Sécurité : Dispositifs de sécurité adaptatifs dédiés de la gamme Cisco ASA 5500

Debugs ASA IKEv2 pour le site à site VPN avec PSKs

16 décembre 2015 - Traduction automatique
Autres versions: PDFpdf | Anglais (22 août 2015) | Commentaires


Contenu


Introduction

Ce document fournit des informations pour comprendre qu'IKEv2 met au point sur l'appliance de sécurité adaptable (ASA) quand la clé pré-partagée (PSKs) sont utilisées.

Remarque: Contribué par Anu M Chacko, ingénieur TAC Cisco.

Conditions préalables

Conditions requises

Aucune spécification déterminée n'est requise pour ce document.

Composants utilisés

Ce document n'est pas limité à des versions de matériel et de logiciel spécifiques.

Les informations contenues dans ce document ont été créées à partir des périphériques d'un environnement de laboratoire spécifique. Tous les périphériques utilisés dans ce document ont démarré avec une configuration effacée (par défaut). Si votre réseau est opérationnel, assurez-vous que vous comprenez l'effet potentiel de toute commande.

Conventions

Pour plus d'informations sur les conventions utilisées dans ce document, reportez-vous à Conventions relatives aux conseils techniques Cisco.

Principale question

L'échange de paquet dans IKEv2 est radicalement différent de ce qu'était il dans IKEv1. Considérant que dans IKEv1 il y avait un échange phase1 clairement délimité qui s'est composé de 6 paquets suivis d'un échange de la phase 2 qui s'est composé de 3 paquets, l'échange IKEv2 est variable. Pour plus d'informations détaillées sur les différences et une explication de l'échange de paquet, référez-vous à l'échange du paquet IKEv2 et à l'élimination des imperfections de niveau de Protocol.

Debugs utilisés

debug crypto ikev2 protocol 127
debug crypto ikev2 platform 127 

Configurations ASA

ASA1

interface GigabitEthernet0/0
 nameif outside
 security-level 0
 ip address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0

interface GigabitEthernet0/2
 nameif inside 
 security-level 100 
 ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 

crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
 protocol esp encryption aes-256
 protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5

access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1 
   host  192.168.2.99
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12 
   host 192.168.2.99 

crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.2
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
crypto map outside_map interface outside

crypto ikev2 policy 1
 encryption aes-256
 integrity sha
 group 2
 prf sha
 lifetime seconds 86400

crypto ikev2 enable outside

tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 ipsec-attributes
 ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
 ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

ASA2

interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
nameif outside 
security-level 0 
ip address 10.0.0.2 255.255.255.0

interface GigabitEthernet0/2
 nameif inside
 security-level 100
 ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0

crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 
protocol esp encryption aes-256 
protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5

access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
   host 191.168.1.1 
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
   host 191.168.1.12

crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.1 
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 
crypto map outside_map interface outside 

crypto ikev2 policy 1
 encryption aes-256
 integrity sha
 group 2
 prf sha
 lifetime seconds 86400 

crypto ikev2 enable outside 
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 type ipsec-l2l 
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 ipsec-attributes
 ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
 ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

Debugs

Description de message ASA1 (demandeur) Debugs Description de message ASA2 (responder)
ASA1 reçoit un paquet qui apparie le crypto acl pour le pair ASA 10.0.0.2. Création d'initiés SA.
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel 
   group for IP: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.2 
   using peer IP
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tp_name set to:
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing outgoing negotiating 
   sa count by one
 
La première paire de messages est l'échange IKE_SA_INIT. Ces messages négocient des algorithmes de chiffrement, des nonces d'échange, et font un échange de Diffie-Hellman. Configuration appropriée :
crypto ikev2 
   policy 1
encryption 
aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 
  86400
crypto ikev2 
  enable
  outside

Tunnel Group 
 matching the 
 identity name 
 is present:

tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.2 
   type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.2
   ipsec-attributes
ikev2 
   remote-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****
ikev2 
   local-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE Event: EV_INIT_SA
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 
   (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI 
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
 
