Seguridad : Dispositivos de seguridad adaptable Cisco ASA de la serie 5500

IPSec ASA y de la Nota Técnica de los debugs IKE (modo principal IKEv1) localización de averías

18 Octubre 2015 - Traducción Automática
Otras Versiones: PDFpdf | Inglés (22 Agosto 2015) | Comentarios

Introducción

Este documento describe los debugs en el dispositivo de seguridad adaptante (ASA) cuando utilizan al modo principal y la clave previamente compartida (PSK). También se trata la traducción de ciertas líneas de debug en la configuración.

Los temas no discutidos en este documento incluyen el paso del tráfico después de que se haya establecido el túnel y los conceptos básicos de IPSec o de Internet Key Exchange (IKE).

Contribuido por Atri Basu, Marcin Latosiewicz, y Jay Taylor joven, ingenieros de Cisco TAC.

Prerrequisitos

Requisitos

Los Quien lea este documento deben tener conocimiento de estos temas.

  • PSK

  • IKE

Componentes Utilizados

La información que contiene este documento se basa en estas versiones de software y hardware.

  • Cisco ASA 8.3.2

  • Router que ejecuta el 12.4T IOS

Convenciones

Para obtener más información sobre las convenciones del documento, consulte Convenciones de Consejos Técnicos de Cisco.

Cuestión central

Los debugs IKE y del IPSec son a veces secretos, pero usted puede utilizarlos para entender donde se localiza un problema del establecimiento del túnel del IPSec VPN.

Situación

Utilizan al modo principal típicamente entre los túneles de LAN a LAN o, en el caso del Acceso Remoto (EzVPN), cuando los Certificados se utilizan para la autenticación.

Los debugs son a partir de dos ASA que funcionen con la versión de software 8.3.2. Los dos dispositivos formarán un túnel de LAN a LAN.

Se describen dos escenarios principales:

  • ASA como el iniciador para el IKE
  • ASA como el respondedor para el IKE

comandos debug usados

Éstos son los comandos debug usados en este documento:

  • isakmp 127 del debug crypto
  • IPSec 127 del debug crypto

Configuración ASA

Configuración IPSec

crypto ipsec transform-set TRANSFORM esp-aes esp-sha-hmac
crypto map MAP 10 match address VPN
crypto map MAP 10 set peer 10.0.0.2
crypto map MAP 10 set transform-set TRANSFORM
crypto map MAP 10 set reverse-route
crypto map MAP interface outside
crypto isakmp enable outside
crypto isakmp policy 10
authentication pre-share
encryption 3des
hash sha
group 2
lifetime 86400
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 ipsec-attributes
pre-shared-key cisco
access-list VPN extended permit tcp 192.168.1.0
255.255.255.0 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0
access-list VPN extended permit icmp 192.168.1.0
255.255.255.0 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0

Configuración IP:

 

ciscoasa# show ip

System IP Addresses:

Interface               Name     IP address     Subnet mask     Method

GigabitEthernet0/0       inside     192.168.1.1     255.255.255.0   manual
GigabitEthernet0/1       outside   10.0.0.1          255.255.255.0   manual

Current IP Addresses:

Interface               Name      IP address     Subnet mask     Method

GigabitEthernet0/0       inside    192.168.1.1     255.255.255.0   manual
GigabitEthernet0/1       outside   10.0.0.1         255.255.255.0   manual

Configuración de NAT

object network INSIDE-RANGE
 subnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0object network FOREIGN_NETWORK
 subnet 192.168.2.0 255.255.255
nat (inside,outside) source static INSIDE-RANGE INSIDE-RANGE
destination static FOREIGN_NETWORK FOREIGN_NETWORK

Depuración

Descripción del mensaje del iniciador
Depuraciones
Descripción del mensaje del respondedor
El intercambio del modo principal comienza; no se ha compartido ningunas directivas, y los pares todavía están adentro MM_NO_STATE. Como el iniciador, el ASA comienza a construir el payload.
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Pitcher: received a key acquire 
message, spi 0x0 IPSEC(crypto_map_check)-3: Looking
for crypto map matching 5-tuple: Prot=1,
saddr=192.168.1.2, sport=2816, daddr=192.168.2.1
dport=2816 IPSEC(crypto_map_check)-3:
Checking crypto map MAP 10: matched.
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE Initiator: New Phase 1,
Intf inside, IKE Peer 10.0.0.2 local Proxy Address
192.168.1.0, remote Proxy Address 192.168.2.0,
Crypto map (MAP)
 
