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Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Denial of Service Vulnerabilities

Advisory ID: cisco-amb-20080514-cucmdos

http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080514-cucmdos

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2008 May 14 16:00  UTC (GMT)


Contents

Cisco Response
Device Specific Mitigation and Identification
Additional Information
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
Related Information

Cisco Response

This Applied Mitigation Bulletin is a companion document to the PSIRT Security Advisory Cisco Unified Communications Manager Denial of Service Vulnerabilities and provides identification and mitigation techniques that administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.

Vulnerability Characteristics

There are multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Unified Communications Manager. These vulnerabilities are summarized in the following subsections:

CTL Provider Memory Consumption Vulnerabilities

These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication and without user interaction. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in a denial of service (DoS) condition. The attack vector for exploitation is through packets using TCP port 2444. TCP port 2444 is the default port, but this can be configured. These vulnerabilities have been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2008-1742 and CVE-2008-1743.

Certificate Authority Proxy Function Related Vulnerability

This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in a DoS condition. The attack vector for exploitation is through packets using TCP port 3804. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2008-1744.

Session Initiation Protocol Related Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in a DoS condition. The attack vector for exploitation is through SIP packets using TCP or UDP port 5060 or 5061. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using spoofed packets. These vulnerabilities have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2008-1745, CVE-2008-1747, and CVE-2008-1748.

Simple Network Management Protocol Related Vulnerability

This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in a DoS condition. The attack vector for exploitation is through SNMP packets using UDP port 61441. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using spoofed packets. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2008-1746.

Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in the PSIRT Security Advisory, which is available at the following link: http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20080514-cucmdos.

Mitigation Technique Overview

Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for these vulnerabilities. Administrators are advised to consider these protection methods to be general security best practices for infrastructure devices and the traffic that transits the network. This section of the document provides an overview of these techniques.

Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using the following methods:

  • Transit access control lists (tACLs)
  • Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF)
  • IP source guard (IPSG)

These protection mechanisms filter and drop, as well as verify the source IP address of, packets that are attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector.

The proper deployment and configuration of Unicast RPF provides an effective means of protection against attacks that use packets with spoofed source IP addresses. Unicast RPF should be deployed as close to all traffic sources as possible.

The proper deployment and configuration of IPSG provides an effective means of protection against spoofing attacks at the access layer.

Effective means of exploit prevention can also be provided by Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance, and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers using the following:

  • tACLs
  • Unicast RPF

These protection mechanisms filter and drop, as well as verify the source IP address of, packets that are attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector.

Cisco IOS NetFlow can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts using flow records.

Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA, Cisco PIX security appliances, and FWSM firewalls can provide visibility through syslog messages and the counter values displayed in the output from show commands.

Risk Management

Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of these vulnerabilities. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.

Device-specific Mitigation and Identification

caution Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.

Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:

Cisco IOS Routers and Switches

Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector when the attack comes from a trusted source address.

The tACL policy denies unauthorized packets on TCP port 2444, SIP packets on TCP and UDP ports 5060 and 5061, packets on TCP port 3804, and SNMP packets on UDP port 61441 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.

Additional information about tACLs is available in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.


!-- Include any explicit permit statements for trusted sources !-- that require access on the vulnerable ports !

access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 2444
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5061
access-list 150 permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060
access-list 150 permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5061
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 3804
access-list 150 permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 61441

! !-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries !-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks !

access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 2444
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5061
access-list 150 deny udp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060
access-list 150 deny udp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5061
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 3804
access-list 150 deny udp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 61441

! !-- Permit/deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance !-- with existing security policies and configurations ! !-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic !

access-list 150 deny ip any any

! !-- Apply tACL to interfaces in the ingress direction 
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
ip access-group 150 in

!

Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration command no ip unreachables. ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration command ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms.

Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding

Some of the vulnerabilities described in this document that have a network attack vector can be exploited by spoofed IP packets. The proper deployment and configuration of Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) can provide protection mechanisms for spoofing that is related to the following vulnerabilities:

  • SIP Related Vulnerabilities
  • SNMP Related Vulnerability

Unicast RPF is configured at the interface level and can detect and drop packets that lack a verifiable source IP address. Administrators should not rely on Unicast RPF to provide complete spoofing protection because spoofed packets may enter the network through a Unicast RPF-enabled interface if an appropriate return route to the source IP address exists. Administrators are advised to take care to ensure that the appropriate Unicast RPF mode (loose or strict) is configured during the deployment of this feature because it can drop legitimate traffic that is transiting the network. In an enterprise environment, Unicast RPF might be enabled at the Internet edge and the internal access layer on the user-supporting Layer 3 interfaces.

