Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Network Building Mediator
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Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Network Building Mediator
Advisory ID: cisco-amb-20100526-mediator
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20100526-mediator
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 May 26 16:00 UTC (GMT)
Contents
Cisco ResponseDevice-Specific Mitigation and Identification
Additional Information
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
Related Information
Cisco Response
This Applied Mitigation Bulletin is a companion document to the PSIRT Security Advisory Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Network Building Mediator and provides identification and mitigation techniques that administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.
Vulnerability Characteristics
There are multiple vulnerabilities in the Cisco Network Building Mediator (NBM) products. These vulnerabilities also affect the legacy Richards-Zeta Mediator products. These subsections summarize these vulnerabilities:
Default credentials: This vulnerability can be exploited remotely with authentication and without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can result in an attacker taking complete control over the vulnerable device.
The attack vectors for exploitation are through packets using these protocols and ports:
- Secure Shell (SSH) using TCP port 22
- Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) using TCP port 80
- Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) using TCP port 443
- Extensible Markup Language Remote Procedure Call (XML-RPC) over HTTP using TCP port 81
- XML-RPC over HTTPS using TCP port 443
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2010-0595.
Privilege escalation: These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely with authentication and without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities can result in the attacker reading and modifying the device configuration or result in a denial of service (DoS) condition as the attacker can reload the vulnerable device. Repeated attempts that successfully exploit the vulnerability that can be used to reload the vulnerable device could result in a sustained DoS condition.
The attack vectors for exploitation are through packets using these protocols and ports:
- HTTP using TCP port 80
- HTTPS using TCP port 443
- XML-RPC over HTTP using TCP port 81
- XML-RPC over HTTPS using TCP port 443
These vulnerabilities have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2010-0596 and CVE-2010-0597.
Unauthorized information interception: These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication and without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities allow information disclosure, which enables an attacker to learn information about the affected device.
The attack vectors for exploitation are through packets using these protocols and ports:
- HTTP using TCP port 80
- XML-RPC over HTTP using TCP port 81
These vulnerabilities have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2010-0598 and CVE-2010-0599.
Unauthorized information access: Unauthorized information access: This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows information disclosure, which enables an attacker to learn information about the affected device.
The attack vectors for exploitation are through packets using these protocols and ports:
- XML-RPC over HTTP using TCP port 81
- XML-RPC over HTTPS using TCP port 443
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2010-0600.
Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in the PSIRT Security Advisory, which is available at this link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20100526-mediator.
Mitigation Technique Overview
Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for these vulnerabilities. Administrators are advised to consider these protection methods to be general security best practices for infrastructure devices and the traffic that transits the network. This section of the document provides an overview of these techniques.
Cisco IOS® Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using infrastructure access control lists (iACLs).
Effective exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers using transit access control lists (tACLs).
These protection mechanisms filter and drop packets that are attempting to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Effective use of Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) event actions provides visibility into and protection against attacks that attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Cisco IOS NetFlow records can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts.
Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA, and FWSM firewalls can provide visibility through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the output from show commands.
The Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System (Cisco Security MARS) appliance can also provide visibility through incidents, queries, and event reporting.
Risk Management
Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of these vulnerabilities. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.
Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification
Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.
Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:
- Cisco IOS Routers and Switches
- Cisco IOS NetFlow
- Cisco ASA and FWSM Firewalls
- Cisco Intrusion Prevention System
- Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System
Cisco IOS Routers and Switches
Mitigation: Infrastructure Access Control Lists
To protect infrastructure devices and minimize the risk, impact, and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks, administrators are advised to deploy iACLs to perform policy enforcement of traffic sent to infrastructure equipment. Administrators can construct an iACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. For the maximum protection of infrastructure devices, deployed iACLs should be applied in the ingress direction on all interfaces to which an IP address has been configured. An iACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.
The iACL policy denies unauthorized SSH packets on TCP port 22, HTTP packets on TCP port 80, HTTPS packets on TCP port 443, XML-RPC packets over HTTP on TCP port 81, and XML-RPC packets over HTTPS on TCP port 443 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic. Whenever possible, infrastructure address space should be distinct from the address space used for user and services segments. Using this addressing methodology will assist with the construction and deployment of iACLs.
Additional information about iACLs is in Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists.
ip access-list extended Infrastructure-ACL-Policy ! !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources !-- that require access on the vulnerable ports and protocol ! permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 22 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 80 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 81 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 443 ! !-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries !-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks ! deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 22 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 80 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 81 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 443 ! !-- Explicit deny ACE for traffic sent to addresses configured !-- within the infrastructure address space ! deny ip any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 ! !-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in !-- accordance with existing security policies and configurations ! !-- Apply iACL to interfaces in the ingress direction ! interface GigabitEthernet0/0 ip access-group Infrastructure-ACL-Policy in !
Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration command no ip unreachables. ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration command ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms.
Identification: Infrastructure Access Control Lists
After the administrator applies the iACL to an interface, the show ip access-lists command will identify the number of SSH packets on TCP port 22, HTTP packets on TCP port 80, HTTPS packets on TCP port 443, XML-RPC packets over HTTP on TCP port 81, and XML-RPC packets over HTTPS on TCP port 443 that have been filtered on interfaces on which the iACL is applied. Administrators should investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show ip access-lists Infrastructure-ACL-Policy follows:
router#show ip access-lists Infrastructure-ACL-Policy
Extended IP access list Infrastructure-ACL-Policy
10 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 22 (241 matches)
20 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq www
30 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 81 (397 matches)
40 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 443 (115 matches)
50 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 22 (43 matches)
60 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq www
70 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 81 (31 matches)
80 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 443 (64 matches)
90 deny ip any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255
router#
In the preceding example, access list Infrastructure-ACL-Policy has dropped these packets that are received from an untrusted host or network:
- 43 SSH packets on TCP port 22 for ACE sequence 50
- 31 XML-RPC packets over HTTP on TCP port 81 for ACE sequence 70
- 64 HTTPS packets or XML-RPC packets over HTTPS on TCP port 443 for ACE sequence 80
For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters and syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Applied Intelligence white paper.
Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Applied Intelligence white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.
Identification: Access List Logging
The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.
Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.
For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging interval interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching induced by ACL logging. The logging rate-limit rate-per-second [except loglevel] command limits the impact of log generation and transmission.
The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers with Supervisor Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.
For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging, reference the Understanding Access Control List Logging Applied Intelligence white paper.
Cisco IOS NetFlow
Identification: Traffic Flow Identification Using NetFlow Records
Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.
router#show ip cache flow
IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets):
1-32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 288 320 352 384 416 448 480
.000 .698 .011 .001 .004 .005 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000
512 544 576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
.000 .001 .256 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes
1885 active, 63651 inactive, 59960004 added
129803821 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes
0 active, 16384 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow
0 alloc failures, 0 force free
1 chunk, 1 chunk added
last clearing of statistics never
Protocol Total Flows Packets Bytes Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec)
-------- Flows /Sec /Flow /Pkt /Sec /Flow /Flow
TCP-Telnet 11393421 2.8 1 48 3.1 0.0 1.4
TCP-FTP 236 0.0 12 66 0.0 1.8 4.8
TCP-FTPD 21 0.0 13726 1294 0.0 18.4 4.1
TCP-WWW 22282 0.0 21 1020 0.1 4.1 7.3
TCP-X 719 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 1.3
TCP-BGP 1 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 15.0
TCP-Frag 70399 0.0 1 688 0.0 0.0 22.7
TCP-other 47861004 11.8 1 211 18.9 0.0 1.3
UDP-DNS 582 0.0 4 73 0.0 3.4 15.4
UDP-NTP 287252 0.0 1 76 0.0 0.0 15.5
UDP-other 310347 0.0 2 230 0.1 0.6 15.9
ICMP 11674 0.0 3 61 0.0 19.8 15.5
IPv6INIP 15 0.0 1 1132 0.0 0.0 15.4
GRE 4 0.0 1 48 0.0 0.0 15.3
Total: 59957957 14.8 1 196 22.5 0.0 1.5
SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts
Gi0/0 192.168.10.201 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 06 0984 0016 9
Gi0/0 192.168.11.54 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 06 0911 01BB 13
Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 06 0016 12CA 1
Gi0/0 192.168.13.97 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 06 0B3E 0050 5
Gi0/0 192.168.10.17 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 06 0B89 0051 22
Gi0/0 10.88.226.1 Gi0/1 192.168.202.22 11 007B 007B 1
Gi0/0 192.168.12.185 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 06 0BD7 01BB 17
Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 06 12CA 0016 1
router#
In the preceding example, there are multiple flows for SSH on TCP port 22 (hex value 0016), HTTP on TCP port 80 (hex value 0050), HTTPS on TCP port 443 (hex value 01BB), XML-RPC over HTTP on TCP port 81 (hex value 0051), and XML-RPC over HTTPS on TCP port 443 (hex value 01BB). Administrators are advised to compare these flows to baseline utilization for SSH traffic sent on TCP port 22, HTTP traffic sent on TCP port 80, XML-RPC traffic over HTTP sent on TCP port 81, and HTTPS traffic sent on TCP port 443, and also investigate the flows to determine whether they are sourced from untrusted hosts or networks.