Construcción MM1. Este proceso incluye la oferta inicial para el IKE y los vendedores soportados NAT-T.
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
constructing ISAKMP SA payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing NAT-Traversal VID ver 02 payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing NAT-Traversal VID ver 03 payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing NAT-Traversal VID ver RFC payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing Fragmentation VID
+ extended capabilities payload
Envíe MM1.
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE SENDING 
Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR
+ SA (1) + VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13)
+ VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13)
+ NONE (0) total length : 168
 
=====================MM1========================>
 
 
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE RECEIVED 
Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR
+ SA (1) + VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13)
+ VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13)
+ NONE (0) total length : 164
MM1 recibido del iniciador.
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
processing SA payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Oakley proposal is acceptable
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Received NAT-Traversal RFC VID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Received NAT-Traversal ver 03 VID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Received NAT-Traversal ver 02 VID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing IKE SA payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
IKE SA Proposal # 1, Transform # 1
acceptable Matches global IKE entry # 2
Proceso MM1. La comparación de las directivas ISAKMP/IKE comienza. El peer remoto hace publicidad que puede utilizar el NAT-T. Configuración relacionada: política isakmp crypto 10 curso de la vida 86400 del group2 del sha del hash del cifrado 3des de la parte alícuota previa de autenticación.
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
constructing ISAKMP SA payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing NAT-Traversal VID ver 02 payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing Fragmentation VID
+ extended capabilities payload
Construcción MM2. En este mensaje el respondedor selecciona que las configuraciones de la política isakmp a utilizar. También hace publicidad de las versiones NAT-T que puede utilizar.
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE SENDING 
Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + SA (1)
+ VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13)
+ NONE(0) total length : 128
Envíe MM2.
 
<===================MM2=========================
 
MM2 recibido del respondedor.
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE RECEIVED 
Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + SA (1)
+ VENDOR (13) + NONE (0) total length : 104
 
Proceso MM2.
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
processing SA payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Oakley proposal is acceptable
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Received NAT-Traversal RFC VID
 
Construcción MM3. Este proceso incluye las cargas útiles de la detección NAT, las cargas útiles del intercambio de claves del Diffie-Hellman (DH) (KE) (el initator incluye g, p, y A al respondedor), y el soporte DPD.
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
constructing ke payload
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing nonce payload
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing Cisco Unity VID payload
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing xauth V6 VID payload
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Send IOS VID
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Constructing ASA spoofing IOS Vendor ID payload
(version: 1.0.0, capabilities: 20000001)
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing VID payload
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Send Altiga/Cisco VPN3000/Cisco ASA GW VID
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing NAT-Discovery payload
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
computing NAT Discovery hash
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing NAT-Discovery payload
Nov 30 10:38:29 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
computing NAT Discovery hash
 
Envíe MM3.
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE SENDING 
Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + KE (4)
+ NONCE (10) + VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13)
+ VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13) + NAT-D (20)
+ NAT-D (20) + NONE (0) total length : 304
 
 
=========================MM3===================>
 
 
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE RECEIVED 
Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + KE (4)
+ NONCE (10) + VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13)
+ VENDOR (13) + NAT-D (130) + NAT-D (130)
+ NONE (0) total length : 284
MM3 recibido del iniciador.
 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
processing ke payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing ISA_KE payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing nonce payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Received DPD VID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Processing IOS/PIX Vendor ID payload
(version: 1.0.0, capabilities: 00000f6f)
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Received xauth V6 VID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing NAT-Discovery payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
computing NAT Discovery hash
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing NAT-Discovery payload
Proceso MM3. De las cargas útiles NAT-D el respondedor puede determinar si el initator está detrás de NAT y si el respondedor está detrás de NAT. Del DH KE, el respondedor del payload consigue los valores de p, de g y del A.
 
 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
computing NAT Discovery hash
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing ke payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing nonce payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing Cisco Unity VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing xauth V6 VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Send IOS VID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Constructing ASA spoofing IOS Vendor ID payload
(version: 1.0.0, capabilities: 20000001)
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Send Altiga/Cisco VPN3000/Cisco ASA GW VID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing NAT-Discovery payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
computing NAT Discovery hash
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing NAT-Discovery payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
computing NAT Discovery hash
Construcción MM4. Este proceso incluye el payload de la detección NAT, el respondedor DH KE genera “B” y “s” (devuelve “B” al initator), y DPD VID.
 
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
Connection landed on tunnel_group 10.0.0.2
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Generating keys for Responder�
Asocian al par al grupo de túnel de 10.0.0.2 L2L, y el cifrado y las claves del hash se generan del “s” arriba y de la clave previamente compartida.
 
 [IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE SENDING 
Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + KE (4)
+ NONCE (10) + VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13)
+ VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13) + NAT-D (130)
+ NAT-D (130) + NONE (0) total length : 304
Envíe MM4.
 
<======================MM4======================
 
MM4 recibido del respondedor.
IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE RECEIVED 
Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + KE (4)
+ NONCE (10) + VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13)
+ VENDOR (13) + VENDOR (13) + NAT-D (20)
+ NAT-D (20) + NONE (0) total length : 304
 
Proceso MM4. De las cargas útiles NAT-D, el initator puede ahora determinar si el iniator está detrás de NAT y si el respondedor está detrás de NAT. Del DH KE, el iniciador recibe “B” y puede ahora generar el “S.”
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
processing ike payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing ISA_KE payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing nonce payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Received Cisco Unity client VID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Received DPD VID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Processing IOS/PIX Vendor ID payload
(version: 1.0.0, capabilities: 00000f7f)
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing VID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Received xauth V6 VID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing NAT-Discovery payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
computing NAT Discovery hash
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing NAT-Discovery payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
computing NAT Discovery hash
Asocian al par al grupo de túnel de 10.0.0.2 L2L, y el initator genera las claves del cifrado y del hash usando “s” arriba y la clave previamente compartida.
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
Connection landed on tunnel_group 10.0.0.2
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Generating keys for Initiator...
Construcción MM5. Configuración relacionada: auto crypto de la identidad del isakmp
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, 
IP = 10.0.0.2, constructing ID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, constructing hash payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Computing hash for ISAKMP
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Constructing IOS keep alive payload:
proposal=32767/32767 sec.
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, constructing dpd vid payload
Envíe MM5.
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
IKE_DECODE SENDING Message (msgid=0)
with payloads : HDR + ID (5) + HASH (8)
+ IOS KEEPALIVE (128) +VENDOR (13)
+ NONE (0) total length : 96
 
======================MM5======================>
 
El respondedor no está detrás de ningún NAT. Ningún NAT-T requerido.
[IKEv1]: 
Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2,
Automatic NAT Detection
Status: Remote end
is NOT behind a NAT
device This end is NOT
behind a NAT device
[IKEv1]: 
IP = 10.0.0.2,
IKE_DECODE RECEIVED
Message (msgid=0)
with payloads : HDR
+ ID (5) + HASH (8)
+ NONE (0) total
length : 64
MM5 recibido del iniciador. Este proceso incluye la identidad del peer remoto (ID) y el aterrizaje de la conexión en un grupo del túnel particular.
 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, 
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing ID payload
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, ID_IPV4_ADDR ID received 10.0.0.2
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing hash payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Computing hash for ISAKMP
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing notify payload
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2,Automatic NAT
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Connection landed on tunnel_group 10.0.0.2
Proceso MM5. La autenticación con las claves previamente compartidas ahora comienza. La autenticación ocurre en ambos pares; por lo tanto, usted verá dos conjuntos de los procesos de autenticación correspondientes. Configuración relacionada: tipo ipsec-l2l de 10.0.0.2 del grupo de túnel
 
Detection Status: Remote end is NOT 
behind a NAT device This end is NOT behind
a NAT device
Ningún NAT-T requerido en este caso.
 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, 
IP = 10.0.0.2, constructing ID payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, constructing hash payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Computing hash for ISAKMP
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Constructing IOS keep alive payload:
proposal=32767/32767 sec.
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, constructing dpd vid payload
Construcción MM6. Envíe la identidad incluye reintroducen las épocas comenzadas y la identidad enviada al peer remoto.
 
