Securely Traversing IACS Data Across the Industrial Demilitarized Zone
Industrial Automation and Control System (IACS) networks are generally open by default; openness facilitates both technology coexistence and IACS device interoperability. Openness also requires that IACS networks be secured by configuration and architecture—that is, defend the edge. Many organizations and standards bodies recommend segmenting business system networks from plant-wide networks by using an Industrial Demilitarized Zone (IDMZ).
The IDMZ exists as a separate network located at a level between the Industrial and Enterprise Zones, commonly referred to as Level 3.5. An IDMZ environment consists of numerous infrastructure devices, including firewalls, VPN servers, IACS application mirrors and reverse proxy servers, in addition to network infrastructure devices such as switches, routers and virtualized services.
Converged Plantwide Ethernet (CPwE) is the underlying architecture that provides standard network services for control and information disciplines, devices and equipment found in modern IACS applications. The CPwE architecture provides design and implementation guidance to achieve the real-time communication, reliability, scalability, security and resiliency requirements of the IACS.
CPwE IDMZ for IACS applications is brought to market through a strategic alliance between Cisco Systems® and Rockwell Automation. The CPwE IDMZ details design considerations to help with the successful design and implementation of an IDMZ to securely share IACS data across the IDMZ.
Holistic Industrial Security
No single product, technology or methodology can fully secure IACS applications. Protecting IACS assets requires a defense-in-depth security approach, which addresses internal and external security threats. This approach uses multiple layers of defense (physical, procedural and electronic) at separate IACS levels that address different types of threats.
Note Security requirements for a physical IDMZ must recognize IACS application needs since data must securely pass from the Industrial Zone to the Enterprise Zone. Separately, Network Address Translation (NAT) and Identity Services are part of CPwE's overall security architecture. Each is available separately, completing CPwE's holistic industrial security approach.
The CPwE Industrial Network Security Framework (Figure 1), which uses a defense-in-depth approach, is aligned to industrial security standards such as ISA/IEC-62443 (formerly ISA-99) Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) Security and NIST 800-82 Industrial Control System (ICS) Security.
Designing and implementing a comprehensive IACS network security framework should serve as a natural extension to the IACS. Network security should not be implemented as an afterthought. The industrial network security framework should be pervasive and core to the IACS. However, for existing IACS deployments, the same defense-in-depth layers can be applied incrementally to help improve the security stance of the IACS.
CPwE defense-in-depth layers (Figure 1) include:
Control System Engineers (highlighted in tan)—IACS device hardening (for example, physical and electronic), infrastructure device hardening (for example, port security), network segmentation, IACS application authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA)
Control System Engineers in collaboration with IT Network Engineers (highlighted in blue)—zone-based policy firewall at the IACS application, operating system hardening, network device hardening (for example, access control, resiliency), wireless LAN access policies
IT Security Architects in collaboration with Control Systems Engineers (highlighted in purple)—Identity Services (wired and wireless), Active Directory (AD), Remote Access Servers, plant firewalls, Industrial Demilitarized Zone (IDMZ) design best practices
Figure 1 CPwE Industrial Network Security Framework
Industrial Demilitarized Zone
Sometimes referred to as a perimeter network, the IDMZ (Figure 2) is a buffer that enforces data security policies between a trusted network (Industrial Zone) to an untrusted network (Enterprise Zone). The IDMZ is an additional layer of defense-in-depth to securely share IACS data and network services between the Industrial and Enterprise Zones. The demilitarized zone concept is commonplace in traditional IT networks, but is still in early adoption for IACS applications.
For secure IACS data sharing, the IDMZ contains assets that act as brokers between the zones. Multiple methods to broker IACS data across the IDMZ exist:
Use an application mirror, such as a PI-to-PI interface for FactoryTalk® Historian
Use Microsoft® Remote Desktop Gateway (RD Gateway) services
Use a reverse proxy server
These broker methods, which help to hide and protect the existence and characteristics of the Industrial Zone servers from clients and servers in the Enterprise Zone, are highlighted in Figure 2 and are covered in CPwE IDMZ.
Figure 2 CPwE Logical Model
High-level IDMZ design principles (Figure 3) include:
All IACS network traffic from either side of the IDMZ terminates in the IDMZ; no IACS traffic directly traverses the IDMZ:
– No direct path between the Industrial and Enterprise Zones
– No common protocols in each logical firewall
EtherNet/IP™ IACS traffic does not enter the IDMZ; it remains within the Industrial Zone
Primary services are not permanently stored in the IDMZ
All data is transient; the IDMZ will not permanently store data
Set-up functional sub-zones within the IDMZ to segment access to IACS data and network services (for example, IT, Operations and Trusted Partner zone)
A properly designed IDMZ will support the capability of being unplugged if compromised, while still allowing the Industrial Zone to operate without disruption
Figure 3 Industrial Demilitarized Zone High-level Concepts
Converged Plantwide Ethernet IDMZ
The CPwE IDMZ Cisco Validated Design (CVD) outlines key requirements and design considerations to help with successfully designing and deploying an IDMZ. IACS data and network services between the Industrial and Enterprise Zones include:
An IDMZ overview and key design considerations
A resilient CPwE Architectural Framework:
– Redundant IDMZ Firewalls
– Redundant Distribution/Aggregation Ethernet Switches
Methodologies to securely traverse IACS data across the IDMZ:
– Application mirror
– Reverse proxy
– Remote Desktop Gateway Services
Methodologies to securely traverse network services across the IDMZ
CPwE IDMZ use cases:
– IACS applications—for example, Secure File Transfer, FactoryTalk applications (FactoryTalk Historian, FactoryTalk VantagePoint®, FactoryTalk View Site Edition (SE), FactoryTalk ViewPoint, FactoryTalk AssetCentre, Studio 5000®)
– Network services—for example, Active Directory (AD), Identity Services Engine (ISE), wireless LAN controller (WLC) control and provisioning of wireless access points (CAPWAP), Network Time Protocol
– Secure Remote Access
Important steps and design considerations for IDMZ implementation and configuration
Note This release of the CPwE architecture focuses on EtherNet/IP, which is driven by the ODVA Common Industrial Protocol (CIP). Refer to the IACS Communication Protocols section of the CPwE Design and Implementation Guide.
Rockwell Automation site: