Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20050202-ipvc
For Public Release 2005 Februrary 2 16:00 UTC (GMT)
Hard-coded Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) community strings
are present in Cisco IP/VC Videoconferencing System models 3510, 3520, 3525 and
3530. Any user who has access to the vulnerable devices and knows the community
strings, can obtain total control of the device.
Cisco strongly recommends that all users deploy the mitigation
measures outlined in the Workaround
This advisory is posted at http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20050202-ipvc
The following products are known to be vulnerable:
The following products are known not to be vulnerable:
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability. In particular, video-enabled Cisco IP video telephones are not
Affected products contain hard-coded SNMP community strings. SNMP is
used for managing and monitoring an IP/VC device and community strings are the
equivalent to a password. All models listed as affected are vulnerable
regardless of the software release they are running.
There is no Cisco bug ID associated with this issue.
Cisco did not provide scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) at time of publication.
A user with knowledge of the community strings can gain full control
of the device. Such user can, among other things, create new services,
terminate or affect existing sessions, and redirect traffic to a different
Cisco will not provide fixed software for this vulnerability.
Customers are strongly advised to deploy the mitigation measures described in
the Workaround section.
The only mitigation for this vulnerability is to disable SNMP traffic
at the switch port that is connected to the affected device. If that cannot be
done, the SNMP traffic to the IP/VC device should be blocked at the nearest
possible point. In order for the mitigation to be successful all possible paths
to the device must be protected. This can be done by blocking traffic on UDP
(User Datagram Protocol) ports 161 and 162. Port 161 is used for
inbound/outbound read/write SNMP access and port 162 is used for outbound
traffic for SNMP traps. Blocking these ports disables all configuration and
traps to/from the device. Access to ports 161 and 162 from the trusted hosts
should be temporarily enabled and the IPVC Configuration Utility used when
configuration changes are required on the affected IP/VC device.
The effectiveness of any workaround is dependent on specific customer
situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and
organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases,
customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to
ensure any applied workaround is the most appropriate for use in the intended
network before it is deployed.
Cisco has released software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html
, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact firstname.lastname@example.org or email@example.com for software upgrades
Customers with contracts should obtain software through their regular update channels. For most customers, software patches and bug fixes should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco
service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should obtain software patches and bug fixes by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC
contacts are as follows.
+1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
+1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a software patch or bug fix. Customers without service contracts should request a software patch or bug fix through the TAC.
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers,
and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
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A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of
this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or
newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the
above URL for any updates.
Initial public release