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE SENDING 
Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + ID (5)
+ HASH (8) + IOS KEEPALIVE (128) +VENDOR (13)
+ NONE (0) total length : 96
Envíe MM6.
 
<======================MM6======================
 
MM6 recibido del respondedor.
[IKEv1]: 
IP = 10.0.0.2,
IKE_DECODE RECEIVED
Message (msgid=0)
with payloads : HDR
+ ID (5) + HASH (8)
+ NONE (0) total
length : 64
[IKEv1]: 
Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2,
PHASE 1 COMPLETED
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Keep-alive
type for this
connection: DPD
[IKEv1 DEBUG]:
Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2,
Starting P1
rekey timer:
64800 seconds.
Fase 1 completa. El isakmp del comienzo reintroduce el temporizador. Configuración relacionada: política isakmp crypto 10 sh run del ciscoasa# del curso de la vida 86400 del group2 del sha del hash del cifrado 3des de la parte alícuota previa de autenticación todo el auto crypto de la identidad del isakmp del isakmp crypto
Proceso MM6. Este proceso incluye la identidad remota enviada del par y de la decisión final con respecto al grupo de túnel de escoger
 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, 
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing ID payload
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, ID_IPV4_ADDR ID received
10.0.0.2
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing hash payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Computing hash for ISAKMP
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Connection landed on tunnel_group 10.0.0.2
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Oakley begin quick mode
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE Initiator starting
QM: msg id = 7b80c2b0
 
Fase 1 completa. El comienzo ISAKMP reintroduce el temporizador. Configuración relacionada: clave previamente compartida Cisco de los IPSec-atributos de 10.0.0.2 del grupo de túnel del tipo ipsec-l2l de 10.0.0.2 del grupo de túnel
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, PHASE 1 COMPLETED
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2,
Keep-alive type for this connection:
DPD DPD has bee negotiated and
Phase 1 is now complete.
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Starting P1
rekey timer: 82080 seconds.
 
La fase 2 (Quick Mode) comienza.
IPSEC: New embryonic SA 
created @ 0x53FC3C00,
SCB: 0x53F90A00,
Direction: inbound
SPI : 0xFD2D851F
Session ID: 0x00006000
VPIF num : 0x00000003
Tunnel type: l2l
Protocol : esp
Lifetime : 240 seconds
 
Construcción QM1. Este proceso incluye los ID de proxy y las directivas del IPSec. Configuración relacionada: el transforme el conjunto crypto del IPSec TRANSFORMA ICMP extendido VPN 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 del permiso de la lista de acceso del esp-sha-hmac del ESP-aes
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, 
IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE got SPI from key engine:
SPI = 0xfd2d851f
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, oakley constucting quick mode
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, constructing blank hash payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, constructing IPSec SA payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, constructing IPSec nonce payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, constructing proxy ID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Transmitting Proxy Id:
Local subnet: 192.168.1.0 mask 255.255.255.0
Protocol 1 Port 0
Remote subnet: 192.168.2.0 Mask 255.255.255.0
Protocol 1 Port 0
The local subnet (192.168.1.0/24) and expcted remote
subnet (192.168.2.0/24) are being sent
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE Initiator sending Initial Contact
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, constructing qm hash payload
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE Initiator sending 1st QM pkt:
msg id = 7b80c2b0
 
Envíe QM1.
 [IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE SENDING   
Message (msgid=7b80c2b0) with payloads : HDR
+ HASH (8) + SA (1) + NONCE (10) + ID (5)
+ ID (5) + NOTIFY (11) + NONE (0) total length : 200
 
 
==========================QM1===================>
 
 
[IKEv1 DECODE]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
IKE Responder starting QM: msg id = 52481cf5
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE RECEIVED
Message (msgid=52481cf5) with payloads :
HDR + HASH (8) + SA (1) + NONCE (10)
+ ID (5) + ID (5) + NONE (0) total length : 172
QM1 recibido del iniciador. El respondedor comienza la fase 2 (QM).
 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, 
IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing hash payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing SA payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing nonce payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing ID payload
Proceso QM1. Este proceso compara los proxys remotos con el local y selecciona la directiva aceptable del IPSec. Configuración relacionada: el transforme el conjunto crypto del IPSec TRANSFORMA el direccionamiento ampliado VPN VPN de la coincidencia del MAPA 10 de la correspondencia de criptografía ICMP 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 del permiso de la lista de acceso del esp-sha-hmac del ESP-aes
 