Le demandeur construit le paquet IKE_INIT_SA. Il contient :
  1. En-tête d'ISAKMP - SPI/version/flags
  2. SAi1 - algorithme de chiffrement que le demandeur d'IKE prend en charge
  3. KEi - Valeur principale publique CAD du demandeur
  4. Nonce de N-demandeur
R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG 
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   r: 0000000000000000]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 0000000000000000
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
 SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44  Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, 
   SPI size: 0, #trans: 4 
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 136
    DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
      19 65 43 45 d2 72 a7 11 b8 a4 93 3f 44 95 6c b8
     6d 5a f0 f8 1f f3 d4 b9 ff 41 7b 0d 13 90 82 cf
     34 2e 74 e3 03 6e 9e 00 88 80 5d 86 2c 4c 79 35
     ee e6 98 91 89 f3 48 83 75 09 02 f1 3c b1 7f f5
     be 05 f1 fa 7e 8a 4c 43 eb a9 2c 3a 47 c0 68 40
     f5 dd 02 9d a5 b5 a2 a6 90 64 95 fc 57 b5 69 e8
     b2 4f 8e f2 a5 05 e3 c7 17 f9 c0 e0 c8 3e 91 ed
     c1 09 23 3e e5 09 4f be 1a 6a d4 d9 fb 65 44 1d
N  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
     84 8b 80 c2 52 6c 4f c7 f8 08 b8 ed! 52 af a2 f4
     d5 dd d4 f4
VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 23

     43 49 53 43 4f 2d 44 45 4c 45 54 45 2d 52 45 41
     53 4f 4e
 VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 59

     43 49 53 43 4f 28 43 4f 50 59 52 49 47 48 54 29
     26 43 6f 70 79 72 69 67 68 74 20 28 63 29 20 32
     30 30 39 20 43 69 73 63 6f 20 53 79 73 74 65 6d
     73 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e
 VID  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3
 
Le demandeur est envoyé.
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500
 
------------------------------------- IKE_INIT_SA envoyé par demandeur ------------------------------------->
 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x0000000000000000 
   MID=00000000
Le responder reçoit IKEV_INIT_SA.
 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 
   10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   r: 0000000000000000]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 0000000000000000
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing incoming negotiating 
   sa count by one
SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
 KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
    DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE 
   Event: EV_RECV_INIT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)
Le responder initie la création SA pour ce pair.
 
MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_INSERT_SA
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Insert SA
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event:EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
   Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): No NAT found
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT  
   Event: EV_PKI_SESH_OPEN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Opening a PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
   Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG
Le responder vérifie et traite le message IKE_INIT :
  1. Choisit la crypto suite de ceux offertes par le demandeur.
  2. Calcule sa propre clé de secret CAD.
  3. Il calcule également une valeur de skeyid, dont toutes les clés peuvent être dérivées pour cet IKE_SA. Tout sauf les en-têtes de tous les messages qui suivent sont chiffrés et authentifiés. Les clés utilisées pour la protection de cryptage et d'intégrité sont dérivées de SKEYID et sont connues en tant que : a. SK_e (cryptage). b. SK_a (authentification). c. SK_d est dérivé et utilisé pour la dérivation du matériel plus loin de base pour CHILD_SAs. Un SK_e et un SK_a distincts est calculé pour chaque direction.
Configuration appropriée :
 
 
crypto ikev2 
   policy 1
encryption 
   aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 
   86400
crypto ikev2 
   enable 
   outside

Tunnel Group 
matching the 
identity name 
is present:

tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.1 
   type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 
   10.0.0.1 
   ipsec-
   attributes
ikev2 remote-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****
ikev2 local-
   authentication 
   pre-shared-key 
   *****
 
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-3:   IKE Proposal: 1, SPI size: 0 
   (initial negotiation),
Num. transforms: 4
AES-CBC SHA1 SHA96 DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
   FRAGMENTATIONIKEv2-PROTO-3: 
   Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
 SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2

KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136

DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
ASA2 établit le message de responder pour l'échange IKE_SA_INIT, qui est reçu par ASA1. Ce paquet contient :
  1. En-tête d'ISAKMP (version/indicateurs SPI/)
  2. Algorithme SAr1(cryptographic que le responder d'IKE choisit)
  3. KEr (valeur principale publique CAD du responder)
  4. Nonce de responder
 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500 InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
   RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 MID=00000000
ASA2 envoie le message de responder à ASA1.
<------------------------------------- IKE_INIT_SA envoyé par responder -------------------------------------
ASA1 reçoit le paquet de réponse IKE_SA_INIT d'ASA2.
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT 
   [IKE_SA_INIT] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
   RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000000
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE 
   Event: EV_DONE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): 
   Fragmentation is
   enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco 
   DeleteReason Notify 
   is enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete 
   SA init exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE 
   Event: EV_CHK4_ROLE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000