Additional information is available in the Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Loose Mode Feature Guide.

For additional information about the configuration and use of Unicast RPF, reference the Understanding Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Applied Intelligence white paper.

IP Source Guard

IP source guard (IPSG) is a security feature that restricts IP traffic on nonrouted, Layer 2 interfaces by filtering packets that are based on the DHCP snooping binding database and manually configured IP source bindings. Administrators can use IPSG to prevent attacks from an attacker who attempts to spoof packets by forging the source IP address and/or the MAC address. The proper deployment and configuration of IPSG coupled with strict mode Unicast RPF can provide the most effective means of spoofing protection to help mitigate the following vulnerabilities:

  • SIP Related Vulnerabilities
  • SNMP Related Vulnerabilities

Additional information about the deployment and configuration of IPSG is available in Configuring DHCP Features and IP Source Guard.

Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

After the administrator applies the tACL to an interface, the show ip access-lists command will identify the number of packets on TCP port 2444, SIP packets on TCP and UDP ports 5060 and 5061, packets on TCP port 3804, and SNMP packets on UDP port 61441 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show ip access-lists 150 follows:

router#show ip access-lists 150
Extended IP access list 150
    10 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 2444
    20 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060
    30 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5061
    40 permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060
    50 permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5061
    60 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 3804
    70 permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 61441
    80 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 2444 (11 matches)
    90 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060 (2 matches)
    100 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5061 (3 matches)
    110 deny udp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060 (19 matches)
    120 deny udp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5061 (12 matches)
    130 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 3804 (10 matches)
    140 deny udp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 61441 (6 matches)
    150 deny ip any any
router#

In the preceding example, access list 150 has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 11 packets on TCP port 2444 for ACE line 80
  • 2 SIP packets on TCP port 5060 for ACE line 90
  • 3 SIP packets on TCP port 5061 for ACE line 100
  • 19 SIP packets on UDP port 5060 for ACE line 110
  • 12 SIP packets on UDP port 5061 for ACE line 120
  • 10 packets on TCP port 3804 for ACE line 130
  • 6 SNMP packets on UDP port 61441 for ACE line 140

For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters and syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Applied Intelligence white paper.

Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Applied Intelligence white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.

Identification: Access List Logging

The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.

caution Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.

For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging interval interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching induced by ACL logging. The logging rate-limit rate-per-second [except loglevel] command limits the impact of log generation and transmission.

The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers with Supervisor Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.

For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging, reference the Understanding Access Control List Logging Applied Intelligence white paper.

Identification: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding

With Unicast RPF properly deployed and configured throughout the network infrastructure, administrators can use the show cef interface type slot/port internal, show ip interface, show cef drop, and show ip traffic commands to identify the number of packets that Unicast RPF has dropped.

Note: The show command | begin regex and show command | include regex command modifiers are used in the following examples to minimize the amount of output that administrators will need to parse to view the desired information. Additional information about command modifiers is available in the show command sections of the Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference.

router#show cef interface GigabitEthernet 0/0 internal | include drop
    --      CLI Output Truncated       --
  ip verify: via=rx (allow default), acl=0, drop=11, sdrop=0
router#

Note:  show cef interface type slot/port internal is a hidden command that must be fully entered at the command-line interface. Command completion is not available for it.

router#show ip interface GigabitEthernet 0/0 | begin verify
    --      CLI Output Truncated       --
  IP verify source reachable-via RX, allow default, allow self-ping
  11 verification drops
  0 suppressed verification drops
router#


router#show cef drop
CEF Drop Statistics
Slot  Encap_fail  Unresolved Unsupported    No_route      No_adj  ChkSum_Err
RP            27           0           0          18           0           0
router#
router#show ip traffic