To view only the traffic flows for SSH packets on TCP port 22 (hex value 0016), HTTP packets on TCP port 80 (hex value 0050), HTTPS packets on TCP port 443 (hex value 01BB), XML-RPC packets over HTTP on TCP port 81 (hex value 0051), and XML-RPC packets over HTTPS on TCP port 443 (hex value 01BB), the command show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(0016|0050|0051|01BB)_ will display the related TCP NetFlow records as shown here:
TCP Flows
router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(0016|0050|0051|01BB)_ SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts Gi0/0 192.168.10.201 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 06 0984 0016 9 Gi0/0 192.168.11.54 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 06 0911 01BB 13 Gi0/0 192.168.13.97 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 06 0B3E 0050 5 Gi0/0 192.168.10.17 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 06 0B89 0051 22 Gi0/0 192.168.12.185 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 06 0BD7 01BB 17 router#
Cisco ASA and FWSM Firewalls
Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists
To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.
The tACL policy denies unauthorized SSH packets on TCP port 22, HTTP packets on TCP port 80, HTTPS packets on TCP port 443, XML-RPC packets over HTTP on TCP port 81, and XML-RPC packets over HTTPS on TCP port 443 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.
Additional information about tACLs is in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.
! !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources !-- that require access on the vulnerable ports and protocol ! access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 22 access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 80 access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 81 access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 443 ! !-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries !-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks ! access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 22 access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 80 access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 81 access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 443 ! !-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in !-- accordance with existing security policies and configurations ! !-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic ! access-list tACL-Policy extended deny ip any any ! !-- Apply tACL to interface(s) in the ingress direction ! access-group tACL-Policy in interface outside !
Identification: Transit Access Control Lists
After the tACL has been applied to an interface, administrators can use the show access-list command to identify the number of SSH packets on TCP port 22, HTTP packets on TCP port 80, HTTPS packets on TCP port 443, XML-RPC packets over HTTP on TCP port 81, and XML-RPC packets over HTTPS on TCP port 443 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show access-list tACL-Policy follows:
firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy access-list tACL-Policy; 9 elements access-list tACL-Policy line 1 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 22 (hitcnt=34) access-list tACL-Policy line 2 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 80 (hitcnt=12) access-list tACL-Policy line 3 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 81 (hitcnt=26) access-list tACL-Policy line 4 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 443 (hitcnt=41) access-list tACL-Policy line 5 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 22 (hitcnt=17) access-list tACL-Policy line 6 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 80 (hitcnt=11) access-list tACL-Policy line 7 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 81 (hitcnt=31) access-list tACL-Policy line 8 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 443 (hitcnt=49) access-list tACL-Policy line 9 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=1938) firewall#
In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy has dropped these packets received from an untrusted host or network:
- 17 SSH packets on TCP port 22 for ACE line 5
- 11 HTTP packets on TCP port 80 for ACE line 6
- 31 XML-RPC packets over HTTP on TCP port 81 for ACE line 7
- 49 HTTPS packets or XML-RPC packets over HTTPS on TCP port 443 for ACE line 8
Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages
Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log keyword present. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 106023.
Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitoring - Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.
In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.
Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.
firewall#show logging | grep 106023
May 26 2010 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.18/2944
dst inside:192.168.60.202/22 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
May 26 2010 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.200/2945
dst inside:192.168.60.202/80 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
May 26 2010 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.99/2946
dst inside:192.168.60.202/80 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
May 26 2010 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.100/2947
dst inside:192.168.60.202/443 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
May 26 2010 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.88/2949
dst inside:192.168.60.202/81 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
May 26 2010 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.175/2950
dst inside:192.168.60.202/443 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
firewall#
In the preceding example, the messages logged for the tACL tACL-Policy show SSH packets on TCP port 22, HTTP packets on TCP port 80, HTTPS packets on TCP port 443, XML-RPC packets over HTTP on TCP port 81, and XML-RPC packets over HTTPS on TCP port 443 sent to the address block assigned to the affected devices.
Additional information about syslog messages for ASA security appliances is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Messages, 8.2. Additional information about syslog messages for the FWSM is in Catalyst 6500 Series Switch and Cisco 7600 Series Router Firewall Services Module Logging System Log Messages.
For additional information about investigating incidents using syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Applied Intelligence white paper.
Cisco Intrusion Prevention System
Mitigation: Cisco IPS Signature Event Actions
Administrators can use Cisco IPS appliances and services modules to provide threat detection and help prevent attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. These vulnerabilities may be detected by these signatures:
- 24241/0 - Cisco Network Building Mediator Default Credentials
- 24739/0 - Cisco Network Building Mediator HTTP Privilege Escalation
- 23879/0 - Cisco Network Building Mediator Unauthorized Information Access
24241/0 - Cisco Network Building Mediator Default Credentials
Beginning with signature update S492 for sensors running Cisco IPS version 6.x and greater, the Default credentials vulnerability can be detected by signature 24241/0 (Signature Name: Cisco Network Building Mediator Default Credentials). Signature 24241/0 is enabled by default, triggers a High severity event, has a signature fidelity rating (SFR) of 85, and is configured with a default event action of produce-alert.