CurState: INIT_DONE Event: 
   EV_START_TMR
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Starting 
   timer to wait for auth 
   message (30 sec)
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
Le responder met en marche le temporisateur pour le processus authentique.
ASA1 vérifie et traite la réponse :
  1. La clé secrète CAD de demandeur est calculée
  2. Le skeyid de demandeur est également généré
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x0
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338

 SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
   id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
 KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
    DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_WAIT_INIT 
   Event: EV_RECV_INIT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): NAT-T is disabled
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_DONE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Fragmentation is enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco DeleteReason Notify is enabled
 
L'échange IKE_INIT_SA entre les ASA est maintenant complet.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete SA init exchange
 
Le demandeur commence l'échange « IKE_AUTH » et commence la génération de la charge utile d'authentification. Le paquet IKE_AUTH contient :
  1. En-tête d'ISAKMP (version/indicateurs SPI/).
  2. IDI (l'identité du demandeur).
  3. Charge utile AUTHENTIQUE.
  4. SAi2 (initie le SA-semblable à l'échange de jeu de transformations de la phase 2 dans IKEv1).
  5. TSi et TSr (sélecteurs du trafic de demandeur et de responder) : Ils contiennent l'adresse source et de destination du demandeur et le responder respectivement à expédier/reçoivent le trafic chiffré. La plage d'adresses spécifie que toute trafique à et de cette plage sera percée un tunnel. Si la proposition semble acceptable au responder, elle renvoie les charges utiles identiques de SOLIDES TOTAUX.
Le 1er CHILD_SA est créé pour la paire de proxy_ID qui apparie le paquet de déclencheur. Configuration appropriée :
crypto ipsec 
   ikev2 
   ipsec-proposal 
   AES256
 protocol esp 
   encryption 
   aes-256
 protocol esp 
   integrity 
   sha-1 md5

access-list 
   l2l_list 
   extended 
   permit ip 
   host 10.0.0.2 
   host 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
   CISCO-GRANITE
IKEv2-PROTO-3:   ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
   (IPSec negotiation),
Num. transforms: 4
   AES-CBC   SHA96   MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: INITIAL_CONTACT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Building packet for encryption; 
   contents are:
 VID  Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
    Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

     47 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
    Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

  TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665

IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
 ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 256
Encrypted data: 252 bytes
 
ASA1 envoie le paquet IKE_AUTH à ASA2.
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001
 
------------------------------------- IKE_AUTH envoyé par demandeur ------------------------------------->
 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001
ASA2 reçoit ce paquet d'ASA1.
 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Request has mess_id 1; 
   expected 1 through 1 REAL Decrypted packet:
   Data: 216 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  
   Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
    Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

     47 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
    Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
 TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
    Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Stopping timer to wait for auth 
   message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_ID
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Recieved valid parameteres in 
   process id
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_FOR_
   PROF_SEL
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group for 
   ID: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1 using 
   phase 1 ID
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_SET_POLICY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4EAP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_POLREQEAP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH

IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PLAT-2: Build config mode reply: no request stored
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK4_IC
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Processing initial contact
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_REDIRECT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Redirect check is not needed, 
   skipping it
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer is accepted
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map 
   outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
ASA2 arrête le temporisateur authentique et vérifie les données d'authentification reçues d'ASA1. Puis, il génère ses propres données d'authentification, exactement comme ASA1 a fait. Configuration appropriée :
crypto ipsec 
   ikev2 
   ipsec-
   proposal 
   AES256
 protocol esp 
   encryption 
   aes-256
 protocol esp 
   integrity 
   sha-1 md5
 
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_MY_AUTH_METHOD
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK4_SIGN
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
   Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
   CISCO-GRANITE
IKEv2-PROTO-3:   ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 (IPSec 
   negotiation),
Num. transforms: 3
   AES-CBC   SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: 
   ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORTIKEv2-PROTO-5: 
   Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGSIKEv2-PROTO-3:
     (16):
Building packet for encryption; contents are:
 VID  Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
     25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDr  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 12 Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
     51 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 28 Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 44 IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, 
   reserved: 0x0, length: 40
  Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

 TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
 NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  Next payload: NOTIFY, 
   reserved: 0x0, length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE, 
   spi size: 0, type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
 NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
   type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: 
   RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
 ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 208
Encrypted data: 204 bytes
Le paquet IKE_AUTH envoyé d'ASA2 contient :
  1. En-tête d'ISAKMP (version/indicateurs SPI/).
  2. Différence interdécile (l'identité du responder).
  3. Charge utile AUTHENTIQUE.
  4. SAr2 (initie le SA-semblable à l'échange de jeu de transformations de la phase 2 dans IKEv1).
  5. TSi et TSr (sélecteurs du trafic de demandeur et de responder) : Ils contiennent l'adresse source et de destination du demandeur et le responder respectivement à expédier/reçoivent le trafic chiffré. La plage d'adresses spécifie que toute trafique à et de cette plage sera percée un tunnel. Ces paramètres sont identiques à celui qui ont été reçus d'ASA1.
 
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001
Le responder envoie la réponse pour IKE_AUTH.
<------------------------------------- Responder envoyé -------------------------------------
Le demandeur reçoit une réponse du responder.
IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
   RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
   RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: 
   Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing  
   the PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): 
   SA created; 
   inserting SA into database
Le responder insère une entrée dans le TRISTE.
ASA1 vérifie et traite les données d'authentification en ce paquet. ASA1 insère alors cette SA dans son TRISTE.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x1
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
   rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 168 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  
   Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20

     25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
 IDr  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
    Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0

     51 01 01 01
 AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
    Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
Auth data: 20 bytes
 SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

   TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
 TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
    TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
    start port: 0, end port: 65535
    start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload: 
   ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  
   Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
    Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
   type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload: 
   NON_FIRST_FRAGS NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload:
   NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
    Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
   type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
Decrypted packet:Data: 236 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Process auth response notify
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH 
   Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_
   FOR_PROF_SEL
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
IKEv2-PLAT-3: connection initiated with tunnel 
   group 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2, 
   key len 5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_EAP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_IKE_ONLY
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing the PKI session
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): SA created; inserting SA into 
   database
 
Le tunnel est sur le demandeur.
CONNECTION 
    STATUS: UP... 
   peer: 10.0.0.2:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION
CONNECTION 
   STATUS: UP... 
   peer: 10.0.0.1:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION
Le tunnel est sur le responder. Le tunnel de responder monte habituellement avant le demandeur.
Procédure d'enregistrement IKEv2.
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
   connection 
   auth hdl set to 15
IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn 
   attribute retrieval 
   successfully queued 
   for register session 
   request.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle 
   timeout set to: 30
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session 
   timeout set to: 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   policy set to 
   DfltGrpPolicy
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class 
   attr set
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel 
   protocol set to: 0x5c
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter 
   ID not configured 
   for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   lock set to: none
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID 
   not configured 
   for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
   connection attribues 
   set valid to TRUE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully 
   retrieved conn attrs
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session 
   registration after conn 
   attr retrieval 
   PASSED, No error
IKEv2-PLAT-3:
CONNECTION STATUS: 
   REGISTERED... 
   peer: 10.0.0.2:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
   connection 
   auth hdl set to 15
IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn 
   attribute retrieval 
   successfully queued for 
   register session request.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
   R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle 
   timeout 
   set to: 30
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session 
   timeout 
   set to: 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   policy set to 
   DfltGrpPolicy
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class 
   attr set
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel 
   protocol set to: 0x5c
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter ID 
   not configured 
   for connection
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
   lock set to: none
IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID 
   not configured 
   for connection
   attribues set 
   valid to TRUE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully 
   retrieved conn attrs
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session 
   registration after conn 
   attr retrieval PASSED, 
   No error
IKEv2-PLAT-3:
CONNECTION STATUS: 
   REGISTERED... 
   peer: 10.0.0.1:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.1
Procédure d'enregistrement IKEv2.

Debugs d'association de sécurité d'enfant

Cet échange se compose d'une seule paire de demande/réponse, et a été mentionné comme un échange de la phase 2 dans IKEv1. Il POURRAIT être initié par l'un ou l'autre de fin de l'IKE_SA après que les échanges initiaux soient terminés.