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2, 
ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET ID
received--192.168.2.0--255.255.255.0
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
Received remote IP Proxy Subnet data in ID Payload:
Address 192.168.2.0, Mask 255.255.255.0,
Protocol 1, Port 0
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing ID payload
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET ID
received--192.168.1.0--255.255.255.0
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
Received local IP Proxy Subnet data in ID Payload:
Address 192.168.1.0, Mask 255.255.255.0,
Protocol 1, Port 0
Se reciben el telecontrol y las subredes locales (192.168.2.0/24 y 192.168.1.0/24).
 
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,   
QM IsRekeyed old sa not found by addr
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
Static Crypto Map check, checking map = MAP,
seq = 10...
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
Static Crypto Map check, map MAP,
seq = 10 is a successful match
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
IKE Remote Peer configured for crypto map: MAP
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
processing IPSec SA payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
IPSec SA Proposal # 1, Transform # 1 acceptable
Matches global IPSec SA entry # 10
Se busca y se encuentra una entrada crypto estática que corresponde con.
 
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,  
IKE: requesting SPI!
IPSEC: New embryonic SA created @ 0x53FC3698,
SCB: 0x53FC2998,
Direction: inbound
SPI : 0x1698CAC7
Session ID: 0x00004000
VPIF num : 0x00000003
Tunnel type: l2l
Protocol : esp
Lifetime : 240 seconds
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
IKE got SPI from key engine: SPI = 0x1698cac7
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
oakley constructing quick mode
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing blank hash payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing IPSec SA payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing IPSec nonce payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing proxy ID
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
Transmitting Proxy Id:
Remote subnet: 192.168.2.0 Mask 255.255.255.0
Protocol 1 Port 0
Local subnet: 192.168.1.0 mask 255.255.255.0
Protocol 1 Port 0
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
constructing qm hash payload
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
IKE Responder sending 2nd QM pkt: msg id = 52481cf5
Construcción QM2. Este proceso incluye la confirmación de las identidades de representación, tipo de túnel, y un control se realiza para el ACL de criptografía duplicado.
 
 [IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE SENDING 
Message (msgid=52481cf5) with payloads :
HDR + HASH (8) + SA (1) + NONCE (10) + ID (5)
+ ID (5) + NONE (0) total length : 172
Envíe QM2.
 
<=======================QM2======================
 
QM2 recibido del respondedor.
IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE_DECODE RECEIVED  
Message (msgid=7b80c2b0) with payloads :
HDR + HASH (8) + SA (1) + NONCE (10)
+ ID (5) + ID (5) + NOTIFY (11)
+ NONE (0) total length : 200
 