Signature 24241/0 fires when usage of default usernames and passwords for the Cisco NBM or legacy Richards-Zeta Mediator products are detected. Firing of this signature may indicate potential exploitation of this vulnerability.
24739/0 - Cisco Network Building Mediator HTTP Privilege Escalation
Beginning with signature update S492 for sensors running Cisco IPS version 6.x and greater, the Privilege escalation vulnerability for CVE-2010-0596 can be detected by signature 24739/0 (Signature Name: Cisco Network Building Mediator HTTP Privilege Escalation). Signature 24739/0 is enabled by default, triggers a High severity event, has a signature fidelity rating (SFR) of 90, and is configured with a default event action of produce-alert.
Signature 24739/0 fires when an attempt to potentially exploit the Privilege escalation vulnerability for CVE-2010-0596 in the Cisco NBM or legacy Richards-Zeta Mediator products is detected.
23879/0 - Cisco Network Building Mediator Unauthorized Information Access
Beginning with signature update S492 for sensors running Cisco IPS version 6.x and greater, the Unauthorized information interception vulnerability for CVE-2010-0599 or Unauthorized information access vulnerability for CVE-2010-0600 can be detected by signature 23879/0 (Signature Name: Cisco Network Building Mediator Unauthorized Information Access). Signature 23879/0 is enabled by default, triggers a Medium severity event, has a SFR of 90, and is configured with a default event action of produce-alert.
Signature 23879/0 fires when potential attempts to exploit the Unauthorized information interception vulnerability for CVE-2010-0599 or Unauthorized information access vulnerability for CVE-2010-0600 are detected.
Administrators can configure Cisco IPS sensors to perform an event action when an attack is detected. The configured event action performs preventive or deterrent controls to help protect against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.
Cisco IPS sensors are most effective when deployed in inline protection mode combined with the use of an event action. Automatic Threat Prevention for Cisco IPS 6.x and greater sensors that are deployed in inline protection mode provides threat prevention against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. Threat prevention is achieved through a default override that performs an event action for triggered signatures with a riskRatingValue greater than 90.
For additional information about the risk rating and threat rating calculation, reference Risk Rating and Threat Rating: Simplify IPS Policy Management.
Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System
Identification: Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System Incidents
The Cisco Security MARS appliance can create incidents regarding events that are related to the vulnerabilities that are described in this document using these IPS signatures:
- 24241/0 - Cisco Network Building Mediator Default Credentials
- 24739/0 - Cisco Network Building Mediator HTTP Privilege Escalation
- 23879/0 - Cisco Network Building Mediator Unauthorized Information Access
After the S492 dynamic signature update has been downloaded, using keyword NR-24241/0, NR-24739/0, or NR-23879/0 for IPS signatures 24241/0, 24739/0, and 23879/0 and a query type of All Matching Event Raw Messages on the Cisco Security MARS appliance will provide a report that lists the incidents created by the IPS signatures.
Beginning with the 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 releases of Cisco Security MARS appliances, support for the Cisco IPS dynamic signature updates feature has been added. This feature downloads new signatures from Cisco.com or from a local web server, correctly processes and categorizes received events that match those signatures, and includes them in inspection rules and reports. These updates provide event normalization and event group mapping, and they also enable the MARS appliance to parse new signatures from the IPS devices.
Caution: If dynamic signature updates are not configured, events that match these new signatures appear as unknown event type in queries and reports. Because MARS will not include these events in inspection rules, incidents may not be created for potential threats or attacks that occur within the network.
By default, this feature is enabled but requires configuration. If it is not configured, this Cisco Security MARS rule will be triggered:
System Rule: CS-MARS IPS Signature Update Failure
When this feature is enabled and configured, administrators can determine the current signature version downloaded by MARS by choosing Help > About and reviewing the IPS Signature Version value.
Additional information about dynamic signature updates and instructions for configuring dynamic signature updates are available for the Cisco Security MARS 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 releases.
Additional Information
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
Revision History
|
Revision 1.0 |
2010-May-26 |
Initial public release |
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
Related Information
- Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletins
- Cisco Security
- Cisco Security IntelliShield Alert Manager Service
- Cisco Guide to Harden Cisco IOS Devices
- Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors
- Cisco IOS NetFlow - Home Page on Cisco.com
- Cisco IOS NetFlow White Papers
- NetFlow Performance Analysis
- Cisco Network Foundation Protection White Papers
- Cisco Network Foundation Protection Presentations
- A Security-Oriented Approach to IP Addressing
- Cisco Firewall Products - Home Page on Cisco.com
- Cisco Intrusion Prevention System
- Cisco IPS Signature Downloads
- Cisco IPS Signature Search Page
- Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