Description de message ASA1 CHILD_SA Debugs Description de message ASA2 CHILD_SA
 
IKEv2-PLAT-5: INVALID PSH HANDLE
IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group 
   for IP: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1 
   using peer IP
IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tp_name set to:
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tunn grp type set to: L2L
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PSH cleanup
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: READY 
   Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_INIT 
   Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for IPSEC rekey
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 
   CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
   (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_BLD_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-3:ÝESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
   (IPSec negotiation), num. transforms: 4
   AES-CBCÝSHA96ÝMD596
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption; 
   contents are:
   SAÝNext payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, 
   SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:  
  length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
fa b7 f0 48
TSiÝNext payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSrÝNext payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12

IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if request will fit in 
   peer window
IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: INITIATOR
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
ENCRÝNext payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 152
Encrypted data: 148 bytes
ASA2 initie l'échange CHILD_SA. C'est la demande CREATE_CHILD_SA. Le paquet CHILD_SA contient typiquement :
  1. SA HDR (version.flags/type d'échange)
  2. Ni de Nonce (facultatif) : Si le CHILD_SA est créé en tant qu'élément de l'échange initial, une deuxième charge utile et le nonce du KE NE DOIVENT PAS être envoyés.
  3. Charge utile SA
  4. KEi (Clé-facultatif) : La demande CREATE_CHILD_SA POURRAIT sur option contenir une charge utile du KE pour qu'un échange supplémentaire CAD active des garanties plus fortes de forward secrecy pour le CHILD_SA.ÝIf que les offres SA incluent différents groupes CAD, KEi DOIT être un élément du groupe le demandeur attend le responder à accept.ÝIf il devine mal, l'échange CREATE_CHILD_SA échouera, et il devra relancer avec un KEi différent.
  5. N (informez charge utile-facultatif) : La charge utile de notification, est utilisée pour transmettre des données informationnelles, telles que des conditions d'erreurs et des transitions d'état, à un pair d'IKE. Une charge utile de notification pourrait apparaître dans un message de réponse (spécifiant habituellement pourquoi une demande a été rejetée), dans un échange INFORMATIONNEL (pour signaler une erreur pas dans une demande d'IKE), ou dans n'importe quel autre message pour indiquer des capacités d'expéditeur ou pour modifier la signification de la demande. Si cet échange CREATE_CHILD_SA réintroduit SA existante autre que l'IKE_SA, la principale charge utile N du type REKEY_SA DOIT identifier SA qui est rekeyed.ÝIf que cet échange CREATE_CHILD_SA ne réintroduit pas SA existante, la charge utile N DOIT être omise.
  6. TSi et TSr(optional) : Ceci affiche les sélecteurs du trafic pour lesquels SA a été créée. Dans ce cas, il est entre les hôtes 192.168.1.12 et 192.168.2.99.
ASA1 reçoit ce paquet.
IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
   RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx 
   [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 
   10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT 
   [CREATE_CHILD_SA]
   [10.0.0.2]:500->
   [10.0.0.1]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_I_WAIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT
ASA2 envoie ce paquet et attend la réponse.
ASA1 reçoit ce paquet précis d'ASA2 et le vérifie.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: INITIATOR 
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Request has mess_id 6; 
   expected 6 through 6
   REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 124 bytes
   SAÝNext payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, 
   SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 ype: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24

2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
fa b7 f0 48
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSrÝNext payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
Decrypted packet:Data: 180 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: READY 
   Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT 
   Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 urState: CHILD_R_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_CC_TYPE
 