Proceso QM2. En este proceso, el extremo remoto envía los parámetros y se escogen los cursos de la vida propuestos más cortos de la fase 2.
 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, 
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing hash payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing SA payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing nonce payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing ID payload
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET ID
received--192.168.1.0--255.255.255.0
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing ID payload
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET ID
received--192.168.2.0--255.255.255.0
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing notify payload
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Responder Lifetime
decode follows (outb SPI[4]|attributes):
[IKEv1 DECODE]: 0000: DDE50931 80010001
00020004 00000E10 ...1............
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
Responder forcing change of IPSec rekeying
duration from 28800 to 3600 seconds
based on response from peer, the ASA is
changing certain IPSEC attributes.
In this case the rekey interval
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, loading all IPSEC SAs
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Generating Quick Mode Key!
Correspondencia de criptografía que corresponde con “MAPA” Found y entrada 10 y correspondido con le contra la lista de acceso “VPN.”
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,    
NP encrypt rule look up for crypto map MAP 10
matching ACL VPN: returned cs_id=53f11198;
rule=53f11a90
El dispositivo ha generado el tráfico entrante y saliente 0xfd2d851f y 0xdde50931for SPI respectivamente.
 [IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2, 
Generating Quick Mode Key!
IPSEC: New embryonic SA created @ 0x53FC3698,
SCB: 0x53F910F0,
Direction: outbound
SPI : 0xDDE50931
Session ID: 0x00006000
VPIF num : 0x00000003
Tunnel type: l2l
Protocol : esp
Lifetime : 240 seconds
IPSEC: Completed host OBSA update,
SPI 0xDDE50931
IPSEC: Creating outbound VPN context,
SPI 0xDDE50931
Flags: 0x00000005
SA : 0x53FC3698
SPI : 0xDDE50931
MTU : 1500 bytes
VCID : 0x00000000
Peer : 0x00000000
SCB : 0x01CF218F
Channel: 0x4C69CB80
IPSEC: Completed outbound VPN context,
SPI 0xDDE50931
VPN handle: 0x000161A4
IPSEC: New outbound encrypt rule,
SPI 0xDDE50931
Src addr: 192.168.1.0
Src mask: 255.255.255.0
Dst addr: 192.168.2.0
Dst mask: 255.255.255.0
Src ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Dst ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Protocol: 1
Use protocol: true
SPI: 0x00000000
Use SPI: false
IPSEC: Completed outbound encrypt rule,
SPI 0xDDE50931
Rule ID: 0x53FC3AD8
IPSEC: New outbound permit rule,
SPI 0xDDE50931
Src addr: 10.0.0.1
Src mask: 255.255.255.255
Dst addr: 10.0.0.2
Dst mask: 255.255.255.255
Src ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Dst ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Protocol: 50
Use protocol: true
SPI: 0xDDE50931
Use SPI: true
IPSEC: Completed outbound permit rule,
SPI 0xDDE50931
Rule ID: 0x53F91538
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2,
NP encrypt rule look up for crypto map MAP 10
matching ACL VPN: returned cs_id=53f11198;
rule=53f11a90
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,
Security negotiation complete for LAN-to-LAN
Group (10.0.0.2) Initiator,
Inbound SPI = 0xfd2d851f,
Outbound SPI = 0xdde50931
Construcción QM3. Confirme todos los SPI creados al peer remoto.
Confirm all SPIs created to remote peer.
IPSEC: Completed host IBSA update,
SPI 0xFD2D851F
IPSEC: Creating inbound VPN context,
SPI 0xFD2D851F
Flags: 0x00000006
SA : 0x53FC3C00
SPI : 0xFD2D851F
MTU : 0 bytes
VCID : 0x00000000
Peer : 0x000161A4
SCB : 0x01CEA8EF
Channel: 0x4C69CB80
IPSEC: Completed inbound VPN context,
SPI 0xFD2D851F
VPN handle: 0x00018BBC
IPSEC: Updating outbound VPN context 0x000161A4,
SPI 0xDDE50931
Flags: 0x00000005
SA : 0x53FC3698
SPI : 0xDDE50931
MTU : 1500 bytes
VCID : 0x00000000
Peer : 0x00018BBC
SCB : 0x01CF218F
Channel: 0x4C69CB80
IPSEC: Completed outbound VPN context,
SPI 0xDDE50931
VPN handle: 0x000161A4
IPSEC: Completed outbound inner rule,
SPI 0xDDE50931
Rule ID: 0x53FC3AD8
IPSEC: Completed outbound outer SPD rule,
SPI 0xDDE50931
Rule ID: 0x53F91538
IPSEC: New inbound tunnel flow rule,
SPI 0xFD2D851F
Src addr: 192.168.2.0
Src mask: 255.255.255.0
Dst addr: 192.168.1.0
Dst mask: 255.255.255.0
Src ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Dst ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Protocol: 1
Use protocol: true
SPI: 0x00000000
Use SPI: false
IPSEC: Completed inbound tunnel flow rule,
SPI 0xFD2D851F
Rule ID: 0x53F91970
IPSEC: New inbound decrypt rule,
SPI 0xFD2D851F
Src addr: 10.0.0.2
Src mask: 255.255.255.255
Dst addr: 10.0.0.1
Dst mask: 255.255.255.255
Src ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Dst ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Protocol: 50
Use protocol: true
SPI: 0xFD2D851F
Use SPI: true
IPSEC: Completed inbound decrypt rule,
SPI 0xFD2D851F
Rule ID: 0x53F91A08
IPSEC: New inbound permit rule,
SPI 0xFD2D851F
Src addr: 10.0.0.2
Src mask: 255.255.255.255
Dst addr: 10.0.0.1
Dst mask: 255.255.255.255
Src ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Dst ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Protocol: 50
Use protocol: true
SPI: 0xFD2D851F
Use SPI: true
IPSEC: Completed inbound permit rule,
SPI 0xFD2D851F
Rule ID: 0x53F91AA0
Envíe QM3.
[IKEv1 DECODE]: Group = 10.0.0.2, 
IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE Initiator sending 3rd
QM pkt: msg id = 7b80c2b0
 