IP statistics:
  Rcvd:  68051015 total, 2397325 local destination
         43999 format errors, 0 checksum errors, 33 bad hop count
         2 unknown protocol, 929 not a gateway
         21 security failures, 190123 bad options, 542768 with options
  Opts:  352227 end, 452 nop, 36 basic security, 1 loose source route
         45 timestamp, 59 extended security, 41 record route
         53 stream ID, 3 strict source route, 40 alert, 45 cipso, 0 ump
         361634 other
  Frags: 0 reassembled, 10008 timeouts, 56866 couldn't reassemble
         0 fragmented, 0 fragments, 0 couldn't fragment
  Bcast: 64666 received, 0 sent
  Mcast: 1589885 received, 2405454 sent
  Sent:  3001564 generated, 65359134 forwarded
  Drop:  4256 encapsulation failed, 0 unresolved, 0 no adjacency
         18 no route, 18 unicast RPF, 0 forced drop
         0 options denied
  Drop:  0 packets with source IP address zero
  Drop:  0 packets with internal loop back IP address 
    --      CLI Output Truncated       --
router#

In the preceding show cef drop and show ip traffic examples, Unicast RPF has dropped 18 IP packets received globally on all interfaces with Unicast RPF configured because of the inability to verify the source address of the IP packets within the Cisco Express Forwarding Forwarding Information Base.

Cisco IOS NetFlow

Identification: Traffic Flow Identification Using NetFlow Records

Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this document that have a network attack vector. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

router#show ip cache flow
IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets):
   1-32   64   96  128  160  192  224  256  288  320  352  384  416  448  480
   .000 .698 .011 .001 .004 .005 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000

    512  544  576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
   .000 .001 .256 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes
  1885 active, 63651 inactive, 59960004 added
  129803821 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
  Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
  Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes
  0 active, 16384 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow
  0 alloc failures, 0 force free
  1 chunk, 1 chunk added
  last clearing of statistics never
Protocol         Total    Flows   Packets Bytes  Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec)
--------         Flows     /Sec     /Flow  /Pkt     /Sec     /Flow     /Flow
TCP-Telnet    11393421      2.8         1    48      3.1       0.0       1.4
TCP-FTP            236      0.0        12    66      0.0       1.8       4.8
TCP-FTPD            21      0.0     13726  1294      0.0      18.4       4.1
TCP-WWW          22282      0.0        21  1020      0.1       4.1       7.3
TCP-X              719      0.0         1    40      0.0       0.0       1.3
TCP-BGP              1      0.0         1    40      0.0       0.0      15.0
TCP-Frag         70399      0.0         1   688      0.0       0.0      22.7
TCP-other     47861004     11.8         1   211     18.9       0.0       1.3
UDP-DNS            582      0.0         4    73      0.0       3.4      15.4
UDP-NTP         287252      0.0         1    76      0.0       0.0      15.5
UDP-other       310347      0.0         2   230      0.1       0.6      15.9
ICMP             11674      0.0         3    61      0.0      19.8      15.5
IPv6INIP            15      0.0         1  1132      0.0       0.0      15.4
GRE                  4      0.0         1    48      0.0       0.0      15.3 
Total:        59957957     14.8         1   196     22.5       0.0       1.5

SrcIf         SrcIPaddress    DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
Gi0/0         192.168.10.201  Gi0/1         192.168.60.102  11 0984 13C4     1
Gi0/0         192.168.11.54   Gi0/1         192.168.60.158  06 0911 098C     3
Gi0/1         192.168.150.60  Gi0/0         10.89.16.226    06 0016 12CA     1
Gi0/0         192.168.13.97   Gi0/1         192.168.60.28   06 0B3E 13C5     5
Gi0/0         192.168.10.17   Gi0/1         192.168.60.97   06 0B89 0EDC     1
Gi0/0         10.88.226.1     Gi0/1         192.168.202.22  11 007B 007B     1
Gi0/0         192.168.12.185  Gi0/1         192.168.60.239  11 0BD7 F001     1
Gi0/0         10.89.16.226    Gi0/1         192.168.150.60  06 12CA 0016     1
router#

In the preceding example, there are multiple flows on TCP port 2444 (hex value 098C), SIP packets on TCP and UDP port 5060 (hex value 13C4) and port 5061 (hex value 13C5), TCP port 3804 (hex value 0EDC), and SNMP packets on UDP port 61441 (hex value F001). This traffic is sent to addresses within the 192.168.60.0/24 address block, which is used for infrastructure devices. The packets in these flows may be spoofed and may indicate an attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this document that have a network attack vector. Administrators are advised to compare these flows to baseline utilization for traffic sent on TCP port 2444, SIP traffic sent on TCP and UDP ports 5060 and 5061, TCP port 3804, and SNMP traffic sent on UDP port 61441 and also investigate the flows to determine whether they are sourced from untrusted hosts or networks.