ASA1 établit maintenant la réponse pour l'échange CHILD_SA. C'est la réponse CREATE_CHILD_SA. Le paquet CHILD_SA contient typiquement :
  1. SA HDR (version.flags/type d'échange)
  2. Ni de Nonce (facultatif) : Si le CHILD_SA est créé en tant qu'élément de l'échange initial, une deuxième charge utile et le nonce du KE NE DOIVENT PAS être envoyés.
  3. Charge utile SA
  4. KEi (Clé-facultatif) : La demande CREATE_CHILD_SA PEUT sur option contenir une charge utile du KE pour qu'un échange supplémentaire CAD active des garanties plus fortes de forward secrecy pour le CHILD_SA.ÝIf que les offres SA incluent différents groupes CAD, KEi DOIT être un élément du groupe le demandeur attend le responder à accept.ÝIf il devine mal, l'échange CREATE_CHILD_SA échoue, et il devra relancer avec un KEi différent.
  5. N (informez charge utile-facultatif) : La charge utile de notification est utilisée pour transmettre des données informationnelles, telles que des errorÝconditions et les transitions d'état, à un IKE peer.ÝA informent la charge utile pourraient apparaître dans un message de réponse (spécifie habituellement pourquoi une demande a été rejetée), dans un échange INFORMATIONNEL (pour signaler une erreur pas dans une demande d'IKE), ou dans n'importe quel autre message pour indiquer des capacités d'expéditeur ou pour modifier la signification de la demande. Si cet échange CREATE_CHILD_SA réintroduit SA existante autre que l'IKE_SA, la principale charge utile N du type REKEY_SA DOIT identifier SA qui est rekeyed.ÝIf que cet échange CREATE_CHILD_SA ne réintroduit pas SA existante, la charge utile N DOIT être omise.
  6. TSi et TSr (facultatifs) : Ceci affiche les sélecteurs du trafic pour lesquels SA a été créée. Dans ce cas, il est entre les hôtes 192.168.1.12 et 192.168.2.99.
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for create child 
   response message type
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child 
   SA exchange
IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer 
   is accepted
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map 
   outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_NO_EVENT
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000005 
   CurState: EXIT Event: EV_FREE_NEG
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Deleting negotiation context 
   for peer message ID: 0x5
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC 
   Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
   CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_OK
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Requesting SPI from IPSec
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_WAIT_SPI Event: EV_OK_GOT_SPI
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
   SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_BLD_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-3:ÝESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
  (IPSec negotiation),
Num. transforms: 3
AES-CBCÝSHA96Ý
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption; 
   contents are:
SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 40
Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12
type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8
type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x0, 
   reserved: 0x0: length: 8
type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

NÝNext payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24

b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05 
   18 1a 27 a6 cb
01 56 22 ad
TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, 
   end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSrÝNext payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx 
   [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE 
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172
ENCRÝNext payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 144
Encrypted data: 140 bytes
 
ASA1 envoie la réponse.
IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT 
   [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->
   [10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006
IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
   RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
   [10.0.0.1]:500->
   [10.0.0.2]:500 
   InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
   RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx 
   [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 
   10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6
ASA2 reçoit ce paquet.
 
IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
   rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
   flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172

REAL Decrypted packet:Data: 116 bytes
SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
   #trans: 3
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
   length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
IKEv2-PROTO-4:Ýlast transform: 0x0, 
   reserved: 0x0: length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:

NÝNext payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24

b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05 18 
   1a 27 a6 cb
01 56 22 ad
TSiÝNext payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.2.99, 
   end addr: 192.168.2.99
TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
   length: 24
Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
   length: 16
start port: 0, end port: 65535
start addr: 192.168.1.12, 
   end addr: 192.168.1.12

Decrypted packet:Data: 172 bytes
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
   CHILD_I_WAIT Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing any notify-messages 
   in child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_PROC_MSG
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (
   I) MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_CHK_IKE_REKEY
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if IKE SA rekey
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
   I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
   Event: EV_GEN_LOAD_IPSEC
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Load IPSEC key material
IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map outside_map seq 1
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10
ASA2 vérifie maintenant le paquet
ASA1 insère cette entrée d'enfant SA dans la base de données d'association de sécurité.
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_R_DONE 
   Event: EV_OK

IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): 
   SA created; inserting 
   SA into database

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
   MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
   CHILD_R_DONE 
   Event: EV_START_DEL_NEG_TMR
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
   SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
   R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
   MsgID = 00000006 
   CurState: CHILD_I_DONE 
   Event: EV_OK

IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): 
   SA created; 
   inserting SA into database

ASA2 insère cette entrée d'enfant SA dans la base de données d'association de sécurité.

