is the
reference point for tunneling between the S-GW and the
P-GW.
Based on the requested
APN from a subscriber UE, the MME selects both the S-GW and
the P-GW that the S-GW connects to. GTP-U
data traffic is carried over the IPSec tunnel between the S-GW
and P-GW for the current and all subsequent subscriber UEs.
|
IPSec for Femto-UMTS Networks
Crypto Map Template Configuration
configure
context vpn_ctxt_name
eap-profile eap_prof_name
mode authentication-pass-through
exit
ip pool ipsec ip_address subnetmask
ipsec transform-set ipsec_trans_set
exit
ikev2 transform-set ikev2_trans_set
exit
crypto template crypto_template
authentication eap-profile eap_prof_name
exit
ikev2-ikesa
transform set listikev2_trans_set
payload crypto_payload_name match childsa [ match { ipv4 | ipv6 }
ip-address-alloc dynamic
ipsec transform-setlist ipsec_trans_set
exit
ikev2-ikesa
keepalive-user-activity
end
configure
context vpn_ctxt_name
hnbgw-service hnbgw_svc_name
security-gateway
bind address segw_ip_address crypto-template crypto_template context segw_ctxt_name
end
X.509 Certificate-based Peer Authentication
| Step | Description |
|---|---|
|
1
|
The peer node initiates
an IKEv2 exchange with the local node, known as the IKE_SA_INIT
exchange, by issuing an IKE_SA_INIT Request
to negotiate cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces, and
perform a Diffie-Hellman exchange with the local node.
|
|
2
|
The local node responds
with an IKE_SA_INIT Response by choosing a cryptographic suite
from the initiator’s offered choices, completing
the Diffie-Hellman and nonce exchanges with the peer node. In
addition, the local node includes the list of CA certificates
that it will accept in its CERTREQ payload. For successful
peer authentication, the CERTREQ payload must contain at
least one CA certificate that is in the trust chain of the peer
certificate. At this point in the negotiation, the
IKE_SA_INIT exchange is complete and all but the
headers of all the messages that follow are encrypted and integrity-protected.
|
|
3
|
The peer node initiates
an IKE_AUTH exchange with the local node by including the
IDi payload, setting the CERT payload to the peer certificate, and
including the AUTH payload containing the signature of the previous
IKE_SA_INIT Request message (in step
1) generated using the private key of the peer certificate. The
authentication algorithm used to generate the AUTH payload is also
included in the AUTH payload. The peer node also includes
the CERTREQ payload containing the list of SHA-1 hash algorithms
for local node authentication. For successful server authentication, the
CERTREQ payload must contain at least one CA certificate that is
in the trust chain of the peer certificate.
|
|
4
|
Using the CA certificate
corresponding to the peer certificate, the local node first
verifies that the peer certificate in the CERT payload has not been
modified and the identity included in the IDi corresponds to the
identity in the peer certificate. If the verification is
successful, using the public key of the peer certificate, the
local node generates the expected AUTH payload and compares it with
the received AUTH payload. If they match, the
authentication of the peer node is successful. Otherwise, the
local node sends an IKEv2 Notification message indicating authentication
failure.
|
|
5
|
The local node responds
with the IKE_AUTH Response, including the IDr
payload, setting the CERT payload to the local node certificate, and
including the AUTH payload containing the signature of the IKE_SA_INIT
Response message (in step 2) generated using the
private key of the local node certificate. The authentication
algorithm used to generate the AUTH payload is also included in
the AUTH payload.
|
|
6
|
Using the CA certificate
corresponding to the local node certificate, the peer node
first verifies that the local node certificate in the CERT payload
has not been modified. If the verification is successful, using
the public key of the local node certificate, the peer
generates the expected AUTH payload and compares it with the received
AUTH payload. If they match, the local node authentication
is successful. This completes the IKE_AUTH exchange.
|
|
7
|
An IPSec SA gets established
between the peer node and the local node. If more IPSec
SAs are needed, either the peer or local node can initiate
the creation of additional Child SAs using a CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchange.
|
Certificate Revocation Lists
Child SA Rekey Support
IKEv2 Keep-Alive Messages (Dead Peer Detection)
x.509 Certificate Configuration
configure
certificate name x.509_cert_name pem { data pem_data_string | url pem_data_url} private-key
pem { [encrypted] data PKI_pem_data_string | url PKI_pem_data_url }
ca-certificate
name ca_root_cert_name pem { data pem_data_string | url pem_data_url }
exit
crypto template segw_crypto_template ikev2-dynamic
authentication local certificate
authentication remote certificate
keepalive interval dur timeout dur_timeout
certificate x.509_cert_name
ca-certificate
list ca-cert-name ca_root_cert_name
payload crypto_payload_name match childsa [match {ipv4 | ipv6}]
ip-address-alloc dynamic
ipsec transform-setlist ipsec_trans_set
end
configure
context vpn_ctxt_name
subscriber default
ip context-name vpn_ctxt_name
ip address pool name ip_pool_name
end