To view only the traffic flows for TCP port 2444 (hex value 098C), SIP traffic sent on TCP and UDP ports 5060 and 5061 (hex value 13C4 and 13C5), TCP port 3804 (hex value 0EDC), and SNMP traffic sent on UDP port 61441 (hex value F001), the command show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_11_.*(13C4|13C5|F001)_ will display the related UDP NetFlow records and the command show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(098C|13C4|13C5|0EDC)_ will display the related TCP NetFlow records as shown here:

UDP Flows

router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_11_.*(13C4|13C5|F001)_
SrcIf         SrcIPaddress     DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
Gi0/0         192.168.12.110   Gi0/1         192.168.60.163  11 092A 13C4     6
Gi0/0         192.168.11.230   Gi0/1         192.168.60.20   11 0C09 13C5     1
Gi0/0         192.168.11.131   Gi0/1         192.168.60.245  11 0B66 F001    18
Gi0/0         192.168.13.7     Gi0/1         192.168.60.162  11 0914 F001     1
Gi0/0         192.168.41.86    Gi0/1         192.168.60.27   11 0B7B 13C5     2
router#

TCP Flows

router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(098C|13C4|13C5|0EDC)_
SrcIf         SrcIPaddress     DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
Gi0/0         192.168.22.103   Gi0/1         192.168.60.122  06 08F3 0EDC     6
Gi0/0         192.168.31.30    Gi0/1         192.168.60.143  06 9811 13C4     1
Gi0/0         192.168.11.201   Gi0/1         192.168.60.105  06 3164 098C    18
Gi0/0         192.168.21.19    Gi0/1         192.168.60.24   06 9114 13C5     1
Gi0/0         192.168.40.106   Gi0/1         192.168.60.210  06 7BC1 0EDC     2
router#

Cisco ASA, PIX, and FWSM Firewalls

Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector when the attack comes from a trusted source address.

The tACL policy denies unauthorized packets on TCP port 2444, SIP packets on TCP and UDP port 5060 and 5061, packets on TCP port 3804, and SNMP packets on UDP port 61441 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.

Additional information about tACLs is available in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.


! !-- Include any explicit permit statements for trusted sources !-- requiring access on the vulnerable ports !

access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 2444 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5060 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5061 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5060 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5061 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 3804 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 61441

! !-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries !-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks !

access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 2444 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5060 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5061 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended deny udp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5060 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended deny udp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5061 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 3804 
access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended deny udp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 61441 

! !-- Permit/deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance !-- with existing security policies and configurations ! !-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic !

access-list Transit-ACL-Policy extended deny ip any any

! !-- Apply tACL to interface(s) in the ingress direction ! 
access-group Transit-ACL-Policy in interface outside

!

Mitigation: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding

Some Cisco Unified Communications Manager vulnerabilities described in this document can be exploited by spoofed IP packets. The proper deployment and configuration of Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) can provide protection mechanisms for spoofing related to the following vulnerabilities:

  • SIP Related Vulnerabilities
  • SNMP Related Vulnerability

Unicast RPF is configured at the interface level and can detect and drop packets that lack a verifiable source IP address. Administrators should not rely on Unicast RPF to provide complete spoofing protection because spoofed packets may enter the network through a Unicast RPF-enabled interface if an appropriate return route to the source IP address exists. In an enterprise environment, Unicast RPF might be enabled at the Internet edge and at the internal access layer on the user-supporting Layer 3 interfaces.

For additional information about the configuration and use of Unicast RPF, reference the Cisco Security Appliance Command Reference for ip verify reverse-path and the Understanding Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Applied Intelligence white paper.

Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

After the tACL has been applied to an interface, administrators can use the show access-list command to identify the number of packets on TCP port 2444, SIP packets on TCP and UDP port 5060 and 5061, packets on TCP port 3804, and SNMP packets on UDP port 61441 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show access-list Transit-ACL-Policy follows:

    firewall#show access-list Transit-ACL-Policy
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy; 15 elements
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 1 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 2444 (hitcnt=0) 
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 2 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5060 (hitcnt=0) 
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 3 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5061 (hitcnt=0)
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 4 extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5060 (hitcnt=0) 
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 5 extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5061 (hitcnt=0)
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 6 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 3804 (hitcnt=0) 
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 7 extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 61441 (hitcnt=0) 
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 8 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 2444 (hitcnt=10)
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 9 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5060 (hitcnt=3)
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 10 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5061 (hitcnt=1)
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 11 extended deny udp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5060 (hitcnt=20) 
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 12 extended deny udp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5061 (hitcnt=8) 
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 13 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 3804 (hitcnt=17) 
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 14 extended deny udp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 61441 (hitcnt=20) 
    access-list Transit-ACL-Policy line 15 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=9)
    firewall#