========================QM3=====================>
 
Fase 2 completa. El iniciador está listo ahora para cifrar y para desencriptar los paquetes usando estos valores de SPI.
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2, 
IKE_DECODE SENDING
Message (msgid=7b80c2b0
with payloads : HDR
+ HASH (8)
+ NONE (0)
total length :76
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2,
IKE got a KEY_ADD msg for SA:
SPI = 0xdde50931
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2,
Pitcher: received KEY_UPDATE,
spi 0xfd2d851f
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2,
Starting P2 rekey timer:
3060 seconds.
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2,
PHASE 2 COMPLETED
(msgid=7b80c2b0)
[IKEv1]: IP = 10.0.0.2,    
IKE_DECODE RECEIVED
Message (msgid=52481cf5)
with payloads : HDR
+ HASH (8)
+ NONE (0)
total length : 52
Iniciador del fom del receivd QM3.
 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2, 
IP = 10.0.0.2, processing hash payload
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, loading all IPSEC SAs
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Generating Quick Mode Key!
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, NP encrypt rule look up for
crypto map MAP 10 matching ACL VPN:
returned cs_id=53f11198; rule=53f11a90
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Generating Quick Mode Key!
IPSEC: New embryonic SA created @ 0x53F18B00,
SCB: 0x53F8A1C0,
Direction: outbound
SPI : 0xDB680406
Session ID: 0x00004000
VPIF num : 0x00000003
Tunnel type: l2l
Protocol : esp
Lifetime : 240 seconds
IPSEC: Completed host OBSA update,
SPI 0xDB680406
IPSEC: Creating outbound VPN context,
SPI 0xDB680406
Flags: 0x00000005
SA : 0x53F18B00
SPI : 0xDB680406
MTU : 1500 bytes
VCID : 0x00000000
Peer : 0x00000000
SCB : 0x005E4849
Channel: 0x4C69CB80
IPSEC: Completed outbound VPN context,
SPI 0xDB680406
VPN handle: 0x0000E9B4
IPSEC: New outbound encrypt rule,
SPI 0xDB680406
Src addr: 192.168.1.0
Src mask: 255.255.255.0
Dst addr: 192.168.2.0
Dst mask: 255.255.255.0
Src ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Dst ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Protocol: 1
Use protocol: true
SPI: 0x00000000
Use SPI: false
IPSEC: Completed outbound encrypt rule,
SPI 0xDB680406
Rule ID: 0x53F89160
IPSEC: New outbound permit rule,
SPI 0xDB680406
Src addr: 10.0.0.1
Src mask: 255.255.255.255
Dst addr: 10.0.0.2
Dst mask: 255.255.255.255
Src ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Dst ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Protocol: 50
Use protocol: true
SPI: 0xDB680406
Use SPI: true
IPSEC: Completed outbound permit rule,
SPI 0xDB680406
Rule ID: 0x53E47E88
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, NP encrypt rule look up
for crypto map MAP 10 matching ACL VPN:
returned cs_id=53f11198; rule=53f11a90
Proceso QM3. Las claves de encripción se generan para los datos SA. Durante este proceso, los SPI se fijan para pasar el tráfico.
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2, IP = 10.0.0.2,   
Security negotiation complete for
LAN-to-LAN Group (10.0.0.2) Responder,
Inbound SPI = 0x1698cac7,
Outbound SPI = 0xdb680406
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, IKE got a
KEY_ADD msg for SA: SPI = 0xdb680406
IPSEC: Completed host IBSA update,
SPI 0x1698CAC7
IPSEC: Creating inbound VPN context,
SPI 0x1698CAC7
Flags: 0x00000006
SA : 0x53FC3698
SPI : 0x1698CAC7
MTU : 0 bytes
VCID : 0x00000000
Peer : 0x0000E9B4
SCB : 0x005DAE51
Channel: 0x4C69CB80
IPSEC: Completed inbound VPN context,
SPI 0x1698CAC7
VPN handle: 0x00011A8C
IPSEC: Updating outbound VPN context 0x0000E9B4,
SPI 0xDB680406
Flags: 0x00000005
SA : 0x53F18B00
SPI : 0xDB680406
MTU : 1500 bytes
VCID : 0x00000000
Peer : 0x00011A8C
SCB : 0x005E4849
Channel: 0x4C69CB80
IPSEC: Completed outbound VPN context,
SPI 0xDB680406
VPN handle: 0x0000E9B4
IPSEC: Completed outbound inner rule,
SPI 0xDB680406
Rule ID: 0x53F89160
IPSEC: Completed outbound outer SPD rule,
SPI 0xDB680406
Rule ID: 0x53E47E88
IPSEC: New inbound tunnel flow rule,
SPI 0x1698CAC7
Src addr: 192.168.2.0
Src mask: 255.255.255.0
Dst addr: 192.168.1.0
Dst mask: 255.255.255.0
Src ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Dst ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Protocol: 1
Use protocol: true
SPI: 0x00000000
Use SPI: false
IPSEC: Completed inbound tunnel flow rule,
SPI 0x1698CAC7
Rule ID: 0x53FC3E80
IPSEC: New inbound decrypt rule,
SPI 0x1698CAC7
Src addr: 10.0.0.2
Src mask: 255.255.255.255
Dst addr: 10.0.0.1
Dst mask: 255.255.255.255
Src ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Dst ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Protocol: 50
Use protocol: true
SPI: 0x1698CAC7
Use SPI: true
IPSEC: Completed inbound decrypt rule,
SPI 0x1698CAC7
Rule ID: 0x53FC3F18
IPSEC: New inbound permit rule,
SPI 0x1698CAC7
Src addr: 10.0.0.2
Src mask: 255.255.255.255
Dst addr: 10.0.0.1
Dst mask: 255.255.255.255
Src ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Dst ports
Upper: 0
Lower: 0
Op : ignore
Protocol: 50
Use protocol: true
SPI: 0x1698CAC7
Use SPI: true
IPSEC: Completed inbound permit rule,
SPI 0x1698CAC7
Rule ID: 0x53F8AEA8
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,
IP = 10.0.0.2, Pitcher:
received KEY_UPDATE, spi 0x1698cac7
Los SPI se asignan a los datos SA.
[IKEv1 DEBUG]: Group = 10.0.0.2,    
IP = 10.0.0.2, Starting P2
rekey timer: 3060 seconds.
El IPSec del comienzo reintroduce las épocas.
[IKEv1]: Group = 10.0.0.2,  
IP = 10.0.0.2, PHASE 2
COMPLETED (msgid=52481cf5)
Fase 2 completa. El respondedor y el iniciador pueden cifrar/tráfico del decrypt.