Vérification de tunnel

ISAKMP

Commande

show crypto isakmp sa det

Sortie

ASA1

ASA1(config)#sh cry isa sa det
There are no IKEv1 SAs

IKEv2 SAs:Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id             Local              Remote     Status         Role
1889403559      10.0.0.1/500        10.0.0.2/500      READY    RESPONDER

      Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
      Life/Active Time: 86400/195 sec
      Session-id: 99220
      Status Description: Negotiation done
      Local spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7       Remote spi: FD366326E1FED6FE
      Local id: 10.0.0.1
      Remote id: 10.0.0.2
      Local req mess id: 14             Remote req mess id: 16
      Local next mess id: 14            Remote next mess id: 16
      Local req queued: 14              Remote req queued: 16
      Local window: 1                   Remote window: 1
      DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
      NAT-T is not detected
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
          AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
          CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
          Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
          ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a
          AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
          CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
          Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
          ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel

ASA2

ASA2(config)#sh cry isa sa det

There are no IKEv1 SAs

IKEv2 SAs:

Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-idÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ LocalÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ RemoteÝÝÝ StatusÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Role
472237395ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ 10.0.0.2/500ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ 10.0.0.1/500ÝÝÝÝ READYÝÝ INITIATOR
ÝÝÝÝÝ Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
ÝÝÝÝÝ Life/Active Time: 86400/190 sec
ÝÝÝÝÝ Session-id: 99220
ÝÝÝÝÝ Status Description: Negotiation done
ÝÝÝÝÝ Local spi: FD366326E1FED6FEÝÝÝÝÝÝ Remote spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
ÝÝÝÝÝ Local id: 10.0.0.2
ÝÝÝÝÝ Remote id: 10.0.0.1
ÝÝÝÝÝ Local req mess id: 16ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Remote req mess id: 13
ÝÝÝÝÝ Local next mess id: 16ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Remote next mess id: 13
ÝÝÝÝÝ Local req queued: 16ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Remote req queued: 13
ÝÝÝÝÝ Local window: 1ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Remote window: 1
ÝÝÝÝÝ DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
ÝÝÝÝÝ NAT-T is not detected Ý
Child sa: local selectorÝ 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ remote selector 192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ ESP spi in/out: 0x8717a5a/0x8564387d Ý
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0 Ý
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0 Ý
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selectorÝ 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ remote selector 192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ ESP spi in/out: 0xf0d97b2a/0x74756292 Ý
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0 Ý
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0 Ý
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel

IPSec

Commande

show crypto ipsec sa

Sortie

ASA1

ASA1(config)#sh cry ipsec sa
interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1 
        host 192.168.2.99
       local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
          (192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
       remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
          192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
       current_peer: 10.0.0.2

       #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
       #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
       #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
       #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
          #pkts decomp failed: 0
       #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
          #fragments created: 0
       #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, 
          #decapsulated frgs needing reassembly: 0
       #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

       local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto endpt.: 
          10.0.0.2/500
       path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
       current outbound spi: F0D97B2A
       current inbound spi : 74756292

     inbound esp sas:
       spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
          transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
          in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
          slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
          sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4008959/28628)
          IV size: 16 bytes
          replay detection support: Y
          Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4147199/28628)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x00000001

    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12 
        host 192.168.2.99
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
        192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      current_peer: 10.0.0.2
      #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
      #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
        #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
        #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
        reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto 
        endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 08717A5A
      current inbound spi : 8564387D

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28734)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28734)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x00000001

ASA2

ASA2(config)#sh cry ipsec sa
interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 host 
        192.168.1.12
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      current_peer: 10.0.0.1

      #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
      #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
        #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
        #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
        reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto 
        endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 8564387D
      current inbound spi : 08717A5A

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4193279/28770)
         IV size: 16 bytes         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28770)
         IV size: 16 bytes         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x00000001

   Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2

     access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
       host 192.168.1.1
     local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
       192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
     remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
       (192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
     current_peer: 10.0.0.1
     #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
     #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
     #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
     #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
       #pkts decomp failed: 0
     #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
       #fragments created: 0
     #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
       reassembly: 0
     #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

     local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto 
       endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
     path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
     current outbound spi: 74756292
     current inbound spi : F0D97B2A

   inbound esp sas:
     spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
        transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
        in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
        slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28663)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x0000000F
   outbound esp sas:
     spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
        transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
        in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
        slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4331519/28663)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x00000001

Vous pouvez également vérifier la sortie de la crypto commande d'ikev2 SA d'exposition. Ceci donne un résultat identique à la sortie de la commande de show crypto isakmp sa :

IKEv2 SAs:

Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id                Local               Remote   Status        Role
1889403559         10.0.0.1/500         10.0.0.2/500    READY   RESPONDER
      Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
      Life/Active Time: 86400/179 sec
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a

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Informations connexes


Document ID: 115935