In the preceding example, access list Transit-ACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 10 packets on TCP port 2444 for ACE line 8
  • 3 SIP packets on TCP port 5060 for ACE line 9
  • 1 SIP packet on TCP port 5061 for ACE line 10
  • 20 SIP packets on UDP port 5060 for ACE line 11
  • 8 SIP packets on UDP port 5061 for ACE line 12
  • 17 packets on TCP port 3804 for ACE line 13
  • 20 SNMP packets on UDP port 61441 for ACE line 14

Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages

Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log keyword present. Additional information about this syslog message is available in Cisco Security Appliance System Log Message - 106023.

Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance or the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance is available in Configuring Logging on the Cisco Security Appliance. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers is available in Configuring Monitoring and Logging on the Cisco FWSM.

In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this document that have a network attack vector. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.

Additional information about regular expression syntax is available in Using the Command Line Interface.

firewall#show logging | grep 106023
Feb 21 2007 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.168.2.18/2944 dst
   inside:192.168.60.191/61441 by access-group "Transit-ACL-Policy"
Feb 21 2007 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.168.3.200/2945 dst
   inside:192.168.60.33/5061 by access-group "Transit-ACL-Policy"
Feb 21 2007 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.168.2.99/2946 dst
   inside:192.168.60.240/5060 by access-group "Transit-ACL-Policy"
Feb 21 2007 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.168.2.100/2947 dst
   inside:192.168.60.115/5060 by access-group "Transit-ACL-Policy"
Feb 21 2007 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.168.4.88/2949 dst
   inside:192.168.60.38/61441 by access-group "Transit-ACL-Policy"
Feb 21 2007 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.168.3.175/2950 dst
   inside:192.168.60.250/5061 by access-group "Transit-ACL-Policy"
firewall#

In the preceding example, the messages logged for the tACL Transit-ACL-Policy show SIP packets for UDP port 5060, UDP port 5061, and UDP port 61441 sent to the address block assigned to affected devices.

Additional information about syslog messages for ASA and PIX security appliances is available in Cisco Security Appliance System Log Messages. Additional information about syslog messages for the FWSM is available in Catalyst 6500 Series Switch and Cisco 7600 Series Router Firewall Services Module Logging Configuration and System Log Messages.

For additional information about investigating incidents using syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Applied Intelligence white paper.

Identification: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding

Firewall syslog message 106021 will be generated for packets denied by Unicast RPF. Additional information about this syslog message is available in Cisco Security Appliance System Log Message - 106021.

Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance or the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance is available in Configuring Logging on the Cisco Security Appliance. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers is available in Configuring Monitoring and Logging on the Cisco FWSM.

In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this document that have a network attack vector. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.

Additional information about regular expression syntax is available in Using the Command Line Interface.

firewall#show logging | grep 106021
Feb 21 2007 00:15:13: %ASA-1-106021: Deny UDP reverse path check from
   192.168.60.1 to 192.168.60.100 on interface outside
Feb 21 2007 00:15:13: %ASA-1-106021: Deny UDP reverse path check from
   192.168.60.1 to 192.168.60.100 on interface outside
Feb 21 2007 00:15:13: %ASA-1-106021: Deny TCP reverse path check from
   192.168.60.1 to 192.168.60.100 on interface outside
firewall#

The show asp drop command can also identify the number of packets that Unicast RPF has dropped, as shown in the following example:

firewall#show asp drop

Frame drop:
  Reverse-path verify failed                          13
  Flow is denied by configured rule                  855
  Expired flow                                         1
  Interface is down                                    2

Flow drop:

firewall#

In the preceding example, Unicast RPF has dropped 13 IP packets received on interfaces with Unicast RPF configured.

For additional information about debugging accelerated security path dropped packets or connections, reference the Cisco Security Appliance Command Reference for show asp drop.

Additional Information

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

Revision History

Revision 1.0

2008-MAY-14

Initial public release

Cisco Security Procedures

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

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