Verificación del túnel


Nota: Puesto que el ICMP se utiliza para accionar el túnel, sólo un IPSec SA está para arriba. Protocolo 1 = ICMP.

show crypto ipsec sa
interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: MAP, seq num: 10, local addr: 10.0.0.1
      access-list VPN extended permit icmp 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (192.168.1.0/255.255.255.0/1/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (192.168.2.0/255.255.255.0/1/0)
      current_peer: 10.0.0.2
      #pkts encaps: 4, #pkts encrypt: 4, #pkts digest: 4
      #pkts decaps: 4, #pkts decrypt: 4, #pkts verify: 4
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 4, #pkts comp failed: 0, #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0
      local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/0, remote crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/0
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: DB680406
      current inbound spi : 1698CAC7
    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x1698CAC7 (379112135)
         transform: esp-aes esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 16384, crypto-map: MAP
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (3914999/3326)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x0000001F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0xDB680406 (3681027078)
         transform: esp-aes esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 16384, crypto-map: MAP
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (3914999/3326)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x00000001

 

show crypto isakmp sa

   Active SA: 1
   Rekey SA: 0 (A tunnel will report 1 Active and 1 Rekey SA during rekey)
Total IKE SA: 1

1   IKE Peer: 10.0.0.2
    Type    : L2L             Role    : responder
    Rekey   : no              State   : MM_ACTIVE

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Document ID: 113574